


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THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1941

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
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

WHO SHARED WITH THE PEOPLE

OF THE UNITED STATES

UNSHAKABLE BELIEF IN THE PRINCIPLES

AND PROCESSES OF DEMOCRACY





Press Association, Inc.

SIGNING THE DECLARATION OF WAR

Foreword

THIS set of four volumes is a continuation of the nine volumes of *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* already published. The first set of five volumes was published in 1938 and covers the first administration of President Roosevelt as well as his two terms as Governor of the State of New York. The second set of four volumes was published in 1941 and covers his second administration as President. This set of four volumes covers his third administration and the brief period of his fourth administration to his death.

In addition to these four volumes of *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, there will shortly be published my book, entitled *Working With Roosevelt*. That book, written as an outgrowth of my work on the thirteen volumes of the Public Papers, tells something of the background and purposes of President Roosevelt's public addresses and papers, and of the men who assisted the President in their preparation.

The general contents, format, and arrangement followed in these four volumes of the Public Papers are substantially the same as in the first nine volumes. In the first nine volumes, however, the introductions and explanatory notes were those of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In these four volumes, that material, perforce, had to be mine.

The 1942 and 1943 volumes of this set cover complete calendar years. The 1941 volume begins on the day of the Third Inaugural, January 20, 1941, and the fourth volume covers not only the entire year 1944 but also the period to President Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945.

The documents have been arranged chronologically. A full index in each volume, however, gives the reader an opportunity to refer to the points covered in these documents and in the notes appended thereto.

A "Cumulative Topical Table" has been furnished for the convenience of readers who wish to find all the statements

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and actions concerning any one particular subject. By reference to this Table, which may be found on pages xv to lviii of the 1944-1945 Volume, a full account may be obtained of activities and Presidential papers in the fields, for example, of Agriculture, National Defense, Social Security, or any other major topic. This Table supersedes previous topical tables printed in the 1928-1932 Volume and the 1937 Volume, inasmuch as the Cumulative Topical Table covers all the items from the governorship through all Presidential administrations — a period of over sixteen years.

The documents have been selected and annotated from the standpoint of their national and international importance. Effort has been made to include as many of the public papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt as possible within the space limitations.

These include all of the important messages to the Congress. Many of the routine messages of transmittal — e.g., messages accompanying the reports of the Federal agencies which were forwarded by the President to the Congress — have been omitted. Veto messages on bills of national importance, like the Smith-Connally Act, have been included. No attempt has been made to include the many messages sent by the President to the Congress vetoing private and local bills.

The public addresses of President Roosevelt include two types — those which were prepared formally in advance, and over which the President and his assistants worked many days; and those which were delivered extemporaneously without substantial advance preparation. All the addresses of the first type have been printed in these volumes; and as many of the second type as possible have been included, with minor editing of the stenographic transcript. The informal and extemporaneous addresses which have been printed have been chosen for their national importance and for their representative character.

The texts of the addresses printed in these volumes sometimes differ from the word-for-word stenographic record. Therefore, persons listening to recordings of the President's addresses, or who check with contemporary newspaper accounts, may occasionally find some discrepancies.

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President Roosevelt and I thoroughly discussed the question of how his addresses should be printed in the first nine volumes of this series, and the same general principles have been followed in all thirteen volumes. The advance text of a prepared address, which was almost always released to the press before the President began speaking, was seldom, if ever, followed by the President word for word when he spoke. He loved to "ad lib," and, in many cases, his "ad libbing" improved the prepared text. In all these volumes, in accordance with the instructions of President Roosevelt with respect to the first nine volumes, I have taken both the prepared, advance text and the stenographic record of the speech as delivered and have tried to combine them. As far as possible, the words of President Roosevelt have been preserved as he delivered them. In many cases, however, I have edited the text to revise portions of the "ad libbing," or extemporaneous speaking. For example, during campaign speeches, the President would occasionally make extemporaneous references to the local scene — in keeping with political custom — and these have been deleted where their meaning would not be clear, and where such remarks are entirely foreign to the speech itself.

In the case of the many unprepared and extemporaneous speeches delivered by the President, I have not slavishly followed the stenographic text. In this, too, I have followed the custom of President Roosevelt. The President himself would often re-edit the typed stenographic record of his extemporaneous remarks before an official text was mimeographed and released to the press. I have taken the same liberties with his extemporaneous remarks in these four volumes, as I did at his suggestion in the preceding nine.

One of the most valuable source materials for the future historian will be the press conferences held by the President on most Tuesday afternoons and Friday mornings when he was in Washington. As described in the note to Item 9 of the 1933 volume, these press conferences were conducted informally, with sometimes as many as 200 reporters present, many of them direct-

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ing questions at the President. In a few extraordinary cases, such as the press conference aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy* on the return home from the Yalta Conference, only three newspapermen were present, constituting a pool. The questions and answers of all the conferences were carefully recorded by expert stenographers and they reveal to an unusual degree the personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt, his human relationships with the reporters, his basic economic and social philosophy, as well as his immediate reaction to specific details of day-to-day problems.

It would take many volumes to print all of these press conferences in their complete form. Included in the volumes of the Public Papers covering President Roosevelt's first administration were 48 of the 337 press conferences held during that period, and 78 of the 374 regular press conferences held during the second administration were printed in the 1937 to 1940 volumes. Ninety-four of the 287 regular press conferences held during the third and fourth administrations have been printed, in whole or in part, in these four volumes. The more important excerpts have been included, where it has been necessary to limit the amount of space to be devoted to the particular conference. The stenographic record of the conference has been printed, except, of course, where minor editing is necessary. Included among the press conferences are a number of historic joint press conferences held by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, a joint conference of the President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and joint conferences held by the President and Prime Ministers Churchill and King. There have also been included a few "special" press conferences with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, with editors and publishers of trade papers, and with the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association.

Only a comparatively few of the Presidential Executive Orders and proclamations have been printed in these volumes. Again the emphasis has been placed upon national and international significance. The full texts of the Executive Orders and the Presidential Proclamations not printed herein may be obtained from the Federal Register, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

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These volumes do not attempt to include any of the private or unpublished letters or other papers or memoranda of the President. These are housed at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, where, with the other books, documents, prints, etc., relating to Mr. Roosevelt's administrations, they will be made available to research students in the future.

There have been included, however, a number of public letters written to individuals, and greetings extended to various conventions and annual meetings held throughout the country. The President received and granted many requests for such greetings, and inasmuch as some of them contain elements of his philosophy or statements of importance, a sample number of them have been printed.

Statements accompanying executive appointments, and memoranda issued with pardons, reprieves, and other acts of executive clemency have been omitted.

The notes and comments accompanying the more significant documents explain the facts and circumstances surrounding their issuance, the reasons and the policy underlying them, legislative and administrative action taken pursuant to them, and the results accomplished by them. Statistics and other background material have been derived from official sources; most of the notes have been reviewed for accuracy by officials responsible during the period for the subjects covered by the notes. These notes do not pretend, of course, to present a complete and exhaustive account of every measure of President Roosevelt's administrations from 1941 to 1945, but merely to provide the general setting needed for a better understanding of the documents. For example, the rich store of data at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library has not been tapped extensively in preparing these notes, and subsequent research will no doubt provide more complete accounts.

I desire to express my appreciation for the efforts of the two men whose assistance is in great measure responsible for the existence of these four volumes. My law partner, Richard S.

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Salant, Esq., has been of great help to me in the planning, arranging, and editing of the materials in these volumes, and has done invaluable work in assisting in the preparation of the introductory matter. Dr. Kenneth W. Hechler, until recently Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University, has conducted the painstaking research required for the historical and factual data herein furnished, and, with competent scholarship, has assisted in preparing the explanatory notes; he performed this same service for the 1937-1940 volumes.

Both of these men have given me invaluable advice and suggestions at every stage of the difficult and complicated process of preparing volumes such as these. Their assistance has been particularly valuable because they have both had practical experience in, and have acquired a wide knowledge of, the administration of the Federal Government. Above all, their understanding appreciation of the principles of Franklin D. Roosevelt and their deep sympathy with his objectives and methods have caused them to devote themselves untiringly to many of the tedious details of this task. I am grateful to them for their part in this undertaking.

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN

New York, N. Y.

October 20, 1949

Introduction

NO ONE could summarize the events of the first year of Franklin D. Roosevelt's third term as vividly and accurately as he did himself. In his address to the Nation on Navy and Total Defense Day, October 27, 1941, he said: "Today in the face of this newest and greatest challenge of them all, we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations."

Under the leadership of President Roosevelt, and, indeed, in large part because of it, we Americans, by the eve of December 7, 1941, had done just that — we had during the first year of his third term gradually but steadily cleared our decks and taken our battle stations.

But while the President's statement serves as an accurate summary of the events of 1941, it is an oversimplification. In the Navy the process of clearing decks and taking battle stations is a smooth, quick, efficient one. The signal is given; the ship is transformed. The hours and days and months of drills for just this moment result in readiness for battle in a matter of a few brief minutes.

A warship, however, is not a democracy. The crew and the officers, trained to be ready on a moment's signal, are not 140,000,000 Americans. And the President of the United States is not the master of this 140,000,000-man crew.

It is, in short, an immeasurably more delicate, painstaking, and complex task for a Nation to clear its decks, and its citizens to take their battle stations. The papers and addresses included in this volume show how President Roosevelt accomplished this unprecedented task.

A democracy — especially our democracy — separated by thousands of miles of water from threatened dangers, is a peace-loving, sleeping giant. Like President Roosevelt, almost all Americans genuinely hated war. So deep was their hatred, so genuine, that they hoped against hope that somehow it could be avoided.

But with the abiding hatred of all Americans for war, there

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were other emotions abroad in our Nation. One, which cut exceedingly deep, was the historic isolationism of many Americans — an emotion held by vast numbers of our people. Many of them had become cynical about world affairs in general. Many of them were disillusioned after the events following the first World War, and they were determined to keep out of this war at nearly any risk. There was a general feeling that Europe had become a decadent continent of secret diplomacy and chicanery. The people insisted on applying literally to the world of 1941 the warning of George Washington against foreign entanglements uttered in 1798 — ignoring that the scientific facts of the world of 1941 had deprived the warning of 1798 of all validity if our Nation was to survive as a democracy. There was the definite belief that it was going to be our choice whether we got into the war or not, that war profiteers had helped us get into the last war but that we could stay out if we wanted to this time. This prompted the passage of all the “neutrality” laws, which proved to be not only useless but actually harmful to our real interests.

Americans’ natural hatred for war, and their persistent adherence to the doctrine of isolationism — both motivated by decent objectives — provided a field for adroit exploitation by those whose objectives were sinister. For Hitler and his Nazis had developed to a terrifying degree of perfection the force of propaganda, of fifth columns, whose purpose was to spread disunity, group and class hatreds, fear and confusion, which would use the inherent freedoms of democracy itself to reduce it to inaction and impotency. Side by side with the Nazis and their propagandists were their dupes among American businessmen who were sure we could do business with Hitler; there were defeatists, who thought that Hitler was invincible and that opposition to him was suicide. There was also by their side another well-trained and malicious group — the Communists and their sympathizers.

Until June 22, 1941, when the Nazi-Soviet pact was broken by Hitler’s attack, the Communists joined with the Nazis in employing every stratagem to disunite America, and to impede

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us in clearing our decks and taking our battle stations. The Communists did the most damage where, during this period, it hurt the most — at the point of actual production of the sinews of war, right at the heart of the “arsenal of democracy.” The Communist-led strike at the plant of the North American Aviation Company was but one example of the damage done by the Communists during this period.

Just how deeply these emotions ran in the fabric of the Nation in 1941 is vividly demonstrated by the acts of the Congress itself. With Hitler rampant, the world aflame, and Pearl Harbor but a few months away, the House of Representatives, in August, 1941, approved by but a single vote — 203-202 — the bill to extend the period of selective training beyond its limit of twelve months. And even less than a month before December 7, 1941, the House, after the President had twice urged the step, voted by only 212-194 to amend the Neutrality Act to permit the arming of our merchant ships.

So the clearing of the decks, and the manning of battle stations in 1941 were certainly not to be accomplished as simply as by a bosun’s signal over a warship’s intercommunication system.

The complexity of this task which faced President Roosevelt on January 20, 1941, was matched only by its urgency. For as 1941 began, Great Britain was standing virtually alone against Hitler and his partners. Her allies had, one by one, been beaten down by Hitler; all of the continent of Europe had been forced from Britain’s side. England’s cities and towns were being pounded by the terrible Nazi air bombings. Hitler was poised to make the all too short jump across the narrow channel, and, had he done so, Britain had not much more than her superb courage to turn him back. And still it seemed that this Nation hoped that it was going to be none of our business.

Britain’s need was desperate. And the citizens of France, Holland, Belgium, and the other European countries which had fallen before Hitler, had practically nothing left except determination and hope.

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Britain's desperate need for aid, and Europe's flickering hopes, could turn in only one direction — across the Atlantic, to the American people under the leadership of President Roosevelt. Had we turned our back, had we been indifferent or scared, had we taken the path of the isolationists or the defeatists, Hitler would have marched on, and American democracy would have been truly isolated, awaiting her turn — but, this time, all alone.

President Roosevelt had long since resolved that no such pattern would develop if he could prevent it. He knew that the issue was the survival of democracy itself, of our way of life as we knew and loved it. He knew that if war and dictatorship were to be kept from our shores, we had to get aid across to Britain and her allies, and get it there quickly, unstintingly, and effectively.

He had the vision to see through all the fog of doubt and to sight the real dangers ahead; he had the courage to fight the tide of isolationism and the clamor of the timid; he foresaw the destiny of free peoples all over the world.

But President Roosevelt also knew that we could do what we had to do only if Americans realized that we had to do it — only if they recognized the urgency of the day. The addresses and public papers in this volume establish how effectively he brought home to all open-minded Americans the perils which he so clearly saw, and how masterfully he led America to extend aid, to clear the decks, and to man the battle stations.

That this was the first order of business — almost the only order of business in 1941 — is shown by the documents in this volume. Of course, the routine business of running the executive branch of the Government went on. But of the 146 items included in this volume, scarcely a half dozen dealt with matters other than the struggle against Hitler and the Fascists, or some phase of national defense.

The President was a leader who refused to wait for the crisis to come to America. He was determined to go out and meet it — to meet it more than halfway.

It was the task of this leader who saw the crisis coming to our

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shores to drive home to the American people the great danger which stood ready to overwhelm them. He knew how careful he had to be in this endeavor. He had tried it once before in the "quarantine speech" of October 5, 1937, in Chicago, and had failed. In 1937, the President had sought to warn the United States and the world of the dangers which lay ahead; he had tried to induce the peace-loving Nations of the world to undertake a system of quarantining aggressors so as to shut them off from the normal commercial and cultural intercourse with the rest of the world. This was an act of leadership which failed — because the American people had not been prepared by facts and frank discussion for this kind of bold thinking. After the speech, the President in many quarters otherwise favorable to him was called a warmonger. He was accused of frightening needlessly the people of this Nation so far removed from the turmoil and conflict of Europe and Asia. The making of that speech and the events which followed upon it are a clear example of how important it is for a leader not to get too far in the vanguard of the people he is leading.

Roosevelt had not made that kind of mistake very often. He had usually tried to make sure that, when he recommended novel measures, the people had all the facts before them, that they knew the reasons and the necessities, that they understood and would support — for it was their support which gave him the strength to do the things he did.

As early as 1932 when he was a candidate for the Presidency for the first time, he made that policy clear. In his Commonwealth Club speech at San Francisco on September 23, he said:

"Government includes the art of formulating a policy, and using the political technique to attain so much of that policy as will receive general support; persuading, leading, sacrificing, teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate."

President Roosevelt realized the mistake he had made in 1937; he was determined not to make it again in 1940 or 1941. This time he knew that he had to give the American people all the facts,

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discuss the facts frankly, and convince the people of the dangers which threatened their existence.

At almost every opportunity—in formal addresses, in informal, extemporaneous remarks, at press conferences, in messages to the Congress or to various organizations—the President pointed out the perils to America, drew the sharp differences between our democracy and Hitler's dictatorship, and told America of the fact—as fact it was—that the survival of democracy was at stake.

These messages he drove home—in his Inaugural Address; in a radio address on his birthday; in messages to the Boy Scouts and to the American Society of Newspaper Editors; in addresses to the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, to the farmers, to the White House Press Correspondents' Association, and to his fellow Democrats on Jackson Day; in informal remarks to a delegation of Ahepa, a Greek society; to the Roosevelt Home Club, and to the Dutchess County schoolteachers.

And as the year wore on, as the peril increased, and as America's role, perforce, had to grow larger, his messages to the people—and to the Allies abroad—increased in urgency. How the President went forward step by step is readily apparent—from the philosophical and calm Inaugural Address, when he said, "In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy," down to his forthright, bitter denunciation of Hitler and his crimes in the speech of September 11, 1941, when he said: "When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him"; then to the time when he could say on October 27, 1941, "We Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations."

Roosevelt knew that action—immediate action—was necessary to enable the Allies in Europe to hold on until help could come to them. This, too, called for convincing the people of the United States that this was the best course to serve American interests. In this, he not only had to overcome the isolationists and defeatists; he had likewise to overcome the

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views of those who saw trouble coming but who thought the proper way to prepare for that trouble was to manufacture as much material and munitions for war as possible and keep it all for ourselves within the continental limits of the United States. There were many conscientious Americans who held this belief, including some of our military and naval leaders.

However, as will be easily determined by reading the documents in this and the succeeding volumes, President Roosevelt from the very outset was convinced — and never hesitated to express that conviction publicly — that our first production of war materials should be sent abroad to those resisting Hitler.

On March 11, 1941, Lend-Lease became law; his own bold concept, on that date, was transformed into one of the most potent weapons against dictatorship.

It was this concept which marked the end of the period of sham and make-believe during which America tried to protect her own security by devious methods instead of forthright action. It was a concept to be used in later years as a precedent for the United States to use her power and influence to help stem aggression and avoid war, without actually sending troops abroad. Greece, Turkey, and all those Nations of Europe whose powers of resistance have been revived by American aid, are now better able to resist Communism and Communists — as a result of that concept.

It was a concept which was made to order for 1941 — produced by the genius and bold imagination of a man who knew precisely what was needed and who knew that the American people would be ready for it if they could be made to realize the dangers they faced.

And so, too, many other important steps were taken as America moved to its battle stations — even before Pearl Harbor. To realize the objectives of Lend-Lease, the United States strengthened its patrol and convoy system. Our troops moved into Greenland, into Iceland, into Dutch Guiana. Axis assets were frozen and Axis businessmen in South America, who spearheaded the fifth column, were blacklisted. Selective service was extended;

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and our merchant ships were armed. An unlimited national emergency was declared. This was the year of the Atlantic Charter which formed the foundation on which the United Nations was built, first for war and then for peace. Lend-Lease was extended to the Soviet Union; it was made clear that though we detested Soviet dictatorship and her anti-religious policy, our own self-interest lay in helping any enemy of Hitler.

And the home front was made ready as the great defense agencies were established — the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Coordinator of Information, the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Economic Defense Board, the Solid Fuels Coordinator, and the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board.

As we read these documents of 1941 and the files of the newspapers of those days, we can see the speed with which Roosevelt, the leader, moved along at a steady distance ahead of public opinion. Never was he so far ahead that when he looked back over his shoulder, he found himself alone; on the other hand, never did those who followed tread upon his heels. Now that we have full documentary proof of the designs and intentions of the Axis, we can recognize Roosevelt's foresight and clear vision in 1941, and how he led the way out to meet the coming attack. There are those (even some very friendly to Roosevelt) who now say that Roosevelt did not move fast enough in 1941; there are also those (who hated him) who said, and still say, that he moved too fast and pushed us into war. I believe that the historians of the future will contradict both of these contentions.

I worked very closely with President Roosevelt during this period. I believe that, for a leader in a democracy, he proved to be just the right distance ahead of public opinion. Knowing that Hitler and Tojo would strike when they wanted to, no matter what we did — he explained to the people boldly and without diplomatic reserve each new crisis — exposing the dan-

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gers and threats ahead and preparing for the blows to come. In all of this, he shunned partisanship in the face of foreign danger, and built up a solid foundation of cooperation and unity between the political parties.

This volume, then, takes us to the close of 1941. It takes us to war. When the infamous blow fell on December 7, 1941, America was shocked back onto its heels; it is in the very nature of peace-loving democracies that they should be shocked by sneak attacks. But, through the leadership of President Roosevelt, we had this on December 7, 1941: we still had our Allies standing against Hitler; our production for war was getting ready; our machinery was set; our decks had been cleared; and we had taken our battle stations.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Samuel Rosanman". The signature is written in black ink and is centered on the page.

New York, N. Y.

July 1, 1949

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The Call to Battle Stations

1 ¶ The Third Inaugural Address — “In the Face of Great Perils Never Before Encountered, Our Strong Purpose Is to Protect and to Perpetuate the Integrity of Democracy.” January 20, 1941

ON EACH national day of Inauguration since 1789, the people have renewed their sense of dedication to the United States.

In Washington's day the task of the people was to create and weld together a Nation.

In Lincoln's day the task of the people was to preserve that Nation from disruption from within.

In this day the task of the people is to save that Nation and its institutions from disruption from without.

To us there has come a time, in the midst of swift happenings, to pause for a moment and take stock — to recall what our place in history has been, and to rediscover what we are and what we may be. If we do not, we risk the real peril of isolation, the real peril of inaction.

Lives of Nations are determined not by the count of years, but by the lifetime of the human spirit. The life of a man is three-score years and ten: a little more, a little less. The life of a Nation is the fullness of the measure of its will to live.

There are men who doubt this. There are men who believe that democracy, as a form of government and a frame of life, is limited or measured by a kind of mystical and artificial fate — that, for some unexplained reason, tyranny and slavery have become the surging wave of the future — and that freedom is an ebbing tide.

But we Americans know that this is not true.

Eight years ago, when the life of this Republic seemed frozen by a fatalistic terror, we proved that this is not true. We were in the midst of shock — but we acted. We acted quickly, boldly, decisively.

These later years have been living years — fruitful years for the people of this democracy. For they have brought to us greater se-

I. Third Inaugural Address

curity and, I hope, a better understanding that life's ideals are to be measured in other than material things.

Most vital to our present and to our future is this experience of a democracy which successfully survived crisis at home; put away many evil things; built new structures on enduring lines; and, through it all, maintained the fact of its democracy.

For action has been taken within the three-way framework of the Constitution of the United States. The coordinate branches of the Government continue freely to function. The Bill of Rights remains inviolate. The freedom of elections is wholly maintained. Prophets of the downfall of American democracy have seen their dire predictions come to naught.

No, democracy is not dying.

We know it because we have seen it revive — and grow.

We know it cannot die — because it is built on the unhampered initiative of individual men and women joined together in a common enterprise — an enterprise undertaken and carried through by the free expression of a free majority.

We know it because democracy alone, of all forms of government, enlists the full force of men's enlightened will.

We know it because democracy alone has constructed an unlimited civilization capable of infinite progress in the improvement of human life.

We know it because, if we look below the surface, we sense it still spreading on every continent — for it is the most humane, the most advanced, and in the end the most unconquerable of all forms of human society.

A Nation, like a person, has a body — a body that must be fed and clothed and housed, invigorated and rested, in a manner that measures up to the standards of our time.

A Nation, like a person, has a mind — a mind that must be kept informed and alert, that must know itself, that understands the hopes and the needs of its neighbors — all the other Nations that live within the narrowing circle of the world.

A Nation, like a person, has something deeper, something more permanent, something larger than the sum of all its parts.

1. *Third Inaugural Address*

It is that something which matters most to its future — which calls forth the most sacred guarding of its present.

It is a thing for which we find it difficult — even impossible — to hit upon a single, simple word.

And yet, we all understand what it is — the spirit — the faith of America. It is the product of centuries. It was born in the multitudes of those who came from many lands — some of high degree, but mostly plain people — who sought here, early and late, to find freedom more freely.

The democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase in human history. It is human history. It permeated the ancient life of early peoples. It blazed anew in the Middle Ages. It was written in Magna Charta.

In the Americas its impact has been irresistible. America has been the New World in all tongues, and to all peoples, not because this continent was a new-found land, but because all those who came here believed they could create upon this continent a new life — a life that should be new in freedom.

Its vitality was written into our own Mayflower Compact, into the Declaration of Independence, into the Constitution of the United States, into the Gettysburg Address.

Those who first came here to carry out the longings of their spirit, and the millions who followed, and the stock that sprang from them — all have moved forward constantly and consistently toward an ideal which in itself has gained stature and clarity with each generation.

The hopes of the Republic cannot forever tolerate either undeserved poverty or self-serving wealth.

We know that we still have far to go; that we must more greatly build the security and the opportunity and the knowledge of every citizen, in the measure justified by the resources and the capacity of the land.

But it is not enough to achieve these purposes alone. It is not enough to clothe and feed the body of this Nation, to instruct, and inform its mind. For there is also the spirit. And of the three, the greatest is the spirit.

1. *Third Inaugural Address*

Without the body and the mind, as all men know, the Nation could not live.

But if the spirit of America were killed, even though the Nation's body and mind, constricted in an alien world, lived on, the America we know would have perished.

That spirit — that faith — speaks to us in our daily lives in ways often unnoticed, because they seem so obvious. It speaks to us here in the Capital of the Nation. It speaks to us through the processes of governing in the sovereignties of 48 States. It speaks to us in our counties, in our cities, in our towns, and in our villages. It speaks to us from the other Nations of the hemisphere, and from those across the seas — the enslaved, as well as the free. Sometimes we fail to hear or heed these voices of freedom because to us the privilege of our freedom is such an old, old story.

The destiny of America was proclaimed in words of prophecy spoken by our first President in his first Inaugural in 1789 — words almost directed, it would seem, to this year of 1941: "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered . . . deeply, . . . finally, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."

If you and I in this later day lose that sacred fire — if we let it be smothered with doubt and fear — then we shall reject the destiny which Washington strove so valiantly and so triumphantly to establish. The preservation of the spirit and faith of the Nation does, and will, furnish the highest justification for every sacrifice that we may make in the cause of national defense.

In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy.

For this we muster the spirit of America, and the faith of America.

We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still. As Americans, we go forward, in the service of our country, by the will of God.

1. *Third Inaugural Address*

NOTE: In his First Inaugural Address (see Item 1, pp. 11-16, 1933 volume), the President had announced a bold program of action to combat the depression. With the confident words that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," the President had instilled in the American people a new faith and spirit. In his Second Inaugural Address (see Item 1, pp. 1-6, 1937 volume) the President called attention to the need for pressing forward in order to combat poverty and raise the American standard of living. "I see one-third of a Nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished." This fact, noted the President, represented a challenge to our democracy which could never be successfully met by self-satisfied inaction.

The President chose a somewhat more philosophical theme for his Third Inaugural Address. His thesis was that a Nation, in some respects, is like a human being, particularly in its possession of a spirit and faith. He dwelt on the importance of this spirit and the vitality of faith in the democratic way of life. The Third Inaugural Address, in my opinion, reads far better than it sounded at the time it was

delivered. Perhaps the inaugural crowd at the Capitol expected the President to coin some striking new phrases, as he had in his first two inaugural addresses; perhaps the very solemnity of the theme hushed public reaction. In any event, the President was disappointed at the apparent failure of his words to evoke popular response.

In delivering his addresses, the President rarely if ever read his prepared text word for word because he frequently ad libbed or looked up from his manuscript to make a point from memory. In the fifth paragraph of the foregoing address, the President talks of the need for the people "to recall what our place in history has been, and to rediscover what we are and what we may be. If we do not, we risk the real peril of isolation, the real peril of inaction." In his prepared text, the President had not mentioned "isolation." After delivering the speech, the President underlined the word "inaction" and wrote on his reading copy "I misread this word as 'isolation,' then added 'and inaction.' All of which improved it!"

2. *Eighth Birthday Ball*

2 ¶ Radio Address on the Occasion of the President's Eighth Birthday Ball for the Benefit of Crippled Children. January 30, 1941

FROM the bottom of my heart I thank all of you — every man, woman and child who has labored with my old friends, Basil O'Connor and Keith Morgan, in this great cause. And let me, at the outset, also give you my thanks in behalf of all those victims of infantile paralysis to whom this celebration tonight spells a new hope and a new courage.

Most of all, I am grateful to America — for reaffirming at this hour America's humanity, America's active concern for its children. This is the eighth birthday in a row which all of you have made an occasion for joining hands in this national humanitarian effort.

I cannot say, as you can well understand, that this is for me a completely happy birthday. These are not completely happy days for any of us in the world. Shall we say that American birthdays this year are being made at least happier than they would otherwise be because all of us are still living under a free people's philosophy?

It is not only that the lights of peace blaze in our great cities and glow in our towns and villages — that laughter and music still ring out from coast to coast — that we will return to safe beds tonight.

It is not that we feel no concern for the plight of free peoples elsewhere in the world; that we do not hope that they may continue the freedom of their governments and their ways of life in the days to come.

It is because we believe in and insist on the right of the helpless, the right of the weak, and the right of the crippled everywhere to play their part in life — and survive.

It is because we know instinctively that this right of the unfortunate comes under our free people's philosophy from the bottom up and can never be imposed from the top down.

2. *Eighth Birthday Ball*

I do have satisfaction on this birthday of mine because of the fact that definite progress has been made in these past twenty years on a national scale in the fight against infantile paralysis. In a very broad but a very definite sense, this fight is a true part of the national defense of America.

I have always tried to remember that the particular problem of infantile paralysis does call for a truly national fight. We have it in every State of the Union. We are at last organizing adequately to fight it.

We have had to face the necessity of uniting medical scientists and doctors and nurses and public health officers and the general public into a unique offensive — and the battle year by year is gaining greater success.

This year-in, year-out campaign culminating on each January thirtieth has had, and still has, the support of almost everyone — from those who give large sums down to the school children of the Nation who contribute their pennies. Clearly, unquestionably, we are winning the fight — winning it, thanks to all of you.

And so, to all of you I give my own thanks for the rarest birthday present of all — the gift of your charity, the gift of your kindness to each other and to the Nation.

NOTE: On his birthday, the President made annual addresses in support of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. The only years when he missed birthday balls were in 1943 and 1945, when he was compelled to be out of the country on his birthday in order to attend the Casablanca and Yalta Conferences. For other birthday addresses

during the President's third term in support of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, see Item 14 and note, 1942 volume, and Item 8 and note, 1944-1945 volume; see also Item 132, 1944-1945 volume for the President's 1945 birthday address which was read by Mrs. Roosevelt because the President was attending the Yalta Conference.

3. *Seven Hundred and Sixteenth Press Conference*

3 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Sixteenth Press Conference (Excerpts). February 7, 1941

(*Fingerprinting of press correspondents — Appointment of John G. Winant — Speeding up of defense measures — Postwar construction projects — National highways.*)

Q. Mr. President, may I bring up a matter that is of great interest to the members of the [press] conference? I —

THE PRESIDENT: Fingerprinting? Is it fingerprinting? (*Laughter*)

Q. Fingerprinting, exactly, plus “mugging.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do they take you side and front, both? (*Laughter*)

Q. But the point is, we have all been “mugged” and all been fingerprinted in the last three days — very successfully, I hope — and —

THE PRESIDENT: I hope so! (*Laughter*)

Q. And we trust, sir, that that will be enough for the entire executive end of the Government, that we will not have to do this in the Navy, Army, and State Department and elsewhere — that the same card, the same identification, will be satisfactory to them that is satisfactory to the White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a very reasonable suggestion; and if Steve [Early] will take that up right away, we will try to get it done; that is a grand idea.

VOICES: Thank you! Thank you! Thank you! (*Applause*)

THE PRESIDENT: What happens if you get your face lifted in between? (*Laughter*)

Q. In between *what*?

Q. That introduces a brand new question, sir! (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, is there any special reason you could give us for the naming of the cruisers for the islands and territories of the United States, including the Philippines? Some comment has been caused by that.

THE PRESIDENT: No, except that we are getting so many ships now it is awfully hard to find names; that’s the size of it. You

3. *Seven Hundred and Sixteenth Press Conference*

know we have certain rules — I don't know whether it is a law — to name battleships after States and cruisers after cities and territories.

Q. Mr. President, Colonel [Robert] McCormick said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday that the geographical and strategical position of the United States is such that any talk of foreign invasion was ridiculous —

THE PRESIDENT: I want to ask you one question back: Did he speak as an expert? (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, it might be interesting to everybody if you agreed to tell us some of the reasons and the characteristics in the appointment of Mr. [John G.] Winant as Ambassador; that is an interesting appointment, an interesting man.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think I could only say something for background, Earl [Godwin]; I think it is a great mistake to make a lead in any story that he was a Republican; he was appointed because he was an American. I think there is a nice distinction there. He was not appointed because he was a Republican. . . . I could say that same thing if he were a Democrat — he was appointed because he was an American of very wide experience, experience in an executive office in one of the States, experience afterwards in social security, and afterwards internationally in the International Labor Office in Geneva. In other words, he had an extremely good background as an American, regardless of what party he belonged to. I realize that this is Washington and people do have to talk about Republicans and Democrats; but in a crisis like this I don't think it is a very good line to take. An Ambassador represents Republicans and Democrats and people who are not enrolled in any party; he represents *all* Americans. In other words, he had a lot of experience that fitted him for the job.

Q. I had this in mind — didn't have any idea about politics, but here is a changing situation — social structure here and abroad, and here was a man who seems to be out in front on some of that stuff; and I wondered if that had anything to do with it.

3. Seven Hundred and Sixteenth Press Conference

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so. He is broader than Washington, D. C. That's an awful thing to say, but you know what I mean. He does represent this country pretty well with certain changing situations which most of us have come to recognize the existence of, which can be worked into the constitutional and democratic form of government that we happen to live under, without the necessity of revolution or dictatorship. I think he represents that, shall I say, *fact* that is going on in our midst and in a great many other places in the world — he represents that fact pretty well.

Q. Mr. President, do you contemplate the appointment of a Minister to Great Britain?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us whether there is any possibility of an interdepartmental committee being established to handle economic defense problems?

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by economic defense? Everything is economic defense.

Q. I mean such things as what we will ship to Britain, particularly coordinating the export control system with the Treasury power.

THE PRESIDENT: I couldn't say yes, and I couldn't say no, because there are a great many things in process. I should doubt very much if it would take that form. In other words, we are perfecting machinery on foreign trade and on domestic trade all the time, and undoubtedly there will be various new forms of organization that will be necessary, because of changing conditions or because the times are ripe to do it. I don't think there will be anything exactly the way you suggest; I know what you are talking about. I doubt it. . . .

Q. Mr. President, when is your engagement with Mr. Willkie?

THE PRESIDENT: I haven't any.

Q. You said you were going to see him. I think he is expected at the Capital.

THE PRESIDENT: I see almost everybody that comes back; I would be delighted to see him as soon as he comes down here. . . .

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Q. There has been speculation as to where the new Baltimore highway will be built, whether most of it would run through land already belonging to the Government. Can you tell us about that?

THE PRESIDENT: Between New York and Washington?

Q. No, the section between Baltimore and Washington.

THE PRESIDENT: I hadn't heard anything about that. I will give you a story on this, because it is just being started now.

As you know, one of the things that we have been thinking about is what happens in this country when we begin to slow down, reduce our defense employment. You remember in 1918, on the eleventh of November, we didn't stop all the employment on defense work. The policy at that time was to make no new contracts after the Armistice, and the policy was also to hold up production where contracts had been given but the production itself had not started; but the policy was to continue to completion almost everything that had been actually ordered and was in production.

The result was that during the following year, '19, and even the first half of '20, employment in the United States on defense work decreased rather gradually. It wasn't cutting everybody off on any one given date or in a month; and the aftermath, the economic aftermath of the war in 1920 was fairly serious but not as bad as it might have been.

At the end of the present fighting, which has to come some day, there will be a slowing-up on defense work, and we have been trying to guard against what would happen at that time to the people who are employed on defense work; so we are starting this reservoir of projects which will be, insofar as possible, ready to shoot, to take up some of the slack, doing it gradually, but we would like to have them in such shape that we know where we are going; and that is why, as a general proposition you may see at this session certain authorization bills for various things going through Congress, which means that Congress very appropriately will decide on the type of work that is to be done when that time comes.

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That is an authorization, which does not mean an appropriation, which is an entirely different matter; but it means that the project has been duly authorized and will be put on the shelf, ready to take out when the end comes; all then being needed is an appropriation from Congress.

One of those, you might say, divisions of things on the shelf will be highways; and Mr. Commissioner MacDonald is coming in to see me today at 12:15 to talk about this whole subject of certain through national highways, which we talked about for a great many years — I think it goes back to the spring of 1933 — and in that discussion we will talk about, first of all, the needs of the country, both military and civil, in times of peace, for these highways.

And we will talk about the principle of excess condemnation that we have talked about many times before, by which the — what do they call it? — the added increment that accrues to real estate along a new road that is put through virgin territory — that added increment which is a mere matter of chance whether you happen to own the farm next to it or five miles away — if you are five miles away, you are out of luck, and if you are right on the new highway, you may suddenly find the value of your farm increased from \$5,000 to \$20,000.

It seems to be constitutional — it has been done in several States — for the Government to buy more land than it needs for the 100-foot or 200-foot right of way and then, over a period of years, sell this land, after having paid for it the reasonable going price of the land at the time, and the Government gets the benefit of the increase in valuation on that land, and in that way pays back either a large part or the whole of the capital cost of the highway.

It has been done in a great many places, and we are talking about that today. That ties in, of course, with your question about this Baltimore road which is merely a local proposition. It might not be anywhere near Fort Meade — it might be ten miles away — I don't know. It is a matter for study; but of course there probably would be some provision for a national highway, for example, on the Atlantic coast; whether

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it would be right along Chesapeake Bay, close to the shore line of the Bay, or whether it would be twenty miles back or fifty miles back, I don't know.

Q. What other projects might fall into that category — hospitals, airports, housing?

THE PRESIDENT: Possibly; any kind of public works, but of course especially trying to build public works in which there would be some kind of a return of capital to the Government.

Q. Mr. President, might it not prove necessary to build some of these highways at the present time in the interests of national defense rather than taking up the economic slack at the end of the emergency? They are complaining about the transportation problem between Washington, New York, and Boston — inadequate highway.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, does the Transportation Division of the Advisory Council admit that?

Q. I think almost everybody who uses the road admits it, sir!
(*Laughter*)

Q. People get lost in Philadelphia, sir!

THE PRESIDENT: I know it! (*Laughter*) But all you have to do is show your fingerprint and you're all right! (*Laughter*)

Q. Thank you, Mr. President!

4 ¶ Radio Address on the Occasion of the Thirty-first Anniversary of the Boy Scouts of America.

February 8, 1941

Fellow Scouts:

THE record of your achievements during the past year is something of which we can all be proud. I am most favorably impressed with the scope and the magnitude of the emergency service training program that is now being developed by the Boy Scouts of America.

The Boy Scouts of today are approaching manhood at a grave hour in the world's history. Recent events have threatened the

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security of free men everywhere; and the democratic way of life is being challenged in many parts of the world. The United States must be strong if our free way of life is to be maintained and for our national policy we, as a Nation, have adopted the motto of the Boy Scout organization — BE PREPARED.

In many ways the Boy Scouts have sought to emulate the deeds of the early American pioneers who subdued the wilderness and established on a new-found continent a better human society. But it is not primarily for mere physical feats that the Boy Scout movement has won the high praise and the esteem of the American people. It is rather because the Boy Scouts have dedicated themselves to the development of those qualities of character, those qualities of citizenship, upon which the future of our democracy rests.

In this grave hour national defense dominates the heart and mind and soul of America. The Government *must* take the major responsibility, since it alone represents all of the people acting in concert. But the Government cannot and should not preempt those fields of private endeavor that have become an indispensable part of life in America.

You who are members of the Boy Scouts have a great opportunity in your organization to do your part in this great task. In your Scout troops you have the opportunity to develop the type of leadership, the group cooperation, which is so greatly needed in a democracy such as ours. You have opportunities in your Scouting program to develop those physical and mental qualities upon which the survival of a self-governing community depends.

The Boy Scouts have made and will continue to make an important contribution to the welfare of America's young manhood. The Boy Scouts have always responded generously when called into action in the service of their communities and their fellow citizens. And so the Nation is confident that the Boy Scouts stand ready to contribute to the national welfare in these critical hours.

It follows, therefore, that I am proud of what you have done,

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I am proud of what you are doing — and I am proud of what I know you will do in days to come in playing your part in our American defense.

5 ¶ The President Requests an Additional \$10,000,000 for T.V.A. February 12, 1941

The President of the Senate.

Sir:

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of Congress a supplemental estimate of appropriation of \$10,000,000 for the Tennessee Valley Authority for the fiscal year 1942, together with drafts of proposed changes in the text pertaining to the appropriation "Tennessee Valley Authority fund" (amendment to H. R. 2788, the independent offices appropriation bill, 1942).

The details of this estimate and the proposed changes in the text, the necessity therefor, and the reason for their transmission at this time are set forth in the letter of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget transmitted herewith, with whose comments and observations thereon I concur.

Respectfully,

NOTE: The immediate purpose of the \$10,000,000 requested by the President in the foregoing message was to finance the quick completion of the Fort Loudoun Dam. This project had originally been scheduled to begin operation in the spring of 1944; the additional appropriation requested in the message was designed to accelerate the completion date to the fall of 1943 to meet the additional power requirements of the war industries located in the Tennessee Valley

areas. The Loudoun Dam was to add, and did add, some 35,000 kilowatts of continuous power to the T.V.A. system half a year ahead of schedule.

The Congress promptly acted to approve the request of the President, and voted an additional \$10,000,000 to the T.V.A. in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act which the President approved April 5, 1941 (55 Stat. 92). The first concrete for the permanent structure at Fort Loudoun was placed in

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July, 1941; the dam was closed in August, 1943; and the first of two 35,000 kilowatt generating units went into operation in November, 1943.

The contribution of the T.V.A. to the winning of the war was incalculable. The capacity of T.V.A. to supply abundant electric power was the major factor in locating one of the Army's largest atomic energy projects at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The designs which T.V.A. had made for prefabricated houses enabled the War Department to obtain in record time almost 5,000 homes for the employees of the atomic energy plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Pasco, Washington. (For an account of the work of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the Army's Manhattan District in the development of the atomic bomb, see Item 60 and note, this volume.)

More than 60 percent of the phosphorus used by the armed forces for incendiary bombs, tracer bullets, smoke screens, and other military purposes was supplied by the T.V.A. T.V.A. furnished the Army Ordnance Department with tons of anhydrous ammonia, ammonium nitrate liquor and crystal. T.V.A. manufactured 228,500 tons of calcium carbide for use in making synthetic rubber. More than 375,000 tons of phosphate and nitrate fertilizer materials were supplied to increase wartime food production, and T.V.A. was the source of supply of 114,000 tons of fertilizer

for lend-lease export to America's allies. The Authority also produced operational and tactical military maps of a topographic nature from air photographs covering more than half a million square miles of territory in eleven European and three Far Eastern countries.

A record-breaking dam construction program was carried on during the war in response to the urgent needs of wartime; as a result the Cherokee Dam was completed in 1941; Watts Bar, Ocoee No. 3, Chatuge, and Nottely in 1942; Fort Loudoun, Apalachia, and Douglas in 1943; and Kentucky and Fontana in 1944. The most spectacular construction record was set in completing the Douglas Dam in the unprecedented time of thirteen months after the start of construction — three months less than it had taken to finish the almost identical Cherokee Dam, which had been completed two days before Pearl Harbor. In spite of difficult foundation conditions and four weeks' delay resulting from two major floods, the Douglas Dam was closed on February 19, 1943, accounting for 80,000 watts of additional power and 1,300,000 acre-feet of storage in the Douglas reservoir.

This accelerated construction was translated into vastly increased sources of electric power during the war years. Installed capacity increased by 127 percent in five years, from approximately 970,000 kilowatts on June 30, 1940, to over 2,200,000 kilowatts on June 30, 1945.

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Three-quarters of the electricity provided went into war production. Power for the production of aluminum, copper, and heavy chemicals, for a large electro-metallurgical plant, a shell-loading plant, arsenals, air bases, and for ordnance plants was delivered by T.V.A. during the war. Our tremendous wartime plane construction program would have been impossible without the aluminum which came from T.V.A. electric power. Power necessary for the atomic energy plant at Oak Ridge would have been impossible without T.V.A.

One need only look back a decade before the war, when the Tennessee River system could only generate small dribbles of power, to appreciate the extent of T.V.A.'s contribution toward winning the war. The construction of additional dams, the construction of a steam plant at Watts Bar, and the acquisition of additional dams and power facilities enabled T.V.A. to rise from the fifth largest power-producing system in 1942 to the top-rank power producer in the Nation by the end of the war. Over twelve billion kilowatt-hours were generated by the T.V.A. hydro and steam plant in 1945; by 1948 this figure was fifteen billions.

This new power was a great boon to individual consumers also. As pointed out in the note to Item 88, p. 367, 1940 volume, the T.V.A. in 1941 served about 425,000 customers, with power revenues amounting to \$15,125,380. In the fiscal year

1948, the T.V.A. served over 900,000 ultimate consumers, and power revenues amounted to \$48,770,000. T.V.A. power was sold by 144 locally owned and managed municipal and cooperative systems. While the domestic consumer of T.V.A. power used 67 percent more electricity than the average domestic consumer in the Nation, the T.V.A. user's electric bill averaged 13 percent lower because of the huge rate savings achieved by the T.V.A. system. In 1940, T.V.A. consumers paid 2.11 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity, as compared with the national average of 3.91 cents per kilowatt-hour; in 1948, the T.V.A. residential consumers paid only 1.57 cents per kilowatt-hour, while the average residential consumer in the United States paid 3.03 cents per kilowatt-hour. As pointed out in the note to Item 88, p. 367, 1940 volume, in 1940 the average consumer of T.V.A. power used 1353 kilowatt-hours compared with the national average of only 925; in 1948, use of T.V.A. power soared to 2,520 kilowatt-hours per average consumer, as compared with the nation-wide average of only 1,505 kilowatt-hours per consumer.

Within the Valley itself, rural electrification had proceeded to such an extent that while in 1934 only one farm in thirty received electricity, this proportion had risen to one farm in seven in 1939, one farm in four in 1944 and better than one farm in two in 1948.

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War is waste; and most of its expenditures are blown up in battle or represent "white elephants" which cannot be used in peacetime. The T.V.A. is a spectacular exception. The T.V.A. is a profitable investment which will bring returns to the Tennessee Valley and to the United States for generations to come. Although power sales dipped slightly with the withdrawal of wartime industrial purchases after the war, by June, 1946, the production and use of electric power by the T.V.A. was breaking even wartime records.

The dream of a 9-foot, 650-mile navigable channel from Paducah, Kentucky, to Knoxville, Tennessee, was realized with the completion of the Kentucky Dam in August, 1944. The Kentucky, largest of the dams in the system, is a mile and a half long and 206 feet high. Additional dredging at several points will produce a minimum depth of 11 feet and minimum width of 300 feet over the entire water course from Paducah to Knoxville. An indication of the increasing value of the Tennessee River for navigation purposes is the fact that in 1939, 70,700,000 ton-miles of traffic moved on the river; this total jumped to 256,465,000 ton-miles of waterborne traffic in 1945. By 1948 it exceeded 400,000,000 ton-miles. A number of enterprises, recognizing the potentialities of the new waterway, have begun construction of grain terminal and storage facilities,

elevators, oil company terminals, and other industrial plants.

With the lifting of wartime travel restrictions, visitors have flocked to the Valley and made new use of its wide recreational resources for boating, fishing, and other sports. Some 25 State, county, and municipal parks were developed on T.V.A. land; group camps were leased by the T.V.A. to Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and other organizations; and an increasing number of leases to private firms and individuals were made along the lake shores. In the 600,000 acres of lakes, fishing for sport and commercial purposes grew rapidly after the war.

Land which was once worn out and eroded soon took on a cover of rich vegetation. The T.V.A. continued its program of developing new fertilizers from phosphates and demonstrating the results of these fertilizers experimentally to farmers throughout the Valley. Improved farming practices had increased the productivity of the soil, increased pasture acreages by 800,000 acres, shifted one million acres from row crops to cover and pasture crops and terraced one million acres. These measures prevented erosion, and generally improved the standard of living of farmers in the area. The T.V.A. took additional steps to preserve and improve the soil and the entire region by reforestation, forest-fire control, and other measures designed to preserve and increase the woodland areas.

In harnessing the Tennessee

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River, the T.V.A. saved the Valley millions of dollars in potential losses from floods. By the storage of water and regulation of its flow during periods of excessive rainfall, it was possible to control the river rise within a few inches.

The T.V.A. has developed into something far more significant in long-range terms than a good investment of money. It has proved to be a sound investment from the standpoint of developing a stronger Valley and providing a symbol of a stronger America.

The manifold achievements of the T.V.A. stand as magnificent monuments to the foresight, persistence, and vision of those who sponsored and actively assisted in the T.V.A. program. Some few disgruntled politicians, and a coal-

tion of frightened private power interests, continue to attack the T.V.A. T.V.A. has met with such widespread popular approval, however, that these opponents dare no longer to make frontal attacks upon it, but persist in hit-and-run attacks on what they call "details." It is no longer disputed by any intelligent observer that T.V.A. immeasurably strengthened the United States in war and, even more important, has given to the Nation a more abundant life in peace.

(See Item 36 and note, pp. 122-129, 1933 volume, for an account of the origins of the Tennessee Valley Authority and its development prior to October 31, 1937; see Item 88 and note, pp. 359-369, 1940 volume, for an account of the work of the T.V.A. up to 1941.)

6 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Nineteenth Press Conference (Excerpts). February 18, 1941

(Appointment of W. Averell Harriman as defense expediter — Priorities — Integration of defense requirements — Contributions by men over draft age — Destroyer-construction program.)

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think there is much news that you haven't already got. You saw Averell Harriman when he went out. That is a thing that has been in the process of discussion for a month or six weeks. When Harry Hopkins came back, what we thought probably would be a need has rather definitely become a need; so Averell Harriman is going over in about ten days. As soon as the defense program under the lend-lease, lend-lease — whatever you call it — bill is perfected more or less, he will go over and — Oh, I suppose you will all

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ask about his title, so I thought I would invent one. I talked over with him what his title would be, and we decided it was a pretty good idea to call him an "Expediter." There's a new one for you. I believe it is not in the diplomatic list or any other list. So he will go over as "Defense Expediter."

That doesn't conform with anything you ever heard of before — but that doesn't mean it isn't an excellent idea. We won't send his name to the Senate — it won't be that kind of job; and that is neither here nor there. He will be Defense Expediter, and he is going in about two weeks.

Q. Is this a permanent proposition?

THE PRESIDENT: No; we talked it over and both agreed that he probably ought to come back here at the end of, say, three months or four months to take what they call in industry a "refresher course" to find out what has happened over here and bring himself up to date in regard to the American production program, and then go on back.

Q. He anticipates there will be contracts, understandings, and agreements, and so forth under the lease-lend?

THE PRESIDENT: Most of that contract work will be ours over here.

Q. I mean somebody has to keep the records to find what they are getting.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; and another thing that Hopkins took up was the matter of priorities. I had a very interesting talk this morning, just to give you a new slant on priorities, with Anne O'Hare McCormick, and she said, "In working out priorities, can you list them as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6?" I said, "No, that is exactly the point; there may be half a dozen different things, different articles, which would all be in the Priority 1 group; now if you list them — say there are 6 of them — as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, the general impression of the public is that No. 1 is more important than No. 6; so what you ought to do is to list all 6 under the figure 1. In other words, they may all be equally important."

I think that is something just for your own guidance; that

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should be explained in writing stories that there is no such thing as saying one particular article is Priority 1. There may be half a dozen that are Priority 1.

Q. Has the lease-lend got to such a point, or have you discussed it, where we send them a thousand units of X and there is an understanding that we get back a thousand units of Y?

THE PRESIDENT: No. In other words, Pete [Brandt], I can tell you exactly what happened yesterday or day before, when I was talking about this thing. We may take time by the forelock, because we want to be ready to shoot just as soon as we are given the green light by Congress. Let me put it this way:

We have, let us say, a column showing what we have on order at the present time for our own Army and Navy; it is very simple to work that up to a boiled-down program so as to get hundreds of pages of orders onto one sheet or one column, and that is divided up into deliveries — expected deliveries; in other words, what they call a “flow sheet.” Column 1 will be '41, column 2 will be '42 calendar year, for put-off deliveries, stuff we have already ordered.

Then comes another double column, what the British have already ordered, divided between 1941 and '42. That is very easy to get.

Then comes a third double column, what we are expecting to order; in other words, the stuff that will be all for our immediate Army and Navy out of the new bills that are up on the Hill today, or will be shortly — deficiency bills, supplementary estimates, and the annual Army and Navy Appropriation Bills for the fiscal year 1942. You see there are three different kinds up there for us. That will be divided into those double columns of 1941 and 1942.

Then you get a fourth category, which is the list the British give us of things that they need which are not on order, and that is the column that the lend-lease bill is about. That will be divided between 1941 delivery and 1942 delivery. Then on the right-hand side of the page you have got a sum

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total of all of these things which are on order or we expect or hope to place on order this spring.

Then of course you come to a question of working in — dovetailing — the priorities between all these different types of things — four different types: On order by us and the British, and to be ordered by us and the British. That is what they are working on so as to get an over-all picture of the whole scheme, looking as far ahead as we can.

Q. Might there be transfers from one column to another?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, a small amount of transfers.

Q. Haven't the British already started making their list in anticipation?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, coming along very well.

Q. Mr. President, where is the column showing the stuff we can spare?

THE PRESIDENT: There is some transfer in this, a relatively small percentage; for instance, it is in the bill as it passed the House, from the money point of view — what was it? — a billion-three, out of former appropriations.

Q. Mr. President, what is Mr. Harriman's relation to our Embassy over there? Does he represent you directly?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, and I don't care. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, how does he report?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, and I don't care.

Q. Is it part of the Office of Production Management?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose he will report to the proper authorities.

Q. That means you. . . .

Q. Mr. President, did you have an opportunity to examine an open letter in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* (February 15, 1941) about what men past draft age can do?

THE PRESIDENT: I did; and I thought it was a very interesting story. I have got it right here. It is by a former marine who is past draft age. This is an open letter, of which the general tenor is — well, there are three things in it, really. It starts off:

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“A good many times when we were lying around in the mud in 1918 —”
meaning over in France

“ — we said, somewhat bitterly: ‘When the next war comes along we’ll go down to the corner and cheer. We’ll take off our hats and salute the boys who are marching away. And then we’ll dive into the nearest restaurant and order a big steak. With onions.’ ”

Then he goes on and he says (*the President paraphrasing*) the other night a lot of draftees were marching away, and they watched and they cheered and then they went into the nearest restaurant and ordered a big steak, with onions — a fine steak, but it had no taste; so apparently, it won’t work. When one’s country is facing an uncertain future, one cannot fail to be concerned — which brings us to the point. “What we want to know,” he says, “is this: What is our part in the current job? What can we do?”

In other words, there are the older fellows, who want to do something and do not quite know what they should do. And that is one of the things that we have been giving a lot of thought to. Quite a lot of people are working on the problem, men and women who want to do something back home, too old to go to the front, Army or Navy. What can they do? They want to do something.

Of course, really, there are two answers; and I suppose, to use a very much overworked word, the word “priority” applies to people as well as it does to machines and tools, people who are doing any kind of useful work in their own community, performing service.

I got a letter the other day from a driver of a school bus up in Dutchess County, 52 years old, who wanted to do something. Well, he is taking kiddies to school every morning and taking them back every night. Somebody has to do it, and he is performing useful service at the present time, probably as useful as is possible for that fellow to do. He ought to be satisfied. He is really doing something.

And the fellow who is running an automobile garage does

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a lot — another friend of mine up there. He wants to do something. He is performing a useful service to his community. He repairs automobiles and fills them with gas at the present time. . . .

I take it this marine has some regular, steady job that is a useful job in his community, and he is doing it today. Now, as time goes on, it may be necessary for us to — how shall I put it? — do a lot of picking and choosing of some of these people, because they may be needed in other things connected with defense. We might have to increase the defense personnel; but as far as we can tell at the present time the increase in the total on immediate operations of defense is growing in a normal way.

At the same time in these communities there are a lot more things that can be done, and that is what we are studying. We are studying better health of the communities, better physical education of boys and girls and middle-aged people. You remember a few weeks ago I accused you all of being physically soft; you are still. We may put in some kind of Swedish exercises out on the front lawn in front of the Executive Offices, and I will lead you — from a chair. (*Laughter*)

There are lots of things that can be done through local cooperation, and I think what we call the home defense thing is coming along pretty well. We will have some kind of a plan within a week or two — I keep putting it off — that will indicate from a central point what might be called ideal programs, leaving it to the communities — in other words, decentralization — as to how best to carry them out in communities and States. They are not ready for anything on it yet. I haven't got down to it yet, but I will pretty soon.

Q. Mr. President, the destroyer program is running ahead of schedule; is there anything you can tell us on that, in general terms?

THE PRESIDENT: I would say, of course — look, here's the thing: it's awfully hard to explain in a story, but you set out a goal for a year, or two years, ahead; what is it? It's an estimate; it

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may be a good estimate or it may be a bad estimate. In the case of plane production, about — what? — a month and a half ago, Mr. Knudsen said he was not satisfied, that he was 30 percent behind his guess that he had made. He couldn't tell you whether his guess was right, or whether it was too high or too low.

In the case of destroyers, the Navy Department made a guess as to how long it would take to turn them out; and that was back — oh, what? — about the first of November. I read their guess and I said, "I know enough myself, just as a layman, to know that your guess is silly — turning out destroyers in 24 to 30 months; in the World War, I turned out destroyers in 10 months." So they revised their estimate; they have nearly cut it in half. Now I don't know whether they are going to live up to that new estimate or not, but the construction of destroyers is speeding up very materially. As I said once before, I don't know whether it is going fast enough yet; if it goes fast and you are tickled to death, the next thing you do is to make it go still faster. . . .

NOTE: During the spring of 1941, the President studied the problem discussed in this press conference as to how best to enlist the services of civilians anxious to take a more active part in the defense effort. This was accomplished through the establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense on May 20, 1941 (see Item 42 and note, this volume, for a discussion of the work of the O.C.D.).

7 (The Seven Hundred and Twentieth Press Conference (Excerpt). February 21, 1941

(Confidential war information, and the responsibility of the Congress and the press.)

Q. Mr. President, General Marshall was quoted as having said that we were strengthening our armed forces in Hawaii and perhaps some of the islands we possess south of Hawaii; is that correct?

7. *Seven Hundred and Twentieth Press Conference*

THE PRESIDENT: Who quoted him?

Q. Various members of Congress, I believe.

THE PRESIDENT: Who was supposed to have said this?

Q. General Marshall.

THE PRESIDENT: In what kind of meeting?

Q. In a secret meeting.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I don't know why this should be anything more than background; I don't think it needs to be off the record. I read the papers this morning.

Now mind you, it is not important for the people to know whether my left eyebrow is raised or whether my tone of voice is angry — you better cut that out. I am not the least bit angry — I am *interested*; I am really interested in a problem of ethics that I think the American people ought to be interested in. It does present a problem, and it is interesting, in times of world upheaval.

I will try to put this — what shall I say? — logically; there are certain things in regard to the defense of the United States that it is advisable, for the defense of the United States, should be kept confidential; and that is why, occasionally, before certain committees on the Hill, these matters — which for national safety it is believed ought to be kept confidential — are spoken of by the experts along those lines — are spoken of only in secret or executive sessions of a committee.

There is not very much new in this; I mean, it has been going on, I think, since 1776. It still lives, this problem does; and this morning, when I started my breakfast, I read front-page stories in all the papers about the Chief of Staff of the Army who was said to have given certain information to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; and the stories then went on to say exactly what this Nation was supposed to have done.

Well, you raise two questions, both of which concern ethics, morals, and patriotism in exactly the same way. The first question is, frankly, as to whether members of that committee, ethically, morally, or patriotically ought to disclose to

7. *Seven Hundred and Twentieth Press Conference*

anybody on the outside what was said. I am simply raising this as an interesting problem.

No. 2: If they do disclose what went on in the secret meeting, it is perfectly obvious that any reporter who is worth his salt will try to find out — perfectly all right. If the story is disclosed to him by a member of the committee, either under seal of secrecy or without any seal of secrecy — it is perfectly all right for the reporter to take that story to his office, because that is part of a reporter's business. So I don't think there is any blame attaching to any reporter who carried those stories to his office; but the printing of the story or putting it on the wires by press associations or newspaper offices in Washington presents another very different, very difficult problem: Is or isn't the owner or the manager or the managing editor or the head of the Washington office under the same moral or ethical or patriotic duty not to print a story which has come out through a violation of confidence, out of a secret session of a Senate committee?

That is a nice question — something that ought to be thought about; and, as I say, I don't attach any blame to any of the newspapermen who got these stories — that is a part of your job, obviously — but I do raise the question in regard to newspapers printing a story of that kind.

And, finally, just to close the thing up, I have got in my hand here from the Chief of Staff a story of what he said, that size (*holding up a typewritten sheet*). It is completely different from any of the stories which actually did appear, second- or third-hand, in any of the papers this morning.

Q. Mr. President, in that connection, isn't there a difference between what might be published in peacetime and what might be published in wartime?

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean?

Q. High officials do give some testimony affecting the welfare of the American people; don't you think it is the function of the press to keep the public informed?

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to say that it is the duty of the

7. *Seven Hundred and Twentieth Press Conference*

press to publish what are considered to be military secrets involving the safety of the country?

Q. No, sir, I made that clear; I didn't include that.

THE PRESIDENT: I fail to see exactly what you are driving at.

Q. Can you tell us, in the interests of accuracy, what the facts are?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly not! That would be what you might call compounding a felony.

Q. Would you consider, sir, that the publication this morning has injured American defense in any way?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do.

Q. The reason I ask that is because you threw a doubt in my mind as to its accuracy.

THE PRESIDENT: It is not correct, in the first place, but a lot of people are going to think it is. . . .

Q. Mr. President, what *does* constitute a national defense secret?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think we have ever had any trouble about that before. There has been mighty little that has been kept secret, and I don't think it has hurt anybody. They are things that have been kept secret on the advice or recommendation of the people who are responsible — primarily responsible — for American defense, the Army and Navy.

Q. Mr. President, if the attitude is taken that any testimony given on the Hill in executive session remains secret, isn't the final test what the Government wants to give out and what it doesn't want to give out?

THE PRESIDENT: No, only if the Government didn't give out or held secret things that there was no reason for holding secret.

Q. Then what *is* the test?

THE PRESIDENT: The test is what the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy thinks would be harmful to the defense of this country to give out.

Q. He is not required to give that to a Congressional committee which leaks.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

7. *Seven Hundred and Twentieth Press Conference*

Q. Then that would be the safest way — not to give it to a Congressional committee.

THE PRESIDENT: It might be the safest way; but of course, naturally, one doesn't like to withhold information from committees of Congress. The best way would be to have no disclosures by members of the committee and no disclosures by publishers.

Q. If there is a conflict?

THE PRESIDENT: Then the second is essential.

Q. The second is a reporter taking it to his office.

THE PRESIDENT: No, the printing of it, I am talking about.

Q. You would not have the second if the first did not arise.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. In your criticism of the press —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) I am not criticizing the press — haven't been.

Q. May we suggest that you include the radio also?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, quite right. It does raise an interesting question of ethics, morals, and patriotism.

Q. Assuming that these reports endanger the country, do you think we ought to be thinking about the possibility of censorship, without a declaration of war?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course not; that is why I am putting it up to the people of the country.

Q. You think it ought to be done voluntarily?

THE PRESIDENT: There is no question of censorship.

Q. You want the papers to figure on some method of their own?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. You have taken it up with the press; do you intend to raise the problem before the members of Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: Let's have a little discussion and see what the Congress does.

NOTE: Not until after America entered the war was any governmental censorship instituted. For an account of the establishment and activities of the Office of Censorship, see Item 138 and note, this volume.

8. *Housing and Community Facilities*

8 (The Congress Is Requested to Authorize \$150,000,000 for Housing and Community Facilities for Defense Centers.

February 24, 1941

To the Congress:

THE national defense program has required a large expansion of existing military and naval establishments. The Government has constructed new cantonments, air depots, and naval bases. We have financed and stimulated the construction of hundreds of new industrial plants to produce airplanes, guns, powder, ships, and tanks. This program has been spread throughout the country and has resulted in new concentrations of military forces and civilian workers.

Military and naval strategy has been the controlling factor in determining the location of many of these new defense establishments. As a result posts and plants have been necessarily located near communities without adequate public facilities and services for the large numbers of workers who arrived to construct them and who will be needed to operate the new establishments. There have been shortages of housing, insufficient sanitary and health facilities, overcrowding of transportation services, and inadequate recreational facilities. In fact, this shortage of essential public facilities has handicapped our rearmament effort in some areas.

The Government has already embarked on a defense housing program, but that is not enough. We must do more to obtain the most effect from new plants, new houses, and, most important, from new workers. There is need, in some areas, for improved streets and roads to carry the increased traffic, additional water supply and sewerage systems to service the new structures, and better health, safety, and welfare facilities to benefit the new workers and their families.

The provision of such community facilities has always been a local responsibility. It still is today; cities generally have been

8. *Housing and Community Facilities*

straining to meet the problem. Yet we must face the fact we cannot expect local governments to assume all the risk of financing the entire cost of providing new public facilities for the defense program.

After the defense program comes to an end, these new facilities may not be needed. This increase in operating and service costs may also be much greater than a coexistent rise in local public revenues from an increased business activity. Under these circumstances, equity requires that that element of risk attributable to the national defense effort should be shared by the Federal Government.

I am therefore transmitting for the consideration of the Congress a supplemental estimate of appropriation to be available for allocation to appropriate Government agencies, and to remain available until expended, in the amount of \$150,000,000 for the purpose of providing community facilities in those communities where there exists or impends such an acute shortage of such facilities as to impede essential national defense activities, and where such facilities cannot otherwise be provided. This estimate is based upon studies and recommendations submitted by the Chairman of the National Resources Planning Board, the Coordinator of Defense Housing, the Administrator of the Federal Works Agency, the Coordinator of Health, Medical, Welfare and Related Activities Affecting the National Defense, and the Director of the Division of State and Local Cooperation of the Defense Commission.

NOTE: As the defense program moved forward, great new war production centers arose rapidly, taxing the existing community facilities for transportation, housing, recreation, health, safety, and welfare. The problem of adequate housing for defense workers required top priority, and numerous steps were taken at the urging of the President to insure adequate

housing for defense workers. (See Item 156 and note, pp. 703-709, 1940 volume; Items 51 and 59 and notes, this volume; Items 24 and 56 and notes, 1942 volume; and Item 49 and note, 1943 volume.)

On October 14, 1940, the President had signed the Lanham Act (54 Stat. 1125), which developed into the cornerstone of the Administration's public housing and com-

8. *Housing and Community Facilities*

munity facilities program during the defense and war periods.

The Lanham Act originally authorized funds for the housing of enlisted men and civilian employees of the Army and Navy and workers engaged in vital defense industries. Following receipt of the foregoing message of the President, the Congress passed legislation adding to the Lanham Act provisions which authorized the construction of public works — primarily schools, water works, sewers, garbage and refuse disposal facilities, public sanitary facilities, works for the treatment and purification of water, hospitals, recreational facilities, and streets and access roads. Under this legislation, which the President approved June 28, 1941 (55 Stat. 361), the Federal Works Agency was authorized to make loans or grants; it was also authorized directly to construct public works necessary to relieve shortages in areas where the President indicated that such shortages interfered with the defense program.

The legislation approved on June 28, 1941, authorized the appropriation of \$150,000,000 for carrying out the defense public works provisions of the Lanham Act. By later amendments, this amount was increased to \$530,000,000.

In the first year of the operation of the public works program, the President approved 1,652 construction projects which cost slightly over \$250,000,000. One-third of these projects involved the construc-

tion of schools. It became necessary after Pearl Harbor to pare down the number of projects undertaken, to confine them largely to one- or two-story temporary buildings, and to omit the use of critical steel, iron, copper, and other vital materials. The War Production Board, Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, Public Health Service, and National Housing Agency assisted in certifying the need for construction of additional community facilities. As of June 30, 1945, 6,867 projects had been approved at an estimated cost of approximately \$750,000,000, about two-thirds of which represented allotments by the Federal Government. Of these projects, 2,829 were for the maintenance and operation of war public services, while 4,038 were for the construction of war public works.

On June 30, 1945, the projects completed or in the pre-construction stage included 1,131 schools, 810 general hospitals, 727 recreation facilities, 456 water systems, 441 sewer systems, and lesser numbers of venereal disease hospitals, fire and police stations, streets and highways, and miscellaneous facilities. These construction activities were carried out in every State, in the territories, and in island possessions, with the concentrated areas of war production and military and naval installations leading in the number of projects.

Early in the war, the Federal Government bore a greater percentage of the cost of these facilities.

9. *Reed Committee Report on Civil Service*

This trend was reversed later, and during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, local communities financed 38.7 percent of construction under the Lanham Act, as compared with only 20 percent in the three preceding fiscal years.

In order more rapidly to solve the acute shortage of community facilities in congested war centers, it became necessary in 1943 for the President to take additional action. By Executive Order No. 9327 the President on April 7, 1943, created the Committee on Congested Production Areas (see Item 34 and note, 1943 volume) to expedite the provision of necessary community facilities in areas where the short-

age was most acute. In contrast to the Federal Works Agency under the Lanham Act, the Committee on Congested Production Areas was not an operating or construction agency, but it did succeed in breaking a number of bottlenecks in order to provide congested areas with necessary facilities.

Additional assistance to communities in supplying necessary war services and health and recreation facilities was provided by the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services (see Item 86 and note, this volume), which was succeeded in 1943 by the Office of Community War Services.

9 ¶ The President Transmits the Report of the Committee on Civil Service Improvement to the Congress. February 24, 1941

To the Congress:

WHATEVER differences there may have been as to details there is no disagreement among thinking men that the great social and technological advances of our national community have made inevitable a large extension of governmental activity. The civil service conception is a postulate of our Government. Therefore, the effective administration of the laws by which this new governmental effort has been brought about, no matter how carefully they may have been formed, has demanded extension of the civil service to take care of these new undertakings. Since March 4, 1933, many positions have been placed by Executive Order within the civil service, but for obvious reasons we have been rather

9. Reed Committee Report on Civil Service

laggard in extending it to those higher positions in the Government which are especially dependent on initiative, imagination, and flexibility. We ought now to appraise the qualities necessary for those who discharge those highest functions, as well as to achieve for them an independence and security which assure the conditions for the best governmental service. These are after all the underlying elements of the civil service ideals. I have deemed it important to try to work out ways and means whereby the country would have the advantages that come from a professional and permanent public service even in the most exacting positions of the national administration.

To that end, by Executive Order 8044 of January 31, 1939, I appointed a committee which should give assurances of disinterestedness and represent ample knowledge of the philosophy and practices of civil service and broad experience with the processes of personnel selection in large enterprises both private and governmental. I named such a committee the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement. I asked this committee to make a comprehensive study of civil service procedure in relation to governmental positions, classed as professional, scientific, higher administrative, and investigative. The committee was requested to inquire into the needs of these services and to recommend the most effective ways for meeting these needs.

Their report has now reached me and in view of its importance for furthering the betterment of the national public administration, I consider it appropriate to bring it to the attention of the Congress. The report should assist all of us who are concerned with the development of a personnel service which shall measure up to the requirements of the complicated public business. And that public business is not likely to be less complicated in the future or less demanding in its contact of men and women of enterprise, originality, disinterestedness, or devotion. Good laws and practices thereunder are of course indispensable but a Government of laws must be through men and these should be chosen with an eye singly to their suitability for the great calling of the public service. I am confident that the report which I am here-

9. *Reed Committee Report on Civil Service*

with transmitting will help in devising effective means for enlarging the scope and extending the area of this type of civil service.

NOTE: The question whether a civil service system should be extended to lawyers has long been a knotty issue. The desirability of removing the hiring, pay, and tenure of lawyers in the Federal Government from political influence or personal partisanship has been a strong factor for including them under civil service. But many lawyers, both in and out of Government, have strongly urged that the profession of law is far too highly personalized to be susceptible of proper inclusion in civil service without putting a premium on mediocrity. The difficult issue was brought to a head by the President's issuance of Executive Order No. 7916 on June 24, 1938 (see Item 79 and note, pp. 385-390, 1938 volume). That order extended the competitive classified civil service, and there followed in its wake keen debate concerning the proper methods of extending the merit system to Government lawyers. The President recognized the difficulty of the problem. He knew that there was no ready answer. He concluded that a thorough study by experts was necessary, and he therefore issued Executive Order No. 8044 on January 31, 1939, which established the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement. (See Item 24 and note, pp. 108-109, 1939 volume.)

Appointed to the President's Committee were seven leading ad-

vocates of civil service reform: Stanley Reed, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, was chairman. Felix Frankfurter, also an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court; Attorney General Frank Murphy; William H. McReynolds, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (later the President's Liaison Officer for Personnel Management); Leonard White, former Civil Service Commissioner; General Robert E. Wood, Chairman of the Board of Sears, Roebuck & Co.; and Gano Dunn, engineer, were members of the Committee, which was known as the "Reed Committee."

Although a major reason for the creation of the Reed Committee was to make recommendations concerning the problems of the application of the classified civil service to lawyers, the President also directed that the Committee consider the issue in respect to other higher level professional, scientific, and administrative fields as well. The Committee was voluntarily assisted by many individuals and groups in the fields under investigation. It appointed advisory committees on lawyers, general and specialized engineering, architects, natural scientists, administrators, social scientists and economists, and retirement, all but the last of which were subject

9. *Reed Committee Report on Civil Service*

to the direction of one or more members of the full Committee.

The report and recommendations of the Reed Committee advanced no revolutionary doctrine in the field of personnel practices. These were matters which had been the subject of much discussion among advocates of improved Federal personnel, and had already been tested to some degree by the Civil Service Commission itself. Yet the distinguished membership of the Reed Committee, its sponsorship by the President, and the comprehensive nature of its work emphasized the inherent importance of its recommendations and thus gave significant impetus toward extending and strengthening the merit system.

The Committee recommended that all professional, scientific, and higher administrative positions not involving determination of policy should be placed under the competitive classified service. It recommended additional staff for the Civil Service Commission to strengthen its recruitment and classification procedures. Specialized methods of examination and selection were recommended for engineers, architects, natural scientists, social scientists and economists.

The Committee was unanimous in its conclusion that the civil service principle should be extended to cover attorneys. It was divided, however, on how this should be done. One group recommended that there be developed simply an

unranked register of lawyers eligible for Federal work, from which the agencies could choose the individuals as they pleased, while the lawyer would also be left with some choice concerning the agency for which he would work. Another group concluded, on the other hand, that lawyers should be assimilated to other civil servants, and that existing civil service rules should be fully applied to them.

Meanwhile, on November 26, 1940, the President had approved the Ramspeck Act (54 Stat. 1211), which authorized the extension of the civil service system to many Federal employees not previously covered. The passage of the Ramspeck Act enabled the President to carry out a number of the basic recommendations of the Reed Committee through Executive Orders. In the first of these, Executive Order No. 8743 issued on April 23, 1941, the President placed 85,000 additional persons under civil service; he also established the Board of Legal Examiners to select and pass on lawyer applicants for Federal service. (See Item 31 and note, this volume.)

Throughout his tenure, the President exerted efforts to raise the standards of the public service. He supported and put into effect the recommendation of the President's Committee on Administrative Management that the merit system be extended "upward, outward, and downward." (See Item 41 and note, pp. 179-192, 1938 volume.) Al-

9. *Reed Committee Report on Civil Service*

though Congress declined to carry out that Committee's recommendation that a single Administrator replace the three-member Civil Service Commission, the President secured many of the objectives sought by this recommendation by appointing one of his Administrative Assistants, William H. McReynolds, as Liaison Officer for Personnel Management.

By Executive Order No. 7916 (see Item 79, pp. 385-390, 1938 volume), the President extended the competitive classified civil service and also established the Council of Personnel Administration to advise and assist the President and the Civil Service Commission in the protection and improvement of the merit system.

In 1939, the President recommended "that the States be required, as a condition for the receipt of Federal funds, to establish and maintain a merit system for the selection of personnel" in administering the State public assistance and employment security services under the Social Security Act. (See Item 11, p. 79, 1939 volume.) The Congress passed and the

President signed this amendment to the Social Security Act (see Item 109 and note, pp. 439-441, 1939 volume).

The President took other steps to raise the level of competence in the Federal service and to minimize the effects of political patronage. He firmly resisted attempts to obtain appointments to the Tennessee Valley Authority on a patronage basis; he strongly supported the provision of the T.V.A. legislation which required that "no political test or qualification shall be permitted or given consideration, but all such appointments and promotions shall be given and made on the basis of merit and efficiency." As a result, T.V.A. has become recognized as an outstanding example of an agency selecting its personnel on a merit basis, free of political influence — and indeed has annually become a target for some legislators for that very reason.

As a result of the President's program, the number of permanent Federal positions included under the Civil Service Act reached 92 percent.

10 ¶ “Our Own Problem of Defense . . .
Involves the Future of Democracy Wherever
It Is Imperiled by Force or Terror” — Ad-
dress to Annual Awards Dinner of Academy
of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.

February 27, 1941

I AM HAPPY to greet the motion picture industry of America, whose representatives are gathered from far and near for the Annual Awards Dinner of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.

In these days of anxiety and world peril our hearts and minds and all of our energies are directed toward one objective. That objective is the strengthening of our national defense. Every day that passes we realize that more and more things in our lives must be evaluated in just such proportion as they contribute to the national defense.

The American motion picture as a national and international force is a phenomenon of our own generation. Within living memory we have seen it born and grow up into full maturity. We have seen the American motion picture become foremost in all the world. We have seen it reflect our civilization throughout the rest of the world — the aims and the aspirations and the ideals of a free people and of freedom itself.

That is the real reason that some Governments do not want our American films exhibited in *their* countries. Dictators — those who enforce the totalitarian form of government — think it a dangerous thing for their unfortunate peoples to know that in *our* democracy officers of the Government are the servants, and never the masters of the people.

In all that I have said on that all-important subject through many months past I have emphasized that in the assault on the democratic form of government that imperils world civilization

10. Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences

today, our problem of national defense has become one of helping to defend the entire Western Hemisphere — all three of the Americas — North, Central, and South. We can no longer consider our own problem of defense as a separate interest. It involves the defense of all the democracies of all the Americas — and therefore, in fact, it involves the future of democracy wherever it is imperiled by force or terror.

An all-important factor in hemispheric defense, in defense of democracies today, is the Lend-Lease Bill, whose early enactment by the Congress we confidently anticipate. It is a pleasure here and now to acknowledge the great service which the newsreels have performed in acquainting the public with all of the implications of this measure as it makes its way through the various legislative stages.

Acceptance of the task of cooperating with all the Americas in defending the entire Western Hemisphere, implicit in our plans for national defense, is a natural outgrowth of our own good neighbor policy in our relations with the other American Republics. Happily for democracy, the Americas stand forth today as a notable example of international solidarity in a world in which freedom and human liberty are threatened with extinction.

We have been seeking to affirm our faith in the Western world through a wider exchange of culture, and of education, and of thought and free expression among the various Nations of this hemisphere. Your industry has utilized, and is utilizing, its vast resources of talent and facilities in a sincere effort to help the people of this hemisphere to come to know each other better.

In carrying on this program of advancing the spirit of inter-American solidarity and continental defense, our Government has established machinery to coordinate our growing commercial and cultural relations with the other American Republics. Our Government has invited you to do your share of the job of interpreting the people of the Western Hemisphere to one another. And all of us in all the twenty-one American Republics and in Canada are grateful that your response is so immediate and so wholehearted.

11. *Seven Hundred and Twenty-third Press Conference*

I do not minimize the importance of the motion picture industry as the most popular medium of mass entertainment. But tonight I want to place the chief emphasis on the service you can render in promoting solidarity among all the peoples of the Americas.

For all of this and for your splendid cooperation with all who are directing the expansion of our defense forces, I am glad to thank you. In the weeks and the months that lie ahead we in Washington know that we shall have your continued aid and support.

11 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Twenty-third Press Conference (Excerpts). March 4, 1941

(Eight years in retrospect — The labor situation — Union fees — Use of manpower.)

THE PRESIDENT: I have been incommunicado — or perhaps some people would say *excommunicado* — for so long I don't know what has happened; maybe you can give *me* the news. . . .

Q. Mr. President, would you care to give us a reminiscent thought on eight years ago today?

THE PRESIDENT: You could say that I, personally, do not feel any different than I have at any time during the eight years. We have a different kind of crisis, a world crisis instead of a domestic crisis, eight years later. In some ways, on a comparable basis for the future of the country, it is probably more serious than the one eight years ago. I think we might let it go at that.

Q. Mr. President, do you see any cause for concern in the labor situation as affecting the defense projects?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course that is a question that would take half an hour to answer — the kind of question that can't be answered. It's a little like saying, "Have you stopped beating your wife? — yes or no?" It's an impossible question to answer as is. Perhaps I can illustrate by telling you this: I got a letter

11. *Seven Hundred and Twenty-third Press Conference*

— oh, yesterday or the day before — from a very worthy citizen in Florida who was frightfully upset because of what he had read. Where he had read it, I am not saying; but anyway it was because of what he had read. And he said, in effect, this: “We are all horrified by the complete breakdown of defense production because of strikes.” In other words, he got it into his head that there was a breakdown in production because of strikes. Now, of course there are a certain number of strikes; and I would hate to give you this as the definitive figure, but I think it is approximately correct that about a quarter of one percent of production has been affected by strikes at any given time. A quarter of one percent is what? — one four-hundredth; so you see the gentleman had got an erroneous impression from what he had read, according to his own statement. That’s worth thinking about. In other words, somebody had written something — I am not saying where — that had caused a perfectly worthy citizen to get a false impression, and that is a great pity for our defense effort. . . .

Q. Mr. President, do you think it is justified for the labor unions to charge fees on construction projects on all men, whether or not they are members of unions, for a job?

THE PRESIDENT: I can’t talk to a general question; give me some specific instances, cases, places; then I will look it up and find out whether the facts are in accordance with the statements; then I will give you an answer after that.

Q. Do you want this in a memo? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: In other words, I can’t talk glittering generalities.

Q. You have heard of the situation, have you not?

THE PRESIDENT: I have heard of one or two specific cases where the fees charged for joining a union were exorbitant; and those cases were taken up by the [American] Federation of Labor for the international concern, and they reported that the practice has been stopped. You have to be specific; I’ll be specific if you are.

Q. All I can do is to refer to testimony before the House Judiciary Committee.

12. *Eighth Anniversary of New Deal Farm Program*

THE PRESIDENT: That has all been referred to the Department of Justice and the Federation of Labor; I think they were all A.F.L. cases. . . .

Q. What about that plan the marine wrote in about for old soldiers and the rest of the people to do something?

THE PRESIDENT: That home defense thing?

Q. Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: That's one of the most difficult things to put together in administrative form that I have had yet, because it covers so many different things in life. It's sort of a general endeavor on the part of men, women, and children in every State in the Union, and it is very hard to set up the right kind of administrative machinery that at the same time will allow it to be decentralized and run primarily by the various communities themselves. Frankly, I have been at it now for about a month, you know — over a month — and I haven't decided on what kind of final machinery to set up. I am still having conferences on it. It's one of those real troubles.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President!

NOTE: Special machinery for the settlement of labor disputes in defense industries was established when the President created the National Defense Mediation Board on

March 19, 1941 (see Item 20 and note, this volume). For an account of the establishment and activities of the Office of Civilian Defense, see Item 42 and note, this volume.

12 ¶ “The Farm Front Is Ready for Any Demand of Total Defense” — Radio Address on the Eighth Year of the New Deal Agricultural Policy. March 8, 1941

I AM GLAD to be able to take part again in this anniversary celebration. Eight long years ago today I sent out a call for farmers and farm leaders to come to Washington to help draft farm legis-

12. Eighth Anniversary of New Deal Farm Program

lation to meet the emergency; and that meeting led directly to the national farm programs that we now have.

Farmers did their work well. Agriculture was almost helpless, as we remember, before the emergencies of 1933 but in September, 1939, when another crisis confronted us, the crisis of the second World War, farming was far better prepared.

The reasons for the favorable position of agriculture in the late summer of 1939 are not hard to find. Agriculture probably suffered more than any other industry from the shortsighted national policies that followed the end of the first World War. When the farmers arrived here in response to my call of March 8, 1933, I found a group eager for action and ready to lay aside minor differences. They knew that there was no time to lose.

So when the second World War began a year and a half ago, the farm programs inaugurated in 1933 served as what might be called shock-absorbers for agriculture. We had no repetition of the "Buy-a-Bale" movement and other ineffective proposals for farm relief that followed August of 1914.

Today there is no call to plow up the plains. American agriculture is in splendid condition to play its full part in the program of national defense. Our granaries are full. Our stores of food and fiber are adequate to meet our own needs at home — yes, and the needs of our friends in the other lands now fighting for their existence — fighting in behalf of all democratic forms of government, fighting against world control by dictatorships.

The country is glad that there are no bottlenecks in our agricultural production. The farm front is ready for any demand of total defense.

It is no accident that the farmers of our country stand ready to serve in the severe trial ahead of us. Their preparedness is the fruit of their own voluntary, concerted efforts, stretching back over all these years.

These efforts are embodied in national farm programs, conceived by the farmers and administered by the farmers.

To me the story of that achievement is a genuine inspiration. Back in 1933, farmers balked at the philosophy of fear and in-

12. Eighth Anniversary of New Deal Farm Program

action. Assisted by their Government, they came together and began to work together to solve some of these difficulties. Through their programs they have raised farm income. They are conserving their soil. They are rehabilitating poverty-stricken farmers. The farm front is a broad one but national programs for agriculture touch every part of this front, in every part of the land.

Six million farmers cooperating in these national programs are helping to give the answer to those who question the future of democracy. I am well aware that these programs have not solved all the farm problems. Out of the present war have arisen new difficulties and new demands. The postwar world will be different in many ways from the world that we knew before September, 1939. But given a sympathetic national administration, farmers can meet these postwar problems as they met the problems of 1933. They *can* achieve the equality they must have if they are to make their proper contribution to the national defense and to the American way of life.

It is the fate of this common life that weighs upon all our hearts tonight. And it may interest you to know that only a few hours ago the Senate passed, by a vote of about two to one, the Lend-Lease Bill for aid to the democracies of the world that are trying to save their democracy. The farmer, no less than the businessman and the workman, has his eyes turned to the world situation.

Democracy over large areas of the Old World is threatened with extinction. And no democratic farm program in the United States, nor the democratic way of life here, can hope to survive the death of democracy over the rest of the earth.

We cannot escape our collective responsibility for the kind of life that is going to emerge from the ordeal through which the world is passing today. We cannot be an island. We may discharge that responsibility unwisely but we cannot escape the consequences of our choice. We would have it a world in which we may live in peace, live in freedom, live in security — the kind of world our farmer forefathers dreamed of and worked for as

13. *Tribute to Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes*

they settled the old Atlantic seaboard and pushed their way into the West. I am confident that the farmers of 1941 want this kind of world to survive.

13 ¶ The President's Tribute to Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes on the One Hundredth Anniversary of His Birth. March 8, 1941

IT IS THE quality of great men that they continue to live long after they are gone. We celebrate the birthday anniversaries of those who in the past have wrought enduringly for the Republic, in order to refresh our spirit and strengthen our will for the tasks of our own day. In reverence of his memory and regard for our own needs, it is appropriate that we should pause on Saturday, March eighth, to draw strength and encouragement from the life of the late Mr. Justice Holmes, who was born one hundred years ago.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was born within a few days of the inauguration of William Henry Harrison as President. Merely to recall that fact suggests the transformations in our national life in the century between March 8, 1841, and March 8, 1941, that make William Henry Harrison remote to our thoughts today.

But Mr. Justice Holmes's wisdom and services to his country kept abreast of these changes. Whether as hero on battlefields or in the less dramatic struggles within a judge's private conscience, Mr. Justice Holmes's life was devoted to those ultimate purposes of civilization to which the Founders dedicated this Nation. He believed passionately in the moral worth of the individual regardless of race or religion or the accident of antecedents. He therefore believed in the unfettered spirit without which man cannot live a civilized life.

This is the faith by which Mr. Justice Holmes was moved to the high endeavor of his life. This is the faith in which he lived

14. *Seven Hundred and Twenty-fifth Press Conference*

and died. This faith he commemorated by leaving his modest fortune to the Government as the representative and the agent of the people of the United States. We do well to cherish the life and memory of this great man as part of our national heritage.

NOTE: On the 92nd birthday of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes — four days after President Roosevelt had been inaugurated in 1933 — the President paid a call on Justice Holmes. This was rather unusual and unprecedented, inasmuch as the President rarely if ever visits other individuals, but receives callers instead at the White House. Yet it was not unusual in the light of the long and useful service rendered to the Nation by Justice Holmes, and the President's appreciation of the magnificent contributions which Justice Holmes made on the United States Supreme Court. (See Item 23, pp. 93-94, 1935 volume, for the President's statement on the death of Justice Holmes; see Item 46, pp. 130-131, 1935 volume, for the President's message to the Congress following Justice Holmes's will bequeathing his estate to the Treasury of the United States Government.)

14 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Twenty-fifth Press Conference (Excerpt). March 11, 1941

(Approval of the Lend-Lease Act.)

THE PRESIDENT: At quarter to four or ten minutes to four, the [Lend-Lease] Bill [H. R. 1776] was duly signed in the presence of the press photographers and the picture people; and immediately thereafter — after they left the room — the second step happened. After talking the thing over with the Army and Navy authorities, the first list of material was approved — Army and Navy material which will go, the greater part of it, to Britain; a portion of it will go to the Greeks. The items, of course, involved must of necessity and fairness be kept secret until such time that the disclosure of their military identity will not be of benefit to anybody else.

At the meeting this morning on that line, I told the Senate and House members of the Committee — we talked it over — and I made the suggestion that they appoint from the two

14. Seven Hundred and Twenty-fifth Press Conference

Appropriations Committees a small subcommittee that would feel entirely free to come down here at any time and be kept in complete and constant touch with everything that is being done under Bill No. 1776.

Of course, there is nothing that could not be disclosed except some of these things which probably we should defer announcing — the type of material or amounts involved — for purely military reasons for a reasonably short time. This particular list of items relates both to the Army and Navy. It is not a very large amount. I only have at the present time the figures showing the total original cost, because you will understand that that does not necessarily mean the billing price for the reason that a great many of these articles are out of date or surplus and haven't got the same monetary value that they had when they were manufactured a good many years ago.

And then I — well, you saw the gentlemen when they went out; they told you about the letter tomorrow which will be the usual — I have forgotten whether it is deficiency or supplemental estimate letter — to the Speaker. It is not a message to the Congress, because this is an appropriation bill and it goes in in the form of a deficiency or supplemental estimate to the Speaker, and, under the rules of the House, it is referred by him to the Appropriations Committee; and then they start hearings, I think, the day after. My letter will go up at noon tomorrow, and they will start the hearings on Thursday; so there is no waste of time in this procedure.

Q. Mr. President, you said you had a total of the value; are you going to tell us what that is?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Mr. President, you called these supplemental or deficiency —
THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) I don't know whether they call it deficiency or supplemental.

Q. Usually supplemental is for the current year; is this for the current year?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

14. *Seven Hundred and Twenty-fifth Press Conference*

Q. What I am getting at, will there be another one for next year?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. You better ask them on the Hill what they want to call it; really, it is an appropriation bill under H. R. 1776.

Q. Mr. President, you have indicated that this list of stuff is current material, surplus, et cetera.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. I haven't read the bill lately; that bill mentioned a certain amount.

THE PRESIDENT: Up to a billion, three hundred million; the amount arrived at — the value of this stuff — will come out of that billion, three hundred million.

Q. I was going to ask you further, sir, if you will permit me, if there have been any terms or any dicker; have you made a deal with these people?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Will that be made public at any time you do so?

THE PRESIDENT: As soon as it is proper. Of course the Congressional people will know about it, but it won't be made public until the items themselves are made public. You couldn't do any figuring on dollars and cents unless you knew what the items were.

Q. Mr. President, is this a lending or a leasing procedure?

THE PRESIDENT: I give it up; I'm not interested.

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us when the proposed aid to China may be forthcoming?

THE PRESIDENT: The what?

Q. Aid for China; I heard you mention Britain and Greece.

THE PRESIDENT: That's all I've done today! (*Laughter*)

Q. Will there be aid to China?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I guess so.

Q. Would it depend, sir, on the report that Lauchlin Currie makes to you?

THE PRESIDENT: That might have something to do with it; I wouldn't say it would depend on it.

15. Request for \$7,000,000,000 for Lend-Lease

Q. Mr. President, will some of this be out of the 1942 budget?

THE PRESIDENT: There is not much we can talk about yet because it is still in the process of working out on the Hill as to whether certain types of things taken out by anticipation, things already ordered but not yet delivered, already appropriated for and ordered and which would fall into the one-billion-three-hundred-million-dollar category — as to whether they should be deducted, or any portion of them, from the seven-billion-dollar appropriation or not. That is a thing that is really a legislative matter and we hadn't worked it out this morning. There are too many categories of things in there to make an over-all statement; some might and some might not. . . .

Q. Is it proper for you to say whether any of this equipment is now on the way?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, no, none of it is on the way — at least it wasn't until five minutes to four, because I didn't approve it until then. We work fast, but there *are* limitations! (*Laughter*)

NOTE: For accounts of the genesis of Lend-Lease, and the operation of the lend-lease program, see the following references: Item 145, pp. 606-615, 1940 volume; Item 152 and note, pp. 668-678, 1940 volume; Item 157, p. 710, 1940 volume; Items 15, 17, 28, 37, 52, 76, 82, 96, 105, 111, 123 and notes, this volume; Item 31, 1942 volume; Items 30, 98, 119 and 124, 1943 volume; and Items 25 and 31, 1944-1945 volume.

15 ¶ The President Requests an Appropriation of \$7,000,000,000 to Finance the Lend-Lease Program. March 12, 1941

My dear Mr. Speaker:

THIS Nation has felt that it was imperative to the security of America that we encourage the democracies' heroic resistance to aggressions, by not only maintaining but also increasing the flow

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of material assistance from this country. Therefore, the Congress has enacted and I have signed H. R. 1776.

Through this legislation, our country has determined to do its full part in creating an adequate arsenal of democracy. This great arsenal will be here in this country. It will be a bulwark of our own defense. It will be the source of the tools of defense for all democracies who are fighting to preserve themselves against aggression.

While the defense equipment produced under H. R. 1776 remains under the control of the United States until it is ready for disposition, it is the fixed policy of this Government to make for democracies every gun, plane, and munition of war that we possibly can.

To accomplish these objectives, I am transmitting an estimate in the amount of \$7,000,000,000, the details of which are set forth in the accompanying letter from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. I strongly urge the immediate enactment of this appropriation.

Respectfully,

Honorable Sam Rayburn,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

NOTE: There can be little question that the lend-lease program was at once one of the most brilliantly conceived and most important contributions of President Roosevelt to ultimate victory. The concept of lend-lease was evolved by the President late in 1940 as a means of defending the United States by furnishing striking power to those who were resisting the Nazi and Fascist forces. Many factors played a role in the President's determination to propose the plan of lend-lease. These factors in-

cluded principles of international economics, the desirability of speeding up war production in the United States, the necessity for building up American defenses, and the need to find a way of evolving a workable plan which would be wholeheartedly supported by the Congress and the American people.

As early as October, 1937, in his "quarantine" speech at Chicago (see Item 128, pp. 406-411, 1937 volume) the President had taken a courageous (although, from the point of view of the American peo-

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ple as a whole, still premature) stand against the spread of aggressive imperialism. Many times thereafter, the President proclaimed the need for curbing aggressor Nations.

His public pronouncements were supplemented by a series of affirmative actions designed to stem the increasing international lawlessness. After the outbreak of the war in 1939, the President realized that the existing embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions to belligerent countries aided the dictators at the expense of those countries fighting aggression. Accordingly, at his request, the Congress in extraordinary session repealed the embargo (see Item 130, 1939 volume). This permitted the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerent Nations on a cash-and-carry basis; i.e., the purchasers would send their ships here for the goods and pay cash for them.

During 1939 and 1940, the President took several other drastic steps to aid the democracies and to keep war away from the United States. Outstanding among those measures was the transfer of 50 over-age destroyers to Great Britain in September, 1940, and, in exchange therefor, the acquisition of naval and air bases on British territory, reaching from Newfoundland to the Caribbean area; and the supply of over \$40,000,000 worth of surplus stocks of rifles, machine guns, field artillery, ammunition, and aircraft to Great Britain following the evacu-

ation at Dunkirk (see note to Item 152, pp. 673-674, 1940 volume).

Even before the outbreak of the European war, Great Britain and France had placed many orders for munitions and aircraft in this country. Concurrently, between 1938 and 1940, the Export-Import Bank of Washington made loans to China totaling \$120,000,000. These loans made possible the purchase by China of American trucks, tires, gasoline, metals, machinery, and electrical equipment. (For an account of financial aid to China see Item 140 and note, pp. 587-595, 1940 volume.) Through these foreign purchases, American defense industries started to expand, to develop the "know-how" which so greatly aided the United States to mobilize its war industry and later to reach the high level of production which it did.

Several days after the passage of the Neutrality Act of 1939 (Nov. 4, 1939), a British Purchasing Commission established headquarters in this country to expedite the purchase of necessary war materials for Great Britain. The British assisted American defense expansion not only by direct purchases but by advancing capital for plant construction, lending the necessary machine tools, and otherwise investing in American manufacturing facilities. British orders made a substantial contribution to the expansion of American machine-tool production, shipbuilding, tanks, and aircraft.

The British and other purchas-

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ing countries were assisted by the work of the Interdepartmental Committee for Coordination of Foreign and Domestic Military Purchases. More popularly known as "the President's Liaison Committee," it had been created by a letter from the President on December 6, 1939, to the Secretaries of War, Navy, and the Treasury. This Liaison Committee cooperated with the foreign missions in placing contracts with American industries. It also helped create new facilities for the production of munitions in the United States, and it stimulated the interchange of plans and blueprints for aircraft and munitions.

After the fall of France, the British took over all of the French contracts for the purchase of matériel in the United States. By the autumn of 1940, British purchases of munitions in the United States rose to a total of over \$3,000,000,000 — a small figure when contrasted with ultimate American wartime expenditures, but a very large figure when contrasted with American prewar defense expenditures.

Late in 1940, however, as the British needs for American material became even more urgent, Britain was experiencing increasing difficulty in making payments. Her dollar and gold supply had become seriously depleted. It was impossible for her to replenish her supply of dollars by the export of British goods to the United States because so much of British production was being devoted to war that Britain

had few goods available to export. By the end of 1940, it was apparent that British dollar resources could not last much beyond January, 1941.

The President was well aware of the perilous economic position of Great Britain late in 1940. Accordingly, he began to give attention to some means of solving this grave problem in order that American munitions and material could continue to assist Great Britain in holding off Axis onslaughts and in this way protect America's first line of defense in Europe.

Several weeks after his reelection for a third term in November, 1940, the President left on a cruise on the *Tuscaloosa*. In the course of this cruise, which took him through the British West Indies area and enabled him to inspect sites for the new naval and air bases recently acquired from the British, the President had an opportunity to consider various alternatives for action which would continue the flow of American war materials to Britain. He concluded that the Congress and American public opinion would not support an outright repeal of provisions of the Neutrality Act without a long and bitter political battle. He felt that even if legislation could be enacted which would permit direct loans to Britain to improve her dollar supply, this would be only a temporary stopgap and would raise the same diplomatic frictions which accompanied war debt settlement discus-

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sions following the first World War. On the other hand, outright gifts of munitions and war matériel not only would be politically inexpedient in the United States, but also might be distasteful to the British people.

During his cruise, the President received a remarkable 4,000-word letter on December 9 from Prime Minister Churchill, reviewing in some detail the British military position and financial situation. This letter, which Churchill after the war termed one of the most important he ever wrote, posed no solution to the problem of how to alleviate Britain's financial squeeze. Nevertheless, it aided the President in his thinking on the subject during the quiet weeks he spent on the deck of the *Tuscaloosa*. Toward the end of his cruise, the President one evening unfolded the lend-lease idea in a conversation with Harry Hopkins. All that remained was to reduce the concept to legislative terms, and to explain it to the country with simplicity and in a way which would capture the imagination. The former was accomplished with the aid of brilliant individuals like Oscar Cox; the latter was done by Roosevelt himself.

After his return to the United States, the President in his historic press conference of December 17, 1940, advanced the concept of lend-lease for the first time in public (see Item 145, pp. 604-615, 1940 volume). This was the occasion at which he used his famous "garden

hose" metaphor pointing out that if a neighbor's home caught fire, you would lend him your garden hose to help put out the fire, without thought of charging for its use but rather in the hope and expectation of getting it back after the fire is out. The President indicated that the defense of Great Britain was the best defense of the United States, and that it was in the self-interest of the United States to lend-lease war materials to Great Britain as they came off American production lines, eliminating the dollar sign from the transaction.

In his fireside chat on national security, delivered on December 29, 1940, the President announced to the world that America would be "the great arsenal of democracy." (See Item 149, pp. 633-644, 1940 volume.) Lend-lease was to be the mechanism by which this objective was to be attained.

On January 6, 1941, the President in his annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union outlined in more detail the principles of lend-lease (see Item 152, pp. 663-678, and note, 1940 volume). On January 10, 1941, H. R. 1776 and its companion bill in the Senate were introduced in both houses of the Congress. (See note to Item 152, p. 674, 1940 volume, for the legislative history of the Lend-Lease Act, which the President approved on March 11, 1941—55 Stat. 31; see also note to Item 152, pp. 675-678, for an account of the

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provisions and initial administration of the Lend-Lease Act.)

Prompt Congressional action followed the President's request of March 12, 1941, set out in the foregoing message, recommending that \$7,000,000,000 be appropriated for the administration of the lend-lease program. The House of Representatives passed, by a vote of 336-55, a bill appropriating this full amount for lend-lease purposes, and the Senate approved the bill by 67-9; the President signed the bill on March 27, 1941 (55 Stat. 53). The new appropriation act, known as the "Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941," appropriated \$7,000,000,000 to remain available until June 30, 1943, for the procurement of defense articles, and for testing, inspecting, improving, repairing, outfitting, reconditioning, or otherwise placing in good working order any defense articles on behalf of foreign Nations whose defense was vital to ours. Subsequent appropriations vastly increased these sums available.

In 1943, the Congress, by overwhelming votes of 407-6 in the House of Representatives and 82-0 in the Senate, approved the extension of the Lend-Lease Act to June

30, 1944. Subsequent enactments extended the Lend-Lease Act to June 30, 1946, after which a three-year period to liquidate lend-lease affairs was provided.

Including the amount appropriated in the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, approximately \$62,413,000,000 were made available for lend-lease purposes from all appropriations (excluding funds available for the leasing of ships). As of V-J Day, the United States Government under the lend-lease program had supplied to its allies American materials and labor representing a total cost of \$48,665,000,000.

For about two months after the passage of the first Lend-Lease Act, the President's Liaison Committee had charge of its administration. On May 2, 1941, the President by the issuance of Executive Order No. 8751 established the Division of Defense Aid Reports for the administration of the Lend-Lease Act. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration was established by Executive Order No. 8926 on October 28, 1941. (See Items 28, 37, 52, 96, 105 and notes, this volume, for additional accounts of the administration of the Lend-Lease Act.)

16 ¶ The President Appoints a Committee to Recommend Means of Coordinating Foreign Relief Activities. March 13, 1941

I AM ENCLOSING a copy of a letter I have received from the Secretary of State with regard to certain problems existing in the field of foreign relief. I would be grateful if you would be good enough to serve on a committee of three I would like to appoint for the purpose of making a thorough canvass of this situation and making recommendations with regard to the best methods of dealing with the problems which have arisen therein.

It would be appreciated if the committee would arrange to meet in Washington at an early date, at which time I will be glad to put at its disposal such information on the subject as may be available.

Very sincerely yours,

(The foregoing letter was addressed to Joseph E. Davies; Charles P. Taft; and Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, President, Carnegie Corporation.)

NOTE: Even when American isolationism has been most virulent, Americans as individuals and America as a Nation have been very sensitive to human suffering, wherever in the world it may occur. All through the 1930's, for example, the persecutions in Nazi Germany, the Spanish Civil War, and Japanese aggressions in China stirred many private relief organizations and individuals to respond to the needs of humanity abroad.

The outbreak of the European war gave a fresh impetus for American relief to be sent abroad to the war sufferers. With the passage of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 and the mobilization of

American military forces, private relief and welfare agencies began to extend a number of services to men and women in uniform.

Under the terms of the Neutrality Act of 1939, all American voluntary agencies except the American Red Cross were required to register and submit monthly reports to the Department of State if they provided relief to individuals in belligerent countries. By successive Presidential proclamations, thirteen countries were designated as belligerent, and 545 separate agencies were registered with the Department of State. The registration and filing of reports required by the Neutrality Act were designed to prevent the

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support of unfriendly governments under the guise of relief for the unfortunate.

By early 1941, there was much competition among the hundreds of foreign and domestic relief agencies. This competition and duplication of staff and activities gave concern not only to the national leaders of these charities but also to local community officials and to local agencies such as community chests. This situation led the Secretary of State on March 3, 1941, to address the following letter to the President:

“Department of State
Washington

March 3, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

“Problems have arisen with regard to the raising of funds for private relief activities which I should lay before you, together with a suggestion for procedure which may aid in their solution.

“The human suffering which has been caused by the conflicts raging in other portions of the world has called forth the humanitarian efforts of the American people. At the same time needs at home have continued, as they have in the past, to inspire similar efforts to relieve human need in this country. It seems likely that these efforts will be increased by the natural concern of our people to provide in every way for the young men who have been called for military training. In the field of foreign relief about three hundred organizations, most of them of a temporary nature, are now registered with the Department of State in order that they may solicit and collect contributions. Here at home local private welfare agencies are continuing their efforts

and must continue to rely on public support. We are also informed that some of our people are planning to launch campaigns to finance activities in areas adjacent to military camps established under the Selective Service Act. All of these efforts are inspired by the finest human instincts, but there is growing danger that they may be frustrated if they are conducted without regard to one another and without proper coordination.

“In the field of foreign relief many agencies are now raising funds without full knowledge of the relief resources already at hand, the needs which actually require relief, or the shipping available for the transportation of relief materials. American aid is being extended to Great Britain, China, Greece, Finland, Spain and many other countries affected by the conflict through the American Red Cross and also through other organizations. While the need for greater coordination exists with regard to all of these undertakings, it is particularly apparent in British relief where the problem of obtaining shipping space for the transportation of relief materials is already serious and requires discriminating knowledge as to the needs existing and as to the most effective method of meeting them. Here it is particularly important that funds should not be solicited for categories of relief which have not been requested, or approved, or for which shipping space is not available. Moreover, in other countries of Europe, economic and military controls as well as limitations upon transportation and communication facilities make effective relief operation impracticable at the present time.

“In relief, both at home and abroad, it is advisable that the efforts of all the relief organizations be considered in their relation to the program of the American Red Cross, which, as you indicated in your statement of October

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12, 1939, holds both under the laws of the United States and under International Agreements an official status and bears definite responsibilities both in domestic and foreign relief and particularly in relation to our armed forces.

"My suggestion, therefore, would be that you appoint a committee of three men who are well informed on matters of local welfare, and foreign relief, and the needs for national defense. This committee might very well examine the entire problem and make recommendations as to what steps might be taken to preserve local and essential welfare services, and to maintain a balance between the facilities and resources available for foreign war relief with particular regard to the financing of new welfare activities in connection with national defense measures.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

The President,
The White House"

After receiving this letter from the Secretary of State, the President addressed his March 13 letter and the Honorable Joseph E. Davies then promptly accepted the chairmanship of the Committee. The President named as the other two members of the Committee Frederick P. Keppel and Charles P. Taft. The Committee immediately undertook a study in collaboration with other departments of the Government. In the course of this study, the Committee conferred with officials in the State, Treasury, War, and Navy Departments, and the Federal Security Agency; met with representatives of the American Red Cross and other relief and welfare organizations; and also solic-

ited information from private organizations such as the National Information Bureau, the National Better Business Bureau, and community chests and councils. The Committee also consulted with representatives of various foreign governments and studied the functions and policies of the National Department of War Services in Canada.

On October 4, 1941, the Committee submitted an interim report to the President. This report concluded that for the most part local welfare activities were well coordinated and community chests were conducting their fund-raising campaigns so as to avoid conflict with the Red Cross roll call. The Committee recognized that there was additional need for cooperation among the several hundred foreign war relief agencies in order to prevent conflicts in timing solicitations and to prevent waste and duplication. The Committee recommended that those private foreign war relief agencies which were not required to register with the Department of State under the provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1939 be requested to furnish the Committee monthly reports on a voluntary basis.

After the interim report of the Committee, the President requested that the Committee continue to function as an advisory agency to reduce confusion in the foreign war relief field, and also to act as a liaison between foreign relief agencies and the various governmental and

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domestic welfare organizations. As recommended by the Committee, a voluntary reporting procedure was established for those agencies not registered with the Department of State.

The coordination of these agencies proceeded during 1941, largely on a conference basis. For example, the Committee discovered that there were over seventy organizations, with many local branches, soliciting contributions for "blitz relief" in England. The Committee further found that although two of these organizations raised 60 percent of the total contributed for British relief, the presence of many other organizations in the field confused the contributors with their competitive appeals, and a great portion of the contributor's dollar went into overhead and did not reach the intended recipients in Britain. By a series of conferences

and suggestions, the Committee succeeded in merging a large number of these British relief agencies.

The entry of the United States into the war affected private war relief in much the same way as it affected many governmental activities. The need for speed, comprehensive action, and precision of operation became increasingly urgent. Accordingly, the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies both recommended to the President that a new authority be established with more adequate supervisory and regulatory powers. In response, the President issued Executive Order No. 9205 on July 25, 1942, establishing the President's War Relief Control Board. (For an account of the activities of the President's War Relief Control Board, see Item 77 and note, 1942 volume.)

17 ¶ "The Light of Democracy Must Be Kept Burning" — Address at Annual Dinner of White House Correspondents' Association. March 15, 1941

THIS dinner of the White House Correspondents' Association is unique. It is the first one at which I have made a speech in all these eight years. It differs from the press conferences that you and I hold twice a week, for you cannot ask me any questions tonight; and everything that I have to say is word for word "on the record."

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For eight years you and I have been helping each other. I have been trying to keep you informed of the news of Washington, of the Nation, and of the world, from the point of view of the Presidency. You, more than you realize, have been giving me a great deal of information about what the people of this country are thinking and saying.

In our press conferences, as at this dinner tonight, we include reporters representing papers and news agencies of many other lands. To most of them it is a matter of constant amazement that press conferences such as ours can exist in any Nation in the world.

That is especially true in those lands where freedoms do not exist — where the purposes of our democracy and the characteristics of our country and of our people have been seriously distorted.

Such misunderstandings are not new. I remember that, a quarter of a century ago, in the early days of the first World War, the German Government received solemn assurances from their representatives in the United States that the people of America were disunited; that they cared more for peace at any price than for the preservation of ideals and freedom; that there would even be riots and revolutions in the United States if this Nation ever asserted its own interests.

Let not dictators of Europe or Asia doubt our unanimity now.

Before the present war broke out on September 1, 1939, I was more worried about the future than many people — indeed, than most people. The record shows that I was not worried enough.

That, however, is water over the dam. Do not let us waste time in reviewing the past, or fixing or dodging the blame for it. History cannot be rewritten by wishful thinking. We, the American people, are writing new history today.

The big news story of this week is this: The world has been told that we, as a united Nation, realize the danger that confronts us — and that to meet that danger our democracy has gone into action.

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We know that although Prussian autocracy was bad enough in the first war, Nazism is far worse in this.

Nazi forces are not seeking mere modifications in colonial maps or in minor European boundaries. They openly seek the destruction of all elective systems of government on every continent — including our own; they seek to establish systems of government based on the regimentation of all human beings by a handful of individual rulers who have seized power by force.

Yes, these men and their hypnotized followers call this a new order. It is not new and it is not order. For order among Nations presupposes something enduring — some system of justice under which individuals, over a long period of time, are willing to live. Humanity will never permanently accept a system imposed by conquest and based on slavery.

These modern tyrants find it necessary to their plans to eliminate all democracies — eliminate them one by one. The Nations of Europe, and indeed we ourselves, did not appreciate that purpose. We do now. The process of the elimination of the European Nations proceeded according to plan through 1939 and well into 1940, until the schedule was shot to pieces by the unbeatable defenders of Britain.

The enemies of democracy were wrong in their calculations for a very simple reason. They were wrong because they believed that democracy could not adjust itself to the terrible reality of a world at war.

They believed that democracy, because of its profound respect for the rights of man, would never arm itself to fight.

They believed that democracy, because of its will to live at peace with its neighbors, could not mobilize its energies even in its own defense.

They know now that democracy can still remain democracy, and speak, and reach conclusions, and arm itself adequately for defense.

From the bureaus of propaganda of the Axis powers came the confident prophecy that the conquest of our country would be "an inside job" — a job accomplished not by overpowering in-

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vasion from without, but by disrupting confusion and disunion and moral disintegration from within.

Those who believed that knew little of our history. America is not a country which can be confounded by the appeasers, the defeatists, the backstairs manufacturers of panic. It is a country that talks out its problems in the open, where any man can hear them.

We have just now engaged in a great debate. It was not limited to the halls of Congress. It was argued in every newspaper, on every wave length, over every cracker barrel in all the land; and it was finally settled and decided by the American people themselves.

Yes, the decisions of our democracy may be slowly arrived at. But when that decision is made, it is proclaimed not with the voice of any one man but with the voice of one hundred and thirty millions. It is binding on us all. And the world is no longer left in doubt.

This decision is the end of any attempts at appeasement in our land; the end of urging us to get along with dictators; the end of compromise with tyranny and the forces of oppression.

And the urgency is *now*.

We believe firmly that when our production output is in full swing, the democracies of the world will be able to prove that dictatorships cannot win.

But, now, *now*, the time element is of supreme importance. Every plane, every other instrument of war, old and new, every instrument that we can spare now, we will send overseas because that is the common sense of strategy.

The great task of this day, the deep duty that rests upon each and every one of us is to move products from the assembly lines of our factories to the battle lines of democracy — NOW!

We can have speed, we can have effectiveness, if we maintain our existing unity. We do not have and never will have the false unity of a people browbeaten by threats, misled by propaganda. Ours is a unity that is possible only among free men and women

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who recognize the truth and face reality with intelligence and courage.

Today, at last — today at long last — ours is not a partial effort. It is a total effort and that is the only way to guarantee ultimate safety.

Beginning a year ago, we started the erection of hundreds of plants; we started the training of millions of men.

Then, at the moment that the aid-to-democracies bill was passed, this week, we were ready to recommend the seven-billion-dollar appropriation on the basis of capacity production as now planned.

The articles themselves cover the whole range of munitions of war and of the facilities for transporting them across the seas.

The aid-to-democracies bill was agreed on by both houses of the Congress last Tuesday afternoon. I signed it one half hour later. Five minutes after that I approved a list of articles for immediate shipment; and today — Saturday night — many of them are on their way. On Wednesday, I recommended an appropriation for new material to the extent of seven billion dollars; and the Congress is making patriotic speed in making the money available.

Here in Washington, we are thinking in terms of speed and speed now. And I hope that that watchword — “Speed, and speed now” — will find its way into every home in the Nation.

We shall have to make sacrifices — every one of us. The final extent of those sacrifices will depend on the speed with which we act NOW!

I must tell you tonight in plain language what this undertaking means to you — to you in your daily life.

Whether you are in the armed services; whether you are a steel worker or a stevedore; a machinist or a housewife; a farmer or a banker; a storekeeper or a manufacturer — to all of you it will mean sacrifice in behalf of your country and your liberties. Yes, you will feel the impact of this gigantic effort in your daily lives. You will feel it in a way that will cause, to you, many inconveniences.

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You will have to be content with lower profits, lower profits from business because obviously your taxes will be higher.

You will have to work longer at your bench, or your plow, or your machine, or your desk.

Let me make it clear that the Nation is calling for the sacrifice of some privileges, not for the sacrifice of fundamental rights. And most of us will do it willingly. That kind of sacrifice is for the common national protection and welfare; for our defense against the most ruthless brutality in all history; for the ultimate victory of a way of life now so violently menaced.

A halfhearted effort on our part will lead to failure. This is no part-time job. The concepts of "business as usual," of "normalcy," must be forgotten until the task is finished. Yes, it's an all-out effort — and nothing short of an all-out effort will win.

Therefore, we are dedicated, from here on, to a constantly increasing tempo of production — a production greater than we now know or have ever known before — a production that does not stop and should not pause.

Tonight, I am appealing to the heart and to the mind of every man and every woman within our borders who loves liberty. I ask you to consider the needs of our Nation and this hour, to put aside all personal differences until the victory is won.

The light of democracy must be kept burning. To the perpetuation of this light, each of us must do his own share. The single effort of one individual may seem very small. But there are 130 million individuals over here. And there are many more millions in Britain and elsewhere bravely shielding the great flame of democracy from the blackout of barbarism. It is not enough for us merely to trim the wick, or polish the glass. The time has come when we must provide the fuel in ever-increasing amounts to keep that flame alight.

There will be no divisions of party or section or race or nationality or religion. There is not one among us who does not have a stake in the outcome of the effort in which we are now engaged.

A few weeks ago I spoke of four freedoms — freedom of speech

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and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want, freedom from fear. They are the ultimate stake. They may not be immediately attainable throughout the world but humanity does move toward those glorious ideals through democratic processes. And if we fail — if democracy is superseded by slavery — then those four freedoms, or even the mention of them, will become forbidden things. Centuries will pass before they can be revived.

By winning now, we strengthen the meaning of those freedoms, we increase the stature of mankind, we establish the dignity of human life.

I have often thought that there is a vast difference between the word "loyalty" and the word "obedience." Obedience can be obtained and enforced in a dictatorship by the use of threat or extortion or blackmail or it can be obtained by a failure on the part of government to tell the truth to its citizens.

Loyalty is different. It springs from the mind that is given the facts, that retains ancient ideals and proceeds without coercion to give support to its own government.

That is true in England and in Greece and in China and in the United States, today. And in many other countries millions of men and women are praying for the return of a day when they can give that kind of loyalty.

Loyalty cannot be bought. Dollars alone will not win this war. Let us not delude ourselves as to that.

Today, nearly a million and a half American citizens are hard at work in our armed forces. The spirit — the determination of these men of our Army and Navy are worthy of the highest traditions of our country. No better men ever served under Washington or John Paul Jones or Grant or Lee or Pershing. That is a boast, I admit — but it is not an idle one.

Upon the national will to sacrifice and to work depends the output of our industry and our agriculture.

Upon that will depends the survival of the vital bridge across the ocean — the bridge of ships that carry the arms and the food for those who are fighting the good fight.

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Upon that will depends our ability to aid other Nations which may determine to offer resistance.

Upon that will may depend practical assistance to people now living in Nations that have been overrun, should they find the opportunity to strike back in an effort to regain their liberties — and may that day come soon!

This will of the American people will not be frustrated, either by threats from powerful enemies abroad or by small, selfish groups or individuals at home.

The determination of America must not and will not be obstructed by war profiteering.

It must not be obstructed by unnecessary strikes of workers, by shortsighted management, or by the third danger — deliberate sabotage.

For, unless we win there will be no freedom for either management or labor.

Wise labor leaders and wise business managers will realize how necessary it is to their own existence to make common sacrifice for this great common cause.

There is no longer the slightest question or doubt that the American people recognize the extreme seriousness of the present situation. That is why they have demanded, and got, a policy of unqualified, immediate, all-out aid for Britain, for Greece, for China, and for all the Governments in exile whose homelands are temporarily occupied by the aggressors.

And from now on that aid will be increased — and yet again increased — until total victory has been won.

The British are stronger than ever in the magnificent morale that has enabled them to endure all the dark days and the shattered nights of the past ten months. They have the full support and help of Canada, of the other Dominions, of the rest of their Empire, and the full aid and support of non-British people throughout the world who still think in terms of the great freedoms.

The British people are braced for invasion whenever such attempt may come — tomorrow — next week — next month.

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In this historic crisis, Britain is blessed with a brilliant and great leader in Winston Churchill. But, knowing him, no one knows better than Mr. Churchill himself that it is not alone his stirring words and valiant deeds that give the British their superb morale. The essence of that morale is in the masses of plain people who are completely clear in their minds about the one essential fact — that they would rather die as free men than live as slaves.

These plain people — civilians as well as soldiers and sailors and airmen — women and girls as well as men and boys — they are fighting in the front line of civilization at this moment, and they are holding that line with a fortitude that will forever be the pride and the inspiration of all free men on every continent, on every isle of the sea.

The British people and their Grecian allies need ships. From America, they will get ships.

They need planes. From America, they will get planes.

From America they need food. From America, they will get food.

They need tanks and guns and ammunition and supplies of all kinds. From America, they will get tanks and guns and ammunition and supplies of all kinds.

China likewise expresses the magnificent will of millions of plain people to resist the dismemberment of their historic Nation. China, through the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, asks our help. America has said that China shall have our help.

And so our country is going to be what our people have proclaimed it must be — the arsenal of democracy.

Our country is going to play its full part.

And when — no, I didn't say if, I said when — dictatorships disintegrate — and pray God that will be sooner than any of us now dares to hope — then our country must continue to play its great part in the period of world reconstruction for the good of humanity.

We believe that the rallying cry of the dictators, their boasting about a master-race, will prove to be pure stuff and nonsense.

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There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be, any race of people on the earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men.

The world has no use for any Nation which, because of size or because of military might, asserts the right to goostep to world power over the bodies of other Nations or other races. We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood.

We believe that the men and women of such Nations, no matter what size, can, through the processes of peace, serve themselves and serve the world by protecting the common man's security; improve the standards of healthful living; provide markets for manufacture and for agriculture. Through that kind of peaceful service every Nation can increase its happiness, banish the terrors of war, and abandon man's inhumanity to man.

Never, in all our history, have Americans faced a job so well worth while. May it be said of us in the days to come that our children and our children's children rise up and call us blessed.

18 ¶ Message to the Congress Transmitting Report of National Resources Planning Board. March 17, 1941

To the Congress:

NATIONAL defense is more than a mobilization of a Nation's armed strength. Equally must we focus public thought on the ideals and objectives of our national life. We must seek wider understanding of the possibilities for that future we prepare to defend.

Among those possibilities are the larger use, the conservation and development of the Nation's resources. I have from time to time during the past eight years called to the attention of the Congress these possibilities; and during these years several laws

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have been enacted to promote the orderly development and prudent husbandry of our national resources, human as well as material.

The National Resources Planning Board has now completed its report, which I send you herewith, on "The Development of Resources and the Stabilization of Employment in the United States." This is the first of a series of such reports which each year I shall transmit to the Congress shortly after submission of the Budget of the United States.

The Budget contains the recommendations of the Chief Executive for the financial outlays to carry on a public works program during the next fiscal year. This report places these recommendations within the framework of a long-range policy of intelligent planning for the future. It contains a six-year program of public construction and a statement of related future policies and plans of the Federal Government.

Under the terms of Reorganization Plan No. 1, effective July 1, 1939, I have, by a series of Executive Orders, given to the National Resources Planning Board responsibility for correlating the six-year public works programs of those agencies which plan or undertake construction directly for the Federal Government and those which indirectly participate in construction by means of loans, grants, or other financial aid. The Board is also aiding cities and States to prepare similar programs or capital budgets so as to develop a full and coordinated program of national development.

The Board can thus help to iron out conflicts among the plans of different agencies, and to present for consideration by the Congress a program which expresses local, State, regional, and national aspirations for a progressive development of our resources and for stabilization of employment.

This six-year program lists the Budget estimates for the coming fiscal year and summarizes a developing program for the ensuing five years. If projects are to be ready at hand for rapid inauguration in times of need, the surveys and investigations, the engineering plans and specifications must be prepared in advance. Au-

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thorizations and financial arrangements must be already agreed upon.

The planning revolving fund, suggested in the Board's report, would make available a shelf of useful projects without in any way committing the Government to the immediate construction of such works. Because of the current national emergency, projects not needed for defense have been temporarily deferred. As a result, we are now in the process of storing up a reservoir of non-defense public work which can be loosed when the pace of rearmament slackens.

The report of the Board is divided into three parts:

Part I, The Federal Program for National Development: This is the report of the Board and contains its findings and recommendations.

Part II, Regional Development Plans: This section reproduces statements prepared through the ten regional offices of the Board in cooperation with regional and State planning agencies and with representative citizens.

Part III, Functional Development Policies: This part of the report is devoted to studies by the technical advisory committees of the Board on national policies for the development of our land, water, and energy resources.

To facilitate their use by the Congress, I recommend that all three parts of the report be printed, together with the illustrations and supporting tables.

NOTE: For additional references to the work of the National Resources Planning Board, see note to Item 125 and references cited therein, pp. 502-503, 1939 volume; Item 5, pp. 36-37, 1940 volume; Item 8 and note, 1942 volume; and Items 20, 28, and notes, 1943 volume.

19 ¶ “The Freedom of the Human Spirit Shall Go On” — Address at Dedication of National Gallery of Art. March 17, 1941

IT IS WITH a very real sense of satisfaction that I accept for the people of the United States and on their behalf this National Gallery and the collections it contains. The giver of this building has matched the richness of his gift with the modesty of his spirit, stipulating that the Gallery shall be known not by his name but by the Nation's. And those other collectors of paintings and of sculpture who have already joined, or who propose to join, their works of art to Mr. Mellon's — Mr. Kress and Mr. Widener — have felt the same desire to establish, not a memorial to themselves, but a monument to the art that they love and the country to which they belong. To these collections we now gratefully add the gift of Miss Ellen Bullard and three anonymous donors, which marks the beginning of the Gallery's collection of prints; and also the loan collection of early American paintings from Mr. Chester Dale.

There have been, in the past, many gifts of great paintings and of famous works of art to the American people. Most of the wealthy men of the last century who bought, for their own satisfaction, the masterpieces of European collections, ended by presenting their purchases to their cities or to their towns. And so great works of art have a way of breaking out of private ownership into public use. They belong so obviously to all who love them — they are so clearly the property not of their single owners but of all men everywhere — that the private rooms and houses where they have lovingly hung in the past become in time too narrow for their presence. The true collectors are the collectors who understand this — the collectors of great paintings who feel that they can never truly own, but only gather and preserve for all who love them, the treasures that they have found.

But though there have been many public gifts of art in the past, the gift of this National Gallery, dedicated to the entire Nation,

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containing a considerable part of the most important work brought to this country from the continent of Europe, has necessarily a new significance. I think it signifies a relation — a new relation here made visible in paint and in stone — between the whole people of this country, and the old inherited tradition of the arts. And we shall remember that these halls of beauty, the conception of a great American architect, John Russell Pope, combine the classicism of the past with the convenience of today.

In accepting this building and the paintings and other art that it contains, the people of the United States accept a part in that inheritance for themselves. They accept it for themselves not because this Gallery is given to them — though they are thankful for the gift. They accept it for themselves because, in the past few years, they have come to understand that the inheritance is theirs and that, like other inheritors of other things of great value, they have a duty toward it.

There was a time when the people of this country would not have thought that the inheritance of art belonged to them or that they had responsibilities to guard it. A few generations ago, the people of this country were often taught by their writers and by their critics and by their teachers to believe that art was something foreign to America and to themselves — something imported from another continent, something from an age which was not theirs — something they had no part in, save to go to see it in some guarded room on holidays or Sundays.

But recently, within the last few years — yes, in our lifetime — they have discovered that they have a part. They have seen in their own towns, in their own villages, in schoolhouses, in post offices, in the back rooms of shops and stores, pictures painted by their sons, their neighbors — people they have known and lived beside and talked to. They have seen, across these last few years, rooms full of painting and sculpture by Americans, walls covered with painting by Americans — some of it good, some of it not so good, but all of it native, human, eager, and alive — all of it painted by their own kind in their own country, and painted

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about things that they know and look at often and have touched and loved.

The people of this country know now, whatever they were taught or thought they knew before, that art is not something just to be owned but something to be made: that it is the act of making and not the act of owning that is art. And knowing this they know also that art is not a treasure in the past or an importation from another land, but part of the present life of all the living and creating peoples — all who make and build; and, most of all, the young and vigorous peoples who have made and built our present wide country.

It is for this reason that the people of America accept the inheritance of these ancient arts. Whatever these paintings may have been to men who looked at them generations back — today they are not *only* works of art. Today they are the symbols of the human spirit, symbols of the world the freedom of the human spirit has made — and, incidentally, a world against which armies now are raised and countries overrun and men imprisoned and their work destroyed.

To accept, today, the work of German painters such as Holbein and Dürer, of Italians like Botticelli and Raphael, of painters of the Low Countries like Van Dyck and Rembrandt, and of famous Frenchmen, famous Spaniards — to accept this work today for the people of this democratic Nation is to assert the belief of the people of this democratic Nation in a human spirit which now is everywhere endangered and which, in many countries where it first found form and meaning, has been rooted out and broken and destroyed.

To accept this work today is to assert the purpose of the people of America that the freedom of the human spirit and human mind — which has produced the world's great art and all its science — shall not be utterly destroyed.

Seventy-eight years ago, in the third year of the War Between the States, men and women gathered here in the Capital of a divided Nation, here in Washington, to see the dome above the Capitol completed and to see the bronze Goddess of Liberty set upon the top. It had been an expensive and laborious business,

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diverting money and labor from the prosecution of the war, and certain critics — for there were critics in 1863 — certain critics found much to criticize. There were new marble pillars in the Senate wing of the Capitol; there was a bronze door for the central portal and other such expenditures and embellishments. But the President of the United States, whose name was Lincoln, when he heard those criticisms, answered: "If people see the Capitol going on, it is a sign that we intend this Union shall go on."

We may borrow the words for our own. We too intend the Union shall go on. We intend it shall go on, carrying with it the great tradition of the human spirit which created it.

The dedication of this Gallery to a living past, and to a greater and more richly living future, is the measure of the earnestness of our intention that the freedom of the human spirit shall go on, too.

NOTE: The National Gallery of Art at Washington, D. C., was established by Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved March 24, 1937 (50 Stat. 51; Item 8 and note, pp. 29-30, 1937 volume). The resolution accepted Andrew W. Mellon's offer to give his art collection, a building, and an endowment fund to the United States. The Congress then authorized public funds for the maintenance of the Gallery and established it as a bureau of the Smithsonian Institution.

The building, constructed at a cost of more than \$15,000,000, was begun in June, 1937, and completed in December, 1940. In the foregoing address, when the Gallery was opened to the public, the President accepted the gift for the Nation.

The President addressed a large

audience of 8,000, including many notable artists and scholars. The directors of nearly every North American and South American art gallery and museum were present in the distinguished gathering.

The National Gallery building, a familiar landmark of the Nation's Capital, is one of the largest marble structures in the world. It is 785 feet long and its floor area exceeds half a million square feet.

The paintings and sculpture presented by Mr. Mellon comprised works by many of the great masters from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and formed a nucleus of high quality from which the Gallery's collection has continued to grow. Even before the Gallery opened, Mr. Samuel H. Kress of New York presented his famous collection of paintings and

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sculpture of the Italian schools. Subsequently Mr. Kress enlarged and even further enriched the Kress Collection with additional paintings and sculpture of the Italian and French schools.

In 1942, the late Joseph E. Widener of Philadelphia donated the famous collection built up by himself and his father, Peter A. B. Widener. Chester Dale of New York

has made generous donations to the Gallery, and in addition has placed on indefinite loan a large collection of modern French paintings. Les-ling J. Rosenwald has given the Gallery his well-known collection of prints and drawings. As of December 31, 1948, the National Gallery included more than 17,000 works of art.

20 ¶ The National Defense Mediation Board Is Established. Executive Order No. 8716.

March 19, 1941

WHEREAS it is essential in the present emergency that employers and employees engaged in production or transportation of materials necessary to national defense shall exert every possible effort to assure that all work necessary for national defense shall proceed without interruption and with all possible speed:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and in order to define further certain functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President with respect to the national emergency as declared by the President to exist on September 8, 1939, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. (a) There is hereby created in the Office for Emergency Management, a board to be known as the National Defense Mediation Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board shall be composed of eleven members to be appointed by the President, of whom three shall be disinterested persons representing the public, four shall be representatives of employees and four shall be representatives of employers. The President shall designate as chairman of the Board one of the members representing the public.

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(b) Each member of the Board shall receive necessary traveling expenses, and each member who, during the period of his service on said Board, is not an officer or employee of the United States shall receive in addition thereto \$25.00 per diem for subsistence expense on such days as he is performing Board duties. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated by Congress or allocated to it by the President, through the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Production Management shall furnish the Board with necessary experts, assistants, officers, and employees, and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.

2. Whenever the Secretary of Labor certifies to the Board that any controversy or dispute has arisen between any employer (or group of employers) and any employees (or organization of employees) which threatens to burden or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials essential to national defense (excluding any dispute coming within the purview of the Railway Labor Act as amended) and which cannot be adjusted by the commissioners of conciliation of the Department of Labor, the Board is hereby authorized —

(a) To make every reasonable effort to adjust and settle any such controversy or dispute by assisting the parties thereto to negotiate agreements for that purpose;

(b) To afford means for voluntary arbitration with an agreement by the parties thereto to abide by the decision arrived at upon such arbitration, and, when requested by both parties, to designate a person or persons to act as impartial arbitrator or arbitrators of such controversy or dispute;

(c) To assist in establishing, when desired by the parties, methods for resolving future controversies or disputes between the parties; and to deal with matters of interest to both parties which may thereafter arise;

(d) To investigate issues between employers and employees, and practices and activities thereof, with respect to such controversy or dispute; conduct hearings, take testimony, make

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findings of fact, and formulate recommendations for the settlement of any such controversy or dispute; and make public such findings and recommendations whenever in the judgment of the Board the interests of industrial peace so require;

(e) To request the National Labor Relations Board, in any controversy or dispute relating to the appropriate unit or appropriate representatives to be designated for purposes of collective bargaining, to expedite as much as possible the determination of the appropriate unit or appropriate representatives of the workers.

3. Whenever a controversy or dispute is certified to the Board, in accordance with section 2, the Chairman, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board, shall designate as a division of the Board such members as he deems necessary to take action with respect to such controversy or dispute, and to perform in connection therewith any of the duties enumerated in section 2; provided (a) that no less than three members shall be assigned to any such division, and (b) that each of the three groups represented on the Board shall be represented on any such division.

4. Whenever a controversy or dispute which has not been certified to it in accordance with section 2 is brought to the attention of the Board, it shall refer the matter to the Department of Labor.

It is hereby declared to be the duty of employers and employees engaged in production or transportation of materials essential to national defense to exert every possible effort to settle all their disputes without any interruption in production or transportation. In the interest of national defense the parties should give to the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor and to the Office of Production Management (a) notice in writing of any desired change in existing agreements, wages, or working conditions; (b) full information as to all developments in labor disputes; and (c) such sufficient advance notice of any threatened interruptions to continuous production as will permit exploration of all avenues of possible settlement of such controversies so as to avoid strikes, stoppages, or lockouts.

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NOTE: As the productive facilities of the United States were shifting rapidly to production for defense and war, it soon became clear that peacetime procedures for resolution of labor-management disputes were not wholly adequate for the new and imperative demands of the day. The Nations fighting the Nazis and Fascists could not afford the delays of labor-management battles or the attrition resulting from economic disputes.

By March, 1941, the need for a new machinery became clear. Strikes and lockouts in defense industries rose from 147 in December, 1940, to 316 in March, 1941. During this period, the number of man-days of idleness because of industrial disputes rose from 458,314 to 1,543,803. Some of the disputes bore marked taints of international politics — for it was still the time before the Nazi invasion of Russia, and the Communists were still trying to continue the policy of isolationism for the United States. Extreme bitterness and rioting broke out in connection with some of the strikes; particularly violent and bitter was the strike of 14,000 men in four plants of the International Harvester Company and 7,500 workers in the Milwaukee plant of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company.

As a result of these developments, the President decided to establish a mediation board, with representation of the employers, the A.F.L. and the C.I.O., and the public, for the purpose of settling labor dis-

putes. The foregoing Executive Order created such a board.

Originally, the National Defense Mediation Board was composed of eleven members, but as its work load increased, the President by Executive Order No. 8731 on April 4, 1941, authorized the appointment of alternate members from labor, industry, and the public, thereby increasing the membership to 41.

The procedure of the Board in handling cases certified to it by the Secretary of Labor was to hear the cases by panels of the Board representing the three groups. In only three cases — involving the Federal Shipbuilding Corporation, the Bethlehem Steel Company, and the bituminous coal operators (captive mines) — did the entire Board sit to consider the issues.

During its life, the Board handled 118 cases involving a total of 1,191,664 workers.

Although the President had legal authority to intervene in labor disputes and compel the resumption of production by seizing military control of the plants, the President believed that this power should only be used in the most extreme cases. Accordingly, during the existence of the National Defense Mediation Board, he ordered the Army or Navy to take over in only three cases: the disputes involving the North American Aviation Company (see Item 50 and note, this volume), Air Associates, Inc., and

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the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company.

So, too, the Board preferred to operate through the processes of mediation, without compulsion, by bringing the parties together and encouraging the development of collective bargaining.

In the fall of 1941, serious disputes arose in the "captive" coal mines (see Items 103 and 116 and notes, this volume). Following a decision by the National Defense Mediation Board which denied the union shop to the United Mine Workers in their dispute with the steel companies, the C.I.O. representatives resigned from the Board. The President refused to accept their resignations, but the practical effect of the C.I.O. action was seriously to impair the effectiveness of the Board.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the President called a labor-management conference to devise means of establishing a new body to deal with wartime labor disputes (see

Items 126, 130, 135, and 142 and notes, this volume). As a result of the labor-management conference, the National War Labor Board was established by Executive Order No. 9017 on January 12, 1942 (see Item 6 and note, 1942 volume). The National War Labor Board took over the cases still pending before the National Defense Mediation Board. The National Defense Mediation Board had settled 96 of the 118 cases which had been brought before it; the remainder were transferred to the new National War Labor Board.

The National Defense Mediation Board was successful in bringing to a peaceful settlement a large number of labor disputes which threatened defense production. The values of the tripartite labor-industry-public representation on the Board were demonstrated, and the tripartite principle was carried on in the work of the successor agency, the National War Labor Board.

21 ¶ The President Transmits to the Congress the Anglo-American Agreement on the Transfer of Certain Naval and Air Bases. March 27, 1941

To the Congress:

ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1940, I transmitted for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State on the preceding day, under which this Government acquired the right to lease naval

21. *Anglo-American Transfer of Bases*

and air bases in Newfoundland and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, and in British Guiana. I now transmit for the information of the Congress a copy of an agreement for the use and operation of these bases, which was signed in London on March 27, 1941, together with the notes exchanged in connection therewith. These bases are for American defense against attack and their construction is consistent with such defense. International developments since my message to the Congress of September third last have emphasized the value to the Western Hemisphere of these outposts of security.

NOTE: See Items 90, 91, and notes, pp. 375-407, 1940 volume for the President's press conference, message to the Congress, notes exchanged between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, and the opinion of the Attorney General on the constitutionality of the exchange of 50 over-age destroyers with Great Britain for certain naval and air bases extending from Newfoundland down to South America. In the note to Item 91, pp. 405-407, 1940 volume, the President discussed the background of the destroyer-bases deal.

Accompanying the foregoing message to the Congress, the President transmitted the text of the agreement between the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom for the use and operation of the bases. It was agreed that the United States would have the right to construct, maintain, operate, use, and control these bases; to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances, and anchorages; and to control the movements of ships and

water-borne craft and the landings, take-offs, movements, and operations of aircraft; to regulate within the leased areas all communications to and from the areas leased; and to install and operate under-sea and other defenses, including detecting and other facilities. In war or in time of emergency, Great Britain agreed that the United States should exercise in the territories, surrounding waters, or air space all powers necessary to conduct military operations deemed desirable by the United States.

The agreement contained provisions governing the trial and punishment of offenses within the leased areas and necessary security measures. The United States was accorded the right to use all utilities, services, and facilities, roads and highways, bridges, canals, etc., controlled by the United Kingdom, under conditions comparable to those applicable to Great Britain. The United States was accorded the right to make topographic and hydrographic surveys outside of the leased areas.

22. *Address to Jackson Day Dinners*

Certain other articles of the agreement applied to control of shipping and aviation, motor traffic, immigration, customs and other duties, wireless stations and submarine cables, postal facilities, taxation, business and professions, health measures, and other rights and duties in the leased areas and in the areas surrounding the bases. The United States was given the right, with due notice, to abandon any leased area or any part thereof without thereby incurring any obligation, and was also given the right at any time before the termination of the lease to take away any removable improvements placed by the United States in the leased area or territorial waters.

Annex 2 to the agreement de-

finied in considerable detail the location of the leased areas in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana. Special provisions for certain individual territories were detailed in Annex 3 to the agreement. In a protocol to the agreement, it was recognized that the defense of Newfoundland was an integral feature of the defense, and it was therefore agreed that those actions taken under the agreement with respect to Newfoundland should respect Canadian interests in regard to defense and should not affect the arrangements recommended by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense — United States and Canada. (See Item 80 and note, p. 331, 1940 volume.)

22 ¶ “The Time Calls for Courage and More Courage” — Radio Address from the U.S.S.

Potomac to Jackson Day Dinners.

March 29, 1941

I AM SITTING in the little cabin of the little ship *Potomac*, in the harbor of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, after a day of sunshine out in the Gulf Stream. That I cannot in person attend one of the many Jackson Day dinners I regret; but it is good that you are again celebrating the memory of a great American leader who believed, fanatically almost, in the principles of a democracy based on the freedom of the ballot box.

I try to get away a couple of times a year on these short trips on salt water. In Washington, as you know, the working day of the Presidency in these days averages about fifteen hours. Even

22. *Address to Jackson Day Dinners*

when I go to Hyde Park or to Warm Springs, the White House office, the callers, and the telephones all follow me. But at sea the radio messages and the occasional pouch of mail reduce official work to not more than two or three hours a day.

So there is a chance for a bit of sunshine or a wetted line, or a biography or a detective story or a nap after lunch. Above all there is the opportunity for thinking things through — for differentiating between principles and methods, between the really big things of life and those other things of the moment which may seem all-important today and are forgotten by the world in a month. That means that if today the fellow next to you catches a bigger fish than you do, or vice versa, as sometimes happens, you don't lie awake at night thinking about it.

Yes, you recapture your philosophy, but in so doing you do not sit down mentally and become a fatalist. You still seek peace of mind and of spirit — but you come to realize that today you have to work overtime, and work harder than ever before in your life to make that kind of peace possible later on. It is a fact that I think we all recognize that if we sit down now we may get run over later. And if our kind of civilization gets run over, the kind of peace we seek will become a mere unattainable dream.

That is why, in the comparative quiet of this week, I have become more than ever clear that the time calls for courage and more courage — action and more action.

That is why it is appropriate today to honor the name of Andrew Jackson — because he was first and foremost a great American, who placed his devotion to country above adherence to party, and provided an ever living symbol of the rugged, courageous spirit of our people.

Responsibility lay heavily upon the shoulders of Andrew Jackson.

In his day the threat to the Federal Union came from within. It was a sectional threat. More than that, it was a threat which came from Jackson's own people — indeed, from some members of his own party. It was inspired by refusal to recognize the sover-

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eign authority of the United States. And by his actions Jackson placed himself far above both section and party.

In our own day the threat to our Union and to our democracy is not a sectional one. It comes from a great part of the world which surrounds us, and which draws more tightly around us, day by day.

Again, to do this job, we Americans — nearly all of us — have risen above any considerations of party politics.

Long before Jackson became President, the two-party system of government had become firmly entrenched as a basic principle of American political life. It had shown its value as a method of obtaining free and open discussion of public issues, formulating new policies to meet new conditions, and fixing responsibility in affairs of government as an indispensable part of our conception of free elections.

The dictators cannot seem to realize that here in America our people can maintain two parties, and at the same time maintain an inviolate and indivisible Nation. The totalitarian mentality is too narrow to comprehend the greatness of a people who can be divided in party allegiance at *election* time, but remain united in devotion to their country and to the ideals of democracy at *all* times.

In dictatorships there can be no party divisions. For all men must think as they are told, speak as they are told, write as they are told, live — and die — as they are told. In those countries the Nation is not above the party, as with us; the party is above the Nation; the party *is* the Nation.

Every common man and woman is forced to walk the straight and narrow path of the party line, not strictly speaking a party line, but rather a line drawn by the dictator himself, who owns the party.

In our country, disagreements among us are expressed in the polling place. In the dictatorships, disagreements are suppressed in the concentration camp.

Last year we held an American election, in which the people — Democrats, Republicans, Independents, and others — by secret

22. *Address to Jackson Day Dinners*

ballot, and without prodding by the bayonets of storm troopers, voted for their public officers — local, State and national.

And we are determined so to act that Americans will go on year after year, holding free elections.

All of the great freedoms which form the basis of our American democracy are part and parcel of that concept of free elections, with free expression of political choice between candidates of political parties. For such elections guarantee that there can be no possibility of stifling freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the air, freedom of worship.

These are the eternal principles which are now being threatened by the alliance of dictator Nations.

Ours is the responsibility of defending these principles which have come to us as our national heritage. Ours is the responsibility of passing them on — not only intact, but stronger than ever, to all the generations yet to come.

We Americans realize how tenuous would be the existence of our party system, our freedom of elections, our freedom of living, if the doctrines of dictatorship were to prevail. For if they were to prevail, it would not be in Europe alone.

The history of Nations betrayed during the past year, the history of Nations conquered during the past year, should show us and the rest of the world what it means to live in a world organized and ruled by the Gestapo.

Let us ask ourselves, frankly and fearlessly: How long could we maintain our ancient liberties under these terrible conditions? How soon would we have to accept the doctrine that one must fight fire with fire?

How long would it be possible to maintain a semblance of our two-party system, with free elections, in a Nazi-dominated world?

How soon would we decide to imitate Nazism and abandon our two-party system, and regiment our people into one party — which would certainly be neither Democratic nor Republican?

Should that evil time come, we would no longer hold these friendly gatherings, either on Jackson Day or on Lincoln Day.

We Americans have already weighed these questions carefully

22. *Address to Jackson Day Dinners*

and thoughtfully. We Americans have announced our determination that, with all our resources and all our power, we shall help those who block the dictators in their march toward domination of the world.

The decision we have reached is not a partisan decision. The leader of the Republican party himself — Mr. Wendell Willkie — in word and in action, is showing what patriotic Americans mean by rising above partisanship and rallying to the common cause. And now that the plain people of America have spoken their determination, Republicans and Democrats in the Congress and out of the Congress are patriotically cooperating to make that determination take positive form.

The enemies of democracy are now trying, by every means, to destroy our unity. The chief weapon they now use against us is propaganda, propaganda that appeals to selfishness, that comes in ever increasing quantities, with ever increasing violence, from across the seas. And it is disseminated within our own borders by agents or innocent dupes of foreign powers.

It is directed against all Americans — Republican and Democratic — farmers and bankers — employers and employees.

Propagandists, defeatists, and dupes, protected as they are by our fundamental civil liberties, have been preaching, and are still preaching, the ungodly gospel of fear. They use insinuation and falsehood. They have tried to shatter the confidence of Americans in their Government and in one another.

We have seen what has happened to the great industrialists of Germany who supported the Nazi movement, and then received their reward in Nazi concentration camps or in death.

We have seen how the workers of France were betrayed by their so-called champions, the Communists. For no matter what Communist lips have said, their actions have proved that in their hearts they care nothing for the real rights of free labor.

The agents of Nazism and those who unwittingly help them are still trying to play both ends against the middle. They have attempted to exploit the natural love of our people for peace. They have represented themselves as pacifists, when actually they

22. *Address to Jackson Day Dinners*

are serving the most brutal warmongers of all time. They have preached "Peace — Peace!" in the same way the devil can quote Scripture.

Of course, the purpose of all this has been to spread terror among us. The effect of it has been only to fortify our determination.

When Abraham Lincoln became President, he had to face the awful reality of a war between the States. On July 4, 1861, in his first message to the Congress, he presented this vital question:

"Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"

Lincoln answered that question as Jackson had answered it — not by words, but by deeds. And America still marches on.

We of today have been presented with that same question. We too are answering it by deeds. Our well-considered philosophy for the attainment of peace comes not from weakness but — everlastingly — from the courage of America.

NOTE: This was the last of the President's Jackson Day Dinner addresses. None was delivered by him during the war. By the spring of 1941, the international crisis had deepened. Axis aggression was sweeping on; Japan's hostility was sharpening.

In these circumstances, the President felt that it was inappropriate to deliver the customary Jackson Day political address to Democratic party members gathered at dinners throughout the country. He was keenly aware of the need for national unity and a bipartisan, or rather non-partisan, approach to the problems of the threatening war and of foreign policy. Accordingly, the tone of the foregoing Jackson Day address in 1941 was a sharp

departure from the President's addresses at similar celebrations in earlier years.

The President's hopes for political unity were, in part at least, realized when, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the chairmen of the Democratic and Republican National Committees both pledged the cooperation of the two major parties during the war (see Item 128, this volume, for the text of the President's reply to these party pledges of wartime cooperation).

(For other and different kinds of Jackson Day addresses, see Item 3, pp. 38-44, 1936 volume; Item 5, pp. 37-45, 1938 volume; Item 6, pp. 60-68, 1939 volume; and Item 3, pp. 25-35, 1940 volume.)

23. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-third Press Conference*

23 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Thirty-third
Press Conference (Excerpts). April 8, 1941

*(U.S.O. — Progress of production program — Voluntary censorship —
Geographical distribution of defense work — Seizure of foreign ships.)*

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I have got two things here. One is a statement —
is it mimeographed, Steve?

MR. EARLY: Not yet.

THE PRESIDENT: Steve will have it mimeographed and you can
have it — about the work of this new organization called the
United Service Organizations for National Defense. Yesterday they
announced their program of service to soldiers, sailors, and
defense workers. This work, of course — by way of explanation —
is essentially around the various camps, navy yards, and new
plants, and provides for the recreation, welfare, and spiritual
needs of the young men and women who have answered, and will
answer, the call to the national defense. The six member
organizations of the United Service Organizations are fulfilling
an essential and patriotic duty. This duty — of maintaining
morale on the home front — is one in which every American
shares. The Federal Government is doing its part. It stands
squarely behind the United Service Organizations, and Congress
has been asked to provide money. The national private
organizations which have incorporated the United Service
Organizations as an over-all planning body are: The Y.M.C.A.;
Y.W.C.A.; Catholic Community Service; Jewish Welfare Board;
Salvation Army; and the Travelers Aid Society. They are to be
congratulated on their vision and on the practical common sense
of their plans for staffing and operating these 300-odd service
centers. The local communities, both public and private
organizations, are preparing to cooperate with them. It is only
the groundwork, but what they need is the support of every
individual citizen, and they should have united support. To
facilitate

23. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-third Press Conference*

their work throughout the country a national conference of community leaders is to be held in Washington April 17, in cooperation with the Federal Security Administrator and the Secretaries of War and Navy.

Well, we have been working up toward that. We have got them all together, and of course, if I were writing a story, I would emphasize the fact that we have got all of these organizations in under the same tent — which is a perfectly magnificent thing, and didn't even happen in the World War. . . . It is a great job. In other words, they are all sitting around the same table and working out a combination of their work.

The other thing I have got is a story which I got out of O.P.M., a new basis to show the progress of the work, and I don't want anybody to suggest that this is being given out with any ideas that we are viewing with pride. We are not — we are not satisfied. There is room for an awful lot more improvement; but it just shows the amount of work that has been done in the past three months, in comparison with the previous six months, in terms of disbursement. Now that is a new approach. It isn't in terms of x number of airplanes, or so many guns; it is in terms of disbursement. In other words, money actually spent out of the Treasury for work done, and, as you know, we don't spend the money out of the Treasury until the work is done. In terms of dollars — in the first three months on these particular things — the acquisition of defense material and construction for defense — we have paid out in the first three months of 1941 one billion, eight hundred million dollars, whereas in the whole of the last six months of 1940 — calendar year — we only paid out one billion, four. On table number two — aircraft, ships, and ordnance. For those three items in the last six months of 1940 we paid out an average of \$116,000,000 a month, and the average of the first three months of this year we paid out an average of \$197,000,000 a month. On new plant facilities during the whole of 1940 we only paid out \$45,000,000, and in the first three months of 1941 we paid out \$240,000,000.

23. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-third Press Conference*

For bases, stations, and fortifications during the last six months of 1940, we paid out \$330,000,000, and the first three months of 1941 we paid out \$550,000,000.

Q. Five hundred fifty was that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Five hundred fifty. Those figures, of course, do not include any payments on British orders.

Well, that is just to give a slant on the angle of money paid out — actual disbursements; and the fact that we are very greatly accelerating it gives a slight comparison of things that have been done in the last three months — I mean the three months of 1941 in comparison with the six months of 1940.

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) But it is not to be taken, as I remarked before, as any satisfaction on my part with the progress of the program. Still much too slow.

Q. How much do you think this should be accelerated in your own mind? You say it is much too slow.

THE PRESIDENT: More.

Q. What is being done?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't give you a figure on that.

Q. What is being done to do that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will just keep on using "chestnut burs" all the time. You are familiar with the use of "chestnut burs" to make a mule go. (*Laughter*)

Q. Can you identify the mule? (*Laughter*)

Q. Who is the mule? (*More laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: You ought to, you come from Missouri, Frank. (*Laughter*)

Q. [Frank] I came from Minnesota, sir.

Q. Mr. President, what are the main reasons why the progress is, as you say, much too slow?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, thousands, thousands of reasons.

Q. I say the main.

THE PRESIDENT: Individuals — mostly human beings.

Q. Can you break that down? (*Much laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: No.

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Q. Mr. President, do you agree with Mr. Biggers that the next hundred days are going to be crucial in our production program?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the next hundred after that (*he laughs*) and the next hundred after that probably. I can't see as far ahead as that. . . .

Q. Mr. President, Secretary of the Navy Knox yesterday commended those newspapers and photographic agencies which made no reference to the arrival of the battleship *Malaya* in New York Harbor. That might have been interpreted as a rebuke to those who did? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The editorials in those papers which did print the stories and did carry the pictures were the lamest excuses to try to get square with our reading public that I have ever read.

Q. Do you think that the voluntary censorship as suggested was more effective?

THE PRESIDENT: I noticed some of the papers advocated the immediate clamping down of legal censorship, which is very interesting probably to all the other papers in the United States. I prefer to go along with the great majority of the newspapers in the United States at this time. I think that covers it.

Q. Would you like to be quoted in words on that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I much prefer to go along with the overwhelming majority of newspapers at this time.

Q. Does that mean something more may be necessary later?

THE PRESIDENT: You can leave out "at this time," because there is nothing else in sight.

Q. Would you prefer that we leave that off, "at this time"?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe the best thing to do is to add to it what I had, "nothing else is in sight at this time." . . .

Q. Mr. President, five Governors representing the Southern Governors Conference arrive here tomorrow for furthering defense industries. Do their efforts in that regard have your support?

23. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-third Press Conference*

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me tell you — let me tell you a story. In the first place, this should not be regarded as — what shall I say — national defense. We are not proceeding on a basis of the benefit by dollars and cents to each and every State of the Union on a square-mile basis or a population basis; we are trying to create national defense on the basis of the greatest speed and efficiency, on a national basis.

Now, I can go on and point out that I had a certain group come in from certain States that have what might be called a rather severe winter climate — three or four feet of snow; they understood perfectly well when I explained to them that we could not put a camp of 60,000 men up in their State, except in the summertime; and because we want these camps to operate all the year round, from the point of view of national defense, we put them in another section of the country, where they could run all through the winter as well as all through the summer. In other words we weren't doing it on a geographical basis but on a climate basis, not an area basis or a sectional basis but on a climate basis.

In the same way, there are certain industries which from the point of view of efficiency ought to go where they have the best and cheapest access to raw materials, and the most practical and useful access to the type of labor that goes into it. Well, that means that there are certain areas, unfortunately, in the country that do not have ready access to certain types of materials, or certain forms of labor.

Now in the South, of course, they have a great many more of these camps than any other place in the country; that is on account of the climate. The Middle West and the East have probably a great deal more factory production allocated to them than in other parts of the country. That is solely from the point of view of efficiency. We are trying all the time, of course, to decentralize — and it is working out pretty well — in accordance with efficiency. I wouldn't want to put, for instance, a steel plant up at the entrance to the Glacier National Park. I don't think it would work. I don't think that I would want to put an all-the-year-round camp of 60,000

23. Seven Hundred and Thirty-third Press Conference

men up at the mouth of Glacier National Park. I don't think it would work in the wintertime. We don't need that many ski troops. (*Laughter*) And so I think it will be a fairly easy thing to persuade these Governors of southern States that they are getting a good deal, and we want them to have anything else they can handle for the efficiency of the whole national program. . . .

Q. Mr. President, you may have answered this question sometime before. Is there any law under which you can acquire these German and Italian ships other than purchase?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so.

Q. And may they be condemned?

THE PRESIDENT: After all, things like that — As I have said several times before, if the Federal Government in times of emergency — mind you this is not a full emergency — can take away your ship, Frank [Kluckhohn], your yacht (*laughter*), against your will, you see, that is called the old “right of eminent domain.” Well, if they can do it to an American citizen — the yacht in our harbor — I think probably the Federal Government would have the right in a future emergency to use the old “right of eminent domain” against some foreign ship.

Q. But that would be only under a full emergency, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is the way I construe it, although I think probably you can get legal opinion to say that I can do it, even under the present limited emergency.

Q. Mr. President, when you take by eminent domain it is for the use of the Government. Could you devote it to the use of another Government?

THE PRESIDENT: No, not necessarily. You could if you wanted to — if you were at war with the other Government. . . .

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: See Item 138 and note, this volume, for an account of the establishment and activities of the Office of Censorship. in the foregoing press conference that he probably had the right to requisition idle foreign ships in American ports without enabling

Although the President indicated legislation, he decided to ask the

24. *Requisition of Idle Foreign Ships*

Congress for such authority (see Item 24 and note, this volume, for the President's message to the Congress and the nature of the authority granted).

24 ¶ A Message to the Congress Asking Power to Requisition Idle Foreign Ships in American Waters. April 10, 1941

To the Congress:

THERE are now in our ports a large number of foreign merchant vessels which have been here for considerable periods of time and which because of war conditions have not seen fit to depart.

Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended by the Act of August 7, 1939, authorizes the Maritime Commission, whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by proclamation, to requisition or purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States, or under construction within the United States, or to requisition or charter the use of any such property, and provides that the owner thereof shall be paid just compensation for the property taken or for its use. The same section provides a method by which compensation shall be determined. There does not appear to be any comparable provision with respect to foreign-owned vessels lying idle in our ports.

In view of the growing shortage of available tonnage suited to our national needs, I am satisfied, after consultation with the heads of the interested departments and agencies of the Government, that we should have statutory authority to take over any such vessels as our needs may require, subject, of course, to the payment of just compensation.

It is obvious that our own ultimate defense will be rendered futile if the growing shortage of shipping facilities is not arrested.

24. Requisition of Idle Foreign Ships

It is also obvious that inability to remove accumulating materials from our ports can only result in stoppage of production with attendant unemployment and suspension of production contracts. It is therefore essential, both to our defense plans and to our domestic economy, that we shall not permit the continuance of the immobilization in our harbors of shipping facilities.

I attach as of possible assistance to the Congress a draft resolution designed to accomplish the purposes above outlined. It will be noted that the draft contemplates the use of funds appropriated by the "Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941," approved March 27, 1941.

NOTE: As the defense program intensified through 1940, there was an increasingly urgent need for shipping facilities. Many factors were contributing to a shortage of tonnage facilities in this country: submarine sinkings, conversion of commercial ships to military uses, withdrawal of ships by the British and Norwegians from Orient and South American trades, the demands created by the Lend-Lease Act and stockpiling programs, and the immobilization of many Danish, French, and Scandinavian vessels in neutral ports. Although new construction was proceeding, it had not been completed quickly enough to fill our merchant shipping needs. It was in this context that the President asked the Congress in the foregoing message to allow the United States to requisition or purchase foreign merchant vessels which were lying idle in waters within the jurisdiction of the United States.

When the President made the request, it was estimated that over

80 foreign ships were lying idle in United States waters, and that almost 150 other vessels were idle in other ports of the Western Hemisphere. It was thought that some of the 150 vessels outside of United States waters might also be available on a voluntary basis for purchase or charter.

On June 6, 1941, the President approved an Act passed pursuant to the foregoing request authorizing the Maritime Commission to requisition or otherwise acquire idle ships in American waters. Under the Act (55 Stat. 242), virtually all of the foreign vessels requisitioned by the United States were taken over prior to the entry of the United States into the war; a few were taken over in the early months after Pearl Harbor.

The following table indicates the nationality, number, and tonnage of the foreign vessels purchased or requisitioned up to June 30, 1942, by the United States under the Act of June 6, 1941:

25. Establishment of Bases in Greenland

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Gross Tons</i>	<i>Dead-weight Tons</i>
Danish	40	142,641	232,783
French	10	139,117	76,888
Italian	28	168,744	231,237
Finnish	17	55,213	80,387
German	3	14,096	22,182
Estonian	2	3,837	5,920
Rumanian	1	3,495	5,000
Dutch	1	3,492	5,292
Lithuanian	1	1,255	1,700
Swedish	1	20,067	9,340
Greek	1	3,034	5,250
Total	105	554,991	675,979

Many of the foreign flag vessels taken over by the Maritime Commission under this authority required considerable repair work before they could be placed in operation. This was particularly true of the 31 Italian and German cargo and passenger vessels, which had been sabotaged before being taken over for American use.

25 ¶ The President Announces That the United States Will Establish Bases in Greenland. April 10, 1941

YESTERDAY we signed an agreement with the Danish Minister in Washington, who acts on behalf of the King of Denmark, as Sovereign of Greenland, including Greenland in our system of cooperative hemispheric defense.

This agreement was signed on the anniversary of the day on which German troops invaded Denmark.

Last May the Greenland Councils requested the United States to keep in mind the exposed position of the Danish flag in Greenland. I at once offered to make available relief, if necessary; and to assure a continued flow of necessary supplies for the island. The present step is a new proof of our continuing friendliness to Den-

25. *Establishment of Bases in Greenland*

mark. Under the present circumstances the Government in Denmark cannot, of course, act in respect of its territory in the Western Hemisphere, but we propose to make sure that when the German invasion of Denmark has ended, Greenland will remain a Danish colony. Meanwhile, we earnestly hope for the quick liberation of Denmark from her present invaders.

NOTE: After the German invasion and occupation of Denmark in April 1940, the United States recognized the danger that Greenland, a Danish possession, might be seized by the Nazis and converted into a source of aggression against the United States. The defense of Greenland against attack was plainly essential to the preservation of the peace and security of the American continent. Greenland is clearly in the Western Hemisphere, and therefore covered by the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine.

Greenland has other strategic attributes which caused the President to take action. Valuable cryolite mines furnished a flux which is necessary in the manufacture of aluminum, and it was essential to defend these cryolite mines against possible foreign aggression or sabotage. Also, Greenland furnished an important point on the northern air route between the United States and the United Kingdom, and the location of air bases there assumed increasing importance in connection with the ferrying of aircraft to the United Kingdom. The area of Julianehaab was considered particularly important in Greenland because it was located midway be-

tween Newfoundland and Iceland and its harbor was open for navigation for the greater part of the year.

An American consulate was established at Godthaab, the capital of Greenland, following the fall of Denmark. In the spring of 1940 a number of United States Coast Guard cutters paid visits to Greenland to reassure the populace. During the remainder of 1940, Greenland authorities requested that American troops and defenses be established on the island. The Department of State felt that if such action were taken during that time it might furnish Japan a pretext for moving into the Dutch East Indies after the German invasion of Holland and the Low Countries. Nevertheless, discussions proceeded between the Department of State and the Minister of Denmark to the United States, Henrik de Kauffmann, concerning American assistance in the defense of Greenland. In March, 1941, the President approved the dispatch of an expedition to Greenland to survey the possibilities of establishing airfields to aid in ferrying warplanes from Canada to the United Kingdom.

On April 5, 1941, the President

25. *Establishment of Bases in Greenland*

sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War authorizing the assembly of matériel and personnel, and the construction of aviation facilities in Greenland. For this purpose, the President authorized the expenditure of \$5,000,000 from the President's Emergency Fund. On April 9, 1941, the Secretary of State and the Minister of Denmark to the United States signed an agreement which gave the United States Government the right to construct, maintain, and operate such landing fields, seaplane facilities, and radio and meteorological installations as would be necessary to maintain Greenland's independent status. Furthermore, the right was given to the United States to improve and deepen harbors, anchorages, and approaches thereto, install aids to navigation by air and water, construct roads, communications services, fortifications, repair and storage facilities, housing for personnel, and in general to insure the efficient operation, maintenance, and protection of such defense facilities.

Naturally, the German-dominated Danish Government in Copenhagen did not like this agreement at all, and ordered the recall of Henrik de Kauffmann through an insistent letter from King Christian to the President. On April 19, 1941, the President replied with a personal cable to the King of Denmark. The President stated that he recognized the German duress under which the

Danish Government had been compelled to act in respect to Greenland. He noted that the presence of German planes over Greenland indicated that the sovereignty of Greenland was being threatened, and that the United States could not tolerate the violation of the integrity of the Western Hemisphere by a non-American Nation. The American Government continued to recognize De Kauffmann as the official representative of the Danish Government, and continued to conduct business with the Danish Government through the American Legation at Copenhagen.

In June, 1941, a defense and construction force sailed for Greenland. In addition to the general construction and improvement work carried out by the terms of the agreement, a United States Consulate building was constructed at Godthaab. Four main bases and 13 outpost stations or auxiliary installations were also constructed. The defense of Greenland was apparently made firm, for the Nazis never dared to strike at the area toward which they had made airplane passes.

Before the end of 1941, the President found it necessary to dispatch American troops to a number of other sectors threatened by the Axis powers, including Iceland, Trinidad, and British Guiana (see Item 63 and note, this volume); and Dutch Guiana (see Item 117 and note, this volume). Further attention was given to the strategic im-

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portance of the Azores, the Cape Verde, and Dakar in respect to the German threat in the Atlantic, but it was not found necessary to take any action to reinforce these areas.

26 ¶ The Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply Is Established. Executive Order No. 8734. April 11, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on September 8, 1939, for the purpose of avoiding profiteering and unwarranted price rises, and of facilitating an adequate supply and the equitable distribution of materials and commodities for civilian use, and finding that the stabilization of prices is in the interest of national defense and that this Order is necessary to increase the efficiency of the defense program, it is hereby ordered:

1. There shall be in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, at the head of which shall be an Administrator appointed by the President. The Administrator shall receive compensation at such rate as the President shall determine and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, and with such advice and assistance as may be necessary from the other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and utilizing the services and facilities of such other departments and agencies to the fullest extent compatible with efficiency, the Administrator shall:

a. Take all lawful steps necessary or appropriate in order (1) to prevent price spiraling, rising costs of living, profiteering, and inflation resulting from market conditions caused by the

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diversion of large segments of the Nation's resources to the defense program, by interruptions to normal sources of supply, or by other influences growing out of the emergency; (2) to prevent speculative accumulation, withholding, and hoarding of materials and commodities; (3) to stimulate provision of the necessary supply of materials and commodities required for civilian use, in such manner as not to conflict with the requirements of the War, Navy, and other departments and agencies of the Government, and of foreign Governments, for materials, articles, and equipment needed for defense (such requirements are hereinafter referred to as "military defense needs"); and (4) after the satisfaction of military defense needs to provide, through the determination of policies and the formulation of plans and programs, for the equitable distribution of the residual supply of such materials and commodities among competing civilian demands.

b. Make studies of the Nation's civilian requirements for materials and commodities, the supply of goods and services, the status and trend of prices and factors thereof, and the impact of the defense program upon civilian living standards; exercise the powers of the President in requesting such studies pursuant to Section 336(a) of Title III of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Title 19, U.S.C., Sec. 1336(a)); and conduct such investigations, hold such hearings, and obtain such reports as may be necessary or desirable to carry out this Order.

c. Determine and publish, after proper investigation, such maximum prices, commissions, margins, fees, charges, or other elements of cost or price of materials or commodities, as the Administrator may from time to time deem fair and reasonable; and take all lawful and appropriate steps to facilitate their observance.

d. Advise and make recommendations to other departments and agencies, whenever the Administrator deems it appropriate, in respect to the purchase or acquisition of materials and commodities by the Government, the prices to be paid there-

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for, and in respect to such of their other activities as may affect the price of materials and commodities.

e. Inform the Office of Production Management of the amount, character, and relative importance of materials and commodities needed for civilian use; and advise and consult with the Office of Production Management with reference to its procurement, production planning, priority, and other actions the effect of which may be to diminish the supply of materials and commodities available for civilian use.

f. Establish and maintain liaison with such departments and agencies of the Government and with such other public or private agencies and persons as the Administrator may deem necessary or desirable to carry out the provisions of this Order.

g. Formulate programs designed to assure adequate standards for, and the most effective use of, consumer goods; stimulate the utilization of substitutes by civilians for consumer goods and commodities of limited supply; develop programs with the object of stabilizing rents; and promote civilian activities which will contribute to the purposes of this Order.

h. Recommend to the President the exercise of the authority vested in him by the following named Acts, whenever, in the opinion of the Administrator, such action by the President will enable the Administrator to carry out and secure compliance with the provisions of section 2a and 2c of this Order:

- (1) Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (Public No. 783, 76th Congress).
- (2) Section 120 of the National Defense Act (Title 50, U.S.C., Sec. 80).
- (3) Section 1 (15) of Title 49, U.S.C.
- (4) The Act of October 10, 1940 (Public No. 829, 76th Congress).

i. Perform the functions and exercise the authority vested in the President by the following named Acts, insofar as and only to the extent that the authority conferred by such Acts will, in the opinion of the Administrator, enable him to carry out and secure compliance with the provisions of section 2a and 2c of

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this Order: Section 713(a)-7 of Title 15, U.S.C., Supp. V; Section 4 of the Act approved June 7, 1939 (Title 50, U.S.C., Supp. V., Sec. 98 (c)); and Section 5 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, as amended by the Act approved June 25, 1940 (Public No. 664, 76th Congress): subject to the disapproval by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy of each proposed action thereunder.

j. Advise upon proposed or existing legislation, and recommend such additional legislation as may be necessary or desirable, relating to prices, rents, or the increase in supply and the equitable distribution of materials and commodities for civilian use.

k. Keep the President informed in respect to progress made in carrying out this Order; and perform such other related duties as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to him.

3. The Administrator may provide for the internal organization and management of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, and may appoint such advisory committees as he finds necessary to the performance of his duties and responsibilities. The Administrator shall obtain the President's approval for the establishment of the principal subdivisions of the Office and the appointment of the heads thereof.

4. There shall be in the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply a Price Administration Committee consisting of the Administrator as Chairman, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Federal Loan Administrator, the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, the Director General and Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management, or such alternate as each may designate, and such other members as the President may subsequently appoint. The Committee shall from time to time, upon request by the Administrator, make findings and submit recommendations to the Administrator in respect to the establishment of maximum prices, commissions, margins, fees,

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charges, and other elements of cost or price of materials or commodities as provided under paragraph 2c above.

5. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated to the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply or as may be allocated to it by the President through the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, and services. However, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply shall use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management or other agencies of the Government.

NOTE: When he established the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense in 1940, the President had appointed Leon Henderson as Price Stabilization Commissioner (see Item 53, pp. 243-250, 1940 volume). Originally, the functions of the Price Stabilization Division were largely statistical in nature.

In the course of its existence, the Price Stabilization Division of the N.D.A.C. took action on a number of specific and local price problems. Early in the defense period, most industries were operating at less than capacity; the supply needed to meet the rising governmental and civilian demands could, therefore, be increased. But as both defense production and civilian demands were accelerated, price increases occurred in some areas and were threatened in others. In an increasing number of cases, the Division held conferences with industries and urged them to keep down

prices. Consultations were held in reference to copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, mercury, steel, pig iron, coke, lumber, farm implements, and machine tools.

The Division also recommended that Army and Navy procurement officers time their purchases and spread their orders wherever possible to conform to existing plant capacities. In this way, a small measure of stabilization was achieved in the procurement of lumber, textiles, clothing, leather, and shoes.

In the early period, letters were written, press releases and direct warnings were issued, and groups of buyers and sellers and Price Stabilization officials met in an effort to avoid by agreement too rapid price increases.

These informal discussions and agreements were effective only during the early defense period. For example, between the months of May, 1940, and February, 1941,

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there occurred a 24 percent rise in industrial production; but in the same period the general index of wholesale prices rose only 3 percent. By February, 1941, however, the combined military and civilian demands for materials had exceeded the supply; shortages were developing. These shortages became more pronounced with the disruption of foreign sources of supply and because of lack of shipping facilities. The rising costs of imports exerted an upward pressure on prices. Demands for wage increases had a further effect on pushing prices up. But since this "inflationary gap" was not generally applicable to all commodities, over-all controls were not initially required.

One by one, the President took the Divisions in the Advisory Commission and bolstered them with additional executive powers to meet the needs of the respective areas over which they had jurisdiction. In January, 1941, the President created the Office of Production Management and transferred to it the Advisory Divisions on Industrial Production, Industrial Materials, and Labor (see Items 153 and 154 and notes, pp. 679-702, 1940 volume). The President established the O.P.M. because it had become necessary to replace the voluntary system of priorities by a compulsory program in order to supply vital materials for the defense program. Similarly, it soon became apparent that more stringent measures were required if the gen-

eral wave of price inflation which had occurred during the first World War was to be avoided.

While plans were being drawn for conferring additional executive powers on a new price agency, the Price Stabilization Division issued a series of maximum price schedules and attempted to obtain compliance with them through publicity and the voluntary cooperation of the industry involved. These maximum price schedules covered secondhand machine tools, aluminum scrap and secondary aluminum ingot, zinc scrap and secondary slab zinc, iron and steel scrap and bituminous coal. The latter schedule was issued when the bituminous coal strike (see Item 30, this volume) threatened to push up prices.

Concurrently, the Consumer Protection Division of the N.D.A.C. had been trying through meetings, publications, and other informal means to prevent unwarranted price increases and otherwise to protect the interests of consumers in such matters as rent control. The President felt that the activities of the Consumer Protection Division were related closely to price stabilization; accordingly, in the spring of 1941 he merged the Consumer Protection Division and the Price Stabilization Division into a new and stronger unit.

Interdependent with general price and consumer interests was the problem of proper allocation among civilians of the supplies which remained after military needs

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had been met. If prices were to be stabilized, some measure of control over civilian distribution in the form of quotas was necessary.

The passage of the Lend-Lease Bill (see Item 15 and note, this volume) made it even more imperative that the President take additional action to stabilize prices. When the United States began shipping an increasing amount of weapons and food supplies abroad, the additional drain on supplies at home added pressure on prices.

When the new Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply was established by the foregoing Executive Order, Leon Henderson was appointed its Administrator. At the time, Mr. Henderson wanted to call the new agency the "Office of Price Administration," but the addition of "Civilian Supply" in the title was finally adopted by the President at the suggestion of Miss Harriet Elliott, who had headed the former Consumer Protection Division in the N.D.A.C.

O.P.A.C.S., as the new agency came to be called, comprised two major divisions — Price and Civilian Allocation. A Consumer Division was also created, but its powers diminished with the increasing demands of military requirements. Under O.P.A.C.S., controls were extended through the issuance of price schedules.

Within a week of the foregoing Executive Order, O.P.A.C.S. imposed a price ceiling on all iron and steel products at the level prevail-

ing on April 16, 1941. This schedule was of vital importance, because it followed an announcement of steel producers that they would increase prices in order to pass on to the users of steel a ten-cent-an-hour wage increase. Iron and steel products constitute almost 12 percent of the total wholesale value of manufactures. The tremendous rise in steel prices during the first World War inflated all prices. The experience of World War I was a warning to O.P.A.C.S. which urged it to prompt action to forestall the recurrence of such inflation.

By August 1, 1941, O.P.A.C.S. had issued formal ceiling schedules for combed cotton yarn, nickel scrap, hides, kips, calfskins, pig iron, fine cotton gray goods, brass scrap, and iron and steel. Other informal controls were utilized. In addition to suggestions and warnings, a "freeze" letter would be sent to the members of an entire industry exhorting them to hold their prices at a certain level. In other cases voluntary agreements were reached, in which members of an industry promised not to exceed a price level, or agreed not to raise prices without informing O.P.A.C.S. By the beginning of August, nearly one-quarter of the wholesale price structure was under either formal or informal controls.

The Civilian Allocation Division operated for four months under O.P.A.C.S., and was then transferred to the Office of Production

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Management by Executive Order No. 8875, issued August 28, 1941. The same Executive Order changed the name of the price control agency to "Office of Price Administration."

The price controls set pursuant to Executive Order No. 8734 were not backed up by enforcement authority. By midsummer of 1941 it became clear that additional legislation was necessary in order to strengthen price control. Accordingly, on July 30, 1941, the President in a message to the Congress requested the enactment of emergency price control legislation (see Item 70 and note, this volume).

The informal type of price control met with many successes, but there were also some notable failures. Informal controls seemed to succeed better when the industry was dominated by one or a few companies, or when the threatened price increase was primarily speculative. This proved to be the case in holding down the prices of farm machinery and gypsum rock. Yet in the case of lumber, petroleum, and automobile prices, informal and voluntary controls were inadequate to check price rises. As time went on, informal controls became increasingly ineffective.

After August 1, 1941, formal price schedules were more frequently utilized for several reasons: Despite the efforts of O.P.A. prices continued to rise after February, 1941; the use of formal orders met with less opposition than had been anticipated; the legal status

of these orders seemed firm; O.P.A. was gaining experience in formulating formal orders; they were more effective than the informal methods.

The entry of the United States into the war, of course, marked a new phase of activity for O.P.A., and eighteen additional formal orders were issued in the months immediately following Pearl Harbor.

Although O.P.A. experienced many difficulties because of its lack of authority prior to the passage of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, its success can be measured by comparing the behavior of prices during World War I with prices during the O.P.A.C.S. and early O.P.A. period. In the first World War, prices rose 22 percent during the first two years; in the same period during World War II they rose 20 percent. Yet in the next eight months of the first World War (July, 1916, to March, 1917) prices rose 30 percent, while in the comparable period in the Second World War (August, 1941, to April, 1942) they rose only 9 percent. This difference is accentuated when we remember that the 9-percent price rise covers in part the period after we entered the war, while the 30 percent price rise of the previous war all occurred before America's entry in 1917. In addition, World War II involved a much greater rate of expenditures and provided vastly greater pressures on prices. By the

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time of Pearl Harbor, the Government was spending two billion dollars a month for war materials; and consumer expenditures naturally rose and affected prices. Under these conditions, the effectiveness of O.P.-A.C.S. and the early O.P.A. in pre-

venting a runaway inflation cannot be denied.

(See Item 12 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the subsequent operation of the Office of Price Administration.)

27 (The Seven Hundred and Thirty-fourth Press Conference (Excerpts). April 11, 1941

(Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply — Office for Emergency Management — Secretary of Labor Perkins — Non-recognition of geographical transfers — Proclamation of war between Germany and Yugoslavia — Revocation of proclamation designating Red Sea as combat area.)

THE PRESIDENT: You people are becoming very popular. I am going to charge admission pretty soon. I have to pay some income tax — so I must charge admission to the audience here if they want to see and hear you all. Think that is a good idea?

Q. I think it is a swell idea. I hope you charge them enough.

Q. The question is who is on exhibit? (*Laughter*)

Q. Comedy, is it?

THE PRESIDENT: No, melodrama.

Q. Each might bring you a souvenir.

Q. If it's educational and charitable it's tax-free.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I have enough to keep you busy for three or four hours. The first is the signing of the order this morning creating the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, under the Office for Emergency Management, to be headed by Mr. [Leon] Henderson. This has been worked out with the approval of O.P.M. It continues and emphasizes the protection of the consumer, and it provides for programs

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to allocate what we call residual supply of materials among the competing civilian demands — I would say what we call the consumer — after the military requirements are satisfied. It — among other things — it merges the existing offices under the National Defense Advisory Commission of seven — the old one — it merges two of those offices and in effect puts them together using the staffs of those two offices. One is Mr. Henderson's office of Price Stabilization, and the other is Miss [Harriet] Elliott's office of Consumer Protection — puts those two together. Well, that means essentially out of the original organization which of course was a temporary one — to get things started — out of those seven original offices, five have now been consolidated and it leaves only two out of the original seven — the Agriculture Division and the Transportation Division — which have not yet been consolidated into the larger picture; and we are now studying exactly where those two would fit in the developed picture. In other words, whether they would come in under the Office for Emergency Management, or whether they would work in through other agencies of the Government.

In this Order there are a great many statutes that are referred to. It is a technical matter, but if anything occurs to you on reading the Order — to what all these section references are — Leon will have a statement or explanation of what the older statutes are. I think that about covers it. I don't think there is any use in going into detail.

Q. Would you give us about a paragraph on what the Office for Emergency Management is, who is on it, and what its function is?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, very simple — when the Reorganization Act was put through, there were authorized several organizations under the Executive Office of the President, because they did not fit in anywhere else. In other words, they referred to a good many different branches of the Government, such for example as the Bureau of the Budget. Beforehand it had

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been more or less under the Treasury, but of course that was not right because they have to pass on the Treasury estimates. So, they were made an independent Office in the Executive Office of the President. Secondly, there was the National Resources Planning Board, which of course again touches a great many different departments, and then there was authorized at that time an emergency office in the Office of the President, not to be set up until and unless needed, and that was called the Office for Emergency Management. Now, under the Office for Emergency Management we set up the O.P.M., and now we are setting up this new organization; and there may be others, we can't tell.

Q. Mr. President, when Mr. Henderson's organization arrives at a conclusion or determination as to a price or priority, will he have authority to enforce it? Is that made clear in the Order?

THE PRESIDENT: As far as the laws go.

Q. Is that included in these —

Q. (*interposing*) Mr. President, how far does —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) In other words, until you have read the Order, I don't think there is any use talking about it.

Q. Will Mr. Henderson continue on the S.E.C.?

THE PRESIDENT: As far as I know. . . .

Q. Mr. President, have you seen the sections of the proposed murals for the new War Department Building? They have been delivered here presumably. Have you?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. I would like to see them very much. Is there any scandal about them? (*Laughter*)

Q. I haven't seen them either.

THE PRESIDENT: Not yet.

Q. Mr. President, a story has been printed again that Secretary Perkins has turned in her resignation. Is that true?

THE PRESIDENT: Just another story. It has been going on for eight years, so it's all right.

Q. Mr. President, is there any question of transferring more destroyers to Britain at this time?

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THE PRESIDENT: No. no.

Then, number two. Are you ready for number two? We are going to do a little jumping now.

I have signed the Act, or rather the Joint Resolution — S. J. Resolution 7, affirming and approving non-recognition of the transfer of any geographic region in this hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power, and providing for consultation with other American Republics, in the event that such transfers should appear likely. You are all familiar with that. It has been duly signed and is now a law.

You are familiar with the Danish agreement that was entered into. You know the reasons for it. You know the fact that Greenland is considered very definitely part of the Western Hemisphere and has the same status, both under the Monroe Doctrine and the various agreements that have been made by the American Republics, as at other places, such as Martinique, Guadeloupe, British Guiana, Trinidad, and so forth and so on. This Resolution of the Senate affirms that as the American policy.

Q. Mr. President, does that imply that there is any consultation necessary with the American Republics with respect to Greenland?

THE PRESIDENT: They all know about it.

Then, two proclamations, along the same general question of war. The first is the proclamation of a state of war between Germany and Italy on the one side and Yugoslavia on the other.

The other is the proclamation which revokes the combat area previously set forth and covering the mouth of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. At that time the original proclamation did not cover the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in so many words, but it set up a small — what you might call a “stopper” from the eastern-most tip of Africa to the Arabian coast. In other words, you could go into the Red Sea without going through that area, and that area has now been revoked

27. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-fourth Press Conference*

as a combat area, in effect making the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea open to commerce like any other non-combat zone.

Q. Mr. President, in that connection, may I ask will the ships be permitted to go up to the Suez Canal?

THE PRESIDENT: I just said that you have taken the "stopper" out.

Q. Yes, yes. Well, then, they can go out?

THE PRESIDENT: I have just said they have taken the "stopper" out.

Q. Is the Suez Canal now in a declared combat zone?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. No?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not the Canal itself.

Q. Not the Canal itself? Could you tell us whether or not the combat zone begins at the eastern Mediterranean there, at the beginning there?

THE PRESIDENT: It covers the Mediterranean.

Q. Do you think, sir, that they could go as far as Port Said, for instance?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I haven't got a large-scale map here. I don't think it is a very practical question. I think they could go —

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) — through Ismailia.

Q. I am not quite clear on the law. When that combat zone is revoked American ships can carry anything into the — ?

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) What are the high seas? What are the high seas? The high seas are everything except things in the combat zone.

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) In other words, the high seas. What is Buenos Aires?

Q. Mr. President, I think there has been some confusion as to whether or not an American ship, with this revocation of the former order, can carry war materials destined for a belligerent through that area.

THE PRESIDENT: No, not for a belligerent, but for a neutral power.

27. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-fourth Press Conference*

Q. They can take it to Egypt, for instance?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. . . .

Q. Mr. President, on this combat zone — does it mean that American ships carrying goods to neutrals may traverse the Suez Canal?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just said it isn't really a practical question. The Suez Canal, in the first place, is in Egypt, and the two ports — I will have to teach you geography, Paul [Leach]. I will have to learn some geography myself.

Port Said is, as I remember it, at the Mediterranean end, and I think it is called Ismailia that is at the other end, and I think there is a railroad along the Canal between those two places. Now, I haven't the faintest idea as to whether a ship would go through the Canal in order to discharge at Port Said, or would go alongside of Ismailia, and the stuff go across the Isthmus by rail.

Q. The Mediterranean would remain out of bounds?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. I am not fully familiar with geography to be able to tell you offhand whether the individual dock at Port Said is in the Mediterranean, or whether it is in the Canal you see. I don't know. Never been there.

Q. Ismailia is in Egypt, is that right?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. And that is a neutral country at which we can deliver supplies there?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Under the Neutrality Act, sir, no supplies ultimately destined for any belligerent could be delivered to a neutral country for transshipment, could they?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. That brings up other questions of international law. I would hesitate very much to say yes or no on that. You get things like a continuous voyage — and if you will read John Bassett Moore's five volumes you will find the House has been on all four sides of that subject. . . .

Q. Would that question be explored in connection with this new proclamation opening up?

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THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so — we don't buy headaches unless we have to. . . .

NOTE: See Item 26 and note, this volume, for the text of the Executive Order establishing the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, and an account of the activities of O.P.A.C.S.

For an explanation of the nature of the Office for Emergency Management and the agencies established under it, see Item 154 and note, pp. 689-702, 1940 volume.

In the foregoing press conference, the President announced that the proclamation designating the Red Sea as a combat area had been revoked. See Items 149 and 150, pp. 561-564, 1939 volume; and Item 27, pp. 127-129, 1940 volume, for previous proclamations of the President defining combat areas from which American ships were to be excluded under the terms of neutrality acts.

28 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Thirty-fifth Press Conference (Excerpts). April 15, 1941

(Shipment of fire hose under Lend-Lease — Lowering of draft age — Universal military service — British situation — Labor agreement in steel industry — German measles — Harry Hopkins — Dollar-a-year men — Protection of American ships — Status of Greenland.)

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I have anything except a little human interest thing that I have saved out yesterday. In the first list of non-military equipment which the British Purchasing Commission wanted, I ran my eye down the list and suddenly it brought back something to me. I remember, once upon a time, I was talking about what people would do if their neighbor's house caught fire — if they happened to have some garden hose in the cellar they would take it out and lend it to their neighbor to put his fire out. On this first list, there are a number of different items like tar, kettles, and road rollers, and pumps, and graders. The last three items are for 900,000 feet of garden hose! (*Laughter*) Not garden hose but fire hose — actually fire hose — at a total cost of about \$300,000. I thought it was a rather nice little coincidence.

28. *Seven Hundred and Thirty-fifth Press Conference*

Q. Mr. President, you said you were going to loan them to them at the time?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. President, do you have any ocean-going fire hose?

THE PRESIDENT: We will have to get it over the ocean some way.

Q. Mr. President, could you talk to us about the possibility of dropping the minimum age limit from 21 to 18, and the possibility of keeping troops in training longer than the one-year period?

THE PRESIDENT: No, we are working on it at the present time. We haven't anything yet. It was felt, I think, that both in the Committees of the House and also in the War Department it was better to get some idea a little bit later on. I don't know what dates are set for Committee hearings. I would say at a guess not until the end of May, the beginning of June, which will give plenty of time for any legislation to be enacted before, let us say, September. It is being studied.

This is entirely offhand. Of course, literally nothing has been decided — that after the first needs are filled, in the way of manpower in relation to the different grades and necessities of turning out an army, then we would come to a more regularized system with the age limit lowered and a certain number of years for people to give their one year of service to the Government of the United States. And of course, as you know, there is a certain amount of talk about everybody giving a year of service to the Government of the United States out of his life. It isn't a bad idea. I should think, as I remarked before, all of you, and I, would have been a lot better off today if we had given one year of service to the Government of the United States from the time we were eighteen until the early twenties. That is just general. . . .

Q. Mr. President, the press reports from Europe indicate that the situation looks rather gloomy for the British at the moment.

THE PRESIDENT: Do they?

Q. Would you care to comment?

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THE PRESIDENT: No, no. No. I don't look that way, do I? (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, do you expect —

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) I hope that is a good enough answer. . . .

Q. Mr. President, now that the S.W.O.C. [Steel Workers Organizing Committee, C.I.O.] and Big Steel have reached an agreement on wages, can you tell us what went on last week in your conference with Mr. Murray, and Olds and Fairless?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I think I told you what they were.

Q. Sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I told you at the time, didn't I? Yes, we had a press conference since then. I don't think there is anything new to add.

Q. The situation has changed since then.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. An agreement has been reached —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) The conference didn't change.

Q. What I am getting at is this: Did you have something to do with bringing about that agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, no. I never have anything to do with that. (*Loud laughter*)

Q. In their talks with you, did Mr. Olds and Mr. Fairless intimate that if they raised wages they might have to raise prices?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. We talked about all kinds of technical things, as to the amount of molybdenum that was needed for a ton of steel, and things like that. (*Laughter*) . . .

Q. Are you going to Warm Springs, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I was afraid somebody was going to ask that question. It will come out anyway — Walter Winchell will break it. What happened is — it's one on me. What happened was that I had hoped to leave last night for Warm Springs, but about last Thursday they had a rather violent outbreak of German measles down there. I didn't mind particularly. I have had German measles. I don't know whether you can get it again, but of course I have quite a number of members

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of the press following me around, and I was thinking about their fate, so — (*laughter*) I had given the trip up until the thing had died down, and then somebody said, well, you would have to do it anyway, because if the President should come down with German measles at this time — (*loud laughter*) it would be subject to a radio broadcast. So, I still hope to get off, but it does depend on what happens down there.

Q. Twenty years ago that was called “liberty measles.” (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: I remember it in 1917 — there was quite an outbreak, and we called it “hun pox.” (*Loud laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, will Mr. Hopkins be a dollar-a-year man?

THE PRESIDENT: No, he will not.

Q. Will he be an Administrative Assistant then, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I don't know what he will be, but he won't be a dollar-a-year man.

Q. Will he get paid? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, sure. He's a Democrat! What a foolish question. (*Loud laughter*)

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) That was what I said to Bill Knudsen the other day. In about the fourth or fifth list of these dollar-a-year men, they were all listed as Republicans except a boy who had graduated from Yale last June and never voted, and I said, “Bill, couldn't you find a Democrat to go on this dollar-a-year list anywhere in the country?” (*Laughter*) He said, “I have searched the whole country over. There's no Democrat rich enough to take a job at a dollar a year.” (*More laughter*) . . .

Q. Is it part of the policy of this Government to protect merchant ships — our merchant ships — wherever they go, as long as they are not in a combat zone?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is the law, you know.

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) It is not a question of policy, it is the law.

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Q. Have any of the commodities shipped abroad to aid the democracies under the terms of the Lease-Lend Bill been sunk?

THE PRESIDENT: I couldn't tell you. I don't know.

Q. Mr. President, could you tell whether you feel there is an increasing demand toward the use of American naval power?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I couldn't tell you that.

Q. Mr. President, is there any agreement —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) I would also — let me put it this way — there has been more nonsense written, more printer's ink spoiled, more oratory orated over that subject by people who don't know a "hill of beans" about it than any other subject in modern times. I know a little bit more about it — not an awful lot — but I know so little that I wouldn't care to discuss the thing from the point of view of "if that" or "if the other" thing. That is just a word of suggestion. Most people have no idea about the subject of protection of shipping.

Q. Mr. President, your answer to the question about the protection of ships wherever they go, if they are not in combat zones, leaves the impression that if our ships go through the Red Sea we will protect them there.

THE PRESIDENT: No, because I don't know of American ships that are in the Red Sea.

Q. You know of ships going there pretty soon?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Sir, there has been some talk of the possibility of arming our merchant ships. Is that under consideration?

THE PRESIDENT: No, only by orators. . . .

Q. Would you care to comment on the Danish Minister's decision to disregard the order for his recall?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I can give you a little historical background on that. You see it has been perfectly clear to anybody who has ever analyzed it — as far as I know practically all writers or people who had anything to do with the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine — way back — that there was recognition at that time of the sovereignty of certain European Nations over territory in the Western Hemisphere, but at the

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same time a general interpretation of the Doctrine that that sovereignty could not be transferred, that it might be against the interests of the Republics of this hemisphere if they were transferred from one European Nation to another. There were several instances where it was attempted, with the general disapproval of the American Republics, and there was one instance, of course, where a European army did come to this continent when we were somewhat busy with other matters, and as soon as the Civil War was over, the European army withdrew.

In the case of Danish possessions, there were principally two of them; one was what used to be called the Danish West Indies, colonized in large part by Danes, and the other was Greenland, which again had been colonized in large part by Scandinavians. They had a civilization up there, as you know, which started at the time of Leif Ericson. They had a Christian people up there. They had a cathedral, I think, and quite an influx of immigrants into Greenland that came from Norway and Denmark, which during at least part of that time were in the same kingdom under the same king.

At all times, through all the centuries, Denmark was, you might say, the father — the sponsor — of those colonists in Greenland. And during the past century, for instance, they have done a great deal to help the colonists and the natives — the Eskimos. They have seen to it that they improved agriculture. They have helped them on mineral surveys and on actual mining, and they have seen to it that they had enough food to last them through bad winters. They have sent ice-breakers there early in the year, and a few years ago a question did come up involving, you might say, the old question of the right of sovereignty as gained on one hand by colonization, on the other hand by exploration. The United States had a claim by exploration to a large part of northern Greenland. That of course was disputed by other countries which had sent explorers up there — earlier explorations by the British and, as an example, some explorations by Norwegians —

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and the thing came to a head because there were a lot of rather wild claims about Greenland.

Denmark, however, had the only claim to Greenland through the process of colonization. Our country said quite rightly, "That is a better title than mere exploration, and we therefore are going to recognize your sovereignty over Greenland because of colonization, and the fact that colonization has been going on for about 900 years — way back in the days of Leif Ericson. Long before Columbus. It seems to be the just thing to do." Therefore, it was recognized by us, thereby officially putting Greenland in exactly the same status as Martinique, British West Indies, Guadeloupe, Curaçao, and the Dutch West Indies, and the same status which had previously been held up in 1917 by the Danish West Indies which at that time — January, 1917 — we purchased. Therefore, clearly, Greenland fell within the interpretation, and the historic treatment that had been accorded to other European sovereignties — territories — in this hemisphere.

Now, on the recent thing, that being perfectly clear, you have to go back to a year ago last ninth of April, when the Government of Denmark was overthrown by surprise, and Denmark was occupied by a large number of troops of another European Nation. From the very beginning the Ministry of Denmark here, as you know, and the State Department held that most unfortunately the Government — the existing Government of Denmark — was a Government under duress (that has been held by us for over a year), and that during war it was impossible to regard the Government of Denmark as a Government not under duress. It was under duress as a matter of actual fact. That being so, we are applying to Denmark what might be called a carrying out of the Monroe Doctrine, which of course has been reinforced by the conferences at Lima and Panama, and Havana, and we are protecting Greenland against any other European Nation, and will continue to do so, and trusting that as soon as the duress is lifted

29. *Letter on Free Speech and Free Press*

from the Government and people of Denmark, Greenland will be restored to an independent Denmark. That is about all.

NOTE: For the text of the President's famous "garden hose" analogy which launched the idea of lend-lease, see Item 145, pp. 606-615, 1940 volume.

See Item 25 and note, this volume, for the President's announcement that the United States was establishing bases in Greenland.

29 ¶ A Letter to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Free Speech and a Free Press.
April 16, 1941

THE assurance I would bring to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, if it were possible for me to greet them in person, would be that free speech and a free press are still in the possession of the people of the United States.

Free speech is in undisputed possession of publishers and editors, of reporters and Washington correspondents; still in the possession of magazines, of motion pictures, and of radio; still in the possession of all the means of intelligence, comment, and criticism. So far as I am concerned it will remain there for that is where it belongs.

It is important that it should remain there, for suppression of opinion and censorship of news are among the mortal weapons that dictatorships direct against their own peoples and direct against the world. As far as I am concerned there will be no Government control of news unless it be of vital military information.

Like all of our liberties, liberty of speech and of the press is not a mere phrase, a mere form of words, a constitutional abstraction. It has a living meaning — whatever the press itself gives it. Government juridical process can afford a negative protection against interference with freedom of speech, but its care, its nurture, and its use are responsibilities of the press itself, which has never prized it so much as it should prize it now.

30. *Request That Coal Mining Be Resumed*

How that freedom should be used, what contributions it should make to national defense, national interest, and national morale, are questions for publishers and editors themselves to decide.

It would be a shameful abuse of patriotism to suggest that opinion should be stifled in its service. United national sentiment, which all of us should desire, bears no resemblance to a totalitarian regimentation of opinion and treatment of news.

I cannot better close this message to the American Society of Newspaper Editors than with a final assurance that those who disagree with what is being done, and with the manner in which it is being done, are free to use their freedom of speech.

(This letter was addressed to Tom Wallace, editor of the *Louisville Times* and president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.)

NOTE: Not until after America entered the war was any governmental censorship instituted. For an account of the establishment and activities of the Office of Censorship, see Item 138 and note, this volume.

30 ¶ The President Requests That Bituminous Coal Mining Be Resumed. April 21, 1941

WHILE an agreement between a majority of operators and workers in the bituminous coal industry has been negotiated, there is still a disagreement, with the union and one group of operators on one side and another group of operators on the other. The result is that the mines, which should be operating, are not doing so and there is a diminishing supply of soft coal available to plants engaged in defense production.

It is imperative that there be no shortage now, or at any other time, of coal for defense production purposes. In order that the supply be immediately replenished, through the resumption of mining operations, and in the best interest of the United States and its citizens, I publicly recommend and urge that:

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1. The miners and operators already in agreement resume coal production under the terms of that agreement.

2. The operators and miners who have not yet reached an agreement, enter into wage negotiations and at the same time reopen the mines, the agreement ultimately reached to be made retroactive to the date of resuming work.

This will bring about prompt return of a steady and needed supply of coal in the interest of national safety. I am certain that all groups concerned in the wage controversy will put the interest of their fellow countrymen above any other interest and immediately begin making arrangements looking toward the reopening of the mines. Bituminous coal production must be resumed, and promptly. The public interest demands it and the public interest is paramount.

NOTE: On March 31, 1941, the expiration date of the contract between the operators of the Appalachian bituminous coal mines and the United Mine Workers of America, the President had sent a telegram jointly to John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America, and Ezra Van Horn, spokesman for the operators and Chairman of the Joint Appalachian Conference: "Uninterrupted operation of bituminous coal industries extremely important. Suggest, if necessary, you continue negotiations during Tuesday looking to satisfactory arrangement. Shall expect report through [John] Steelman [the Government mediator] before midnight."

Nevertheless, the new contract was not signed, and on April 2, 1941, 400,000 bituminous coal miners, who produced 85 percent of the Nation's output, went on strike. Two major issues were involved in

the strike: first, the miners' demand for an increase of \$1.00 a day, and second, their demand that the forty-cent-a-day differential in the wages of miners in the northern and southern portions of the Appalachian region be abolished. Since the shortage of coal was directly responsible for a drop in steel production during April, the President intervened in the bituminous coal strike and, as indicated in the foregoing statement, recommended a formula for possible settlement of the strike.

Immediately prior to the statement of the President, the United Mine Workers and the operators in the northern Appalachian area had reached an agreement on the dollar-a-day increase in wages. There was no agreement, however, covering the southern Appalachian area, and on April 24, the Secretary of Labor certified the dispute to the National Defense Mediation Board. (See Item 20 and note, this

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volume, for an account of the organization and functions of the National Defense Mediation Board.)

On April 27, 1941, the panel of the National Defense Mediation Board unanimously recommended that the President's foregoing interim proposal be accepted by the miners and operators. The northern operators and the union immediately accepted the President's recommendations, and late the following day the southern operators also accepted the recommendations. The 400,000 bituminous coal miners resumed work on April 30, 1941, after being out on strike for nearly a month.

After the miners returned to work under the interim arrangement, negotiations between the union and the operators continued. They were unsuccessful. Accordingly, on May 23, the National Defense Mediation Board recalled the negotiating parties to Washington. The central point in the con-

troversy remained the forty-cent differential in the daily wage rates between the northern and southern regions. On this issue, the Board thoroughly examined the historical and current reasons for the differential; and on June 5 it recommended that this differential be eliminated. The Board made additional recommendations on basic tonnage rates, safety practices, vacations with pay, seniority, and several other phases of the new contract between the miners and operators. On July 6, 1941, the miners and operators signed a new two-year contract based in large part on the recommendations of the National Defense Mediation Board. The contract was retroactive to April 1, 1941.

(For a discussion of the bituminous coal strike of 1943 over renewal of this contract, and the President's intervention in that strike, see Items 45, 46, 66, 120 and notes, 1943 volume.)

31 ¶ The President Extends Civil Service to Cover Additional Persons. Statement and Executive Order No. 8743. April 23, 1941

Statement:

I HAVE signed today an Executive Order, to take effect July 1, 1941, which brings into civil service more than one hundred thousand government positions which until today have been exempted.

The issuance of this Order is a significant milestone in civil

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service reform, both in the number and in the proportion of Federal positions to be filled in accordance with the Civil Service Act.

During my years in office, I have signed a number of Executive Orders extending the classified civil service. Three years ago I went as far as it was legally possible to go at that time by covering into civil service all positions not definitely excluded by statute and not policy-determining in character. I could not cover in numerous positions which had been exempted from civil service by specific Congressional enactments.

In the last year, however, two events of profound significance in terms of improvement in government have occurred. The Congress last November passed the Ramspeck Act, which removed numerous prohibitions against extending civil service to thousands of positions. It is under the authority of this Act that today's Order is issued. In February, "The President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement," which I appointed two years ago with Mr. Justice Reed as Chairman, made its final report to me. I have previously transmitted this report to Congress by special message. In substance this Executive Order accepts and, indeed, implements the recommendations of that Committee.

The Order includes the higher administrative, professional, and technical posts as well as the intermediate and lower grade positions, with the exception of a very few exemptions created by the Ramspeck Act itself. It is the fruition of the recommendation in 1937 of "The President's Committee on Administrative Management" that the merit system be extended "upward, outward and downward."

This Order will become generally effective on January 1, 1942, at which time the positions will be brought within the competitive classified civil service. It provides that those positions becoming vacant between July 1, 1941, and January 1, 1942, will automatically be brought within the civil service when they become vacant and will thereafter be filled in accordance with civil service.

There are in each department and agency some positions of a

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policy-determining character which probably should be exempt from civil service requirements. The Civil Service Commission will immediately begin consultations with the several agencies to determine those very few positions.

The Committee on Civil Service Improvement has recommended two alternative plans for covering attorney positions into the service. After careful study of both plans, I have decided to put into effect, with certain minor modifications, the so-called "Plan A" which was recommended by a numerical majority of the Committee.

The increasing demands of Government make it essential that it should be able to command the highest quality of legal work. I have, therefore, decided to subject Government lawyers, like other professional men in the service of the Government, to the standards and the requirements of the merit system. We must shut out considerations of caprice or favoritism or worse in the selection of our law officers. It is important to enlist in the creation of this career system the utmost good will of the legal profession within and without the Government. "Plan A" commends itself to me as the most promising way to make effective the induction of the legal positions into our civil service system. The responsibility for working out the details for the future recruitment of Government lawyers will be primarily in the hands of a committee of lawyers, to be named by the President, whose professional standing and personal qualities will give assurance of complete disinterestedness. This committee will serve as an arm, as it were, of the Civil Service Commission in working out this aspect of civil service. The details of this procedure are set forth in the Order.

For the first time in the history of this Government the greatest possible opportunities are now open for the development of a broad merit system which will further encourage men and women of outstanding ability to enter the government under conditions which will offer them fair and equal opportunities to build satisfactory careers.

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The requirements of today and those of the future are so great that the services of the best minds in the Nation must be secured if governmental affairs are to be conducted in the manner demanded by modern conditions and at the high level of ability which a democratic Government owes to the people of the United States.

Executive Order:

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by section 1 of the Act of November 26, 1940, entitled "Extending the Classified Executive Civil Service of the United States" (54 Stat. 1211), by the Civil Service Act (22 Stat. 403), and by section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. All offices and positions in the executive civil service of the United States except (1) those that are temporary, (2) those expressly excepted from the provisions of section 1 of the said Act of November 26, 1940, (3) those excepted from the classified service under Schedules A and B of the Civil Service Rules, and (4) those which now have a classified status, are hereby covered into the classified civil service of the Government.

SECTION 2. Section 1 of this Order shall become effective on January 1, 1942, except that as to positions affected thereby which are vacant at any time after June 30, 1941, and before January 1, 1942, it shall become effective when the vacancies first exist during such period, and appointments to such vacant positions shall be made in accordance with the Civil Service Rules as amended by section 3 of this Order, unless prior express permission is given by the Civil Service Commission for appointment without regard thereto.

SECTION 3. (a) Upon consideration of the report of the Committee on Civil Service Improvement (House Document No. 118, 77th Congress) appointed by Executive Order No. 8044 of January 31, 1939, it is hereby found and determined that the regulations and procedures hereinafter prescribed in this section with

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respect to attorney positions in the classified civil service are required by the conditions of good administration.

(b) There is hereby created in the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) a board to be known as the Board of Legal Examiners (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board shall consist of the Solicitor General of the United States and the Principal Legal Examiner of the Civil Service Commission, as members *ex officio*, and nine members to be appointed by the President, five of whom shall be chosen from the chief law officers of the Executive departments, agencies or corporate instrumentalities of the Government, two from the law-teaching profession, and two from attorneys engaged in private practice. The President shall designate the chairman of the Board. Five members shall constitute a quorum, and the Board may transact business notwithstanding vacancies thereon. Members of the Board shall receive no salary as such, but shall be entitled to necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties hereunder.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board to promote the development of a merit system for the recruitment, selection, appointment, promotion, and transfer of attorneys in the classified civil service in accordance with the general procedures outlined in Plan A of the report of the Committee on Civil Service Improvement, appointed by Executive Order No. 8044 of January 31, 1939.

(d) The Board, in consultation with the Civil Service Commission, shall determine the regulations and procedures under this section governing the recruitment and examination of applicants for attorney positions, and the selection, appointment, promotion, and transfer of attorneys, in the classified service.

(e) The Commission shall in the manner determined by the Board establish a register or registers of eligibles from which attorney positions in the classified service shall be filled: *Provided*, That any register so established shall not be in effect for a period longer than one year from the date of its establishment. Upon request of the Board, the Commission shall designate appropriate

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regions or localities and appoint regional or local boards of examiners composed of three persons approved by the Board, within or without the Federal service, to interview and examine such applicants as the Board may recommend.

(f) The number of names to be placed upon any register of eligibles for attorney positions shall be limited to the number recommended by the Board; and such registers shall not be ranked according to the ratings received by the eligibles, except that persons entitled to veterans' preference as defined in section 1 of Civil Service Rule VI shall be appropriately designated thereon.

(g) Any person whose name has been placed upon three registers of eligibles covering positions of the same grade, and who has not been appointed therefrom, shall not thereafter be eligible for placement upon any subsequently established register covering positions of such grade.

(h) The eligibles on any register for attorney positions shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census, and the Commission shall certify to the appointing officer for each vacancy all the names on the appropriate register which meet the apportionment requirements: *Provided*, That whenever the Board shall be of the opinion that apportionment of eligibles on any register for attorney positions is not warranted by conditions of good administration, it shall so notify the Commission, which shall thereafter certify all the persons on such register to the appropriate appointing officer. The appointing officer shall make selections for any vacancy or vacancies in attorney positions from the register so certified, with sole reference to merit and fitness.

(i) Any position affected by this section which is vacant after June 30, 1941, may be filled before available registers have been established pursuant to this section only by the appointment of a person who has passed a noncompetitive examination prescribed by the Commission with the approval of the Board, and such person after the expiration of six months from the date of his appointment shall be eligible for a classified civil-service sta-

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tus upon compliance with the provisions of section 6 of Civil Service Rule II, other than those provisions relating to examination.

(j) The incumbent of any attorney position covered into the classified service by section 1 of this Order may acquire a classified civil-service status in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of Civil Service Rule II: *Provided*, That the noncompetitive examination required thereunder shall be prescribed by the Commission with the approval of the Board.

(k) The Commission with the approval of the Board shall appoint a competent person to act as Secretary to the Board; and the Commission shall furnish such further clerical, stenographic, and other assistants as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

(l) The Civil Service Rules are hereby amended to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this section.

SECTION 4. The noncompetitive examinations prescribed pursuant to sections 3 and 6 of this Order and section 2(a) of the said Act of November 26, 1940, shall, among other things, require any person taking such examination to meet such reasonable standards of physical fitness and personal suitability as the Civil Service Commission may prescribe.

SECTION 5. Persons who on the effective date of section 1 of this Order are on furlough or leave without pay from any position covered into the classified service by that section may be recalled to duty within one year of the date that they are furloughed or given leave without pay, and may be continued in such positions thereafter but shall not thereby acquire a classified civil-service status. If they are not recalled to duty within the time specified herein, they shall be separated from the service.

SECTION 6. Any person who in order to perform active service with the military or naval forces of the United States has left, or leaves, a position (other than a temporary position) which is covered into the classified civil service under section 1 of this Order shall be reinstated in the department or agency to the position in which he last served or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay in the same department or agency, and upon re-

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instatement thereto may acquire a classified civil-service status: *Provided*, (1) that he has been honorably discharged from the military or naval service, (2) that he makes application for reinstatement within forty days of such discharge, (3) that the head of the department or agency concerned recommends within one year of his reinstatement that he be permitted to acquire a classified civil-service status and certifies that he has served with merit for at least six months, and (4) that he qualifies in such suitable noncompetitive examination as the Commission may prescribe.

SECTION 7. Executive Order No. 8044 of January 31, 1939, is hereby revoked so far as it applies to positions covered into the classified civil service by this Order.

NOTE: The foregoing Executive Order raised the total number of positions placed under the merit system of the classified civil service to a material degree. (For additional accounts of extension of the merit system during the President's terms, see Items 96 and 96a, pp. 285-287, 1933 volume; Item 125, pp. 367-369, 1935 volume; Item 128, pp. 371-372, 1935 volume; Item 5, pp. 50-51, 1936 volume; Items 241 and 241a, pp. 668-681, 1936 volume; Item 66, pp. 250-251, 1937 volume; Item 74 and note, pp. 278-280, 1937 volume; Item 10, p. 57, 1938 volume; Item 41 and note, pp. 179-192, 1938 volume; Item 79 and note, pp. 385-390, 1938 volume; Item 24, pp. 108-109, 1939 volume; and Item 9 and note, this volume.)

Section 3 of the foregoing Executive Order also created the Board of Legal Examiners in the Civil Service Commission and prescribed its composition and duties.

The Board of Legal Examiners,

however, through no fault of its own, had a difficult and short-lived career. Congress was hostile to it and its operations, and as a result the President was reluctantly forced to issue amendatory Executive Order No. 9358. That Order provided that, pending action by the Congress with respect to the continuance of the Board of Legal Examiners, the application of the civil service laws to attorney positions should be administered by the regular facilities of the Civil Service Commission. Executive Order No. 9358 further provided that the Civil Service Commission should have authority to give effect to the other provisions of section 3 of Executive Order No. 8743. A Legal Examining Unit was established in the Commission for these purposes.

But even this dilution of the President's original plans was not satisfactory to the Congress. On June 27, 1944, with virtually no

32. *Heroic Resistance of Greek People*

comprehensive consideration of the difficult basic issues, the Congress enacted an appropriation act (58 Stat. 361), which included a rider providing that no part of the appropriation should be available for the salaries of the Legal Examining Unit of the Civil Service Com-

mission. Thus the program for the recruitment and examination of applicants for attorney positions, and their selection, appointment, promotion, and transfer in the classified civil service, was effectively terminated by legislative action.

32 ¶ The President Praises the Heroic Resistance of the Greek People.

April 25, 1941

THE heroic struggle of the Hellenic people to defend their liberties and their homes against the aggression of Germany after they had so signally defeated the Italian attempt at invasion has stirred the hearts and aroused the sympathy of the whole American people.

During the Hellenic War of Independence more than a century ago, our young Nation, prizing its own lately won independence, expressed its ardent sympathy for the Greeks and hoped for Hellenic victory. That victory was achieved.

Today, at a far more perilous period in the history of Hellas, we intend to give full effect to our settled policy of extending all available material aid to free peoples defending themselves against aggression. Such aid has been and will continue to be extended to Greece.

Whatever may be the temporary outcome of the present phase of the war in Greece, I believe that the Greek people will once more ultimately achieve their victory and regain their political independence and the territorial integrity of their country. In that high objective, the people of Greece and their Government can count on the help and support of the Government and the people of the United States.

(Statement made to a delegation of the Greek patriotic society, Ahepa.)

33 (The Seven Hundred and Thirty-eighth
Press Conference (Excerpts). April 25, 1941

(*Hemisphere defense — Patrols and convoys — Greenland — Defeatists and appeasers.*)

THE PRESIDENT: Steve [Early] says there isn't anything — any formality, or anything to talk about today.

Q. Mr. President, three strong speeches were made yesterday by three Cabinet officers —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Three?

Q. Yes, Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, and Secretary Wickard.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, is that so?

Q. (*continuing*) About possible advances in foreign policy, and greater aid and more initiative, etc. Would you comment, sir, on this?

THE PRESIDENT: I think they speak for themselves pretty clearly, and for the great majority of the American people.

Q. And also for you, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. President, the newspapers this morning generally seem to regard these speeches as indicating that it may soon be necessary to resort to an extended use of the Navy in protecting the "bridge of ships." Would you consider that a fair interpretation of the speeches?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that we had better talk about interpretations. I think we had better confine ourselves to facts, and I am sorry, but I have to make a liar out of a lot of people — some of them in this room. What — I will tell you how.

In September, 1939, about a year and a half ago, the whole subject of hemisphere defense came up, as we know. And at that time, because of the conditions surrounding the outbreak of the war — in other words, a complete failure to adhere to international law, a surprise invasion, which was followed by other surprise attacks on peaceful Nations — at that time there was instituted by the Western Hemisphere what is

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known as a *patrol*, and that patrol extended on all sides of the hemisphere as necessary at the time. Of course, nobody here knows geography. People said it was 300 miles off-shore. It wasn't. It was a patrol that was carried out partly by the American Navy, partly by other American ships, off what was then considered a reasonable limit, depending on where it was. A lot of very careless people called it 300 miles. If you went over to the eastern shore of Maryland, you would have found for the past year and a half that that patrol was extended a thousand miles out to sea at that point. It was maintained as a patrol for such distances as seemed advisable, in view of the conditions at the time. That patrol has been extended from time to time in different places. Some places it has been pulled in, depending entirely on the conditions and the locations on any given duty. That was a patrol. It was not a convoy.

I think some of you know what a horse looks like. I think you also know what a cow looks like. If, by calling a cow a horse for a year and a half, you think that that makes the cow a horse, *I don't think so*. Now, that's pretty plain language. You can't turn a cow into a horse by calling it something else; calling it a horse it is still a cow. Now this is a patrol, and has been a patrol for a year and a half, still is, and from time to time it has been extended, and is being extended, and will be extended — the patrol — for the safety of the Western Hemisphere.

Q. Could you tell us, sir, how far it may possibly go?

THE PRESIDENT: That is exactly the question I hoped you would ask. As far on the waters of the seven seas as may be necessary for the defense of the American hemisphere.

Q. Mr. President —

Q. (*interposing*) Will there be any extension of its functions?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no.

Q. Could you define its functions?

THE PRESIDENT: Its function is protection of the American hemisphere.

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Q. By belligerent means?

THE PRESIDENT: Protection of the American hemisphere.

Q. Mr. President, does that include the protection of shipping, that is —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Protection of the American hemisphere.

Q. Mr. President, just what —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Now you can't —. Just what? What do you mean, just what? [*No answer*] The point of it is the protection of the American hemisphere, and will be so used as it has been for the past year and a half. Now I can't tell you what is going to happen.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us the difference between a patrol and a convoy?

THE PRESIDENT: You know the difference between a cow and a horse?

Q. Yes, I know the difference.

THE PRESIDENT: All right, there is just as much difference. Just exactly as much difference.

Q. Is there more patrolling against —

THE PRESIDENT: The point is the protection of the merchant convoy — the escorting of merchant ships in a group to prevent an act of aggression against that group of merchant ships under escort. A patrol is a reconnaissance — I think that is the word — of certain areas of ocean to find out whether there is any possibly aggressive ship within that area, or areas, or the whole of the ocean, which might be coming toward the Western Hemisphere, or into the Western Hemisphere.

Now one thing that will occur to you as being, just as you say, a rule of common sense — back there in 1939 the area of the patrol on the Atlantic was nearer, because there didn't seem to be any danger of an attack on places like Bermuda or Newfoundland, or Greenland, or Trinidad, or Brazil. The events, however, in the later period of the war show that such attack is more possible today than it was then. We have, incidentally, some rather valuable American lives and Ameri-

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can property at various points that we didn't have in 1939. Again Greenland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the obligation that we have under the Monroe Doctrine for the protection of Canada against any other non-American Nation. That's old stuff. Then you have got other islands, the Bahamas, Antigua, and all the West Indies, Trinidad, British Guiana, which were not an American possession a year and a half ago. Today they are. Those bases, those points —

Q. (*interposing*) Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) It's a little bit like what I was talking about to one of the Senators over the telephone today. He happened to come from the West, and it's rather a good simile. In the old days a wagon train across the plains — of course it had its immediate guard around it, that was perfectly true — but it didn't go — it didn't move across the plains unless it got reports from a long ways—200 to 300 miles off. It was not felt safe to wait until the Indians got two miles away before you saw them. It was advisable, if possible, to find out if the Indians were 200 miles away.

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) I think the simile probably is a useful one.

Q. Mr. President, if this patrol should discover some apparently aggressive ships headed toward the Western Hemisphere, what would it do about it?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me know. (*Loud laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, has this Government any idea of escorting convoys?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, and that, I am afraid, will be awfully bad news to some of you.

Q. Is there any better plan?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q. Has it any better system?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you remember Mr. Bairnsfather. [English cartoonist in World War I, whose celebrated character Old

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Bill said to his worried friend in a shell-hole, "If you know a better 'ole, go to it.]"

Q. Mr. President, to some of us who read those speeches of the Cabinet officers, they seem to be concerned about the delivery of aid to Britain. How does this tie in with that?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, it's a new one on me. . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us — (*Loud laughter*) could you tell us whether these patrol ships have any instructions as to the action they should take, in the event there was an attack in nearby —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) I can't tell you where they are because the next question would be just where are they, and just where are they going tomorrow. You see?

Q. Mr. President, does this extension of patrol involve any revision of the so-called Pan-American Security Zone?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no.

Q. No connection?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Mr. President, are we doing anything special, with any —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Just an extension. After all, it's just what has been going on for a year and a half. Now, that will answer all your questions. . . .

CONSTANTINE BROWN: Mr. President, last week you said that people in this country are not quite aware of the gravity of the situation. Would you care to amplify that a little bit?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so, Constantine, without some further thought about it beforehand. Perhaps I could put it as one little thought to throw out.

There are people in this country, I am sorry to say I can't recognize any faces here, but some in this room — who are adopting a rather curious attitude, which I should say hadn't been thought through. These people say out of one side of the mouth, "No, I don't like it, I don't like dictatorship," and then out of the other side of the mouth, "Well, it's going to beat democracy, it's going to defeat democracy, therefore I might just as well accept it." Now, I don't call that good

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Americanism. I am not mentioning any names but that attitude is held by a minority in this country. It's just the same way — I read an editorial on Monday, or something like that the other day — which said in effect, Why, we have always had conquerors all through the history of the world, and Alexander the Great who tried to conquer all the known world, he was not satisfied to stay at home — where was it, Macedonia? — he went out and tried to conquer lots of people he never saw before, just to add to his empire. He was not satisfied with his own people, his own flesh and blood.

And there was another fellow called Caesar. He was not satisfied with the Rome of his day, and went out to conquer the whole of Europe and North Africa, and the Near East, and so forth and so on. And then there were, according to this mentality — there were two other conquerors — one was Cromwell, who conquered England, and the other one was George Washington, who conquered America. (*Laughter*) Now, any mentality that lumps George Washington and Cromwell with Caesar and Napoleon — oh, yes, Napoleon — Napoleon and Alexander the Great — well, all I can say is I am awfully sorry that people with those mentalities are in such high places that they can write or talk at all. It's just dumb.

Now, coming back to this mythical person in our midst who takes the attitude that dictatorships are going to win anyway, I think that is almost equally dumb, because I am "agin" them, and everybody else in this country — the overwhelming majority are "agin" them. We will fight for the democratic process, and that's all. We are willing to fight for the democratic process. I don't want to lie down and say, "Dictatorship is inevitable. We have got to do the best we can. We have got to make our peace. We have got to yield to the demands of the dictatorship because it has the military might to win." I don't think along those lines, and neither do you. . . .

If you go back to the roster of the Army in the Civil War — we called on people there from liberty-loving people on

34. *Defense Savings Bonds and Stamps*

both sides — both the Confederates and the North; and from outside this country we had people fighting for us because they believed in it. On the other hand, the Confederacy and the North let certain people go. In other words, in both armies there were — what shall I call them? — there were Vallandighams [Ohio's Clement L. Vallandigham, leader of the "Copperheads" in the Civil War].

Well, Vallandigham, as you know, was an appeaser. He wanted to make peace from 1863 on because the North "couldn't win." Once upon a time there was a place called Valley Forge and there were an awful lot of appeasers that pleaded with Washington to quit, because he "couldn't win." Just because he "couldn't win." See what Tom Paine said at that time in favor of Washington keeping on fighting!

Q. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It's worth reading.

Q. Wasn't it, "These are the times that try men's souls?"

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that particular paragraph. . . .

34 ¶ Radio Address on the Occasion of the President's Purchases of the First Defense Savings Bond and Defense Savings Stamps.

April 30, 1941

ONE thought is uppermost in my mind as I make grateful acknowledgment of this dual honor. It is that in reserving the first Defense Savings Bond and the first Defense Postal Savings Stamps in the name of the President, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster General have given emphasis to the national character of this defense savings campaign. This character of the campaign is national in the best sense of the word — for it is going to reach down, we hope, to the individual and the

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family in every community, and on every farm, in every State and every possession of the United States.

It is national and it is homey at the same time. For example, I am buying not one stamp but ten stamps each to go into a little book for each of my ten grandchildren. And the first savings bond is being made out in the name of Mrs. Roosevelt as beneficiary.

It is fitting that the President in his purchases should be a sort of a symbol of the determination of all the people to save and sacrifice in defense of democracy.

In a larger sense, this first defense bond and these first defense stamps sold to the President constitute tangible evidence of a partnership — a partnership between all of the people and their Government — entered into to safeguard and perpetuate all of those precious freedoms which Government guarantees. In this time of national peril what we all must realize is that the United States Government is you and I and all the other families next door all the way across the country and back again. It is one great partnership.

This evening we are giving special thought to the financial structure of our partnership. We know that we are engaged in an all-out effort to perpetuate democracy in the New World by helping it to be safe and by aiding embattled democracy in the Old World and everywhere else. From the Atlantic to the Pacific, America today at this time of the year happens to be in the full beauty of glorious springtime. And we have eyes to see the beauty of our country this spring as we never saw it in any spring before, in the memory of most of us.

For a great many people are appreciating our blessings all the more when they realize what blessings so many other millions of people have lost this spring and last spring — so many millions of people who hoped and prayed and even assumed — even took it for granted that fate — some kind fate — would let them live on as they had always lived.

In the few words that I am speaking to my fellow countrymen tonight, I desire above all else to emphasize the thought that in

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just such measure as we support our Government will our Government be strong and effective and safe.

Defenses that were adequate ten years ago are today a broken reed. New machines in the air, on the land, and on the sea have created a revolution in the conduct of offensive war, and therefore of necessity in the conduct of defensive war.

Nations and lands that were safe ten years ago by virtue of the mere fact of distance — the mere fact of miles — countries thousands of miles away from possible aggression have today been overrun by mechanized conquerors. And so distance is no longer a guarantee of safety.

Your Government, therefore, is arming, factories spring up, production multiplies — a country-wide unanimous effort of planning and of work.

And so at this time we add another call — a frank and clear appeal for financial support to pay for our arming, and to pay for the American existence of later generations.

With jobs more plentiful and wages higher, slight sacrifice here and there, the omission of a few luxuries, will swell the coffers of our Federal Treasury. The outward and the visible tokens of partnership through sacrifice will be the possession of these defense bonds and defense savings stamps which are, at the same time, a guarantee of our future security.

Yes, your Government is asking that you make this sacrifice. But is it a sacrifice? Is it a sacrifice for us to give dollars when more than a million of our finest young men have been withdrawn from civilian life to accept the discipline of military life in defense of our country? No, I do not think that sacrifice is the word. This defense savings program is rather a privilege and an opportunity — an opportunity to share in the defense of all the things we cherish against the threat that is made against them. We must fight this threat wherever it appears; and it can be found at the threshold of every home in America.

And so my fellow Americans, I ask you to demonstrate again your faith in America by joining me in investing in the new defense savings bonds and stamps. I know you will help.

34. *Defense Savings Bonds and Stamps*

NOTE: The financing of the costliest war in history through taxation and borrowing by the Government was designed in such a way as to reduce the danger of inflation and at the same time to offer investors securities which would be free from risk and would yield a good return on their investment.

On May 1, 1941, the Government placed on sale three new series of defense savings bonds as well as defense savings stamps for installment payment on the purchase of defense savings bonds. Under the terms of the Public Debt Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 7), the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized with the approval of the President to issue, through the postal service or otherwise, new issues of United States Savings Bonds and Stamps to help finance the national defense program. A Defense Savings Staff was established in the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury to promote the sale of these bonds and stamps.

The new savings bonds of Series "E" were intended primarily to provide for the investment of amounts saved from the current income of individuals, and holdings were limited to \$5,000 issued during any one calendar year to any one person. They were sold in denominations of \$25, \$50, \$100, \$500, and \$1,000 (maturity values), and the issue price of each bond was 75 percent of its maturity value. The bonds were payable at face value ten years from their date

of issue, and the purchase price of Series "E" afforded an investment yield of about 2.9 percent a year, compounded semiannually.

The savings bonds of the new Series "F" and "G" were intended to meet the requirements of larger investors. The bonds of Series "F" were issued on a discount basis, the issue price being 74 percent of their maturity value. Series "F" bonds matured twelve years from the date of issue, and the investment yield approximated 2.53 percent per annum, compounded semiannually. The bonds of the new Series "G" were issued at par, bore interest at the rate of 2.5 percent payable semiannually, and matured in twelve years.

Postal savings stamps of a special defense series in denominations of 10, 25, and 50 cents and \$1.00 and \$5.00 were made available for purchase at post offices and many other public agencies. These stamps, collected in defense stamp albums, could be accumulated until the purchase price of a defense bond was reached.

Sales of defense savings bonds and stamps increased steadily throughout 1941, and after Pearl Harbor the designation was changed to war savings stamps and war savings bonds. In December, 1941, approximately three and one-half times as many Series "E" savings bonds were purchased as in November, 1941, and the rate of sale of war savings bonds continued to increase in the succeeding

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months. Cash receipts from sales of war savings stamps increased from \$6,350,000 in November, 1941, to \$25,650,000 in December, 1941, and sales of war savings stamps continued to increase rapidly.

In order to simplify the public's purchase of savings bonds, the Treasury Department sponsored the payroll savings plan in the Nation's business enterprises, in the armed forces, among the employees of the Government, and in many other fields of activity. Participation in the payroll savings plan contributed substantially to the increase in sales of war savings bonds. By June, 1944, over 27½ million persons were participating in the payroll savings plan.

Close to 45 billion dollars was realized by selling defense and war savings bonds to approximately 85 million persons. Following World War I, the prices of Government

bonds fell and at one point Fourth Liberty Loan Bonds sold below 83. Since they were marketable, the World War I Liberty Bonds were subject to price fluctuation. However, the war savings bonds sold in the World War II period had cash redemption values guaranteed by the Government, thus assuring the investor a return of at least his original investment. In this way, small investors were protected in the event they were forced to sell their bonds before they matured.

During the war, seven war loan campaign drives were conducted, and the President took an active interest in these drives (see Items 47, 67, and 99 and notes, 1943 volume, and Items 42 and 115 and notes, 1944-1945 volume). In October 1945 a \$200 denomination bond bearing President Roosevelt's portrait was added to the Series E issues.

35 ¶ The President Asks for a Twenty-four-Hour Day, and a Seven-Day Week, for Machines in Defense Production.

April 30, 1941

Dear Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Hillman:

MY RECENT discussions with you have emphasized in my mind the urgent necessity of expanding and speeding up the manufacture and use of critical machine tools. I have watched the steady and substantial growth of the machine-tool industry dur-

35. *'Round the Clock Machine Operation*

ing the past months. At the same time I have seen the critical machines in our defense plants used in an ever growing number of hours each week. I know that this increase has been caused by the hard work of yourselves, of your associates, and of the men who manage and work in the plants throughout the Nation.

But it is not enough. The ever increasing demands for munitions, planes, and ships, caused by the critical situation which confronts our Nation, requires that they be produced in even larger quantities and ahead of the schedules assigned to them. It is essential that industry continue to increase the number of vital machines manufactured and that every single critical machine in the United States be used the maximum number of hours each week.

Every effort should be made to utilize to the very limit those critical machines; if they be in defense plants, by increased hours of operation on the work at hand; if in other plants, by finding defense items or parts for them to make or, as a last resort, by moving the tools to defense plants where they may be urgently needed.

Our problem is to see to it that there is no idle critical machine in the United States. The goal should be to work these machines twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, relieving the machines only for such time as is required for overhauling and repair.

The country should be further combed for men who have had experience on these machines. We should ask them to transfer their efforts to this operation which is so essential to our defense. No effort or justifiable expense should be spared in speeding this program, in order to obtain the objective which our national interests require.

Workers and managers will, I believe, join with you with spirit and determination in pursuing and achieving this goal at the earliest possible moment.

Very truly yours,

36. *Recommendation for \$3,500,000,000 in Taxes*

36 ¶ The President Recommends the Levying of \$3,500,000,000 in Taxes. May 1, 1941

My dear Mr. Chairman:

SECRETARY Morgenthau has recommended that three and one-half billion of additional taxes should be levied during the coming year to defray in part the extraordinary defense expenditures.

This total represents the minimum of our revenue requirements. I hope that you and the other members of your Committee will act favorably on his goal.

You will recall that in my Budget Message this year, I suggested a financial policy aimed at collecting progressive taxes out of a higher level of national income. I urged that additional tax measures should be based on the principle of ability to pay. This still is my view.

I am confident that your Committee will recommend legislation specifically aimed at making the Federal revenue system evasion-proof and so devised that every individual and every corporation will bear its fair share of the tax burden. The income tax can not fix the tax liability of individuals and corporations with equity as long as the tax base is defined to exclude substantial and significant elements of income.

I hope your Committee, with the help of the Treasury, will formulate a tax bill which will convince the country that a national defense program intended to protect our democracy is not going to make the rich richer and the poor poorer.

I am sure that you and I are agreed that defense is a national task to which every American must contribute in accordance with his talents and treasure and that the people of the United States are gladly willing to make whatever sacrifices may be necessary to strengthen the common defense.

Very sincerely yours,

Honorable R. L. Doughton,
Chairman, Ways and Means Committee,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

36. Recommendation for \$3,500,000,000 in Taxes

NOTE: There were several compelling reasons for recommending a higher rate of corporation, individual income, and excise taxes during the defense period. Of course, additional revenues were needed to finance the expanding defense program and the increasing financial burden of lend-lease commitments abroad. Higher profits and large incomes, and a rising total national income, made it possible to raise the rates of taxation and still leave the vast majority of individuals and corporations with greater incomes after the payment of higher taxes.

In addition, the President recognized that higher taxes played an important role in preserving economic stability. As the national purchasing power rose and as consumer commodities became more scarce, money in circulation furnished an upward pressure on prices. With increasing consumer demands and restricted output of consumer commodities, there was a danger of inflation which could be partially ameliorated by increasing the tax rate and thereby relieving some of the upward pressure on prices. (See Item 26 and note, this volume, for an account of the work of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply and its successor, the Office of Price Administration, in their efforts to prevent inflationary price movements.)

In response to the foregoing recommendation, the House of Representatives in August, 1941, passed a tax bill which, it was esti-

mated, would raise \$3,216,000,000 in additional revenues. As a further means of raising additional revenue, the President on July 31, 1941, had written to Representative Robert L. Doughton, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, recommending the lowering of exemptions for individual income tax payers. In his letter to Chairman Doughton, the President stated:

"There is one other subject which I did not have a chance to talk with you about. It relates to lowering the exemption in the lower brackets. I know that very few tax experts agree with me, but I still think that some way ought to be found by which the exemption of a single person should be reduced to \$750, with a provision for a straight simple payment of some small contribution to the national tax income through some simple agency and on some simple form.

"In the same way I think that the married exemption should be reduced to \$1,500, again with a simple method of paying the tax through a simple agency and on a simple form.

"Further, I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of our citizens want to contribute something directly to our defense, and that most of them would rather do it with their eyes open than do it through a general sales tax or through a multiplication of what we have known as nuisance taxes. In other words, most Americans who are in the lowest income brackets are willing and proud to chip in directly, even if their individual contributions are very small in terms of dollars. After all, the majority of all Americans are in these lower brackets."

In the course of the Senate's consideration of the revenue bill, the

37. *Division of Defense Aid Reports*

exemption of a single person was reduced from \$800 to \$750, and the married exemption was reduced from \$2,000 to \$1,500, in accordance with the President's recommendation. The House approved these changes and the bill as finally passed embodied provisions for new taxes which, it was estimated, would yield \$3,553,400,000.

The President approved the Revenue Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 687) on September 20, 1941. Surtax rates were increased in the new Act and made applicable to the entire surtax net income, the first \$4,000 of which had been previously free from surtax. Excess profits tax rates were increased by ten percentage points in each bracket so that the rates ranged from 35 percent of the first \$20,000 of adjusted excess profits net income to 60 percent of such income over \$500,000. Further increases were made in the capital stock tax rate and the estate and gift tax rates.

Increased taxes were levied on a number of items including playing cards, safe deposit boxes, distilled

spirits, imported perfumes, wines, tires and tubes, radio sets and parts, mechanical refrigerators, and telephone, telegraph, cable, and radio messages. New manufacturers' excise taxes were levied on phonographs and records, musical instruments, matches, sporting goods, luggage, electric, gas, and oil appliances, photographic apparatus, electric signs, business and store machines, rubber articles, washing machines, optical equipment, and electric light bulbs. New retailers' excise taxes were levied on jewelry, furs, and toilet goods. New taxes were also imposed on the transportation of persons, on coin-operated amusement and gaming devices, bowling alleys, billiard and pool tables, and on the use of motor vehicles and boats. Amusement and cabaret taxes were increased.

The Revenue Act of 1941 also established a committee to study all expenditures of the Federal Government with a view to recommending the elimination of non-essential expenditures.

37 ¶ The Division of Defense Aid Reports Is Established. Executive Order No. 8751.

May 2, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes and by the Act of March 11, 1941, entitled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States" (hereafter referred

37. *Division of Defense Aid Reports*

to as the Act), in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President in respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on September 8, 1939, and in order to provide for the effective administration of said Act in the interest of national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Division of Defense Aid Reports, at the head of which shall be an Executive Officer appointed by the President. The Executive Officer shall receive compensation at such rate as the President shall approve and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Division of Defense Aid Reports shall perform and discharge the following described duties and responsibilities:

a. Provide a central channel for the clearance of transactions and reports, and coordinate the processing of requests for aid under the Act.

b. Maintain such system of records and summary accounts to be approved by the Bureau of the Budget, as may be necessary for adequate administrative and financial control over operations under the Act and as will currently reflect the status of all such operations.

c. Prepare such reports as may be necessary to keep the President informed of progress under the Act; assist in the preparation of reports pursuant to section 5b of the Act; and serve generally as a clearing house of information for agencies participating in the program.

d. Perform such other duties relating to defense aid activities as the President may from time to time prescribe.

3. Within the limitation of such funds as may be allocated for the Division of Defense Aid Reports by the President, the Executive Officer may employ necessary personnel and make pro-

37. *Division of Defense Aid Reports*

vision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services. In so far as practicable, the Division of Defense Aid Reports shall use such general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management or other agencies of the Government.

NOTE: On December 6, 1939, the President had addressed letters to the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Treasury, by which he had appointed the Interdepartmental Committee for the Coordination of Foreign and Domestic Military Purchases. The function of this Committee, known as the "President's Liaison Committee," was to coordinate foreign military purchases in the United States. (See Item 15 and note, this volume, for an account of the work of the President's Liaison Committee, of the origin and legislative history of the Lend-Lease Act, and of the appropriations for its administration.)

Upon the enactment of the Lend-Lease Act on March 12, 1941, the staff of the President's Liaison Committee focused its attention on lend-lease matters. To supplement the lend-lease activities of the Committee, the President appointed an advisory committee, the chairman of which was Harry L. Hopkins and the members of which included representatives of the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, Department of Agriculture, Treasury Department, and Office of Production Management. This advisory committee was charged with the general supervision of lend-lease administration.

The foregoing Executive Order established the Division of Defense Aid Reports, charged with the duty of providing the necessary administrative and financial control over lead-lease operations under the new Act. By military order of May 6, 1941, the President appointed Major General James H. Burns as Executive Officer of the Division of Defense Aid Reports. Meanwhile, various international aid and foreign procurement offices in other governmental departments were expanded in order to handle many of the operational functions under lend-lease. The Division of Defense Aid Reports, in turn, had the overall responsibility of determining lend-lease requirements and the availability of production of the items required, of allocating the items made available, and of establishing the reporting and accounting procedures and financial arrangements.

Within a few hours after he had signed the Lend-Lease Act, the President declared that the defense of Great Britain and of Greece was vital to the defense of the United States. At the same time, the President authorized the Secretary of the Navy to furnish the British with 28 P.T. and P.T.C. boats, 3,000 propelling charges for depth bombs, a

37. *Division of Defense Aid Reports*

number of naval guns, and ammunition for the arming of merchant ships. The President also authorized the Secretary of War to transfer to Greece fifty 75-millimeter guns and 150,000 shells, as well as 30,000 shells for 155-millimeter field howitzers for use in the mountain fighting against Italy.

Of equal importance was the transfer of large quantities of food. On April 16, 1941, the President directed the Secretary of Agriculture to transfer to Great Britain 100,000 cases of evaporated milk, 11,000 tons of cheese, and 11,000 tons of eggs. These supplies helped to alleviate a serious food crisis. Additional shipments of food to Great Britain during the remainder of 1941 substantially compensated for the shortages which Britain suffered as a result of the submarine blockade. During 1941, over half the value of all lend-lease exports to the United Kingdom were food shipments.

Actual battle material supplied to the British under lend-lease in 1941 included American tanks shipped to the Middle East. Almost 300 light tanks — over half of the total American production in April, May, and June, 1941 — were shipped to the British forces under lend-lease for use in Libya and Egypt. To aid the British in staving off Rommel's armored attack in the summer of 1941, a huge number of medium tanks, as well as more than 13,000 trucks, were rushed to the British.

In the early months of the administration of the Lend-Lease Act, the President maintained a direct and personal interest in every transaction. Assisted by Harry L. Hopkins, he personally decided such questions as which countries should receive lend-lease aid, the terms on which they should receive it, the quantity of goods to be transferred to particular countries, and the extent to which defense articles should be transferred under lend-lease or should remain in this country to serve in the training of our military forces. But the procurement process rapidly became regularized so that the War and Navy Departments handled the lend-lease procurement of planes, tanks, guns, and warships; the Maritime Commission, merchant ship construction and ship repairs; the Department of Agriculture, food and other agricultural products; and the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, raw materials and industrial equipment.

It can hardly be contended that the net tangible impact of the early lend-lease shipments upon the course of the war was overwhelming. The food sent to Great Britain and the tanks sent to the British forces in Egypt proved of substantial benefit during 1941, but the lend-lease program did not reach its peak before Pearl Harbor.

But an immeasurably valuable and concrete contribution of the early operations of lend-lease was made directly to the United States.

37. *Division of Defense Aid Reports*

This contribution was the enormous impetus lend-lease procurement gave to the production of arms and munitions. The rapid acceleration of production made it possible for the United States to achieve the almost incredible war production goals reached during 1943 and 1944 (see Item 9 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of American war production). By June 1, 1941, over \$4,000,000,000 of the \$7,000,000,000 appropriation had been allocated to the procurement agencies, and contracts had been already placed for almost \$1,000,000,000 worth of supplies and equipment. By August 31, 1941, lend-lease contracts totaling \$3,500,000,000 had been placed. These funds helped build the famous Willow Run bomber plant of the Ford Company, the Chrysler tank arsenal in Detroit, and hundreds of shipyards, aircraft plants, and other industrial plants and factories.

On May 6, 1941, lend-lease aid to China began with a declaration of the President that the defense of China was vital to the defense of the United States; by this declaration, China became eligible under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act to receive American aid. Much of the aid to China was in the form of the improvements of the Burma Road and the speeding up of traffic over it. Trucks, spare parts, gasoline, and lubricants were dispatched for use on the Burma Road and in other parts of China. Lend-Lease funds and equipment were supplied for

the construction of a vital railroad, and medical men were sent to combat malaria during the construction of the railroad. Additional lend-lease funds were supplied for the training and reequipping of a number of Chinese Army divisions and the building and equipping of a Chinese Air Force to be supplemented by volunteer American airmen (the "Flying Tigers"). Many of the Chinese fliers were trained in this country. (For comments of the President and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek on aid to China, see Item 21, 1943 volume.)

The Nazi attack on Russia on June 22, 1941, immediately resulted in new and unanticipated demands upon the lend-lease program. Some shipments of material aid were made to Russia prior to Pearl Harbor (see Items 96 and 111 and notes, this volume, for an account of lend-lease aid to Russia).

With the establishment of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board on August 25, 1941 (see Item 83 and note, this volume), the President established new machinery for fixing allocations and priorities and for dividing the supply of available materials between military needs of the United States, defense aid needs, and the civilian needs of the people of the United States. At the time of the creation of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, the President announced the appointment of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. as Lend-Lease Administrator. By letter dated September 16, 1941,

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the President vested Mr. Stettinius with the responsibility of exercising general supervision and control over the lend-lease program. He also advised Mr. Stettinius that "Harry Hopkins is, of course, familiar with the administration of lend-lease, and I hope you will consult with him and with me where matters of major policy arise."

On October 28, 1941, the Presi-

dent issued Executive Order No. 8926 which abolished the Division of Defense Aid Reports and established the Office of Lend-Lease Administration (see Item 105 and note, this volume, for the text of the Executive Order and an account of the functions and operations of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration).

38 ¶ Remarks at Staunton, Virginia, on the Dedication of Woodrow Wilson's Birthplace.

May 4, 1941

WE ARE meeting here today to dedicate a new shrine of freedom. By this action we are bearing true witness to the faith that is in us—a simple faith in the freedom of democracy in the world.

It is the kind of faith for which we have fought before—for the existence of which we are ever ready to fight again.

I can think of no more fitting place in all the land for Americans to pledge anew their faith in the democratic way of life than at the birthplace of Woodrow Wilson. In this quiet Presbyterian manse first saw the light of day one whose whole active life was dedicated to the cause of freedom, to the conquest of fear, and to the liberation of the eternal spirit of man from every thralldom imposed by fear.

Woodrow Wilson was fortunate in his birthplace. He was favored in his parentage and his environment. I like the old phrase that this was a home of plain living and high thinking and wherever the family moved in the migrations incident to the religious calling of the father, they carried with them ideals which put faith in spiritual values above every material consideration.

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In the tragic conflict which the world witnesses today and which threatens everything that we have most loved as a free people, we see more clearly than ever before the unyielding strength of things of the spirit. All of recorded history bears witness that the human race has made true advancement only as it has appreciated spiritual values. Those unhappy peoples who have placed their sole reliance on the sword have inevitably perished by the sword in the end.

No, physical strength can never permanently withstand the impact of spiritual force.

And Woodrow Wilson's whole career was a triumph of the spiritual over the sordid forces of brute strength. Under his leadership this country made, as we know, very great spiritual progress.

Of Woodrow Wilson this can be said, that in a time when world councils were dominated by material considerations of greed and of gain and of revenge he beheld the vision splendid. That selfish men could not share his vision of a world emancipated from the shackles of force and the arbitrament of the sword in no wise detracts from its splendor. Rather does the indifference of hostile contemporaries enhance the beauty of the vision which he sought to rebuild.

He will be held in everlasting remembrance by those who knew him and those who came after him, as a statesman who, when other men sought revenge and material gain, strove to bring nearer the day which should see the emancipation of conscience from power and the substitution of freedom for force in the government of the world.

It is good for America that this house in which Woodrow Wilson was born will be preserved for us and for many future generations. In this Valley of Virginia it will remind America that his ideals of freedom were wide enough to support democracy in all the world. He taught — and let's never forget it — he taught that democracy could not survive in isolation. We applaud his judgment and we applaud his faith.

39 ¶ The President Orders Construction of a Fleet of Heavy Bombers to Give the Democracies Command of the Air. May 5, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

THE effective defense of this country and the vital defense of other democratic Nations requires that there be a substantial increase in heavy bomber production. To this end will you take whatever action is needed, including the procurement of aircraft, to obtain substantially the production rate which I am indicating to you in a private memorandum.

I am advising the Office of Production Management to take the necessary steps to provide appropriate priority ratings applicable to this increased bomber program. Will you in cooperation with the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of Production Management work out the proper procedure to accomplish this very important task with all possible speed?

I am fully aware of the fact that increasing the number of our heavy bombers will mean a great strain upon our production effort. It will mean a large expansion of plant facilities and the utilization of existing factories not now engaged in making munitions. But command of the air by the democracies must and can be achieved. Every month the democracies are gaining in the relative strength of the air forces. We must see to it that the process is hastened and that the democratic superiority in the air be made absolute.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable,
The Secretary of War

NOTE: The very nature of aircraft as a weapon of war and the extraordinary role played by fighters, bombers, and other types of airplanes in World War II combined to make aircraft production a symbol of all war production. It was, accordingly, a symbol which President Roosevelt was quick to dramatize. Throughout, he emphasized aircraft production not only for its own inherent importance in

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the war but also as a dramatic point of reference for all other production. It was something which the people understood better than statistics of any other weapons.

In 1938, the United States Army Air Forces comprised fewer than 20,000 officers and men and only 1,600 planes. Military planes were then being built at a rate of about 100 of all types a month. But 1938 was the turning point for our air power. It was in that year that the production of the B-17 "Flying Fortresses" was begun and the B-24 Liberator and the B-25 Mitchell medium bomber were designed. During 1938 plans for the famous B-29's, the Superfortresses, were begun.

Quick to act on his realization of the vital importance of air power in the defense of the United States, the President sent a special message to the Congress on January 12, 1939, requesting \$300,000,000 for expansion of the Army Air Corps and for an increase in plane production to what appeared then to be the high rate of 5,500 planes a year. (See Item 8, pp. 70-74, 1939 volume.) In that message the President told Congress: "Military aviation is increasing today at an unprecedented and alarming rate. Increased range, increased speed, increased capacity of airplanes abroad have changed our requirements for defense aviation. The additional planes recommended will considerably strengthen the air defenses of the continental United States, Alaska,

Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone."

Just six days after the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries in May, 1940, the President made his dramatic — some thought it fantastically melodramatic — statement: "I should like to see this Nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 planes a year" (Item 48, p. 202, 1940 volume). Some of his opponents — Thomas E. Dewey among them — dismissed the President's statement as impossible of fulfillment and as "demagoguery." Yet before the end of the war, America's plane production reached a monthly rate exceeding 100,000 planes a year, and in 1944, 96,318 planes were in fact produced. This achievement, and the skepticism of those who derided his 1940 statement, gave the President great delight. He pointed to the achievement often during the war (see, e.g., Item 4, 1942 volume; Item 63, 1942 volume; Item 40, 1944-1945 volume). And indeed, his emphasis on both the accomplishment and the skepticism provided a telling point in the 1944 campaign (see Item 98, 1944-1945 volume).

At the beginning of the war, the great need of the British was for fighter planes with which to ward off the assaults of the Luftwaffe. After the R.A.F.'s heroic victory in the Battle of Britain, the necessity by the spring of 1941 was for heavy bombers with which to carry the attack to Germany. General H. H.

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Arnold, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, visited England late in April, 1941, and discussed with R.A.F. leaders their increasing need for heavy bombers. The President was convinced after General Arnold's return that the United States should concentrate on heavy bomber production even at the expense of delaying production on other types of planes.

In writing the foregoing letter, the President planned an expanded program under which 500 heavy bombers a month would be produced by June 30, 1943. The daring magnitude of this objective is underscored by the fact that the scheduled delivery of heavy bombers for the month of June, 1941 — shortly after the letter was written — was only 9, and two new heavy bomber plants recently started were to bring the total production of this type of plane up to only 200 a month.

Prompt steps were taken to carry out the President's plan. High priority ratings were assigned for the planes, engines, and components, and for the machine tools necessary for their manufacture. Far more sweeping, the Army Air Corps, the Office of Production Management, and the aircraft industry decided to utilize the automotive industry to expand existing aircraft plants and to pool the resources of the aircraft industry. As a result, many aircraft firms had to forgo work on their own models and join in the production of planes designed by competitors. Yet this step was taken with

complete success, which was a remarkable tribute to the industry's patriotic cooperation even before the United States was at war.

In 1941, aircraft and engine factories were expanded and peacetime industries were converted. Mass production of B-24's, B-25's and B-26's began early that year. So too with total production of all kinds of heavy bombers. By March, 1943, heavy bombers were being turned out at a rate of over 500 a month — the goal which had been set by the President in 1941. In March, 1944, 1,569 heavy bombers were produced.

Meanwhile, the phenomenal increase in production of heavy bombers was paralleled by a like production curve in all types of military aircraft. In September, 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland, the United States produced only 117 aircraft. By January, 1942, the number rose to 2,978; a year later, the rate had reached 5,013 a month; 7,596 aircraft were produced in September, 1943, and 9,113 in March, 1944. And the increase was not only in quantity, but in size, quality, and armament as well.

Of course, not all aircraft produced by us were used by our own military forces. A great number of planes were delivered to our allies either under lend-lease or through direct purchase. As early as May, 1940, despite the need of the United States of planes for training purposes, about 2,000 aircraft were sent to France and Britain. The

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President had decided that their need was greater, and that these planes could be used more effectively by Great Britain and France in actual combat than by us merely for training. The Battle of Britain proved him right. By October 1, 1943, 31,871 aircraft had been furnished to Great Britain, Russia, France, and exiled airmen from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and many other countries. Approximately the same number again were

shipped to our allies in the months between October, 1943, and the end of the war.

Some idea of the enormous part the air arms played in defeating the enemy can be gained from a single statistic: A total of 1,554,463 tons of bombs were dropped by the Army Air Force against Germany, and 502,781 tons of bombs — plus the A-bombs — were dropped against Japan.

40 ¶ The President Requests Funds for the N.Y.A. to Train Workers for Defense.

May 14, 1941

The Speaker of the House of Representatives
Sir:

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of Congress supplemental estimates of appropriations for the National Youth Administration, Federal Security Agency, for the fiscal year 1941, amounting to \$22,500,000.

The details of these estimates, the necessity therefor, and the reasons for their transmission at this time are set forth in the letter of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, transmitted herewith, with whose comments and observations thereon I concur.

Respectfully,

NOTE: The foregoing message to the Congress requested additional appropriations to be used chiefly to provide funds for the work-experience training program of the National Youth Administration of the Federal Security Agency.

The National Youth Administra-

tion had been established by Executive Order No. 7086 on June 26, 1935 (see Items 86 and 86-A and notes, pp. 281-287, 1935 volume, for an account of the establishment and operation of the N.Y.A. during the President's first term of office). The record of the N.Y.A.'s real

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achievements and genuine contributions refutes the indiscriminate, bitter, and unintelligent attacks upon it by a few vocal opponents of the Roosevelt Administration. It performed an incalculably valuable service in avoiding a lost generation of men and women during the depression.

When it was first established, the N.Y.A. operated under the Works Progress Administration; in 1939 it was transferred to the Federal Security Agency; and during the last days of its existence it was a part of the War Manpower Commission. The transfer of N.Y.A. to the War Manpower Commission was in recognition of the increasingly important contributions which it was making to the defense and war efforts (see Item 44 and note, 1942 volume).

The basic original purposes of N.Y.A. were to assist needy students in the completion of their education; to provide work experience and benefits to local communities and youth in general by the part-time employment of young people from relief families; to develop constructive leisure-time activities; and to encourage job training, counseling, and placement services for youth.

Through work projects, student aid, and guidance and placement, the N.Y.A. provided constructive assistance to thousands of young people growing up during the depression. Without it, many of them would have grown up in an atmosphere of cynicism, ignorance, and

temptation to crime which always accompanies idleness. In the early days of the New Deal, the N.Y.A. program was supplemented by the Civilian Conservation Corps (see Item 31, pp. 107-110, 1933 volume).

In the period from 1935 through 1943, the N.Y.A. extended financial assistance to over 2,134,000 young boys and girls, enabling them to remain in schools and colleges to continue their education. This student work program reached its peak during the academic year 1939-1940 when close to 750,000 individuals in 1,700 colleges and universities and over 28,000 secondary schools received benefits on N.Y.A. student jobs. Students were assigned jobs in connection with construction and repair of buildings and facilities and machine shop and automotive repair projects; they served in clerical, laboratory research, and library positions; they engaged in public welfare work and many additional types of useful work. Monthly grants were limited to a maximum of \$25 per individual in the closing phases of the N.Y.A. program, but even this low amount enabled thousands to continue and complete their education. At the same time, many practical skills were developed by the students in the course of their education.

In its out-of-school work program the N.Y.A. provided work opportunities for millions of young people; it also supplied essential training and apprenticeships to boys and girls who later went into defense and war industries. During

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the defense period, the N.Y.A. conducted valuable training in some 2,500 machine shops, foundries, forges, and woodworking, sheet-metal, radio, aviation, and electrical shops. This developed into the major emphasis of the N.Y.A. program, and after Pearl Harbor, the N.Y.A. sharply curtailed its relief and rehabilitation programs which had been necessary during depression years.

During the eight years of its operation, the N.Y.A. employed 2,677,000 different youths on work projects in the out-of-school work program. The highest level of N.Y.A. employment was during the fiscal year 1941, when such employment reached a monthly average of 326,000 because of the emphasis on work and training programs for defense employment.

In most cases, the projects on which the N.Y.A. workers were assigned were those selected by state or local public agencies, and decentralized administration was one of the keynotes of N.Y.A. operation. Exceptions to this rule were made

in the case of defense and war needs, which were determined from a standpoint of over-all military necessity.

In refreshing contrast to the program of many foreign countries during this period, the N.Y.A. furnished new hope and opportunity for America's youth. By enabling many unemployed youths to obtain useful work and by assisting others in continuing their education the N.Y.A. not only raised the general morale of this group but also furnished constructive contributions toward the physical improvement of local communities and provided training which was invaluable when the country needed manpower during the war years.

Under the terms of the Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act of 1944 (57 Stat. 494), the termination of N.Y.A.'s war projects commenced in July, 1943, and the agency was liquidated at the end of 1943. (See Item 97, 1943 volume, for the President's tribute to the N.Y.A. and Aubrey Williams, its Administrator.)

41 ¶ The President Declares That Vichy Collaboration with Germany Is a Menace to the Western Hemisphere. May 15, 1941

THE policy of this Government in its relations with the French Republic has been based upon the terms of the armistice between Germany and France and upon recognition of certain clear limitations imposed upon the French Government by this armistice.

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Furthermore, we have had assurances given by the head of the French State on behalf of his Government that it did not intend to agree to any collaboration with Germany which went beyond the requirements of that armistice agreement. This was the least that could be expected of a France which demanded respect for its integrity.

The people of France, who cherish still the ideals of liberty and free institutions and guard that love of these priceless possessions in their minds and hearts, can be counted on to hold out for these principles until the moment comes for their reestablishment. It is inconceivable they will willingly accept any agreement for so-called "collaboration" which will in reality imply their alliance with a military power whose central and fundamental policy calls for the utter destruction of liberty, freedom, and popular institutions everywhere.

The people of the United States can hardly believe that the present Government of France could be brought to lend itself to a plan of voluntary alliance implied or otherwise which would apparently deliver up France and its colonial empire, including French African colonies and their Atlantic coasts with the menace which that involves to the peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere.

NOTE: In the tragic hour when France faced imminent defeat by the Nazi invaders in 1940, the President cabled Paul Reynaud, the Premier of France, that the United States sympathetically supported the French resistance and would send war matériel and supplies (see Item 59, pp. 265-267, 1940 volume). At the time, Premier Reynaud asked for a declaration of war by the United States in order to pull France back from the brink of disastrous defeat. The President knew that the American defense program had not progressed sufficiently to

support active military intervention; and he recognized, too, that the Congress and public opinion would never have supported military intervention in 1940. Nevertheless, in response to Premier Reynaud's appeal, the President directed that two thousand 75-millimeter guns remaining from World War I, together with some available airplanes, be turned over to the French. The contribution was small; the gesture was large. But no more was practicable. And at the same time, the President appealed to the British to increase the air

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support they were giving to the French armies.

But the inevitable tragedy happened, and France fell. Even before the conclusion of the French armistice with Germany, the President made vigorous representations to the French authorities to insure that the French fleet be kept out of the hands of Germany and the enemies of democracy. At a time when the fortunes of the democratic Nations were at a low ebb in the summer of 1940, the issue of the French fleet was crucial in determining the naval balance between the Axis and the democracies. During the conference between Hitler and Marshal Pétain, the President, on October 25, 1940, sent a sharply worded warning that if the French allowed the Germans to use their fleet against the British, "Such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the United States Government." In response to this note, additional assurances were received from Marshal Pétain that the French fleet would not be used in support of the Germans. In December, 1940, Marshal Pétain conveyed to the President his promise that the French fleet would be scuttled before it was allowed to fall into German hands.

In December, 1940, the President named the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, as Ambassador to France. In a letter of instructions to Admiral Leahy, dated December 20, 1940, the President underscored his con-

cern about maintaining the French fleet free of German control. He instructed the new envoy to cultivate close relations with Marshal Pétain in order to divert him from overactive collaboration with Germany and to bring to the Marshal's attention the nature of the American program of aid to democracies. The President also gave other instructions designed to strengthen the bargaining power of the French against more active collaboration with the Axis. At the same time, he pointed out the interest of the United States in the French North African possessions and the improvement of their economic status, and authorized Ambassador Leahy to take up this subject and announce that our Government was prepared to assist in the economic improvement of French North Africa.

The strategic importance of the French colonies in French West Africa — particularly Atlantic ports like Dakar which faced toward South America — led the President to take additional steps to encourage the French regime to resist further collaboration with Germany. The issue became more acute in May, 1941, when a conference was held between Admiral Darlan and Hitler and French-German negotiations in Paris were scheduled. On May 15, 1941, Marshal Pétain made a radio statement to the people of France asking them to withhold opinion concerning these pending negotiations with Germany because

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of lack of public information in the matter. Pétain also called for full public confidence in him in order that France might be restored to its rightful place among the European Nations.

Concurrently with Pétain's radio address, the President issued the foregoing statement.

Following out the policy of taking a determined stand against the German occupation of the French West African colonies, the President, in announcing to the Congress on July 7, 1941, that troops of the United States were landing in Iceland and the British West Indies, added: "The United States cannot permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere." (See Item 63 and note, this volume.)

Again, on September 12, 1941, the President appealed to Marshal Pétain to maintain French control over the French African colonies.

The President had no illusions about the abject subservience of Pierre Laval to Nazi Germany, and in general regarded the Vichy trend toward collaboration as an inevitable one. Nevertheless, he reasoned that the maintenance of relations with Vichy would allow the full force of American influence to be brought to bear against the most extreme forms of collaboration such as allowing Germany the use of the French fleet and bases in North Africa, as well as French colonies

in the Western Hemisphere itself.

As it developed, the French fleet did not in fact fall into German hands. In accordance with assurances which Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan several times gave to Admiral Leahy, the fleet was scuttled by the French themselves in order to frustrate the Nazis' attempt to seize it when they invaded what had theretofore been unoccupied France. And when it became apparent that Ambassador Leahy could be of no further influence in restraining the Vichy Government, he was recalled in 1942, and rendered invaluable service in diplomatic as well as military matters to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman (see Item 76 and note, 1942 volume, for the President's acceptance of Ambassador Leahy's resignation).

The President's policy resulted in close relations between the United States and General Maxime Weygand, who commanded French forces in North Africa until the Germans demanded that he be removed in 1942. The conclusion of an economic accord, as recommended by the President in his initial letter of instructions of December 20, 1940, to Admiral Leahy, resulted in establishing a number of American vice consuls at various points throughout French North Africa, enabling them to observe and report on Axis activities and provide valuable intelligence for the North African invasion in November, 1942. Finally, the political

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and military intelligence secured in Vichy itself was of enormous value to the United States in determining its course in world politics and military strategy.

(See Items 115, 116, 119, and 124 and notes, 1942 volume, for an account of the North African invasion and the events which immediately followed.)

42 ¶ The Office of Civilian Defense Is Established. Executive Order No. 8757. May 20, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President in respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on September 8, 1939, to assure effective coordination of Federal relations with State and local governments engaged in defense activities, to provide for necessary cooperation with States and local governments in respect to measures for adequate protection of the civilian population in emergency periods, to facilitate constructive civilian participation in the defense program, and to sustain national morale, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Office of Civilian Defense, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his responsibilities and duties under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director shall receive no salary or other remuneration for his services, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies, directions, and regulations as the President may from time to time prescribe, and with such advice and assistance as may be necessary from the other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and utilizing the operating services and facilities of such departments and agencies as

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far as possible, the Director shall perform and discharge the following described duties and responsibilities:

a. Serve as the center for the coordination of Federal civilian defense activities which involve relationships between the Federal Government and State and local governments, territories, insular possessions, and the District of Columbia (as hereinafter used in this Order the term "State and local" shall include territories, insular possessions, and the District of Columbia); establish and maintain contact with State and local governments and their defense agencies; and facilitate relationships between such units of government and the agencies of the Federal Government in respect to defense problems.

b. Keep informed of problems which arise from the impact of the industrial and military defense effort upon local communities, and take necessary steps to secure the cooperation of appropriate Federal departments and agencies in dealing with such problems and in meeting the emergency needs of such communities.

c. Assist State and local governments in the establishment of State and local defense councils or other agencies designed to coordinate civilian defense activities.

d. With the assistance of the Board for Civilian Protection, described in paragraph 4 of this Order, study and plan measures designed to afford adequate protection of life and property in the event of emergency; and sponsor and carry out such civil defense programs, including the recruitment and training of civilian auxiliaries, and disseminate to appropriate officials of the Federal Government and State and local governments such information concerning civil defense measures as may be necessary to meet emergency needs.

e. With the assistance of the Volunteer Participation Committee, described in paragraph 5 of this Order, consider proposals, suggest plans, and promote activities designed to sustain the national morale and to provide opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the defense program; review and approve all civilian defense programs of Federal departments

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and agencies involving the use of volunteer services in order to assure unity and balance in the application of such programs; and assist State and local defense councils or other agencies in the organization of volunteer service units and in the development of their activities.

f. Maintain a clearing house of information on State and local defense activities in cooperation with appropriate Federal departments and agencies.

g. Review existing or proposed measures relating to or affecting State and local defense activities, and recommend such additional measures as may be necessary or desirable to assure adequate civilian defense.

h. Perform such other duties relating to participation in the defense program by State and local agencies as the President may from time to time prescribe.

3. The Director may provide for the internal organization and management of the Office of Civilian Defense. He shall obtain the President's approval for the establishment of the principal subdivisions of the Office and the appointment of the heads thereof.

4. There shall be in the Office of Civilian Defense a Board for Civilian Protection (hereinafter referred to as the Board) to be composed of the Director as Chairman and a representative of each of the following departments and agencies of the Federal Government to be designated by the heads thereof: Department of War, Department of the Navy, Department of Justice, Federal Security Agency, and such others as the President may from time to time determine. In addition, each of the following organizations shall be invited to designate a representative to serve as a member of the Board:

a. The Council of State Governments

b. The American Municipal Association

c. The United States Conference of Mayors

The Board shall advise and assist in the formulation of civil defense programs and measures, appropriate to the varying needs of each part of the Nation, designed to afford adequate protec-

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tion of life and property in the event of emergency. The members of this Board shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

5. There shall be in the Office of Civilian Defense a Volunteer Participation Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting of the Director as Chairman and not more than twenty members, representative of the various regions and interests of the Nation, to be appointed by the President. The Committee shall serve as an advisory and planning body in considering proposals and developing programs designed to sustain national morale and to provide opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the defense effort. The members of the Committee shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

6. The Director is authorized, with the approval of the President, to appoint such additional advisory committees and subcommittees, with respect to State and local cooperation, national morale, civil defense planning, civilian participation, and related defense activities, as he may find necessary or desirable to assist him in the performance of his duties. Such advisory committees may include representatives from Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, private organizations, and the public at large. The members of advisory committees shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

7. Within the limitation of such funds as may be appropriated to the Office of Civilian Defense, or as may be allocated to it by the President through the Bureau of the Budget, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services. However, the Office of Civilian Defense shall use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as

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may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management or other agencies of the Government.

NOTE: Probably no single civilian Federal agency enlisted the services of so many American people and came so closely into their homes and their daily lives as the Office of Civilian Defense. Whatever its mistakes, and whatever gloss the hindsight of postwar may impose on its varied activities, O.C.D. was an enormous project which had both actual value and potential value. Happily, no enemy attack on our continent made it necessary to test its potential value.

The O.C.D. was based on the conception that a broad base of cooperative action by millions of civilians was essential to defend against attacks — then deemed wholly possible — and to sustain national morale. For several months prior to the creation of O.C.D., the Division of State and Local Cooperation of the National Defense Advisory Commission had carried out a skeleton program in this field. (See note to Item 154, p. 700, 1940 volume.)

At first the Division of State and Local Cooperation was primarily concerned with assisting defense production by funneling information to States, local governments, and communities. Each State had a defense council which reported to the Division on problems of coordination requiring Federal attention. The impact of greatly expanded defense production on local communities created many local problems

and acute difficulties with respect to roads, schools, police, hospitals, sanitation, and the supply of labor. The Division had obtained and collated the necessary information on which was based the President's request of February 24, 1941, that \$150,000,000 be appropriated for additional community facilities made necessary by the new defense activities. (See note to Item 8, this volume, for discussion of this appropriation and the terms of the Lanham Act providing aid for community facilities.)

As the danger of Axis aggressions increased, the Division of State and Local Cooperation began to place greater emphasis on protection. Discussions were held with the Civil Aeronautics Authority on volunteer training for air-raid protection. Fire defense schools were established. Local health, child care, food conservation, scrap collection drives, and general public morale also received the attention of the Division.

The O.C.D. took over the responsibilities for these functions. It developed and expanded these programs and provided a comprehensive organization for mobilizing volunteer participation and local defense. Under the leadership of the late Fiorello H. LaGuardia, its first Director, the O.C.D. set up a far-flung air-raid protection organization. Protective equipment was acquired and distributed. Protection

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programs were developed to include a signal and communications system to warn civilians of approaching planes; methods of dealing with incendiary and demolition bombs, fire, and poison gas were developed and taught; practice blackouts became a regular feature of American life; and preparations for disaster relief were carefully made.

After we got into the war, the O.C.D. was reorganized by Executive Order No. 9134, issued April 15, 1942. This Order among other things included the following:

1. A Civilian Defense Board was to replace the original Civilian Protection Board and the Volunteer Participation Committee. The new Board provided a broader base of interagency support and participation through representation of the War, Navy, and Justice departments, and the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services.

2. The responsibilities of O.C.D. with respect to national morale were eliminated, since the President had previously transferred the major responsibility for morale to other agencies, particularly the Office of Facts and Figures. (See note to Item 99, this volume.)

At the peak of its operation O.C.D. supplied numerous volunteers to the Aircraft Warning Service of the War Department. During the early years of the war, these faithful men and women remained at their posts by shifts on 24-hour alerts. In a 300-mile strip along the coasts of the country there was an

average of one observation post for every 32 square miles of territory. Not until October, 1943, after the strategic position of the Allies had become much more favorable, were these 24-hour shifts reduced to a stand-by basis.

Meanwhile, to aid the communications system, emergency radio stations were authorized for local defense councils. In addition, messengers were mobilized for use in emergencies. The messenger volunteers at one time numbered between 300,000 and 400,000.

In cooperation with the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, the O.C.D. sponsored a Forest Fire Fighters Service as an auxiliary to the regular forest patrols. Volunteer membership in this activity rose to 185,000 by the end of 1943.

A Rescue Service was organized by the O.C.D. to train in techniques of extricating victims from the rubble of bombed buildings.

Plans were laid for emergency evacuation of persons from devastated areas. This involved arrangements for housing of evacuees and provision of necessary transportation.

The Medical Division of the O.C.D. provided instruction and established units for the care and treatment of civilian casualties. Mobile medical teams of doctors and nurses were organized and trained, supported by rescue services and stretcher teams. Receiving hospitals for casualties were planned. The O.C.D. furnished medical

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equipment and supplies to supplement community stocks. Over 70,000 units of blood plasma were distributed to 174 hospitals in "target areas," and another 80,000 units were distributed throughout the remainder of the country. In cooperation with the American Red Cross, a program of volunteer nurses' aides helped alleviate the results of a grave shortage of nurses.

In the Act of January 27, 1942 (56 Stat. 19), the Congress appropriated \$100,000,000 for the Director of the O.C.D. to furnish facilities, supplies, and services to communities on the basis of need. Executive Order No. 9088, issued March 6, 1942, issued the regulations to be followed under this Act. It also provided for the wearing of distinctive insignia and arm bands by civilian defense personnel.

Among the items distributed were fire pumps and trailers, gas masks, surgical equipment, first-aid and hospital equipment, arm bands, gasproof capes and clothing, fire-fighting clothing, and steel helmets. Because the requests for protective equipment were far in excess of the quantity available, the O.C.D. had to institute a system of priorities. The system was based on the amount of equipment a community already possessed and the estimates of the War Department as to the most logical targets of enemy attack.

To secure the widest use of this equipment, the O.C.D. encouraged reciprocal assistance among neigh-

boring communities. Reallocations of the equipment were made from time to time as the strategic situation changed.

Six supply depots were established: at Birmingham, Alabama; Chicago, Illinois; Fitchburg, Massachusetts; Hanover, Pennsylvania; New Castle, Indiana; and Salt Lake City, Utah. These were used for storage, assorting, and packing, and were situated in localities considered to be reasonably safe from enemy air attack.

Of the \$100,000,000 appropriated by the Congress for equipment and distribution, only \$51,753,355 was expended as of August 31, 1944. The constantly improving military situation and the use of cheaper substitutes for scarce items cut expenditures drastically.

Early in the war, the O.C.D. worked with the War Department in formulating plans for the protection of industrial plants and facilities from sabotage. Later, Executive Order No. 9165, issued May 19, 1942, expanded and defined the O.C.D.'s responsibilities for facility security. The Order made it clear that the primary responsibility for protective measures rested on the owners and operators of essential facilities. To aid the O.C.D. in discharging its functions, a sabotage advisory committee and an intelligence committee, composed of representatives of the participating Federal agencies, were established. The O.C.D. then developed security plans, reviewed existing plans,

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and assisted in organizing security programs for the various agencies. In addition, training schools were sponsored and literature was issued on anti-sabotage and counter-espionage matters.

The plant protection program was closely related to the facility security program, and the two were eventually merged. Unlike the facility security program, the plant protection program operated through State and local civilian defense organizations rather than through other Federal agencies. These State and local agencies then dealt with the industrial plant owners and operators directly. The phases of plant protection stressed by the O.C.D. included minimizing the effects of air raids, countering the work of subversive elements, reducing losses by fire, enforcing measures to reduce industrial accidents, preparing to meet effects of natural disasters, and establishing lines of communications and means of assistance within the community.

In June, 1943, the O.C.D. developed the States War Inspection Service in conjunction with the facility security and plant protection programs. This new service was carried on in cooperation with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and placed special emphasis on fire protection and accident prevention. Acting under instructions from the O.C.D., inspectors visited all plants included on an essential facilities list maintained by the O.C.D. — at its peak,

13,000 plants — and secured the voluntary cooperation of the plant managers in installing and maintaining safety techniques.

In November, 1943, both the War and Navy Departments decided to reduce manpower and expenditures in their plant protection programs. It was felt that by this time the chief needs for the O.C.D. facility security program had been fulfilled and the danger of enemy attack had lessened. Accordingly, on April 18, 1944, the President issued Executive Order No. 9437, terminating the facility security program and revoking Executive Order No. 9165. The States War Inspection Service, however, was continued until the date of the O.C.D.'s termination, June 30, 1945.

Perhaps the most dramatic phase of the O.C.D. program was the Civil Air Patrol. Even before the establishment of the O.C.D., the President in April, 1941, had discussed plans to utilize civilian pilots in defense missions and to provide pre-induction flight training. Following these discussions, the Civil Air Patrol was established under the O.C.D.

Rigorous training was instituted in area patrol and reconnaissance, air-ground communications, dropping of supplies, and search for missing aircraft. Patrol members were also taught Morse code, first aid, crash procedure, meteorology, navigation, and some thirty other related subjects.

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During the war, the Civil Air Patrol undertook a number of miscellaneous missions which not only aided the war effort but also acted as training measures in the event of enemy attack. For example, planes scoured the countryside during scrap metal drives and located many tons of iron and steel in the form of abandoned bridges, mining machinery, and auto graveyards. During floods and other disasters, marooned persons were located from the air, and blood plasma and medical aid were rushed to the scene. Among other missions undertaken by the Civil Air Patrol were testing the effectiveness of the aircraft warning system, conducting mock air raids, building new airfields and improving existing fields, providing courier service between isolated Army posts, emergency transportation of machine parts and critical materials for war plants, and towing targets for the military forces. In cooperation with the U. S. Forest Service, a forest patrol was instituted. Planes detected fires, ferried personnel engaged in fire fighting, transported supplies and equipment to fire camps, and dropped fire fighters into critical areas by parachute.

One of the most heroic activities of the Civil Air Patrol was the coastal patrol. Single-motored planes operated on dangerous missions as far as 100 miles out to sea, searching for enemy submarines and floating mines and hunting for survivors of sunken ships. Early in

1942, there were not enough Army and Navy planes to patrol coastal waters completely. In those critical months, enemy submarines were sinking our ships within sight of American shores. Civil Air Patrol planes were at first unarmed, and their mission was to spot U-boats and call on bombers to attack the submarines. Later, bombs and depth charges were slung under the planes and they were helpful in cutting down the submarine menace. The Civil Air Patrol maintained 26 bases to cover the Atlantic and Gulf coast from the Canadian border to Tampico, Mexico. These civilian planes are credited with spotting 173 submarines and dropping bombs or depth charges against 57.

By April, 1943, the Patrol included 80,000 members and had 4,500 aircraft. All members wore Army uniforms, and many of the officers in charge had been detailed by the Army Air Forces to the O.C.D for service with the Patrol. The War Department had been urging for some months that this organization should logically become a part of the War Department. By Executive Order No. 9339 of April 29, 1943, the President provided for the transfer of the Civil Air Patrol to the War Department.

Far different, yet also useful, were the more controversial activities of O.C.D. which related to social and economic impact of the war on the civilian side. The Presi-

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dent felt from the start that the social and economic impact of war on the community was also an important aspect of national defense. Accordingly, the community service programs of O.C.D. received increasingly greater attention. These programs included health, welfare, and medical services; assistance in the administration of governmental economic controls; assistance to the armed forces in this country; and various educational and public information services. The President also felt that these community service programs afforded an excellent opportunity for volunteers to participate and provide constructive war service.

In recognition of the importance of directing the energies of millions of volunteers, including women, into useful channels, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Director in Charge of Volunteer Participation on September 22, 1941. She served for five months and without compensation; she applied her characteristic energy, ability, and enthusiasm to the assignment. She resigned two months after Pearl Harbor, after completing the organization of civilian participation and doing pioneer work in community service programs.

There was a popular misunderstanding in some quarters — carefully nurtured by hostile segments of the Congress and the press — of the purposes and functions of the community service programs. Attempts, at least partly political,

were made to discredit the programs by singling out isolated instances where the dollar and cents value of a particular activity was difficult to measure. There were such instances, of course. There were some directly traceable to Mrs. Roosevelt's supervision. These were seized upon by the hostile press and members of the Congress and exaggerated by them out of all proportion in an unpatriotic attempt to discredit the whole program. In a program which enlisted the services of nearly everyone in the Nation, it was inevitable that some mistakes should be made. There was little doubt, however, that the sustaining of national morale through civilian participation proved a great benefit — much of which was due to Mrs. Roosevelt's untiring efforts.

The O.C.D. worked closely with the Selective Service System and the Pre-Induction Training Branch of the War Department in providing services for prospective members of the armed forces. Civilian volunteers undertook clerical duties with local draft boards, assisted in the organization of pre-induction meetings in local communities, and helped draftees adjust their personal affairs prior to entrance into service.

Considerable assistance was supplied by the O.C.D. in obtaining compliance with Federal economic controls in local communities. Civilian volunteers assisted in checking compliance with O.P.A. price

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ceilings, in distributing information about the need for rationing, in recruiting agricultural labor, and in promoting victory gardens. The O.C.D. also stimulated the car-sharing program among workers for the conservation of automobiles, tires, and gasoline.

In the early months of its operation, the O.C.D. bore the responsibility for disseminating information to States and local communities. Most of this work was centered in the Bureau of Facts and Figures, which later grew into the independent Office of Facts and Figures and in 1942 was merged into the Office of War Information. (See Item 99 and note, this volume; see also Item 67 and note, 1942 volume.) After the establishment of the Office of War Information, the O.C.D. concentrated on the organization of local discussion facilities and the local distribution of informational literature produced by O.W.I. and other Federal agencies.

As the war progressed and America took the offensive on both the Pacific and the European fronts, the danger of enemy attack on the United States diminished. This gradually shifted the emphasis of the O.C.D.'s major program away from the protection phases. In the summer and fall of 1943, upon the advice and approval of the War and Navy Departments, the O.C.D. be-

gan a gradual demobilization of its protection services. More of the energies of the Office were then shifted to community service activities.

With the rapid improvement in the strategic situation of the Allies, and the lessened danger of enemy attack on the United States, there was a feeling in 1943 that the O.C.D. should be abolished. The then Director of the O.C.D. recommended to the President that its functions be transferred to the War Department and to the Office of Community War Services of the Federal Security Agency. The President felt that a dismantling of the agency before the end of the war would provide a great blow to national morale, and would mean a psychological letdown for the hardworking civilian volunteers. He decided that the functions of O.C.D. should continue. Through 1944, however, the Federal Government reduced its direction and expenditures in this field and relied on the States and local governments to carry on.

As Allied armies swept across the Rhine, invaded the Philippines, and prepared for the final blows of the war, the President made plans for the liquidation of O.C.D. The Executive Order (No. 9562) terminating the O.C.D. was signed by President Truman on June 4, 1945, effective as of June 30, 1945.

43 (The Congress Is Asked for an Oil Pipeline to Supply Middle Atlantic Refineries with Crude Oil. May 20, 1941

The Speaker of the House of Representatives

Sir:

AS A RESULT of recent study by the special subcommittee on petroleum investigation of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Chairman Cole has transmitted to me for consideration a proposed measure "to facilitate the construction, extension or completion of interstate petroleum pipelines related to national defense." This measure is concerned with one of the vital phases of our national defense program.

The vast concentration of industry, population, and military bases on the Atlantic coast is now dependent for petroleum upon tankers plying between the Gulf coast and the Middle Atlantic ports. Not only is this water route long and potentially perilous, but even present demands upon these transportation facilities make restriction of oil consumption to essential uses a distinct possibility within a few months. The immediate construction of pipelines to augment the supply to the Atlantic coast is the one means available to us to relieve the situation.

The bill which is proposed by Mr. Cole seems to me adequate to accomplish its objectives, and, in my opinion, it is a measure of first rank in importance. The situation which the bill is designed to correct must be remedied. I therefore take this means to call the measure directly to your attention and to urge that it be given early and earnest consideration by the Congress.

Respectfully,

NOTE: During 1940, oil tankers shipped 98½ percent of the petroleum supply used by the Atlantic coast and eastern areas of the country, while pipelines supplied only 1½ percent. Approximately four fifths of the petroleum which was shipped by oil tankers came from the Gulf coast areas; the remainder was shipped from California and from foreign countries. The percentage of petroleum transported

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by pipeline rose very slightly in the early months of 1941, but still comprised only 2 percent of the total in June, 1941.

As the danger of enemy submarine action against oil tankers increased, and as shortages of American shipping facilities developed, the President took prompt steps to augment the oil tanker transportation by some other means of carrying petroleum to the Atlantic seaboard.

In a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on January 23, 1941, the President wrote:

"The Atlantic-coast area now is dependent upon ocean transportation for nearly its entire supply of crude-petroleum products. Present facilities for such transportation do not afford much leeway under normal conditions and very likely will prove inadequate in an emergency. It is in the interest of national defense to augment currently these facilities, especially if this can be done by private agencies without extra cost to the Government.

"I have been informed by the Government agencies concerned that the completion of one gasoline pipeline and the commencement of another to the Southeastern States have been delayed by opposition from other carriers in interstate commerce. Although this situation ultimately might correct itself, delay in its solution will retard the completion of essential transportation facilities. If the matter is not settled before your committee resumes its investigations under House Resolution 290, as extended, I hope that it will be included in your hearings and that a solution thereto will be presented to the Congress."

While the Congress was inquiring into the national defense needs for petroleum, the international situation became progressively worse. Petroleum and shipping rapidly increased in importance for national defense and lend-lease aid. In the spring of 1941, some fifty American oil tankers were assigned to the British to transport petroleum products to the United Kingdom. The transfer accentuated the urgency for pipelines. In the early months of 1941, there was an almost steady decline in the total number of tankers available for oil shipment. As a result it became necessary to draw upon the oil held in storage along the Atlantic coast. During the first quarter of 1941, the stocks of crude oil and petroleum products on the Atlantic coast were reduced by over 11,000,000 barrels.

In response to the President's recommendation embodied in the foregoing message, the Congress enacted legislation authorizing the President to provide for the construction, extension, or completion by the Government of petroleum pipelines. It also extended the right of eminent domain to private persons constructing such pipelines (to the extent that the President approved the exercise of eminent domain for this purpose). The President approved this act (55 Stat. 610) on July 30, 1941; its authority extended for a two-year period, at the end of which it was renewed for a further two-year period (57 Stat. 270), approved June 30, 1943.

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The acute shortage of steel prevented construction of any large governmental pipeline projects during 1941. The Office of Defense Transportation pressed into service a number of railroad tanker cars to substitute for oil tankers. (See Item 137 and note, this volume, for an account of the work of the Office of Defense Transportation.)

In June, 1942, the W.P.B. allocated the necessary steel for the western leg of the 24-inch ("Big Inch") pipeline from Longview, Texas, to Phoenixville Junction, Pennsylvania—a distance of 1,254 miles—with 20-inch extensions to the New York and Philadelphia refinery areas. Shortly after its completion in the summer of 1943, "Big Inch" was supplying nearly half the crude oil brought into the east

coast area and was pumping over 300,000 barrels of crude oil a day from the Gulf coast oil fields to the refineries in the New York and Philadelphia area.

In December, 1943, the construction of the 1,475-mile, 20-inch pipeline from Beaumont, Texas, to Linden, New Jersey (the "Little Inch" pipeline), was completed, and it pumped a capacity of 235,000 barrels of gasoline daily. The completion of these pipelines with the assistance of Government financing was accomplished just in time, for Axis submarines and the general shortage of shipping had reduced coastwise tanker shipments of petroleum from 1,472,000 barrels daily in June, 1941, to 57,000 barrels daily in January, 1943.

44 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Forty-fourth Press Conference. May 23, 1941

(Effect of Axis victory on business — "Business as usual" — The gravity of the situation — America First — Excess profits taxes — Progress of production program.)

(This press conference was held especially for editors of business magazines and papers.)

MR. WOOTON [Mr. Paul Wooton, President of National Conference of Business Paper Editors]: Mr. President, I thought that since you have this group here, and behind these men are several hundred thousands of readers, that you might like to say just the sort of editorial they could write, or what kind of an article they might run, that would be most helpful in

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forwarding the defense program. They are all anxious to do something constructive, and they go to the key men in industry in the papers, and if you have any thought at all that would be helpful along that line, I know they would appreciate it.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you can't overstress the seriousness of the present situation. I think it does need stressing, because we all know that this world situation, if it goes the wrong way — the Axis powers win — it is going to hit business far more than any one thing that has ever hit them. It will hit them far worse than a mere ending of all of these emergency orders, because it will mean that you will get "put in a vise," not by our own volition, or the volition of all the democratic Nations that have an economy that is somewhat similar to ours. We will get "put in a vise," a "strait jacket," by the Axis powers; and I don't think that the seriousness of that situation can be overestimated. I think it ought to be played up all the time. And furthermore, that if we are going to meet the situation as it develops, and as it is becoming increasingly serious, that we have got to quit all this silly business of "business as usual." The Nations that are actually at war certainly are not conducting "business as usual," and the more we help to defeat the control of the world by dictatorships, the less "business as usual" we are going to have.

It means giving up, of course, on the part of the American public, and therefore of the manufacturers of the country — the businessmen of the country — a great many things which were all very nice and pleasant in our normal lives, and substitute for them the things that are necessary to carry on this aid to the democracies that we are giving at the present time.

Well, it is going to hit a lot of people, sure, but you can't eat your cake and have it too. That is the message to give to the American people: "You can't eat your cake and have it too." If you do one thing you have got to go all out for it. If you are going to do the other thing — lie down and take it on the chin — it will be putting us in a strait jacket that we won't

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get out of for one hundred years. I think that should be told quite frankly to the public.

After all, the country *can* get on without a great many things that it uses normally. Is it worth while to give up certain things in order to carry through an effort to survive, or isn't it? We know that there is a very great lack of understanding at the present time of the seriousness of the world situation as it affects us. You take, for example, a great deal of this perfectly well-intended publicity has been stupid. I begged them when they started the so-called Aid to Britain movement — I said, "You know there are an awful lot of people in this country that don't personally 'give a continental' about Aid to Britain, but on the other hand, if you tell the whole sentence you get people to understand."

What is the whole sentence? "America First Through Aid to Britain." Now that's a very different thing; that tells the truth. You are working for America first, because England today is holding the line and is doing practically all the fighting. Now the real sentence is, "Let us keep America going by giving aid to Britain while we are arming ourselves," and that is the thought to get across. And I think you can all help tremendously to make people realize the seriousness of the situation, and eliminate a lot of the perfectly silly prejudices that exist today because of wrong slogans — literally, the wrong slogans.

I suppose, for example, that if there is any person in the United States who happens to be the leader of the America First movement, it is the unfortunate fellow who happens to have the responsibility — who happens to be President of the United States. He is the leader of the America First movement. Now these other fellows jumped, and nobody's printed the fact that they have grabbed off something that does not belong to them. . . .

We are all pretty well agreed that these are times not to make large profits, and we have to go back in working things like that out. We have a curious situation. I notice one or

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two — the best friends that I have in the world — are very large stockholders, and I will give you an illustration — in the Coca-Cola Company. There are some of the original people that went in, and they went in with what to them was an awful lot of capital — ten thousand dollars — and today on that original investment of ten thousand dollars — figure out the percentage on that investment that they are getting in the way of dividends. And yet, under the present tax laws — mind you, that happens to be, of course, one shining example under the present tax law — Coca-Cola — you take the average they would get during the previous five years. They don't pay any excess taxes on — what? — a thousand percent of profit, yet that is an awfully big profit on an original amount of capital that they put in.

On the other hand, you take some other organization like United States Steel. Taking it over a period of ten years the yield to the individual who bought United States Steel common is not high, while they are hit today because the average of their earnings this year is way ahead of the average — above the average of the last five years. They are paying enormous excess profits, but it is hitting the fellow who made the investment in United States Steel. He is lucky if on the average of the past ten years he has made four or five percent on his money. . . .

Well I think — I think that, taking it by and large, business as a whole is going along awfully well in this whole thing, and we are having very, very few complaints.

I was talking the other day to one of those people who had been largely responsible for the great effort of 1917 and 1918, and there were three of the fairly top people who were running the war production of the country, which began, mind you, not until the day we got into the war in 1917. There had been a certain amount done in the way of orders from the British and the French before we got into the war, but the great volume of orders came after we got into the war with no preparation for it. To these three people I asked the

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straight question: "How does the speed of our present production effort, on a relative basis, compare with the speed from the sixth of April, 1917, to the sixth of April, 1918?" And all three of them — although they are not in this year responsible for this production as they were then — all three of them said, "You are way ahead of what had been done in the first year of the World War." I said, "How far?" They agreed about three months ahead in the first twelve months of effort. Well, now, that is quite a record to have that admitted by three fellows who were responsible for the 1917 effort.

MR. WOOTON: It certainly is.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a pretty good compliment to pay to American business. I really do.

MR. WOOTON: And that is the text of these editorials that industry by and large is doing —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Yes.

MR. WOOTON: — a breath-taking job.

THE PRESIDENT: That's right. Of course, there are an awful lot of things that — oh, what will I say? — interpretative writers some people call them — columnists some people call them. (*Laughter*) They are not fair to business, not fair to government, either one. I will give you a very good example.

Somebody came out the other day with a story that we are way behind where we ought to be on the production of tanks. Tanks are needed. They are needed by the British in Egypt, in England, all over the place. We need them also, and yet we are way, way behind. We have only just begun turning out a few tanks. Of course, it did not tell the real story, the real story on tanks. It is not their fault. They put the thing down on paper without checking.

Now, on tanks, what happened? Last year, about last summer, from about the end of May on up to July, when they were working out the priorities, that is to say, the classification that these orders would go into, we needed to make four main divisions of production. One was airplanes, of course,

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and another was guns — anti-tank guns and all other kinds of guns. A third was ammunition — I would say powder and shot and shell. And the fourth was tanks. And we couldn't give an A-1 priority to all four groups because it would have slowed up the whole program group if we had given equal priority to all four groups.

So the military people were called in, and the British were called in, and we said to them, from the production point of view, one at least of these groups has got to be put in the second category. Now, we fellows were laymen — businessmen — and the Army and the Navy and the British said, "Well, about the last thing we need today is tanks." They didn't see the need at that time for tanks. Now, that is the best possible opinion that we could get, so out of those four groups we put the tank group into the second priority category — deliberately — on military advice — which we have to go on. Now, of course, everybody is cussing out the tank manufacturers, and cussing out the Government for being behind.

Well, that is just an illustration of how you have to know all of the surrounding facts before you can write intelligently on some particular thing that you hear. I think it is probably a good illustration.

MR. WOOTON: It certainly is. Well, Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) It's good to see you all.

MR. WOOTON: I think it's mighty fine of you to see us, and in behalf of these editors, I thank you very, very much.

THE PRESIDENT: If there's anything we can do to help, let us know.

MR. WOOTON: Thank you, Mr. President.

45 ¶ “We Choose Human Freedom” — A Radio Address Announcing the Proclamation of an Unlimited National Emergency. May 27, 1941

I AM SPEAKING tonight from the White House in the presence of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, the Canadian Minister, and their families. The members of this Board are the Ambassadors and Ministers of the American Republics in Washington. It is appropriate that I do this for now, as never before, the unity of the American Republics is of supreme importance to each and every one of us and to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Our future independence is bound up with the future independence of all of our sister Republics.

The pressing problems that confront us are military and naval problems. We cannot afford to approach them from the point of view of wishful thinkers or sentimentalists. What we face is cold, hard fact.

The first and fundamental fact is that what started as a European war has developed, as the Nazis always intended it should develop, into a world war for world domination.

Adolf Hitler never considered the domination of Europe as an end in itself. European conquest was but a step toward ultimate goals in all the other continents. It is unmistakably apparent to all of us that, unless the advance of Hitlerism is forcibly checked now, the Western Hemisphere will be within range of the Nazi weapons of destruction.

For our own defense we have accordingly undertaken certain obviously necessary measures:

First, we have joined in concluding a series of agreements with all the other American Republics. This further solidified our hemisphere against the common danger.

And then, a year ago, we launched, and are successfully carrying out, the largest armament production program we have ever undertaken.

We have added substantially to our splendid Navy, and we

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have mustered our manpower to build up a new Army which is already worthy of the highest traditions of our military service.

We instituted a policy of aid for the democracies — the Nations which have fought for the continuation of human liberties.

This policy had its origin in the first month of the war, when I urged upon the Congress repeal of the arms embargo provisions in the old Neutrality Law, and in that message of September 3, 1939, I said, "I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world might swiftly pass. I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candor, that darker periods may lie ahead."

In the subsequent months, the shadows deepened and lengthened. And the night spread over Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France.

In June, 1940, Britain stood alone, faced by the same machine of terror which had overwhelmed her allies. Our Government rushed arms to meet her desperate needs.

In September, 1940, an agreement was completed with Great Britain for the trade of fifty destroyers for eight important off-shore bases.

And in March, 1941, the Congress passed the Lend-Lease Bill and an appropriation of seven billion dollars to implement it. This law realistically provided for material aid "for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."

Our whole program of aid for the democracies has been based on hard-headed concern for our own security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wish to live. Every dollar of material that we send helps to keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere, and every day that they are held off gives us time to build more guns and tanks and planes and ships.

We have made no pretense about our own self-interest in this aid. Great Britain understands it — and so does Nazi Germany.

And now — after a year — Britain still fights gallantly, on a "far-flung battle line." We have doubled and redoubled our vast production, increasing, month by month, our material supply of the

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tools of war for ourselves and for Britain and for China — and eventually for all the democracies.

The supply of these tools will not fail — it will increase.

With greatly augmented strength, the United States and the other American Republics now chart their course in the situation of today.

Your Government knows what terms Hitler, if victorious, would impose. They are, indeed, the only terms on which he would accept a so-called “negotiated” peace.

And, under those terms, Germany would literally parcel out the world — hoisting the swastika itself over vast territories and populations, and setting up puppet governments of its own choosing, wholly subject to the will and the policy of a conqueror.

To the people of the Americas, a triumphant Hitler would say, as he said after the seizure of Austria, and as he said after Munich, and as he said after the seizure of Czechoslovakia: “I am now completely satisfied. This is the last territorial readjustment I will seek.” And he would of course add: “All we want is peace, friendship, and profitable trade relations with you in the New World.”

Were any of us in the Americas so incredibly simple and forgetful as to accept those honeyed words, what would then happen?

Those in the New World who were seeking profits would be urging that all that the dictatorships desired was “peace.” They would oppose toil and taxes for more American armament. And meanwhile, the dictatorships would be forcing the enslaved peoples of their Old World conquests into a system they are even now organizing to build a naval and air force intended to gain and hold and be master of the Atlantic and the Pacific as well.

They would fasten an economic stranglehold upon our several Nations. Quislings would be found to subvert the governments in our Republics; and the Nazis would back their fifth columns with invasion, if necessary.

No, I am not speculating about all this. I merely repeat what is already in the Nazi book of world conquest. They plan to treat the Latin American Nations as they are now treating the Balkans.

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They plan then to strangle the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada.

The American laborer would have to compete with slave labor in the rest of the world. Minimum wages, maximum hours? Nonsense! Wages and hours would be fixed by Hitler. The dignity and power and standard of living of the American worker and farmer would be gone. Trade unions would become historical relics, and collective bargaining a joke.

Farm income? What happens to all farm surpluses without any foreign trade? The American farmer would get for his products exactly what Hitler wanted to give. The farmer would face obvious disaster and complete regimentation.

Tariff walls — Chinese walls of isolation — would be futile. Freedom to trade is essential to our economic life. We do not eat all the food we can produce; and we do not burn all the oil we can pump; we do not use all the goods we can manufacture. It would not be an American wall to keep Nazi goods out; it would be a Nazi wall to keep us in.

The whole fabric of working life as we know it — business and manufacturing, mining and agriculture — all would be mangled and crippled under such a system. Yet to maintain even that crippled independence would require permanent conscription of our manpower; it would curtail the funds we could spend on education, on housing, on public works, on flood control, on health and, instead, we should be permanently pouring our resources into armaments; and, year in and year out, standing day and night watch against the destruction of our cities.

Yes, even our right of worship would be threatened. The Nazi world does not recognize any God except Hitler; for the Nazis are as ruthless as the Communists in the denial of God. What place has religion which preaches the dignity of the human being, the majesty of the human soul, in a world where moral standards are measured by treachery and bribery and fifth columnists? Will our children, too, wander off, goose-stepping in search of new gods?

We do not accept, we will not permit, this Nazi "shape of

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things to come." It will never be forced upon us, if we act in this present crisis with the wisdom and the courage which have distinguished our country in all the crises of the past.

Today, the Nazis have taken military possession of the greater part of Europe. In Africa they have occupied Tripoli and Libya, and they are threatening Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Near East. But their plans do not stop there, for the Indian Ocean is the gateway to the farther East.

They also have the armed power at any moment to occupy Spain and Portugal; and that threat extends not only to French North Africa and the western end of the Mediterranean but it extends also to the Atlantic fortress of Dakar, and to the island outposts of the New World — the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.

The Cape Verde Islands are only seven hours' distance from Brazil by bomber or troop-carrying planes. They dominate shipping routes to and from the South Atlantic.

The war is approaching the brink of the Western Hemisphere itself. It is coming very close to home.

Control or occupation by Nazi forces of any of the islands of the Atlantic would jeopardize the immediate safety of portions of North and South America, and of the island possessions of the United States, and, therefore, the ultimate safety of the continental United States itself.

Hitler's plan of world domination would be near its accomplishment today, were it not for two factors: One is the epic resistance of Britain, her colonies, and the great Dominions, fighting not only to maintain the existence of the Island of Britain, but also to hold the Near East and Africa. The other is the magnificent defense of China, which will, I have reason to believe, increase in strength. All of these, together, are preventing the Axis from winning control of the seas by ships and aircraft.

The Axis Powers can never achieve their objective of world domination unless they first obtain control of the seas. That is their supreme purpose today; and to achieve it, they must capture Great Britain.

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They could then have the power to dictate to the Western Hemisphere. No spurious argument, no appeal to sentiment, no false pledges like those given by Hitler at Munich, can deceive the American people into believing that he and his Axis partners would not, with Britain defeated, close in relentlessly on this hemisphere of ours.

But if the Axis Powers fail to gain control of the seas, then they are certainly defeated. Their dreams of world domination will then go by the board; and the criminal leaders who started this war will suffer inevitable disaster.

Both they and their people know this — and they and their people are afraid. That is why they are risking everything they have, conducting desperate attempts to break through to the command of the ocean. Once they are limited to a continuing land war, their cruel forces of occupation will be unable to keep their heel on the necks of the millions of innocent, oppressed peoples on the continent of Europe; and in the end, their whole structure will break into little pieces. And let us remember, the wider the Nazi land effort, the greater is their ultimate danger.

We do not forget the silenced peoples. The masters of Germany have marked these silenced peoples and their children's children for slavery — those, at least, who have not been assassinated or escaped to free soil. But those people — spiritually unconquered: Austrians, Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, Frenchmen, Greeks, Southern Slavs — yes, even those Italians and Germans who themselves have been enslaved — will prove to be a powerful force in the final disruption of the Nazi system.

All freedom — meaning freedom to live, and not freedom to conquer and subjugate other peoples — depends on freedom of the seas. All of American history — North, Central, and South American history — has been inevitably tied up with those words, "freedom of the seas."

Since 1799, 142 years ago, when our infant Navy made the West Indies and the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico safe for American ships; since 1804 and 1805 when we made all peaceful

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commerce safe from the depredations of the Barbary pirates; since the War of 1812, which was fought for the preservation of sailors' rights; since 1867, when our sea power made it possible for the Mexicans to expel the French Army of Louis Napoleon, we have striven and fought in defense of freedom of the seas for our own shipping, for the commerce of our sister Republics, for the right of all Nations to use the highways of world trade — and for our own safety.

During the first World War we were able to escort merchant ships by the use of small cruisers, gunboats, and destroyers; and that type, called a convoy, was effective against submarines. In this second World War, however, the problem is greater. It is different because the attack on the freedom of the seas is now fourfold: first — the improved submarine; second — the much greater use of the heavily armed raiding cruiser or the hit-and-run battleship; third — the bombing airplane, which is capable of destroying merchant ships seven or eight hundred miles from its nearest base; and fourth — the destruction of merchant ships in those ports of the world that are accessible to bombing attack.

The Battle of the Atlantic now extends from the icy waters of the North Pole to the frozen continent of the Antarctic. Throughout this huge area, there have been sinkings of merchant ships in alarming and increasing numbers by Nazi raiders or submarines. There have been sinkings even of ships carrying neutral flags. There have been sinkings in the South Atlantic, off West Africa and the Cape Verde Islands; between the Azores and the islands off the American coast; and between Greenland and Iceland. Great numbers of these sinkings have been actually within the waters of the Western Hemisphere itself.

The blunt truth is this — and I reveal this with the full knowledge of the British Government: the present rate of Nazi sinkings of merchant ships is more than three times as high as the capacity of British shipyards to replace them; it is more than twice the combined British and American output of merchant ships today.

We can answer this peril by two simultaneous measures: first, by speeding up and increasing our own great shipbuilding pro-

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gram; and second, by helping to cut down the losses on the high seas.

Attacks on shipping off the very shores of land which we are determined to protect, present an actual military danger to the Americas. And that danger has recently been heavily underlined by the presence in Western Hemisphere waters of a Nazi battleship of great striking power.

You remember that most of the supplies for Britain go by a northerly route, which comes close to Greenland and the nearby island of Iceland. Germany's heaviest attack is on that route. Nazi occupation of Iceland or bases in Greenland would bring the war close to our own continental shores, because those places are stepping-stones to Labrador and Newfoundland, to Nova Scotia, yes, to the northern United States itself, including the great industrial centers of the North, the East, and the Middle West.

Equally, the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, if occupied or controlled by Germany, would directly endanger the freedom of the Atlantic and our own American physical safety. Under German domination those islands would become bases for submarines, warships, and airplanes raiding the waters that lie immediately off our own coasts and attacking the shipping in the South Atlantic. They would provide a springboard for actual attack against the integrity and the independence of Brazil and her neighboring Republics.

I have said on many occasions that the United States is mustering its men and its resources only for purposes of defense — only to repel attack. I repeat that statement now. But we must be realistic when we use the word "attack"; we have to relate it to the lightning speed of modern warfare.

Some people seem to think that we are not attacked until bombs actually drop in the streets of New York or San Francisco or New Orleans or Chicago. But they are simply shutting their eyes to the lesson that we must learn from the fate of every Nation that the Nazis have conquered.

The attack on Czechoslovakia began with the conquest of Austria. The attack on Norway began with the occupation of Den-

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mark. The attack on Greece began with occupation of Albania and Bulgaria. The attack on the Suez Canal began with the invasion of the Balkans and North Africa, and the attack on the United States can begin with the domination of any base which menaces our security — north or south.

Nobody can foretell tonight just when the acts of the dictators will ripen into attack on this hemisphere and us. But we know enough by now to realize that it would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard.

When your enemy comes at you in a tank or a bombing plane, if you hold your fire until you see the whites of his eyes, you will never know what hit you. Our Bunker Hill of tomorrow may be several thousand miles from Boston.

Anyone with an atlas, anyone with a reasonable knowledge of the sudden striking force of modern war, knows that it is stupid to wait until a probable enemy has gained a foothold from which to attack. Old-fashioned common sense calls for the use of a strategy that will prevent such an enemy from gaining a foothold in the first place.

We have, accordingly, extended our patrol in North and South Atlantic waters. We are steadily adding more and more ships and planes to that patrol. It is well known that the strength of the Atlantic Fleet has been greatly increased during the past year, and that it is constantly being built up.

These ships and planes warn of the presence of attacking raiders, on the sea, under the sea, and above the sea. The danger from these raiders is, of course, greatly lessened if their location is definitely known. We are thus being forewarned. We shall be on our guard against efforts to establish Nazi bases closer to our hemisphere.

The deadly facts of war compel Nations, for simple self-preservation, to make stern choices. It does not make sense, for instance, to say, "I believe in the defense of all the Western Hemisphere," and in the next breath to say, "I will not fight for that defense until the enemy has landed on our shores." If we believe in the independence and the integrity of the Americas, we must be will-

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ing to fight, to fight to defend them just as much as we would to fight for the safety of our own homes.

It is time for us to realize that the safety of American homes even in the center of this our own country has a very definite relationship to the continued safety of homes in Nova Scotia or Trinidad or Brazil.

Our national policy today, therefore, is this:

First, we shall actively resist wherever necessary, and with all our resources, every attempt by Hitler to extend his Nazi domination to the Western Hemisphere, or to threaten it. We shall actively resist his every attempt to gain control of the seas. We insist upon the vital importance of keeping Hitlerism away from any point in the world which could be used or would be used as a base of attack against the Americas.

Second, from the point of view of strict naval and military necessity, we shall give every possible assistance to Britain and to all who, with Britain, are resisting Hitlerism or its equivalent with force of arms. Our patrols are helping now to insure delivery of the needed supplies to Britain. All additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken. Any and all further methods or combination of methods, which can or should be utilized, are being devised by our military and naval technicians, who, with me, will work out and put into effect such new and additional safeguards as may be needed.

I say that the delivery of needed supplies to Britain is imperative. I say that this can be done; it must be done; and it will be done.

To the other American Nations — twenty Republics and the Dominion of Canada — I say this: the United States does not merely propose these purposes, but is actively engaged today in carrying them out.

I say to them further: you may disregard those few citizens of the United States who contend that we are disunited and cannot act.

There are some timid ones among us who say that we must preserve peace at any price — lest we lose our liberties forever.

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To them I say this: never in the history of the world has a Nation lost its democracy by a successful struggle to defend its democracy. We must not be defeated by the fear of the very danger which we are preparing to resist. Our freedom has shown its ability to survive war, but our freedom would never survive surrender. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

There is, of course, a small group of sincere, patriotic men and women whose real passion for peace has shut their eyes to the ugly realities of international banditry and to the need to resist it at all costs. I am sure they are embarrassed by the sinister support they are receiving from the enemies of democracy in our midst — the Bundists, the Fascists, and Communists, and every group devoted to bigotry and racial and religious intolerance. It is no mere coincidence that all the arguments put forward by these enemies of democracy — all their attempts to confuse and divide our people and to destroy public confidence in our Government — all their defeatist forebodings that Britain and democracy are already beaten — all their selfish promises that we can "do business" with Hitler — all of these are but echoes of the words that have been poured out from the Axis bureaus of propaganda. Those same words have been used before in other countries — to scare them, to divide them, to soften them up. Invariably, those same words have formed the advance guard of physical attack.

Your Government has the right to expect of all citizens that they take part in the common work of our common defense — take loyal part from this moment forward.

I have recently set up the machinery for civilian defense. It will rapidly organize, locality by locality. It will depend on the organized effort of men and women everywhere. All will have opportunities and responsibilities to fulfill.

Defense today means more than merely fighting. It means morale, civilian as well as military; it means using every available resource; it means enlarging every useful plant. It means the use of a greater American common sense in discarding rumor and distorted statement. It means recognizing, for what they are,

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racketeers and fifth columnists, who are the incendiary bombs in this country of the moment.

All of us know that we have made very great social progress in recent years. We propose to maintain that progress and strengthen it. When the Nation is threatened from without, however, as it is today, the actual production and transportation of the machinery of defense must not be interrupted by disputes between capital and capital, labor and labor, or capital and labor. The future of all free enterprise — of capital and labor alike — is at stake.

This is no time for capital to make, or be allowed to retain, excess profits. Articles of defense must have undisputed right of way in every industrial plant in the country.

A Nation-wide machinery for conciliation and mediation of industrial disputes has been set up. That machinery must be used promptly — and without stoppage of work. Collective bargaining will be retained, but the American people expect that impartial recommendations of our Government conciliation and mediation services will be followed both by capital and by labor.

The overwhelming majority of our citizens expect their Government to see that the tools of defense are built; and for the very purpose of preserving the democratic safeguards of both labor and management, this Government is determined to use all of its power to express the will of its people, and to prevent interference with the production of materials essential to our Nation's security.

Today the whole world is divided between human slavery and human freedom — between pagan brutality and the Christian ideal.

We choose human freedom — which is the Christian ideal.

No one of us can waver for a moment in his courage or his faith.

We will not accept a Hitler-dominated world. And we will not accept a world, like the postwar world of the 1920's, in which the seeds of Hitlerism can again be planted and allowed to grow.

We will accept only a world consecrated to freedom of speech and expression — freedom of every person to worship God in his own way — freedom from want — and freedom from terror.

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Is such a world impossible of attainment?

Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, the Emancipation Proclamation, and every other milestone in human progress — all were ideals which seemed impossible of attainment — and yet they were attained.

As a military force, we were weak when we established our independence, but we successfully stood off tyrants, powerful in their day, tyrants who are now lost in the dust of history.

Odds meant nothing to us then. Shall we now, with all our potential strength, hesitate to take every single measure necessary to maintain our American liberties?

Our people and our Government will not hesitate to meet that challenge.

As the President of a united and determined people, I say solemnly:

We reassert the ancient American doctrine of freedom of the seas.

We reassert the solidarity of the twenty-one American Republics and the Dominion of Canada in the preservation of the independence of the hemisphere.

We have pledged material support to the other democracies of the world — and we will fulfill that pledge.

We in the Americas will decide for ourselves whether, and when, and where, our American interests are attacked or our security is threatened.

We are placing our armed forces in strategic military position.

We will not hesitate to use our armed forces to repel attack.

We reassert our abiding faith in the vitality of our constitutional Republic as a perpetual home of freedom, of tolerance, and of devotion to the word of God.

Therefore, with profound consciousness of my responsibilities to my countrymen and to my country's cause, I have tonight issued a proclamation that an unlimited national emergency exists and requires the strengthening of our defense to the extreme limit of our national power and authority.

The Nation will expect all individuals and all groups to play

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their full parts, without stint, and without selfishness, and without doubt that our democracy will triumphantly survive.

I repeat the words of the signers of the Declaration of Independence — that little band of patriots, fighting long ago against overwhelming odds, but certain, as we are now, of ultimate victory: "With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."

NOTE: See Item 46, this volume, for the text of the president's proclamation announcing an unlimited national emergency.

46 ¶ The President Proclaims That an Unlimited National Emergency Confronts the Country. Proclamation No. 2487.

May 27, 1941

WHEREAS on September 8, 1939, because of the outbreak of war in Europe a proclamation was issued declaring a limited national emergency and directing measures "for the purpose of strengthening our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations,"

WHEREAS a succession of events makes plain that the objectives of the Axis belligerents in such war are not confined to those avowed at its commencement, but include overthrow throughout the world of existing democratic order, and a worldwide domination of peoples and economies through the destruction of all resistance on land and sea and in the air, AND

WHEREAS indifference on the part of the United States to the increasing menace would be perilous, and common prudence requires that for the security of this Nation and of this hemisphere we should pass from peacetime authorizations of military strength to such a basis as will enable us to cope instantly and decisively with any attempt at hostile encirclement of this hemisphere, or the establishment of any base for aggression against it, as well as

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to repel the threat of predatory incursion by foreign agents into our territory and society,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, do proclaim that an unlimited national emergency confronts this country, which requires that its military, naval, air, and civilian defenses be put on the basis of readiness to repel any and all acts or threats of aggression directed toward any part of the Western Hemisphere. ✓

I call upon all the loyal citizens engaged in production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the Nation to the end that a system of government that makes private enterprise possible may survive.

I call upon all our loyal workmen as well as employers to merge their lesser differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the only kind of government which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital.

I call upon loyal State and local leaders and officials to cooperate with the civilian defense agencies of the United States to assure our internal security against foreign directed subversion and to put every community in order for maximum productive effort and minimum of waste and unnecessary frictions.

I call upon all loyal citizens to place the Nation's needs first in mind and in action to the end that we may mobilize and have ready for instant defensive use all of the physical powers, all of the moral strength, and all of the material resources of this Nation.

NOTE: See Item 45, this volume, the reasons for this declaration of for the President's address as to an unlimited national emergency.

47 ¶ Harold L. Ickes Is Named Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense.

May 28, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

RECENT significant developments indicate the need of coordinating existing Federal authority over oil and gas and insuring that the supply of petroleum and its products will be accommodated to the needs of the Nation and the national defense program. Government functions relating to petroleum problems are now divided among numerous officers and agencies of the Federal Government and the principal oil-producing States. The various phases of operation in the petroleum industry itself are numerous and complex. One of the essential requirements of the national defense program, which must be made the basis of our petroleum defense policy in the unlimited national emergency declared on May 27, 1941, is the development and utilization with maximum efficiency of our petroleum resources and our facilities, present and future, for making petroleum and petroleum products available, adequately and continuously, in the proper forms, at the proper places, and at reasonable prices to meet military and civilian needs.

Some of the problems with which we are now confronted and which require immediate action are: The proper development, production, and utilization of those reserves of crude oils and natural gas that are of strategic importance both in quality and location; elimination or reduction of cross hauling of petroleum and its products and the development of transportation facilities and of methods by which more efficient use can be made of existing transportation and storage facilities; balancing refining operations to secure the maximum yields of specific products with full consideration for requirements, the most economical use of the raw materials, and efficiency of production and distribution; and the elimination of the drilling of unnecessary wells in proven fields and of other unnecessary activities and equipment.

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In order to provide the desired coordination, I am hereby designating you as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense. In that capacity it will be your function and responsibility as my representative:

1. To obtain currently from the States and their agencies, from the petroleum and allied industries, from the officers and agencies of your Department, and from other appropriate Federal departments and agencies information as to (a) the military and civilian needs for petroleum and petroleum products, (b) the factors affecting the continuous, ready availability of petroleum and petroleum products for those needs, and (c) any action proposed which will affect such availability of petroleum and petroleum products.
2. To make specific recommendations to any appropriate department, officer, corporation, or other agency of the Federal Government, particularly the Office of Production Management and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, to the appropriate agency representing any State or any combination of States, and to any appropriate industry or part thereof, as to action which is necessary or desirable, on the basis of your determinations, to insure the maintenance of a ready and adequate supply of petroleum and petroleum products.

In carrying out these responsibilities, it is expected that you will consult with the several officers and agencies of the Federal Government, and with the States acting severally or in any joint capacity, to the end that all governmental participation shall consistently further the purposes above outlined. It is also expected that you will consult with the petroleum industry and those industries which affect its functioning, to aid them in shaping their policies and operations in the discovery, development, production, processing, transportation, storage, distribution, marketing, consumption, and import and export of petroleum and petroleum products.

In order to facilitate your work and efforts, I am requesting that the several departments and agencies having functions re-

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lated to the petroleum problem give you antecedent advice of any action proposed which may affect the continuous, ready availability of petroleum or petroleum products for military and civilian needs, so that you may have opportunity to make specific recommendation concerning such action. I am also requesting that they notify you of all meetings and conferences dealing with these problems, so that your representatives may be in attendance when you deem it advisable.

It is suggested that from time to time you call together all or any of the heads of such departments and agencies, or their representatives, as a committee to discuss such problems as may arise and to develop ways and means of effectuating the highest degree of coordination of Federal functions for the furtherance of the policy herein outlined. The heads of the departments and agencies concerned are being informed of this suggestion and of the contents of this letter, and I am sure you will find them ready to cooperate fully in rendering the assistance requested herein or otherwise needed to assure success of the program.

Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to you, you may employ necessary personnel, including a Deputy Coordinator whose appointment shall be approved by me and to whom you may make any necessary delegation of functions, and may make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, services, and for actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties. You will, of course, make use of such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general services and facilities as you now have available or as may be made available to you through the Office for Emergency Management or other agencies of the Government.

Yours sincerely,

The Honorable,
The Secretary of the Interior

NOTE: Before 1941, Federal regulation of the oil industry had been limited to legislation which prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of petroleum which had been produced in excess

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of the quantity permitted by the laws of the several States. This prohibition upon interstate transportation of "hot oil" had been embodied in section 9c of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. But on January 7, 1935, the Supreme Court, in the famous case of *Panama Refining Company v. Ryan* (293 U.S. 388), ruled that this provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional. (See Introduction to 1935 volume, p. 7.) Subsequently, the Congress passed the Connally Act (49 Stat. 30) embodying similar prohibitions against the interstate transportation of "hot oil" but correcting the provisions which were thought to have caused the Supreme Court to invalidate Section 9c. (See Item 21 and note, pp. 88-89, 1935 volume.)

Meanwhile the Department of the Interior through its Bureau of Mines, the Petroleum Conservation Division, and the United States Geological Survey undertook an affirmative program with respect to oil conservation and the discovery of new oil fields.

Early in 1941, it became apparent that the interests of national defense urgently required correction of the somewhat disorderly system of producing, transporting, and utilizing oil. In March, 1941, the National Resources Planning Board recommended the creation of a Federal authority, for the duration of the emergency, to control the production and distribution of oil. The issue crystallized in the spring of

1941 when a shortage of oil tankers and transportation facilities threatened to deplete the supply of petroleum where it was most needed by defense industries. It had become necessary to divert fifty oil tankers from the Atlantic coastwise traffic in order to aid in transshipping supplies to the British. Early in May, the Secretary of the Interior and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply both urged Federal regulation of petroleum.

Accordingly on May 6, 1941, the President wrote a memorandum to Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, stating in part:

"Developments in the oil industry indicate the immediate necessity for coordination of existing Federal authority over oil and gas to avoid price increases and shortages. Coordinating authority should be lodged in the Department of the Interior where most oil agencies are now located, and should provide representation of other agencies, including, in particular, O.P.M. and O.P.A.C.S. . . ."

Acting pursuant to this memorandum, the Bureau of the Budget consulted with the interested parties. As a result of these negotiations, the President wrote the foregoing letter designating the Secretary of the Interior as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense. By the letter the President vested the Coordinator with the responsibility of assembling data concerning the needs and supply of petro-

48. Retirement of Chief Justice Hughes

leum and authorized him to make necessary recommendations to the various Federal agencies, State governments, and the oil industry with regard to the maintenance of adequate petroleum supplies.

Before December 7, 1941, the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense made a number of surveys of the capacity for production, transportation, refining, and distribution of oil, and of the equipment and supply requirements of the oil industry. Plans were laid for the expansion of facilities for the production of high-octane gasoline and for supplying petroleum to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The Office of Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense also advised the Office of Production Management on such questions as priority applications, preference ratings, and limitation and curtailment orders in relation to petroleum.

Close relations were maintained by the Petroleum Coordinator for War (to which the name had been changed after Pearl Harbor) with a number of foreign countries.

Originally, the powers of the Petroleum Coordinator for War were advisory only. But during 1942 the President recognized that it was necessary to strengthen the control of the Federal Government over petroleum. Accordingly, on December 2, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9276, establishing the Petroleum Administration for War (see Item 131 and note, 1942 volume).

For an account of the activities of the Office of Defense Transportation in connection with the transport of petroleum, see Item 137 and note, this volume. For an account of the construction and operation of Federal oil pipelines, see Item 43 and note, this volume.

48 ¶ Exchange of Communications Between the President and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes on His Retirement. June 2, 1941

My dear Mr. Chief Justice:

I AM DEEPLY distressed by your letter of June 2 telling me of your retirement on July first from active service as Chief Justice of the United States. This comes to me, as I know it will to the whole Nation, as a great shock for all of us had counted on your continuing your splendid service for many years to come. My every inclination is to beg you to remain; but my deep concern

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for your health and strength must be paramount. I shall hope to see you this coming week in Washington.

Sincerely and affectionately yours, -

Supreme Court of the United States

June 2, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Considerations of health and age make it necessary that I should be relieved of the duties which I have been discharging with increasing difficulty. For that reason I avail myself of the right and privilege granted by the Act of March 1, 1937, 28 U. S. Code, Section 3758, and retire from regular active service on the Bench as Chief Justice of the United States, this retirement to be effective on and after July 1, 1941.

I have the honor to remain,

Respectfully yours,

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

49 ¶ A Message to the Congress Urging Speedy Authorization of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. June 2, 1941

To the Congress:

I RECOMMEND authorization of construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, pursuant to the agreement of March 19, 1941, with Canada, as an integral part of the joint defense of the North American continent.

Production and more production is the keynote of our all-out race for national defense. Electric power and transportation are limiting factors in the production of planes, guns, tanks, and ships.

The enemies of democracy are developing every hydroelectric

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resource and every waterway from Norway to the Dardanelles. Are we to allow this continent to be out-matched because short-sighted interests oppose the development of one of our greatest resources?

Your action on this project will either make available or withhold 2,200,000 horsepower of low-cost electric power for the joint defense of North America.

Your action on this project will either open or keep bottled up one of the greatest transportation resources ever offered a people.

Both countries need the power. Both face power shortages which threaten to grow more serious as the demands of the defense program multiply with almost incredible rapidity.

Let us remember that it takes tens of thousands of kilowatt-hours of electricity to produce the materials that go into a single airplane. Our present aluminum program alone calls for more than ten billion kilowatt-hours a year. It is constantly expanding with the need for more planes to outstrip the aggressors.

Steam power plant construction offers no substitute for St. Lawrence power. No steam plants can provide the large blocks of low-cost electric energy required for certain essential defense industries. Furthermore, we are going to need all our capacity to produce steam power plant equipment to meet the tremendous demands which are growing in other parts of the country and to build power installations to drive our merchant and naval vessels.

Our defense production is a gigantic assembly line. Transportation is its conveyor belt. If raw materials cannot flow freely to our great industrial plants and the products cannot move continuously to the front, defense breaks down. Bottlenecks in transportation are as serious as shortages of power.

Expanding production is going to burden the railroads to the limit. We are expanding their rolling stock as fast as we can, but even the present orders for new cars and locomotives are competing for manufacturing capacity which could otherwise produce tanks and other items of heavy armament.

The Seaway will help prevent transportation bottlenecks. It

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will provide a great highway to and from important defense production areas. It will cut by more than a thousand miles the stretch of dangerous open water which must be traveled by supplies to Great Britain and strategic North Atlantic bases. It will increase our capacity to build ships.

The Great Lakes today hold many shipways and dry docks, as well as resources of men and materials for shipbuilding. They are bottled up because we have delayed completing the Seaway. If we start the Seaway now, scores of additional merchant ships may be built in coastal yards freed by transferring a portion of the longer-term naval program to the Great Lakes.

The St. Lawrence Project must be expedited. No comparable power, shipbuilding, and transportation facilities can be made available in the time required to construct this project.

In dealing with the present emergency, too many people have underestimated the degree to which our resources will be taxed. We cannot afford to make any more mistakes of that kind.

I am advised that we can build the St. Lawrence Project in four years. Under emergency pressure it may be completed in less time. I should like to agree with the people who say that the country's danger will be over sooner than that. But the course of world events gives no such assurance; and we have no right to take chances with the national safety.

I know of no single project of this nature more important to this country's future in peace or war. Its authorization will demonstrate to the enemies of democracy that, however long the effort, we intend to outstrip them in the race of production. In the modern world, that race determines the rise and fall of Nations.

I hope that authorization will not be delayed.

NOTE: The foregoing message was another in the long, and unsuccessful, series of steps which the President took in an attempt to obtain Congressional authorization for the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. Since 1895, various propo-

sitions have been considered for the development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. On March 14, 1934, the United States Senate voted 46-42 in favor of a treaty with Canada authorizing the waterway, but the vote fell short of the neces-

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sary two-thirds majority for ratifying the treaty. (For earlier attempts by Mr. Roosevelt, as Governor of New York and as the President, to develop the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, see Chapter IV, 1928-1932 volume; Item 7, 1934 volume; Item 34, 1936 volume; Items 59 and 63, 1937 volume; Items 106 and 155, 1938 volume; and Items 114 and 143, 1940 volume.)

Early in 1941, the additional needs of power for defense purposes caused the President to press for a new agreement with Canada which would enable the development of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the generation of electricity from the water power of the St. Lawrence River. On October 17, 1940, by Executive Order No. 8568 the President established the St. Lawrence Advisory Committee and provided for a preliminary investigation of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River (see Item 114 and note, 1940 volume).

Following studies, initial engineering work, and a series of joint meetings between the St. Lawrence Advisory Committee and the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes Basin Committee late in 1940, it was agreed that the entire project could be completed within four years. With the enactment of lend-lease, it seemed even more essential to speed the project in order to assist in expediting aid to Great Britain. Details of the agreement between Canada and the United States were perfected in an exchange of corre-

spondence between the President and the Prime Minister of Canada during early March, 1941.

On March 14, 1941, the Attorney General advised the President as follows:

"It is legally unobjectionable so far as this country is concerned for the executives of the United States and Canada to enter into an agreement regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence deep waterway project conditioned for its effectiveness upon the subsequent enactment of necessary legislation by Congress and by the Canadian Parliament. If an agreement is executed and approved in this manner its provisions would be binding upon the United States as respects Canada."

The two countries signed the agreement on March 19, 1941. Article XI of the agreement expressly provided that it was an agreement subject to the approval of the Congress. On March 21, 1941, the President transmitted the agreement to the Congress.

In June, 1941, H. R. 4927 was introduced by the Chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee of the House of Representatives. The President then sent the foregoing message to the Congress urging that the deliberations be speeded to authorize the project. The House bill was approved by the Rivers and Harbors Committee by a vote of 17-8. Later, this bill was replaced and the Rivers and Harbors Bill of 1941 (H. R. 5993) incorporating the project was reported to the House of Representatives favorably

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on November 21, 1941. Consideration of the issue was deferred after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Congressional efforts were renewed in late 1944 and early 1945 to enact the necessary legislation to authorize the St. Lawrence seaway-power project. The Congress declined to enact the necessary legislation.

Broad reasons of national security and welfare led the President to press consistently for the development of this great new source of power. Opposition to the project arose from a conglomerate alliance of special interests and partisans of sectionalism. Railroad interests, coal and shipping interests, and private power companies opposed the plan with blind determination during the years when it was con-

sidered. Many shipping centers in the country were fearful that they would lose business, notwithstanding the broader national demands of defense and war.

The failure to authorize the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project is an unfortunate chapter in legislative history. The completion of this great source of power would have assisted in the production of aluminum and also provided cheap power for other munitions industries. The T.V.A., Boulder Dam, and the Columbia River projects were three great pillars for this kind of production in different sections of the country. The lack of a similar power project in the Northeast was a real handicap in the prosecution of the war.

50 (A Statement by the President and an Executive Order on the Taking Possession of the Plant of North American Aviation Company at Inglewood, California. Executive Order No. 8773. June 9, 1941

Statement:

CONTINUOUS production in the Los Angeles plant of North American Aviation, Inc., is essential to national defense. It is engaged in the production of airplanes vital to our defense and much of the property in the plant is owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States. Production in this plant has ceased because of a labor dispute.

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Conciliation was resorted to and efforts at conciliation failed. The dispute was then certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Defense Mediation Board.

The course of mediation has now been interrupted in violation of an agreement entered into by the bargaining representatives of the workers to continue production during the course of the mediation. Full stoppage of production has resulted. This has created a situation seriously detrimental to the defense of the United States.

Because of this situation, as President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, I have determined that this plant must be reopened at once. I have therefore directed that the Secretary of War shall immediately take charge of the plant and remain in charge and operate the plant until normal production shall be resumed.

Our country is in danger and the men and women who are now making airplanes play an indispensable part in its defense. I call upon the workers to return to their jobs, with full confidence in the desire and ability of this Administration to protect their persons and their interests. I have an abiding confidence in the loyalty and patriotism of the American workers and I am sure that they will seize this opportunity to cooperate in the national interest. Their fundamental rights as free citizens will be protected by the Government and negotiations will be conducted through the process of collective bargaining to reach a settlement fair and reasonable to the workers and to the company. The company already has stated that any such settlement will be retroactive to May first.

The Army has been directed to afford protection to all workers entering or leaving the plant, and in their own homes.

Executive Order:

WHEREAS on the twenty-seventh day of May, 1941, a Presidential proclamation was issued, declaring an unlimited national emergency and calling upon all loyal citizens in production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the Nation to the end

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that a system of government which makes private enterprise possible may survive; and calling upon all our loyal workmen as well as employers to merge their lesser differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the only kind of government which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital; and calling upon all loyal citizens to place the Nation's needs first in mind and in action to the end that we may mobilize, and have ready for instant defensive use, all of the physical powers, all of the moral strength, and all of the material resources of the Nation; and

WHEREAS North American Aviation, Inc., at its Inglewood plant in the City of Los Angeles, State of California, has contracts with the United States for the manufacture of military aircraft and other material and articles vital to the defense of the United States; and the United States owns aircraft in the course of production, raw material, machinery, and other property situated in the said company's plant, and

WHEREAS a controversy arose at said plant over terms and conditions of employment between the company and the workers which they have been unable to adjust by collective bargaining; and whereas the controversy was duly certified to the National Defense Mediation Board, established by the Executive Order of March 19, 1941; and whereas before the negotiations had been concluded before the said Board, and in violation of an agreement between the bargaining representatives of the company and the workers authorized to appear before the Board and conduct the negotiations, production at said plant of said aircraft and other articles and materials vital to the defense of the United States was interrupted by a strike which still continues, and

WHEREAS the objectives of said proclamation of May 27, 1941 are jeopardized and the ability of the United States to obtain aircraft essential to its armed forces and to the national defense is seriously impaired by said cessation of production, and

WHEREAS for the time being and under the circumstances hereinabove set forth it is essential in order that such operations be assured and safeguarded that the plant be operated by the United States;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pursuant to the

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powers vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, as President of the United States of America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, hereby authorize and direct that the Secretary of War immediately take possession of and operate the said plant of North American Aviation, Inc., through such person or persons as he may designate, to produce the aircraft and other articles and material called for by its contracts with the United States or otherwise, and to do all things necessary or incidental thereto. Such necessary or appropriate adjustments shall be made with respect to existing and future contracts and with respect to compensation to the company, as further orders hereafter issued by the Secretary of War shall provide. The Secretary of War shall employ or authorize the employment of such employees, including a competent civilian advisor on industrial relations, as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order. And I hereby direct the Secretary of War to take such measures as may be necessary to protect workers returning to the plant.

Possession and operation hereunder shall be terminated by the President as soon as he determines that the plant will be privately operated in a manner consistent with the needs of the national defense.

NOTE: The airplane plant of North American Aviation, Inc., was the first of three defense plants which the President had to order taken over by the Army or Navy before Pearl Harbor in order to insure uninterrupted production in the face of labor difficulties. The other two plants were those of Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, and Air Associates, Inc.

After a bitterly contested election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, North American Aviation began collective bargain-

ing negotiations with United Automobile Workers of America, Local 683, C.I.O. The main issue in the negotiations was the union's demand for wage increases. Since little progress was made, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Defense Mediation Board on May 22 (see Item 20 and note, this volume, for an account of the National Defense Mediation Board).

Simultaneously with the President's proclamation of an unlimited national emergency (see Item 46 and

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note, this volume), North American Aviation, Inc., and the union concluded an interim agreement in which both pledged that there would be no interruption of work while the case was pending before the Board. But in flagrant violation of this interim agreement, as well as in defiance of the orders of the national leadership of the union, the local officers of the union brought about a wildcat strike on June 5. Richard T. Frankenstein, Director of Aircraft for the United Automobile Workers, promptly and emphatically denounced the strike in a Nation-wide broadcast and condemned the tactics of the Communists who were the major factor behind the strike. The Soviet Union at this time was still an ally of Hitler.

But the strikers were unmoved by Mr. Frankenstein's efforts, and the President accordingly issued the foregoing statement and Executive Order directing the Army to take over the struck plant. Within an hour after the Executive Order had been issued, Army troops had cleared the entrances to the plant and men started returning to work.

Army officers placed in temporary control of the North American plant assured the workers that seizure was only to prevent interference with the national defense program, and that Government control in no way impaired the right of workers to bargain collectively and to negotiate through accredited represen-

tatives. On June 10, the day following the President's statement and Executive Order, a majority of the men had already returned to their jobs. The local union leaders called a mass meeting on that day, and also voted to return to work. By June 11, both production and employment were again normal.

On June 17, the National Defense Mediation Board reopened hearings in the case. The negotiations resulted in certain wage increases for the workers in the plant, and the Board recommended certain other provisions to protect union security. On July 1, both the company and the union voted acceptance of the recommendations of the National Defense Mediation Board. On July 2, the President issued Executive Order No. 8814 returning the North American Aviation Company plant to its owners.

In addition to the three plants which the President ordered seized by the Army or Navy before America entered the war, 64 additional plants or groups of plants were seized at the direction of the President during the period of the war. The vast majority of these seizures were because of interruption, or threatened interruption, of war production by management-labor disputes. In a few cases, such as those involving York Safe and Lock Co. and Lord Manufacturing Co., the seizure was for other reasons involving unsatisfactory production or recalcitrant management.

51 ¶ A Letter Urging Adequate Homes for Industrial Workers as a Major Factor in the Defense Program. June 9, 1941

My dear Mrs. Rosenman:

THIS is a most appropriate time for the conference now being held in Washington by the National Committee on the Housing Emergency. The demands of speedy, all-out national defense have served to focus attention upon the whole housing problem of the Nation. The rapid expansion of industrial plants for airplanes and tanks and guns and all kinds of defense materials, the building of new plants for such purposes, the construction of camps and training quarters, the doubled and quadrupled activities of shipyards — all of these efforts of our Nation to build up its national defense have brought hundreds of thousands of workers and their families into areas not equipped to house them.

But they must be housed — and adequately housed. The Government has already taken steps to do its part to provide adequate housing for these defense workers. But we have just made a beginning. The task requires not only quick action and intelligent planning by the Federal Government. It requires the cooperation of states and cities and towns — and, equally as important, the cooperation and unselfish assistance of real estate owners and private builders.

I understand that your conference has brought together not only the representatives of civic associations and Government departments — Federal, State, and local — but also representatives of labor, of real estate boards, and of private construction companies. It is in this type of cooperative effort and planning and discussion, that the road to success is possible.

In the Federal housing program we have laid a groundwork which has not only made a substantial beginning in the solution of the general over-all housing needs of the Nation, but which has also given us great experience of all kinds with which to proceed to plan and to act in the future.

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I am sure that the forthcoming discussions will be helpful in acquainting the general public with what has been done, and with what must be done, if democracy is really to serve its function of meeting the justifiable desire of the average American citizen for an American standard of living.

Very sincerely yours,

Mrs. Samuel I. Rosenman,
Chairman, National Committee on the Housing Emergency,
Mayflower Hotel,
Washington, D. C.

NOTE: The National Committee on the Housing Emergency, to which the President addressed the foregoing letter, was established in January, 1941, for the primary purpose of encouraging the private and public construction of adequate housing for workers engaged in producing war materials. It was a purely private, non-profit organization composed of persons interested in promoting both public and private housing construction. The President's letter was read at a Housing Inventory Conference of the Committee called in Washington, D. C., in June, 1941. This Conference was attended by more than 600 persons from 24 States and Puerto Rico, and public officials and

private citizens formulated a series of recommendations to meet the housing emergency.

On July 3, 1941, the National Committee on the Housing Emergency wrote to the President suggesting a complete reorganization and consolidation of the many agencies in the Federal Government concerned with housing. Executive Order No. 9700 effected such a reorganization and established the National Housing Agency (see Item 24 and note, 1942 volume).

For additional discussion of the Administration's defense and war housing program, see Items 8 and 59 and notes, this volume, Items 24 and 56 and notes, 1942 volume, and Item 49 and note, 1943 volume.

52 (Message to the Congress Transmitting the
First Formal Report on the Operations of the
Lend-Lease Act. June 10, 1941

To the Congress:

SECTION 5 (B) of Public Law No. 11, Seventy-seventh Congress, approved by me on March 11, 1941 [Lend-Lease Act], provides in part as follows:

“The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose.”

In compliance with this provision I am submitting this report.

We have supplied, and we will supply, planes, guns, ammunition, and other defense articles in ever-increasing quantities to Britain, China, and other democracies resisting aggression.

Wars are not won by guns alone, but wars are not won without guns. We all know this full well now. Beginning with the outbreak of the war the American public began to realize that it was in our own national interest and security to help Britain, China, and other democratic Nations.

Beginning with the outbreak of the war British and French orders began to be placed. But dollars could not be immediately turned into airplanes and ships and guns and ammunition.

In those dark days when France was falling, it was clear that this Government, to carry out the will of the people, had to render aid over and above the matériel coming off the assembly line. This Government, therefore, made available all that it possibly could out of its surplus stocks of munitions.

In June of 1940, the British Government received from our surplus stocks rifles, machine guns, field artillery, ammunition, and aircraft in a value of more than 43 million dollars. This was equipment that would have taken months and months to produce and which, with the exception of the aircraft, cost about 300 million dollars to produce during the World War period.

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Most of this matériel would not have been usable if we had kept it much longer. This equipment arrived in Britain after the retreat from Dunkirk, where the British had lost great quantities of guns and other military supplies. No one can appraise what effect the delivery of these supplies had upon the successful British resistance in the summer and fall of 1940 when they were fighting against such terrific odds.

Since June, 1940, this Government has continued to supply war matériel from its surplus stocks, in addition to the matériel produced by private manufacturers. The fifty over-age destroyers which Britain received in exchange for the defense bases were a part of the aid supplied by the Government.

By the turn of the year 1941, the British commitments in this country for defense articles had reached the limit of their future dollar resources. Their striking power required the assurance that their munitions and equipment would steadily and certainly be augmented, not curtailed.

The will of our people, as expressed through the Congress, was to meet this problem, not only by the passage of the Lend-Lease Act but by the appropriation of 7 billion dollars made on March 27 of this year to carry out this task.

In the ninety days since the Lend-Lease Act was passed, and in the seventy-four days since the funds were appropriated, we have started in motion the vast supply program which is essential to the defeat of the Axis powers.

In these seventy-four days, more than $4\frac{1}{4}$ billion dollars out of the 7 billion dollars have been allocated to the War, Navy, Agriculture, and Treasury Departments and to the Maritime Commission to procure the aid authorized. Contracts have been let for long-range bombers, ships, tanks, and the other sinews of war that will be needed for the defense of the democracies. The balance of less than $2\frac{3}{4}$ billion is being rapidly allocated.

To be effective, the aid rendered by us must be many sided. Ships are necessary to carry the munitions and the food. We are immediately making available to Britain 2 million gross tons of cargo ships and oil tankers.

But this is not enough. Adequate shipping for every day to

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come must be reasonably assured. Since the Appropriation Act was passed, 550 million dollars has been allocated for the construction of new ships under the Lend-Lease Act. Contracts have been let and the new ways required to build these ships are now nearing completion. Allied ships are being repaired by us. Allied ships are being equipped by us to protect them from mines, and are being armed by us to protect them as much as possible against raiders. Naval vessels of Britain are being repaired by us so that they can return quickly to their naval tasks.

The training program of 7,000 British pilots in our schools in this country is under way. Valuable information is being communicated, and other material assistance is being rendered in a mounting benefit to the democracies.

Millions of pounds of food are being and will be sent. Iron and steel, machine tools and the other essentials to maintain and increase the production of war materials in Britain are being sent and received in larger quantities day by day.

Since September, 1939, the war goods sent to Britain have risen steadily. The over-all total exports to the British Empire have greatly increased in 1941 over 1940. What is more important, the increase of those things which are necessary for fighting have increased far beyond our other exports. In the first five months of this year we have sent more than twelve times as many airplanes to Britain as we did in the first five months of 1940. For the first four months of this year the dollar value of explosives sent to the British Empire was about seventeen times as much as for the first four months of 1940. Ninety times as much in dollar value of firearms and ammunition was sent to Britain during the first four months of this year as for the first four months of 1940.

With our national resources, our productive capacity, and the genius of our people for mass production we will help Britain to outstrip the Axis powers in munitions of war, and we will see to it that these munitions get to the places where they can be effectively used to weaken and defeat the aggressors.

In the report that follows facts and figures are given to the extent advisable without disclosing military secrets to benefit the

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Axis powers. These facts describe the past and portray the present status of our aid to those Nations so gallantly fighting the aggressors. They do not present the most important fact of all — the strong will of our people to see to it that these forces of aggression shall not rule the world.

We have before us a constant purpose not of present safety alone but, equally, of future survival.

NOTE: When the first report was given, the lend-lease program had been in operation only 74 days since the passage on March 27, 1941, of the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941. A summary of the first report on lend-lease aid which the President transmitted to

the Congress with the foregoing message is contained in the note to Item 152, pp. 673-678, 1940 volume.

For other descriptions of the accomplishments of lend-lease and the administration of the Lend-Lease Act, see Items 15, 37, and 105 and notes, this volume.

53 ¶ The President Orders O.P.M. to Take Steps to Bar Discrimination in Defense Work.

June 12, 1941

*Memorandum for
Honorable William S. Knudsen
Honorable Sidney Hillman*

COMPLAINTS have repeatedly been brought to my attention that available and much-needed workers are being barred from defense production solely because of race, religion, or national origin. It is said that at a time when labor stringencies are appearing in many areas, fully qualified workers are being turned from the gates of industry on specifications entirely unrelated to efficiency and productivity. Also that discrimination against Negro workers has been Nation-wide, and other minority racial, national, and religious groups have felt its effects in many localities. This situation is a matter of grave national importance, and immediate steps must be taken to deal with it effectively.

53. *Barring Discrimination in Defense Work*

I note with satisfaction that the Office of Production Management has recognized the seriousness of this situation, and that on April 11, 1941, it addressed a letter on the subject to all holders of defense contracts. As Chief Executive of the Nation I place the full support of my office behind your statement to the effect that, "All holders of defense contracts are urged to examine their employment and training policies at once to determine whether or not these policies make ample provision for the full utilization of available and competent Negro workers. Every available source of labor capable of producing defense materials must be tapped in the present emergency."

No Nation combating the increasing threat of totalitarianism can afford arbitrarily to exclude large segments of its population from its defense industries. Even more important is it for us to strengthen our unity and morale by refuting at home the very theories which we are fighting abroad.

Our Government cannot countenance continued discrimination against American citizens in defense production. Industry must take the initiative in opening the doors of employment to all loyal and qualified workers regardless of race, national origin, religion, or color. American workers, both organized and unorganized, must be prepared to welcome the general and much-needed employment of fellow workers of all racial and nationality origins in defense industries.

In the present emergency, it is imperative that we deal effectively and speedily with this problem. I shall expect the Office of Production Management to take immediate steps to facilitate the full utilization of our productive manpower.

NOTE: The foregoing statement of the President was issued shortly before he decided to use more formal means to reduce discrimination in defense work. Two weeks later, the President issued Executive Order No. 8802 establishing a Committee on Fair Employment Practice to prevent discrimination

in employment by holders of defense contracts on account of race, creed, color, or national origin (see Item 58 and note, this volume).

The Committee on Fair Employment Practice was first a part of the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management (later the War Production Board). On July

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30, 1942, it was transferred to the War Manpower Commission. By Executive Order No. 9346 issued on May 27, 1943, the President established the Committee on Fair Employment Practice as an independent unit in the Office for Emergency

Management in order to give it the prestige of separate status; at the same time, the Committee was given additional powers in order to strengthen its authority (see Item 55 and note, 1943 volume).

54 ¶ The President Freezes the Assets of Certain European Countries. Executive Order No. 8785. June 14, 1941

BY VIRTUE of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 415), as amended, by virtue of all other authority vested in me, and by virtue of the existence of a period of unlimited national emergency, and finding that this Order is in the public interest and is necessary in the interest of national defense and security, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, do prescribe the following:

Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

SECTION 1. All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, if (i) such transactions are by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of any foreign country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, or (ii) such transactions involve property in which any foreign country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since the effective date of this Order had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect:

A. All transfers of credit between any banking institutions within the United States; and all transfers of credit between any

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banking institution within the United States and any banking institution outside the United States (including any principal, agent, home office, branch, or correspondent outside the United States, of a banking institution within the United States);

B. All payments by or to any banking institution within the United States;

C. All transactions in foreign exchange by any person within the United States;

D. The export or withdrawal from the United States, or the earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency by any person within the United States;

E. All transfers, withdrawals or exportations of, or dealings in, any evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property by any person within the United States; and

F. Any transaction for the purpose or which has the effect of evading or avoiding the foregoing prohibitions.

SECTION 2. A. All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise:

(1) The acquisition, disposition or transfer of, or other dealing in, or with respect to, any security or evidence thereof on which there is stamped or imprinted, or to which there is affixed or otherwise attached, a tax stamp or other stamp of a foreign country designated in this Order or a notarial or similar seal which by its contents indicates that it was stamped, imprinted, affixed, or attached within such foreign country, or where the attendant circumstances disclose or indicate that such stamp or seal may, at any time, have been stamped, imprinted, affixed, or attached thereto; and

(2) The acquisition by, or transfer to, any person within the United States of any interest in any security or evidence thereof if the attendant circumstances disclose or indicate that the security or evidence thereof is not physically situated within the United States.

B. The Secretary of the Treasury may investigate, regulate, or

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prohibit under such regulations, rulings, or instructions as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, the sending, mailing, importing, or otherwise bringing, directly or indirectly, into the United States, from any foreign country, of any securities or evidences thereof or the receiving or holding in the United States of any securities or evidences thereof so brought into the United States.

SECTION 3. The term "foreign country designated in this Order" means a foreign country included in the following schedule, and the term "effective date of this Order" means with respect to any such foreign country, or any national thereof, the date specified in the following schedule:

- (a) April 8, 1940 —
Norway and
Denmark;
- (b) May 10, 1940 —
The Netherlands,
Belgium, and
Luxembourg;
- (c) June 17, 1940 —
France (including Monaco);
- (d) July 10, 1940 —
Latvia, Estonia, and
Lithuania;
- (e) October 9, 1940 —
Rumania;
- (f) March 4, 1941 —
Bulgaria;
- (g) March 13, 1941 —
Hungary;
- (h) March 24, 1941 —
Yugoslavia;
- (i) April 28, 1941 —
Greece; and
- (j) June 14, 1941 —
Albania,

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Andorra,
Austria,
Czechoslovakia,
Danzig,
Finland,
Germany,
Italy,
Liechtenstein,
Poland,
Portugal,
San Marino,
Spain,
Sweden,
Switzerland, and
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The "effective date of this Order" with respect to any foreign country not designated in this Order shall be deemed to be June 14, 1941.

SECTION 4. A. The Secretary of the Treasury and/or the Attorney General may require, by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, or otherwise, any person to keep a full record of, and to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, from time to time and at any time or times, complete information relative to, any transaction referred to in Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 415), as amended, or relative to any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters, or other papers, in connection therewith, in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed; and the Secretary of the Treasury and/or the Attorney General may, through any agency, investigate any such transaction or act, or any violation of the provisions of this Order.

B. Every person engaging in any of the transactions referred to in Sections 1 and 2 of this Order shall keep a full record of

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each such transaction engaged in by him, regardless of whether such transaction is effected pursuant to license or otherwise, and such record shall be available for examination for at least one year after the date of such transaction.

SECTION 5. A. As used in the first paragraph of Section 1 of this Order "transactions [which] involve property in which any foreign country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, has . . . any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect," shall include, but not by way of limitation (i) any payment or transfer to any such foreign country or national thereof, (ii) any export or withdrawal from the United States to such foreign country, and (iii) any transfer of credit, or payment of an obligation, expressed in terms of the currency of such foreign country.

B. The term "United States" means the United States and any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; the term "continental United States" means the States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Alaska.

C. The term "person" means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other organization.

D. The term "foreign country" shall include, but not by way of limitation,

(i) The state and the government thereof on the effective date of this Order as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof or any territory, dependency, colony, protectorate, mandate, dominion, possession, or place subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

(ii) Any other government (including any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof) to the extent and only to the extent that such government exercises or claims to exercise *de jure* or *de facto* sovereignty over the area which on such effective date constituted such foreign country, and

(iii) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable cause to believe that such person is, or has been, since such effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on behalf of any of the foregoing.

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E. The term "national" shall include,

(i) Any person who has been domiciled in, or a subject, citizen, or resident of a foreign country at any time on or since the effective date of this Order,

(ii) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, organized under the laws of, or which on or since the effective date of this Order had or has had its principal place of business in such foreign country, or which on or since such effective date was or has been controlled by, or a substantial part of the stock, shares, bonds, debentures, notes, drafts, or other securities or obligations of which, was or has been owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, such foreign country and/or one or more nationals thereof as herein defined,

(iii) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, since such effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on behalf of any national of such foreign country, and

(iv) Any other person who there is reasonable cause to believe is a "national" as herein defined.

In any case in which by virtue of the foregoing definition a person is a national of more than one foreign country, such person shall be deemed to be a national of each such foreign country. In any case in which the combined interests of two or more foreign countries designated in this Order and/or nationals thereof are sufficient in the aggregate to constitute, within the meaning of the foregoing, control or 25 per centum or more of the stock, shares, bonds, debentures, notes, drafts, or other securities or obligations of a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, but such control or a substantial part of such stock, shares, bonds, debentures, notes, drafts, or other securities or obligations is not held by any one such foreign country and/or national thereof, such partnership, association, corporation, or other organization shall be deemed to be a national of each of such foreign countries. The Secretary of the Treasury shall have full power to determine that any person is or shall be deemed to

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be a "national" within the meaning of this definition, and the foreign country of which such person is or shall be deemed to be a national. Without limitation of the foregoing, the term "national" shall also include any other person who is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be, or to have been, since such effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit or under the direction of a foreign country designated in this Order, or national thereof, as herein defined.

F. The term "banking institution" as used in this Order shall include any person engaged primarily or incidentally in the business of banking, of granting or transferring credits, or of purchasing or selling foreign exchange or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent, or any person holding credits for others as a direct or incidental part of his business, or brokers; and, each principal, agent, home office, branch, or correspondent of any person so engaged shall be regarded as a separate "banking institution."

G. The term "this Order," as used herein, shall mean Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended.

SECTION 6. Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended, shall no longer be deemed to be an amendment to or a part of Executive Order No. 6560 of January 15, 1934. Executive Order No. 6560 of January 15, 1934, and the Regulations of November 12, 1934, are hereby modified in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Order, and except as so modified, continue in full force and effect. Nothing herein shall be deemed to revoke any license, ruling, or instruction now in effect and issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 6560 of January 15, 1934, as amended, or pursuant to this Order; provided, however, that all such licenses, rulings, or instructions shall be subject to the provisions hereof. Any amendment, modification, or revocation by or pursuant to the provisions of this Order of any orders, regulations, rulings, instructions, or licenses shall not affect any act done, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil or criminal case prior to such amendment, modification, or revocation, and all penalties, forfeitures, and

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liabilities under any such orders, regulations, rulings, instructions, or licenses shall continue and may be enforced as if such amendment, modification, or revocation had not been made.

SECTION 7. Without limitation as to any other powers or authority of the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General under any other provision of this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and empowered to prescribe from time to time regulations, rulings, and instructions to carry out the purposes of this Order and to provide therein or otherwise the conditions under which licenses may be granted by or through such officers or agencies as the Secretary of the Treasury may designate, and the decision of the Secretary with respect to the granting, denial, or other disposition of an application or license shall be final.

SECTION 8. Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, provides in part:

“... Whoever willfully violates any of the provisions of this subdivision or of any license, order, rule or regulation issued thereunder, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than \$10,000, or, if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such violation may be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both.”

SECTION 9. This Order and any regulations, rulings, licenses, or instructions issued hereunder may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time.

NOTE: The device of freezing foreign funds—that is, making the funds of certain countries and their nationals unavailable except under license of this Government — was an integral part of our policy during World War II. It was a recognition of the obvious fact that modern war is economic as well as military.

Initially, the purpose of freezing foreign funds located in the United States was to protect assets of citizens of the invaded countries from

seizure and use by the invaders. A subsidiary purpose was to protect the American institutions which had custody of the funds from adverse claims by the invaders on the one hand, and the original owners of the funds on the other hand. Funds were frozen for the first time on April 10, 1940, when Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. (See Item 27(a) and note, pp. 131-134, 1940 volume.)

As the international crisis be-

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came more acute for us, freezing controls came to be used as a sharp and effective weapon of economic warfare with which to strike telling blows at the Axis powers.

Freezing controls were successively extended to the assets of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and various Baltic and Balkan countries. The foregoing Executive Order extended controls to Germany and Italy and fourteen other European countries comprising the continent of Europe. By Executive Order No. 8832 of July 26, 1941 (see Item 68 and note, this volume), freezing controls were instituted against Japan, and at the same time at China's request, the freezing control was extended to China.

Before Pearl Harbor, these frozen assets, including bank deposits, gold and securities, merchandise, patents, and other forms of property, were administered by the Treasury Department. After the United States entered the war, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 9095, March 11, 1942, establishing the Office of Alien Property Custodian (see Item 30 and note, 1942 volume). That Office was vested with responsibility for enemy property which required active administration—such as patents, copyrights, trade-marks, foreign ships, and going business enterprises. Property—such as bullion, cash, and bank deposits—which did

not need active administration remained under the Foreign Funds Control of the Treasury Department.

The assets under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department were administered through a licensing program under which permission was granted, on application, to effect transactions not inimical to the interests of the United States. At the height of the freezing control program, blocked assets totalled almost \$8,000,000,000.

Administration of the freezing control regulations was decentralized and conducted through the 12 Federal Reserve Banks and a large measure of responsibility was placed on commercial banks and other persons holding foreign-owned assets. By these means, the Treasury Department kept a tight and careful control over foreign funds. Thus the Axis powers were denied the use of commercial and financial facilities of the United States, and, as a result, in most cases the enemy was forced to give up its efforts toward economic penetration through funds in America. In addition, Axis financing of propaganda, sabotage, and other subversive activities was seriously impaired by the freezing device. (For a description of other measures of economic warfare, see Items 65, 68, and 71 and notes, this volume, and Item 104 and note, 1943 volume.)

55 ¶ The President Sends a Message to the Special Convocation of the University of Oxford Held at the Harvard Commencement on the Award of a Degree of Doctor of Civil Law. June 19, 1941

ALL the world can be enriched by a new symbol which supports truth and the search for truth.

In days like these, therefore, we rejoice that this Special Convocation, in breaking all historic precedent, does so in the great cause of preserving the free learning and the civil liberties which have grown stone upon stone in *our* lands through the centuries. That is why I am proud to be permitted to have a part.

It is right that this unfettered search for truth "is universal and knows no restriction of place or race or creed." There have been other symbols throughout the years and in the present. The American Ambassador in Britain gave recognition to this recently when he said:

"Only this week in London in the early morning hours of the Sabbath Day, enemy bombs destroyed the House of Commons room of the Parliament and smashed the altar of Westminster Abbey. These two hits seemed to me to symbolize the objectives of the dictator and the pagan. Across the street from the wreckage of these two great historic buildings of State and Church, Saint-Gaudens' statue of Abraham Lincoln was still standing. As I looked at the bowed figure of the Great Emancipator and thought of his life, I could not help but remember that he loved God, that he had defined and represented democratic government, and that he hated slavery.

"And as an American I was proud that he was there in all that wreckage as a friend and sentinel of gallant days that have gone by, and a reminder that in this great battle for freedom he waited quietly for support for those things for which he lived and died."

We, too, born to freedom, and believing in freedom, are willing to fight to maintain freedom.

56. *Message on Sinking of the Robin Moor*

We, and all others who believe as deeply as we do, would rather die on our feet than live on our knees.

NOTE: The foregoing message Edwin M. Watson, Secretary to the President was read at President. Harvard University by Maj. Gen.

56 ¶ “We Are Not Yielding and We Do Not Propose to Yield” — Message to the Congress on the Sinking of the *Robin Moor*. June 20, 1941
To the Congress:

I AM UNDER the necessity of bringing to the attention of the Congress the ruthless sinking by a German submarine on May 21 of an American ship, the *Robin Moor*, in the South Atlantic Ocean (25° 40' West, 6° 10' North) while the vessel was on the high seas en route to South Africa.

According to the formal depositions of survivors the vessel was sunk within thirty minutes from the time of the first warning given by the Commander of the submarine to an officer of the *Robin Moor*.

The submarine did not display its flag, and the Commander did not announce its nationality.

The *Robin Moor* was sunk without provision for the safety of the passengers and crew.

It was sunk despite the fact that its American nationality was admittedly known to the Commander of the submarine and that its nationality was likewise clearly indicated by the flag and other markings.

The sinking of this American ship by a German submarine flagrantly violated the right of United States vessels freely to navigate the seas subject only to a belligerent right accepted under international law. This belligerent right, as is known to the German Government, does not include the right deliberately to sink

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a merchant vessel, leaving the passengers and crew to the mercies of the elements. On the contrary the belligerent is required to place the passengers and crew in places of safety.

The passengers and crew of the *Robin Moor* were left afloat in small lifeboats from approximately two to three weeks when they were accidentally discovered and rescued by friendly vessels. This chance rescue does not lessen the brutality of casting the boats adrift in midocean.

The total disregard shown for the most elementary principles of international law and of humanity brands the sinking of the *Robin Moor* as the act of an international outlaw.

The Government of the United States holds Germany responsible for the outrageous and indefensible sinking of the *Robin Moor*. Full reparation for the losses and damages suffered by American nationals will be expected from the German Government.

Our Government believes that freedom from cruelty and inhuman treatment is a natural right. It is not a grace to be given or withheld at the will of those temporarily in a position to exert force over defenseless people.

Were this incident capable of being regarded apart from a more general background, its implications might be less serious — but it must be interpreted in the light of a declared and actively pursued policy of frightfulness and intimidation which has been used by the German Reich as an instrument of international policy.

The present leaders of the German Reich have not hesitated to engage in acts of cruelty and many other forms of terror against the innocent and the helpless in other countries, apparently in the belief that methods of terrorism will lead to a state of affairs permitting the German Reich to exact acquiescence from the Nations victimized.

This Government can only assume that the Government of the German Reich hopes through the commission of such infamous acts of cruelty to helpless and innocent men, women, and children to intimidate the United States and other Nations into a course of non-resistance to German plans for universal conquest

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—a conquest based upon lawlessness and terror on land and piracy on the sea.

Such methods are fully in keeping with the methods of terrorism hitherto employed by the present leaders of the German Reich in the policy which they have pursued toward many other Nations subsequently victimized.

The Government of the German Reich may however be assured that the United States will neither be intimidated nor will it acquiesce in the plans for world domination which the present leaders of Germany may have.

We are warranted in considering whether the case of the *Robin Moor* is not a step in a campaign against the United States analogous to campaigns against other Nations. We cannot place reliance on official declarations to the contrary.

Like statements, declarations, and even solemn pledges have been forthcoming in respect of many Nations, commencing with the statement that the Government of the German Reich considered its territorial aspirations satisfied when it seized Austria by force. Evidence that the Government of the German Reich continues to plan further conquest and domination is convincing, and, indeed, scarcely disputed.

Viewed in the light of the circumstances the sinking of the *Robin Moor* becomes a disclosure of policy as well as an example of method. Heretofore, lawless acts of violence have been preludes to schemes of land conquest. This one appears to be a first step in assertion of the supreme purpose of the German Reich to seize control of the high seas, the conquest of Great Britain being an indispensable part of that seizure.

Its general purpose would appear to be to drive American commerce from the ocean wherever such commerce was considered a disadvantage to German designs; and its specific purpose would appear to be interruption of our trade with all friendly countries.

We must take it that notice has now been served upon us that no American ship or cargo on any of the seven seas can consider itself immune from acts of piracy. Notice is served on us, in effect, that the German Reich proposes so to intimidate the

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United States that we would be dissuaded from carrying out our chosen policy of helping Britain to survive.

In brief, we must take the sinking of the *Robin Moor* as a warning to the United States not to resist the Nazi movement of world conquest. It is a warning that the United States may use the high seas of the world only with Nazi consent.

Were we to yield on this we would inevitably submit to world domination at the hands of the present leaders of the German Reich.

We are not yielding and we do not propose to yield.

NOTE: The ruthless sinking of the *Robin Moor* was the first time in the war that the Germans had sunk an American merchant ship. The actual sinking occurred on May 21, six days prior to the President's fireside chat proclaiming an unlimited national emergency (see Item 45, this volume), but the details did not become known until several weeks later when friendly vessels accidentally discovered the survivors in lifeboats.

This incident occurred so soon after the President's fireside chat, that he felt a second speech on the subject of the freedom of the seas would be somewhat repetitious.

Therefore, he decided to send the foregoing message to the Congress in order to call this new outrage to the attention of both the Congress and the people. The President knew that such a message to the Congress would be printed in the newspapers and announced over the radio in a way that the public would be fully informed of the incident.

In his final revision of the message to the Congress, the President penciled in the concluding and clinching sentence: "We are not yielding and we do not propose to yield."

57 ¶ The President Asks the Congress for Legislation Authorizing the Requisition of Property for National Defense. June 21, 1941

My dear Senator Reynolds:

IN CONNECTION with the pending legislation now being considered by your committee, the broad intent of which is to reinforce the defense program by providing for the use or acquisition

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of certain kinds of defense materials and properties now in private hands, I call your attention to the fact that while the Government should be in a position to obtain this essential equipment and property, it is wholly willing to pay just and fair compensation for it.

It is apparent that our Government should be able, upon the payment of a just price, to obtain whatever equipment and property is needed for national defense.

Since its foundation our Government has had the power to obtain private property for public use. By this right of eminent domain our Government for many generations has acquired private property for post-office sites, public buildings, roads, parks, and other public uses. This power I believe should now be broadened to meet the needs of the present national emergency. Our national defense is a public use of the highest order.

During the last similar emergency, the Government's need of broader requisitioning powers was met piecemeal. When a particular kind of property was needed, a particular requisitioning statute was drafted to cover that need. These piecemeal statutes separately gave the Government requisitioning power over virtually everything from distilled spirits required in the making of munitions to lumber needed for making aircraft. This procedure caused unwarranted delays in waiting for the necessary legislation, and it resulted in the enactment of at least seventeen different statutes, all containing language substantially similar to that of the present bill.

This prior experience shows that it would be difficult and even impossible for us now to catalogue each and every one of the Government's needs in advance. I cite an example, relatively unimportant in itself but significant of the difficulty. Who would have thought a few weeks ago that any American citizen who owned a needed transport plane would have set up his personal and private judgment against that of his own Government as to the Government's need for such a plane? The enclosed correspondence shows how one citizen places his own predilection over and above the national need. I think that this correspondence will be of interest to your committee.

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Some of the other foreseeable needs of the present time include machine tools, stocks of aluminum, and other similar raw materials and German-controlled patents. But they would obviously not cover the complete needs of the Government even for a very short period, and the Government, if its powers were limited to them, would be unable to obtain other types of equipment or property promptly if the owners — as occasionally happens — demanded exorbitant prices or refused to sell altogether.

Of course, the Government has always paid and always will pay a fair compensation.

I know that a people who have agreed to draft themselves into military service will not hesitate to approve any draft of their own equipment and property which is necessary for defense.

Very truly yours,

NOTE: The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 not only provided for the draft of manpower into military service but also conferred on the President the power to place compulsory orders with any company for materials or products needed by the War or Navy Department, and to take immediate possession of any plant refusing to fill such orders (see Item 102, pp. 445-446, 1940 volume). In the foregoing letter, the President requested the Congress for additional powers to requisition inventories of materials in private hands which were vital to the national defense. This legislation was needed because the Government had no adequate power under existing statutes to prevent a private manufacturer who, for example, had acquired several years' supply of aluminum from consuming this

aluminum in the production of non-defense articles.

As recommended by the President, the Congress enacted legislation authorizing the President to requisition property required for the defense of the United States. The President approved this legislation on October 16, 1941 (55 Stat. 742). The Act granted broad authority to the President to requisition military or naval equipment, supplies, munitions, machinery, tools, and other materials. Thus there was no need for enactment of the many piecemeal statutes which, as the President indicated in his letter, had been passed during World War I.

The law enacted in 1941 was to expire by its own terms at the end of two years. Thereafter the Congress passed amendments which extended the President's power of

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requisition for additional periods during and immediately after the war.

In prosecuting the war, on a number of occasions the President found it necessary to use the authority granted by this legislation. When he did use it, he used it in furtherance of the war program, on behalf of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, the War Production Board, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, and other Federal departments and agencies. Although cooperation in the war effort by nearly all the people was wholehearted, some individuals were unwilling to dispose of their property for Government use, or unwilling to dispose of it

except at prices found to be unfair and unreasonable. In such instances, exercise of the authority conferred in this legislation was necessary, and lack of that authority would have seriously affected the prosecution of the war effort. Under the terms of the Act, fair and just compensation was determined by the President or his agent on the basis of fair market value at the time of requisitioning. If the owner was not satisfied with the determination of the President as to value, he was paid one-half the amount determined and then had a right to sue the United States in the Court of Claims or a district court of the United States for the remaining amount to which he thought he was entitled.

58 ¶ The President Establishes the Committee on Fair Employment Practice and Reaffirms the Policy of Full Participation in the Defense Program by All Persons, Regardless of Race, Creed, Color, or National Origin. Executive Order No. 8802. June 25, 1941

WHEREAS it is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders; and

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WHEREAS there is evidence that available and needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense production solely because of consideration of race, creed, color, or national origin, to the detriment of workers' morale and of national unity:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and as a prerequisite to the successful conduct of our national defense production effort, I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this Order, to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

And it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. All departments and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

2. All contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

3. There is established in the Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which shall consist of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. The Chairman and members of the Committee shall serve as such without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to performance of their duties. The Committee shall receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the provisions of this Order and shall take appropriate

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steps to redress grievances which it finds to be valid. The Committee shall also recommend to the several departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and to the President all measures which may be deemed by it necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions of this Order.

NOTE: As defense production accelerated during 1940 and early 1941, the labor market became tighter. Although it became increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient labor in defense industries, employers, labor unions, and some parts of the Government itself continued to discriminate in employment practices against racial and religious minority groups. There were many reasons for such discriminations: Such a policy provided economic advantages for those in favored classes; ignorance and stubborn prejudice dictated the policy in other cases; sometimes the vociferous threats of a handful of narrow-minded officials or employees overrode the more sensible judgment of others; in still other cases, discriminations persisted merely because those in control sincerely believed that Federal effort to alter these practices would arouse so much local antagonism as to impair the national defense program.

The President was determined to build a powerful United States by integrating every group into the national defense effort. His intense antipathy for the undemocratic practices of discrimination coincided perfectly with this determina-

tion. He knew that an anti-discrimination policy was dictated not only by ordinary principles of democratic decency but also by the imperative necessity of making available the largest possible supply of labor. He felt keenly the inconsistency of helping to defeat the Nazis and Fascists and of tolerating the kind of injustice and discrimination on which these dictatorships thrived.

On June 12, 1941, the President sent a memorandum to William S. Knudsen and Sidney Hillman, co-Directors of the Office of Production Management, calling attention to the unwisdom of permitting Negroes and other minority groups to be barred from national defense production. (See Item 53 and note, this volume.) But it almost immediately became apparent to the President that a more formal and mandatory arrangement was necessary in order to give substance to this declaration of national policy. He therefore issued the foregoing Executive Order, which created a Committee on Fair Employment Practice in the Office of Production Management.

Under the original Executive Order, the Committee was to consist of a Chairman and four other

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members. Before the appointment of any personnel for the Committee, Executive Order No. 8823, issued July 18, 1941, increased the membership to a Chairman and five members, all of whom were appointed on July 18. Subsequently, the President increased the membership of the Committee to seven (Executive Order No. 9111, issued March 25, 1942).

From its establishment until July 30, 1942, when it was placed within the War Manpower Commission, the Committee on Fair Employment Practice functioned within the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management and the War Production Board. By the issuance of Executive Order No. 9346 on May 27, 1943, the Committee was reestablished as an independent body within the Office for Emergency Management (see Item 55 and note, 1943 volume).

Both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations went on record in their national conventions as supporting anti-discrimination policies. In addition, the A.F.L. and C.I.O. Presidents, William Green and Philip Murray, were original members of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice.

One of the most important provisions of the Executive Order required that all defense contracts with the Government contain a provision "obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any

worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin." The Committee was given the power to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination and held its first series of hearings on October 20-21, 1941. In passing on this first case, the Committee confined itself to making recommendations to the parties involved. In succeeding cases, "directives" were substituted for recommendations, but the Committee at first met some resistance. Particularly difficult were many of the southern railroads; there the attempts to end discrimination were flatly defied (see Item 2, 1944-1945 volume, for the President's further efforts on this score; as to the President's opposition to discrimination against Negroes in the Army, see Item 10, 1944-1945 volume).

The President recognized that a miracle could not be wrought overnight and that ingrained intolerance could not be wiped out by executive fiat. Nevertheless, the firm declaration of national policy and the patient methods of persuasion and conciliation employed by the Committee on Fair Employment Practice gradually resulted in the employment of a larger percentage of minority groups in the furtherance of the national defense program. (For statistics on the employment of minority groups, and for additional details on the operations of the independent Committee on Fair Employment Practice, established on May 27, 1943, see Item 55 and note, 1943 volume.)

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And, certainly of no little importance, the work of the Committee resulted in many instances of employment of Negroes and whites side by side; by the end of the war, many employers—as well as many employees—learned that such a normal procedure was not so startling after all. Further, the Committee, and the Executive Order under which it operated, provided a pattern which was adopted on a permanent basis by a number of State legislatures.

59 (A Message to the Congress Asking for \$300,000,000 for a Defense Housing Program. June 26, 1941

To the Congress:

THE Act of October 14, 1940 (Public, No. 849, known as the "Lanham Act"), as amended and supplemented, has to date authorized a public housing program of \$300,000,000 for defense needs. Appropriations have been made to the full extent of the authorization, and practically all of the funds appropriated have been allocated to projects.

I am convinced, from information presented to me by heads of interested departments and agencies of the Government, that there remain further needs which cannot be provided for except by the enlargement of the authorization under this Act. It is normally exceedingly difficult to predict housing needs, and during the present emergency accurate prediction is well-nigh impossible by reason of rapid expansion of, and frequent necessary changes in, the national defense program which defense housing must serve. Data have been presented to me which indicate the possibility that the Government should be prepared to undertake the construction of at least 125,000 additional defense homes between now and July 1, 1942. It is thought best, however, to limit the additional program to \$300,000,000 at this time, which will permit the construction of approximately 75,000 houses to fill the most urgent present needs.

The effect of the national defense program has not yet been

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fully registered on the housing market. Some new plants heretofore brought into the defense program have not yet reached full capacity and many new facilities yet remain to be constructed. It has been recognized that increased subcontracting and curtailment of certain kinds of production for civilian use will reduce the need for new housing to some extent. However, in many cases new plants or increases of existing plants will of necessity be located in areas not affected by these factors. In practically every case where existing plants are increased, those workers who must be brought into the area will require a proportionately larger number of new houses, because those vacancies which were previously available have generally been absorbed.

The importance of adequate housing in the defense program should be self-evident. Without housing for workers, industries producing ships, planes, tanks, and other defense materials cannot function to full capacity.

I, therefore, suggest to the Congress the enactment of legislation providing an increase from \$300,000,000 to \$600,000,000 in the authorization contained in the Act of October 14, 1940, as amended.

In view of the urgency of this matter, I suggest that it receive the early consideration of the Congress.

NOTE: The initial major impetus for defense housing was the enactment of the Lanham Act (54 Stat. 1125) on October 14, 1940. That Act, however, authorized only \$150,000,000 for the housing needs of defense workers and enlisted men and civilian employees of the Army and Navy. By early 1941, nearly all of the original \$150,000,000 had been allocated to provide over 33,000 family-dwelling units. On April 29, 1941, the President approved an amendment to the Lanham Act (55 Stat. 147) which

raised the original authorization to \$300,000,000.

The intensification of the defense program in turn accentuated the need for additional housing. Accordingly, the President in the foregoing message to the Congress urged that the Lanham Act's authorization be further increased from \$300,000,000 to \$600,000,000.

Congress ultimately carried out the President's recommendations and the larger authorization became law on January 21, 1942 (56 Stat. 11). Subsequent amendments

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to the Lanham Act authorized expenditures up to \$1,500,000,000.

Throughout the defense period and in the early months of the war, the Federal Works Agency had the major responsibility for the administration of the Lanham Act's provisions relating to housing. On February 24, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9070; that Order created the National Housing Agency into which the several Federal housing agencies were combined. As a result, the housing func-

tions under the Lanham Act were transferred to the National Housing Agency. (See Item 24 and note, 1942 volume, for a detailed account of the developments in the war housing program as administered by the National Housing Agency; on the war housing program, see also Item 56, 1942 volume, and Item 49, 1943 volume, and notes. For an account of other phases of the Lanham Act dealing with public works and community facilities, see Item 8 and note, this volume.)

60 ¶ The Office of Scientific Research and Development Is Established. Executive Order No. 8807. June 28, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the unlimited national emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, for the purpose of assuring adequate provision for research on scientific and medical problems relating to the national defense, it is hereby ordered:

1. There shall be within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Office of Scientific Research and Development, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his responsibilities and duties under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director shall receive compensation at such rate as the President shall determine and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

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2. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, and with such advice and assistance as may be necessary from the other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, the Office of Scientific Research and Development shall:

a. Advise the President with regard to the status of scientific and medical research relating to national defense and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress in this field.

b. Serve as the center for the mobilization of the scientific personnel and resources of the Nation in order to assure maximum utilization of such personnel and resources in developing and applying the results of scientific research to defense purposes.

c. Coordinate, aid, and, where desirable, supplement the experimental and other scientific and medical research activities relating to national defense carried on by the Departments of War and Navy and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

d. Develop broad and coordinated plans for the conduct of scientific research in the defense program, in collaboration with representatives of the War and Navy Departments; review existing scientific research programs formulated by the Departments of War and Navy and other agencies of the Government, and advise them with respect to the relationship of their proposed activities to the total research program.

e. Initiate and support scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of warfare with the objective of creating, developing, and improving instrumentalities, methods, and materials required for national defense.

f. Initiate and support scientific research on medical problems affecting the national defense.

g. Initiate and support such scientific and medical research as may be requested by the Government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States under the terms of the Act of March 11, 1941, entitled

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“An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States”; and serve as the central liaison office for the conduct of such scientific and medical research for such countries:

h. Perform such other duties relating to scientific and medical research and development as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to it.

3. The Director may provide for the internal organization and management of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and may appoint such advisory committees as he finds necessary to the performance of his duties and responsibilities. The Director shall obtain the President’s approval for the establishment of the principal subdivisions of the agency and the appointment of the heads thereof.

4. In carrying out its functions, the Office of Scientific Research and Development shall utilize the laboratories, equipment, and services of governmental agencies and institutions to the extent that such facilities are available for such purposes. Within the limits of funds appropriated or allocated for purposes encompassed by this Order, the Director may contract with and transfer funds to existing governmental agencies and institutions, and may enter into contracts and agreements with individuals, educational and scientific institutions (including the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council), industrial organizations, and other agencies, for studies, experimental investigations, and reports.

5. The Director is authorized to take over and carry out the provisions of any contracts which fall within the scope of this Order heretofore entered into by (1) the National Defense Research Committee, established by order of the Council of National Defense on June 27, 1940, (2) the Health and Medical Committee, established by order of the Council of National Defense on September 19, 1940, and (3) the Federal Security Administrator in his capacity of Coordinator of Health, Medical, Welfare, Nutrition, Recreation, and other related activities as authorized by order of the Council of National Defense on November 28, 1940. The Director is further authorized to assume

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any obligations or responsibilities which have heretofore been undertaken by the above agencies for and on behalf of the United States Government and which fall within the scope of this Order.

6. There is created within the Office of Scientific Research and Development an Advisory Council consisting of the Director as Chairman, the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee (hereinafter described), the Chairman of the Committee on Medical Research (hereinafter described), one representative of the Army to be designated by the Secretary of War, and one representative of the Navy to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy. The Council shall advise and assist the Director with respect to the coordination of research activities carried on by private and governmental research groups and shall facilitate the interchange of information and data between such groups and agencies.

7. There shall be within the Office of Scientific Research and Development a National Defense Research Committee consisting of a Chairman and three other members appointed by the President, and in addition the President of the National Academy of Sciences, the Commissioner of Patents, one officer of the Army to be designated by the Secretary of War, one officer of the Navy to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, and such other members as the President may subsequently appoint. The National Defense Research Committee shall advise and assist the Director in the performance of his scientific research duties with special reference to the mobilization of the scientific personnel and resources of the Nation. To this end it shall be the responsibility of the Committee to recommend to the Director the need for and character of contracts to be entered into with universities, research institutes, and industrial laboratories for research and development on instrumentalities of warfare to supplement such research and development activities of the Departments of War and the Navy. Furthermore, the Committee shall from time to time make findings, and submit recommendations to the Di-

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rector with respect to the adequacy, progress, and results of research on scientific problems related to national defense.

8. There shall be within the Office of Scientific Research and Development a Committee on Medical Research consisting of a Chairman and three members to be appointed by the President, and three other members to be designated respectively by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency. The members so designated by the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Federal Security Administrator shall be selected from the respective staffs of the Surgeons General and the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service with particular reference to their qualifications in the field of medical research. The Committee on Medical Research shall advise and assist the Director in the performance of his medical research duties with special reference to the mobilization of medical and scientific personnel of the Nation. To this end it shall be the responsibility of the Committee to recommend to the Director the need for and character of contracts to be entered into with universities, hospitals, and other agencies conducting medical research activities for research and development in the field of the medical sciences. Furthermore, the Committee shall from time to time, on request by the Director, make findings and submit recommendations with respect to the adequacy, progress, and results of research on medical problems related to national defense.

9. The members of the Advisory Council, the National Defense Research Committee, the Committee on Medical Research, and such other committees and subcommittees as the Director may appoint with the approval of the President shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to necessary and actual transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

10. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated to the Office of Scientific Research and Development or as may be allocated to it by the President, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies,

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facilities, and services. However, the Director shall use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available to him through the Office for Emergency Management.

NOTE: The President at an early stage forecast that the war, if it came, would involve new weapons and new methods of warfare. He was determined at the outset to utilize America's scientific genius to keep us ahead of our potential enemies. His foresight in this field was an incalculable contribution to ultimate victory. Just before the fall of France in June, 1940, he summoned Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, to discuss the mobilization of the country's scientists and the correlation of their work with that of the military services. As a result, the National Defense Research Committee was established on June 27, 1940, under the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. (See note to Item 154, p. 699, 1940 volume.)

The Office of Scientific Research and Development was a natural outgrowth of the work of the National Defense Research Committee, which under the terms of the Executive Order was made a part of the Office. A Committee on Medical Research was also established by the Order and made a part of the Office.

By these Orders in 1940 and 1941, the President, a full eighteen months before Pearl Harbor, har-

nessed the efforts and skill of the best scientific brains in the Nation to the defense effort. These Orders also brought together the unified effort of thousands of interested institutions and individuals.

The President recognized that other countries were unifying the efforts of their private scientists and turning their major attention to new methods of war. He knew from reports of German scientific activity and experiments that there was little time to lose if we were to keep abreast. No one will ever be able to compute the time and human lives which were saved by this early recognition of the importance of scientific research for war.

One of the early steps was to enlist the facilities of the leading scientific institutions of the country in the fields of physics, chemistry, metallurgy, and civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering. Contracts for research were made with scores of universities and laboratories. To mention only a few, the California Institute of Technology specialized in rocket research; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology maintained a huge Radiation Research Laboratory; Harvard had a Radio Research Laboratory; and Princeton specialized in ballistics.

The most important work stimulated by the Office of Scientific Re-

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search and Development was, of course, in the field of atomic development. As early as 1939, the President had become interested in scientific experiments with the element uranium and the progress toward the disintegration of the atom. On August 2, 1939, the eminent physicist, Professor Albert Einstein, wrote to the President of the possibility of developing an atomic bomb of terrific destructive power. After some conferences, the President appointed an Advisory Committee on Uranium, headed by Dr. Lyman J. Briggs, Director of the National Bureau of Standards, and including representation of the Army and Navy. On November 1, 1939, this Advisory Committee reported to him that the splitting of a mass of uranium atoms might produce a chain reaction and that "if the reaction turned out to be explosive in character it would provide a possible source of bombs with a destructiveness vastly greater than anything now known."

Meanwhile, atomic research was continuing and expanding at various university laboratories. The research was given additional impetus by Professor Einstein's report that research on uranium was being actively carried on by a section of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. The President suggested a conference of the governmental and non-governmental groups working on the uranium experiments. As a result of this conference, he decided to give more

formal status to the governmental efforts to encourage atomic development, and he therefore placed the Advisory Committee on Uranium under the National Defense Research Committee.

On October 9, 1941, the President received from Dr. Vannevar Bush the report of various British scientists that an atomic bomb could be constructed from U-235. The President directed that discussions on the subject be broadened to include a few other individuals. He appointed a top policy group consisting of Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, General George C. Marshall, Dr. Bush, and Dr. James B. Conant. Taking an active, personal interest in the subject, the President held frequent conferences with the members of this group and gave it added impetus and personal support.

On November 27, 1941, Dr. Bush transmitted to the President a report of a committee of outstanding physicists of the National Academy of Sciences which recommended that America concentrate on an expanded program to produce the bomb. The Academy committee stated that a sufficient mass of U-235 could produce a bomb of tremendous destructive power. In June, 1942, the top policy group recommended a great expansion of the work and the transfer of the major part of the program to the War Department. Emphasis in the work was shifting from research to

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production, a field in which the armed forces had a major interest. The President approved these recommendations. For nearly a year the atomic bomb project was carried on as a joint O.S.R.D.-Army effort with the Army constructing the necessary pilot plants and O.S.R.D. continuing research on the feasibility of the various processes. In May, 1943, the entire project was taken over by the Manhattan District of the Corps of Engineers, which became responsible for the coordination of the efforts of the scientists, the industrialists, and the technologists.

At the time of the President's decision to go ahead full-speed on the project, four feasible methods of producing fissionable materials were known. Rather than guess at which one of these four methods would be successful, it was decided to go forward on all four simultaneously. This decision entailed extraordinary expense and taxed our already limited supply of manpower and critical materials. But it insured success — and speed. One of these methods was eliminated early in the work. Actually, the final process combined some features of the three remaining methods.

The Manhattan District of the Corps of Engineers was established on August 13, 1942, and shortly afterward Brigadier General (later Major General) Leslie R. Groves became its head. An electromagnetic plant and a gaseous diffusion plant were erected at Oak Ridge,

Tennessee (Clinton Engineer Works). A plutonium plant was constructed at Richland, Washington (Hanford Engineer Works). For reasons of secrecy and safety, work on the bombs was carried on at the now-famous Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, under the direction of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. There the bomb was developed.

A Military Policy Committee was established to determine allocation of materials, production, additional research, and the strategy of procedure. Dr. Bush was Chairman of this Committee with Dr. Conant as his alternate and Major General W. D. Styer and Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell as the other members of the Committee. In August, 1943, the President established a Combined Policy Committee under the chairmanship of Secretary Stimson to clear relationships with Great Britain and Canada, both of which had cooperated closely with American scientists in the research phases of the project.

A total of two billion dollars was spent to achieve a scientific miracle which ushered in a new age. Few men, if any, would have risked this huge gamble in wealth and resources. It is interesting to speculate whether any individual except Roosevelt would, as President, have had the courage and foresight to embark on this venture into the unknown.

Atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in August,

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1945. The genius, which had made the new age possible, had been supplied by America's engineers and scientists; the vision and foresight of the President had mobilized the necessary support.

Although the atomic bomb was the most dramatic and spectacular achievement of the Nation's scientists, in countless other fields they produced and perfected weapons and techniques which shortened the war. In partnership with the Navy, new means of subsurface warfare were developed, particularly in radar aids to aircraft in the search for and destruction of submarines. Such improvements as the magnetic airborne detector and the radio sonobuoy gave eyes and ears to our naval vessels and aircraft, and enabled our forces to gain the upper hand in the war against the U-boats.

Numerous improvements in guns and gunnery were developed, as well as in the power and accuracy of bombing. The high velocity aircraft rocket and many other types of rockets were successfully developed and used in all theaters of war. In cooperation with the Engineer Board, various methods of detecting and exploding land mines were evolved. New explosives, flame throwers, incendiaries, and smokes made more deadly our striking power. Radars for ground, ship, and airborne use were developed particularly by the Radiation Research Laboratory. These are only a few examples of the scien-

tific work which gave us new weapons of war.

Next to the atomic bomb, the development of the VT or proximity fuse for shells was probably the outstanding scientific feat of the war. It took ingenious planning to devise and insert into each shell a miniature radio set which could withstand the shock of several hundred revolutions per second. This radio device increased the accuracy of anti-aircraft fire and made possible accurate airbursts of artillery shells over enemy ground troops. Proximity-fused shells were introduced in 1943 in the Pacific theater, but their use in the European theater was delayed until late in 1944 lest the Germans capture a dud and duplicate the device for effective use against our own aircraft. This new "secret weapon" was first used by us in the Battle of the Bulge against the Luftwaffe on December 16 and against German ground troops two days later. The devastating effect of these shells in the fog of the Ardennes played an important part in checking the German counteroffensive.

The Committee on Medical Research of the O.S.R.D. made a number of strides in developing improvements in medicine and applying them to war conditions. New insecticides and rodenticides were applied with great success in troop areas. The use of blood plasma, sulfonamides, and penicillin was adapted and improved so that the percentage of World War II deaths

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from wounds was cut in half as compared with such deaths in World War I.

Most of the early work of the Office of Scientific Research and Development was performed in the United States. On October 15, 1943, an Office of Field Service was established as a major subdivision of O.S.R.D. and specialists were sent directly to the theaters of war.

These experts served as consultants in the installation and operation of the new weapons and techniques which had been developed in this country.

(For additional data on the work of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, see the President's letter to Dr. Vannevar Bush dated November 20, 1944 — Item 116 and note, 1944-1945 volume.)

61 ¶ Remarks at the Dedication of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York.

June 30, 1941

IT SEEMS to me that the dedication of a library is in itself an act of faith.

To bring together the records of the past and to house them in buildings where they will be preserved for the use of men and women in the future, a Nation must believe in three things.

It must believe in the past.

It must believe in the future.

It must, above all, believe in the capacity of its own people so to learn from the past that they can gain in judgment in creating their own future.

Among democracies, I think through all the recorded history of the world, the building of permanent institutions like libraries and museums for the use of all the people flourishes. And that is especially true in our own land, because we believe that people ought to work out for themselves, and through their own study, the determination of their best interest rather than accept such so-called information as may be handed out to them by certain types of self-constituted leaders who decide what is best for them.

And so it is in keeping with the well-considered trend of these difficult days that we are distributing our own historical collec-

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tions more widely than ever before throughout our land. From the point of view of the safety — the physical safety — of our records, it is wiser that they be not too greatly concentrated. From the point of view of accessibility modern methods make dissemination practicable.

This particular Library is but one of many new libraries. And so, because it happens to be a national one, I as President have the privilege of accepting this newest house in which people's records are preserved — public papers and collections that refer to our own period of history.

And this latest addition to the archives of America is dedicated at a moment when government of the people by themselves is being attacked everywhere.

It is, therefore, proof — if any proof is needed — that our confidence in the future of democracy has not diminished in this Nation and will not diminish.

As all of you know, into this Library has gone, and will continue to go, the interest and loving care of a great many people. Most of you who are here today are old friends and neighbors of mine — friends and neighbors throughout the years. And so all of you, my friends and neighbors, are in a sense Trustees of this Library through the years to come.

We hope that millions of our citizens from every part of the land will be glad that what we do today makes available to future Americans the story of what we have lived and are living today, and what we will continue to live during the rest of our lives.

And so I am grateful to all of you for all that you have done.

I think that the ceremonies are now over, except for one very important addition that relates to the future. Under an Act of the Congress of the United States, there was authorized to be appointed a Board of Trustees, who will be responsible for this Library from midnight tonight, through the years to come.

I am glad that you have come today, because as I suggested at lunch to some of the Trustees, this is the last chance you have got to see this Library free of charge. At midnight tonight the

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Government of the United States takes over, and they take over through this Board of Trustees, of which Dr. Connor, the National Archivist of the United States, is to be the Chairman, and on which will serve ex officio our own neighbor from this County, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States — Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

And incidentally, I have appointed a number of very old friends of mine to serve as additional Trustees: My old law partner, Basil O'Connor from New York; and Frank Walker, who in addition to being a very old friend is also the man who carries your mail; and Dr. [Samuel Eliot] Morison, an old seafaring friend of mine. And now let us see, who else is there? Oh, I asked Harry Hopkins but he couldn't get here today. He was terribly sorry, but he said, quite frankly, that Long Island was cooler than Hyde Park. Another old friend, whom you have seen here many times with me — Harry Hopkins.

And so I am asking the first Federal Judge to be appointed from Dutchess County for I don't know how many generations, our old friend Eddie Conger of Poughkeepsie, to step forward when I give out these — I won't call them diplomas, but they look like diplomas — to these new Trustees. I am going to ask Federal District Judge Conger to administer the Oath of Office.

Now I hope you will all feel very welcome to come in and see the building and what is in it.

NOTE: The President's deep interest in American history was an outstanding personal characteristic. He was distressed that in many cases the public papers of his predecessors were incomplete and sometimes had been wholly lost to later generations. This, he felt, not only was a loss to scholars and historians but also was a loss in terms of experience which might give guidance to later executives vested with the grave duties involved in

the Presidency. He was long determined that there would be no such void for the period during which he served. This determination was motivated by his recognition that each President, for good or ill, makes history, and, in a democracy, every citizen should have available all the tools, all the data, for future knowledge and evaluation.

To carry out these convictions, the President took concrete steps. At his press conference of Decem-

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ber 10, 1938, the President announced his plans to donate land which was part of his Hyde Park property to construct a library and museum to house the documents, reports, correspondence, books, models, and other memorabilia assembled during his lifetime, particularly during his Presidency (see Item 156 and note, 1938 volume). On November 19, 1939, the President delivered an address at the laying of the cornerstone of the Library (see Item 158, 1939 volume).

On July 18, 1939, Congress approved a Joint Resolution (53 Stat. 1062) providing for the establishment and maintenance of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. The resolution authorized the Archivist of the United States to accept a tract of land consisting of about sixteen acres donated by the President. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Inc., a non-profit New York corporation, was authorized to construct the library building to be presented to the Government and to landscape the grounds. The resolution empowered the Archivist to accept for the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library historical materials donated by President Roosevelt, and also to acquire from other sources historical books and other materials covering the same period as the materials received from the President.

The resolution also provided for a Board of Trustees to accept gifts of personal property and administer them for the benefit of the

Library. The Board consists of the Archivist and the Secretary of the Treasury as ex-officio members and five other members appointed by the President for life. Four of the appointees are: James M. Landis (appointed by President Truman upon the death of Harry L. Hopkins), Samuel E. Morison, Basil O'Connor, and Frank C. Walker; I am the fifth.

Frank C. Walker, Treasurer of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Inc., directed the raising of funds from private sources for the construction of the Library and its equipment, the cost of which was approximately \$350,000. The building is set far back from the New York-Albany Post Road on the Roosevelt estate. On the first floor are the main exhibition room, naval exhibition room, and public research room. The library stacks are three tiers high running through the second story of the building. When the Library was constructed, it was felt that ample space was being provided for the documents and additional materials to be assembled in the building. But the building was constructed for a two-term President; and besides, the huge number of documents and other materials assembled during the war years was not anticipated.

After the formal dedication of the building by the President in the foregoing address, the exhibition rooms were opened to the public. Among the museum items displayed were naval prints and pic-

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tures and ship models, which the President had spent many years in collecting; Oriental rugs, Chinese carvings, Scandinavian glassware, and Arabic metalwork, which had been given to the President by friends from all over the world; and hundreds of trinkets, souvenirs, relics, and other curios sent to the President.

Among the other museum objects received during the later years were swords, airplane models, flags, rifles, and other war relics; many gifts from foreign statesmen — including a model of one of the movable ports used in the Normandy invasion and presented to the President by Winston Churchill; albums of stamps of foreign countries given to the President by the heads of those countries; a jeweled sword and scabbard presented to the President by King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia; and other presents from the Presidents of Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico, Cuba, and many other countries. The Library had received, by 1946, nearly 4,000 such museum items.

Of even greater interest to students of the Roosevelt era is the rich collection of manuscript materials housed in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Some of the items in the collection of Roosevelt Presidential manuscript material include official correspondence, official files, some personal files, abstracts and copies of letters addressed to the President by individuals, material relating to his various conference trips, sched-

ules of his daily White House engagements, stenographic transcripts of his addresses and press conferences, a number of notes and drafts of his speeches and writings, and thousands of unassorted letters from the general public on various issues.

Many other manuscript materials relate directly to the period when the President was in the White House. These include: White House correspondence of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, much of which bears directly upon official matters; political correspondence of the Democratic National Campaign Committee, the Good Neighbor League, Inc., 1936-1939, the National Committee of Independent Voters, etc.; and numerous other related items. It is anticipated that the Library collection of Presidential papers will be enriched considerably by the addition of the papers of Cabinet officers and other officials connected with the Roosevelt Administrations.

The valuable White House materials are by no means the only Roosevelt papers which are housed in the Library. The collection includes a wide series of Roosevelt manuscripts covering his boyhood, education, entry into politics in the New York State Senate, service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the first World War; campaign for the Vice-Presidency in 1920; the period when he was stricken by infantile paralysis and his convalescence; and service as Governor of New York. The fruits of the Presi-

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dent's specialization in naval history, including a number of valuable historical manuscripts on naval affairs since 1775, have also been accessioned by the Library.

A total of approximately 47,000 books and pamphlets from the Roosevelt family library, gifts to the President, donations of private individuals to the Library, and a large number of books and other written materials concerning the President, are also included.

Many sound recordings of the President's addresses have been preserved for posterity. The Library possesses over 1,200 sound recordings of the President or relating to the President.

Nearly 300,000 feet of motion-picture film are also housed in the Library. These motion pictures go back as far as the first World War period when Mr. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. They also include a number of newsreels of the President, his family, and his associates. Even the President's Scottie, Fala, who was the butt of attacks by some of the least discriminating of the President's opponents (see Item 76 and note, 1944-1945 volume), is the subject of a one-reel film in color.

Because of the acute space shortages in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the sound recordings and motion pictures in possession of the

Library have been physically housed in the National Archives in Washington, D. C. The other materials were made available to the public as quickly as they could be arranged and catalogued. Prior to May 1, 1946, only the exhibitions and museum items were open to public inspection. On May 1, 1946, the opening of the research room allowed the use of a number of the manuscript materials in the Roosevelt Library.

During the first year after the President dedicated the Library, 46,000 persons visited the building and its grounds. A total of 127,000 visitors came during 1945-1946.

On April 12, 1946 — the first anniversary of the President's death — the President's widow presented to the Government a 33-acre portion of the rolling Hyde Park Roosevelt estate surrounding the home in which he was born and the rose garden in which he is buried. The President's home was preserved with the same furnishings and surroundings which he had enjoyed while he lived there, and the public was allowed access to the house and grounds. On April 12, 1946, President Truman dedicated the Franklin D. Roosevelt National Historic Site as a national shrine. In the year following the dedication 469,414 persons coming from all over the world visited the site.

62 ¶ “The United States Will Never Survive as a Happy and Fertile Oasis of Liberty Surrounded by a Cruel Desert of Dictatorship” — Fourth of July Address at Hyde Park, New York.

July 4, 1941

IN 1776, ON the fourth day of July, the Representatives of the several States in Congress assembled, declaring our independence, asserted that a decent respect for the opinion of mankind required that they should declare the reasons for their action. In this new crisis, we have a like duty.

In 1776 we waged war in behalf of the great principle that Government should derive its just powers from the consent of the governed. In other words, representation chosen in free elections. In the century and a half that followed, this cause of human freedom swept across the world.

But now, in our generation — in the past few years — a new resistance, in the form of several new practices of tyranny, has been making such headway that the fundamentals of 1776 are being struck down abroad and definitely they are threatened here.

It is, indeed, a fallacy, based on no logic at all, for any Americans to suggest that the rule of force can defeat human freedom in all the other parts of the world and permit it to survive in the United States alone. But it has been that childlike fantasy itself — that misdirected faith — which has led Nation after Nation to go about their peaceful tasks, relying on the thought, and even the promise, that they and their lives and their government would be allowed to live when the juggernaut of force came their way.

It is simple — I could almost say simple-minded — for us Americans to wave the flag, to reassert our belief in the cause of freedom — and to let it go at that.

Yet, all of us who lie awake at night — all of us who study and study again, know full well that in these days we cannot save

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freedom with pitchforks and muskets alone, after a dictator combination has gained control of the rest of the world.

We know too that we cannot save freedom in our own midst, in our own land, if all around us — our neighbor Nations — have lost their freedom.

That is why we are engaged in a serious, in a mighty, in a unified action in the cause of the defense of the hemisphere and the freedom of the seas. We need not the loyalty and unity alone, we need speed and efficiency and toil and an end to backbiting, and an end to the sabotage that runs far deeper than the blowing up of munitions plants.

I tell the American people solemnly that the United States will never survive as a happy and fertile oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorship.

And so it is that when we repeat the great pledge to our country and to our flag, it must be our deep conviction that we pledge as well our work, our will and, if it be necessary, our very lives.

63 ¶ The President Informs the Congress of the Landing of American Troops in Iceland, Trinidad, and British Guiana and Transmits an Exchange of Messages with the Prime Minister of Iceland. July 7, 1941

To the Congress:

I AM TRANSMITTING herewith for the information of the Congress a message I received from the Prime Minister of Iceland on July first and the reply I addressed on the same day to the Prime Minister of Iceland in response to this message.

In accordance with the understanding so reached, forces of the United States Navy have today arrived in Iceland in order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British forces which

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have until now been stationed in Iceland in order to insure the adequate defense of that country.

As I stated in my message to the Congress of September third last regarding the acquisition of certain naval and air bases from Great Britain in exchange for certain over-age destroyers, considerations of safety from overseas attack are fundamental.

The United States cannot permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere. We have no desire to see any change in the present sovereignty of those regions. Assurance that such outposts in our defense frontier remain in friendly hands is the very foundation of our national security and of the national security of every one of the independent Nations of the New World.

For the same reason substantial forces of the United States have now been sent to the bases acquired last year from Great Britain in Trinidad and in British Guiana in the south in order to forestall any pincers movement undertaken by Germany against the Western Hemisphere. It is essential that Germany should not be able successfully to employ such tactics through sudden seizure of strategic points in the South Atlantic and in the North Atlantic.

The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat in three dimensions:

The threat against Greenland and the northern portion of the North American Continent, including the islands which lie off it.

The threat against all shipping in the North Atlantic.

The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain — which is a matter of broad policy clearly approved by the Congress.

It is, therefore, imperative that the approaches between the Americas and those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential to its national security, and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open and free from all hostile activity or threat thereof.

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As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts.

This Government will insure the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a sovereign state.

In my message to the Prime Minister of Iceland I have given the people of Iceland the assurance that the American forces sent there would in no way interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of that country, and that immediately upon the termination of the present international emergency all American forces will be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their Government in full and sovereign control of their own territory.

Message Sent by the Prime Minister of Iceland to the President:

In a conversation of June 24th, the British Minister explained that British forces in Iceland are required elsewhere. At the same time he stressed the immense importance of adequate defense of Iceland. He also called my attention to the declaration of the President of the United States to the effect that he must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the Western Hemisphere — one of the President's measures is to assist in the defense of Iceland — and that the President is therefore prepared to send here immediately United States troops to supplement and eventually to replace the British force here. But that he does not consider that he can take this course except at the invitation of the Iceland Government.

After careful consideration of all the circumstances the Iceland Government, in view of the present state of affairs, admit that this measure is in accordance with the interest of Iceland,

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and therefore are ready to entrust the protection of Iceland to United States on the following conditions:

1. United States promise to withdraw all their military forces land, air and sea from Iceland immediately on conclusion of present war.

2. United States further promise to recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland and to exercise their best efforts with those powers which will negotiate the peace treaty at the conclusion of the present war in order that such treaty shall likewise recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland.

3. United States promise not to interfere with Government of Iceland neither while their armed forces remain in this country nor afterwards.

4. United States promise to organize the defense of the country in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible safety for the inhabitants themselves and assure that they suffer minimum disturbance from military activities; these activities being carried out in consultation with Iceland authorities as far as possible. Also because of small population of Iceland and consequent danger to Nation from presence of a numerous army, great care must be taken that only picked troops are sent here. Military authorities should be also instructed to keep in mind that Icelanders have been unarmed for centuries and are entirely unaccustomed to military discipline and conduct of troops towards the inhabitants of the country should be ordered accordingly.

5. United States undertake defense of the country without expense to Iceland and promise compensation for all damage occasioned to the inhabitants by their military activities.

6. United States promise to further interests of Iceland in every way in their power, including that of supplying the country with sufficient necessities, of securing necessary shipping to and from the country and of making in other respects favorable commercial and trade agreements with it.

7. Iceland Government expects that declaration made by President in this connection will be in agreement with these prom-

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ises on the part of Iceland, and Government would much appreciate its being given the opportunity of being cognizant with wording of this declaration before it is published.

8. On the part of Iceland it is considered obvious that if United States undertake defense of the country it must be strong enough to meet every eventuality and particularly in the beginning it is expected that as far as possible effort will be made to prevent any special danger in connection with change-over. Iceland Government lays special stress on there being sufficient airplanes for defensive purposes wherever they are required and they can be used as soon as decision is made for United States to undertake the defense of the country.

This decision is made on the part of Iceland as an absolutely free and sovereign state and it is considered as a matter of course that United States will from the beginning recognize this legal status of the country, both states immediately exchanging diplomatic representatives.

Message Sent by the President of the United States in Response to a Message from the Prime Minister of Iceland:

I have received your message in which you have informed me that after careful consideration of all the circumstances, the Iceland Government, in view of the present state of affairs, admits that the sending to Iceland of United States troops to supplement and eventually to replace the present British forces there would be in accordance with the interests of Iceland and that, therefore, the Iceland Government is ready to entrust the protection of Iceland to the United States on the following considerations:

1. United States promise to withdraw all their military forces land, air and sea from Iceland immediately on conclusion of present war.

2. United States further promise to recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland and to exercise their best efforts with those powers which will negotiate the peace treaty at the conclusion of the present war in order that such treaty

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shall likewise recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland.

3. United States promise not to interfere with Government of Iceland neither while their armed forces remain in this country nor afterwards.

4. United States promise to organize the defense of the country in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible safety for the inhabitants themselves and assure that they suffer minimum disturbance from military activities; these activities being carried out in consultation with Iceland authorities as far as possible. Also because of small population of Iceland and consequent danger to Nation from presence of a numerous army, great care must be taken that only picked troops are sent here. Military authorities should be also instructed to keep in mind that Icelanders have been unarmed for centuries and are entirely unaccustomed to military discipline and conduct of troops towards the inhabitants of the country should be ordered accordingly.

5. United States undertake defense of the country without expense to Iceland and promise compensation for all damage occasioned to the inhabitants by their military activities.

6. United States promise to further interests of Iceland in every way in their power, including that of supplying the country with sufficient necessities, of securing necessary shipping to and from the country and of making in other respects favorable commercial and trade agreements with it.

7. Iceland Government expect that declaration made by President in this connection will be in agreement with these promises on the part of Iceland, and Government would much appreciate its being given the opportunity of being cognizant with wording of this declaration before it is published.

8. On the part of Iceland it is considered obvious that if United States undertake defense of the country it must be strong enough to meet every eventuality and particularly in the beginning it is expected that as far as possible efforts will be made to prevent any special danger in connection with change-over. Iceland Government lays special stress on there being sufficient air-planes for defensive purposes wherever they are required and

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they can be used as soon as decision is made for United States to undertake the defense of the country.

You further state that this decision is made on the part of Iceland as an absolutely free and sovereign state and that it is considered as a matter of course that the United States will from the beginning recognize the legal status of Iceland, both states immediately exchanging diplomatic representatives.

I take pleasure in confirming to you hereby that the conditions set forth in your communication now under acknowledgment are fully acceptable to the Government of the United States and that these conditions will be observed in the relations between the United States and Iceland. I may further say that it will give me pleasure to request of the Congress its agreement in order that diplomatic representatives may be exchanged between our two countries.

It is the announced policy of the Government of the United States to undertake to join with the other Nations of the Western Hemisphere in the defense of the New World against any attempt at aggression. In the opinion of this Government, it is imperative that the integrity and independence of Iceland should be preserved because of the fact that any occupation of Iceland by a power whose only too clearly apparent plans for world conquest include the domination of the peoples of the New World would at once directly menace the security of the entire Western Hemisphere.

It is for that reason that in response to your message, the Government of the United States will send immediately troops to supplement and eventually to replace the British forces now there.

The steps so taken by the Government of the United States are taken in full recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Iceland and with the clear understanding that American military or naval forces sent to Iceland will in no wise interfere in the slightest degree with the internal and domestic affairs of the Icelandic people; and with the further understanding that, immediately upon the termination of the present international emergency, all such military and naval forces will be at once

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withdrawn leaving the people of Iceland and their Government in full sovereign control of their own territory.

The people of Iceland hold a proud position among the democracies of the world, with a historic tradition of freedom and of individual liberty which is more than a thousand years old. It is, therefore, all the more appropriate that in response to your message, the Government of the United States, while undertaking this defensive measure for the preservation of the independence and security of the democracies of the New World, should at the same time be afforded the privilege of cooperating in this manner with your Government in the defense of the historic democracy of Iceland.

I am communicating this message, for their information, to the Governments of all of the other Nations of the Western Hemisphere.

NOTE: During May, 1940, a month after the Nazi invasion of Norway, British troops began to arrive in Iceland to assist in building up the defenses of that island. Great Britain considered it essential to move troops into Iceland in order to protect British convoy routes to the United States and to prevent an encirclement of the British Isles from the north. The presence of Nazi paratroopers in Norway, U-boat bases in Norway, and numerous German "tourists" in Iceland, along with periodic reconnaissance flights by German aircraft over Iceland, prompted the British to take measures to prevent a sudden German seizure of Iceland.

After the fall of France, and with the Germans threatening the British Isles themselves, Great Britain

was in urgent need of her own troops at home. Nevertheless, Britain dared not leave Iceland undefended. Meanwhile, it became clear to the United States that additional protection of Greenland was necessary to preserve the security of the American continent (see Item 25 and note, this volume, for a discussion of American troops in Greenland). It became clear that in view of the proximity of Iceland to Greenland, the security of the American continent could be insured only by the defense of both of these areas.

Following the German invasion of Denmark, the Parliament of Iceland (the Althing) assumed control of Iceland's foreign affairs and elected a regent to assume the functions of the King of Denmark. Con-

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sular officers were then exchanged between Iceland and the United States, and commencing early in 1941 negotiations were carried on among Iceland, the United States, and Great Britain regarding the replacement of British troops in Iceland by American troops. While the negotiations were going on, the President announced publicly, in his address of May 27, 1941:

“Control or occupation by Nazi forces of any of the islands of the Atlantic would jeopardize the immediate safety of portions of North and South America, and of the island possessions of the United States, and, therefore, the ultimate safety of the continental United States itself. . . . Most of the supplies for Britain go by a northerly route, which comes close to Greenland and the nearby island of Iceland. Germany’s heaviest attack is on that route. Nazi occupation of Iceland or bases in Greenland would bring the war close to our own continental shores, because those places are stepping-stones to Labrador, Newfoundland, to Nova Scotia, yes, to the northern United States itself, including the great industrial centers of the North, the East and the Middle West.”

As noted in the foregoing communications exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister of Iceland, the Icelandic Government laid down eight conditions under which it would entrust the protection of Iceland to the United States, dealing primarily with a recognition of the complete independence of Iceland, the necessity for American forces abstaining from

interfering with Icelandic internal affairs, and a pledge to withdraw American troops after the conclusion of the war in Europe. These conditions were accepted by the President.

A task force of close to 4,400 marines from the First Marine Brigade arrived at Reykjavik, Iceland, on July 7, 1941, to begin the relief of some 25,000 British troops stationed there at that time. Two days before the landing of this task force, the President had orally notified the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations that the approach of any Axis force within 50 miles of Iceland was deemed conclusive evidence of hostile intention, and therefore justified an attack by the armed forces of the United States. The aircraft carrier *Wasp*, along with the Thirty-third Pursuit Squadron and 4,200 army troops embarked for Iceland, and this contingent arrived on August 6, 1941, without any untoward incidents.

The strengthening of American troops in Iceland continued until the summer of 1943, when the American troop strength in Iceland reached approximately 40,000. Beginning in the summer of 1943, large bodies of troops were moved to the United Kingdom in anticipation of the cross-channel invasion. By October, 1944, troop strength in Iceland was down to 8,560, as the threat of Nazi invasion dissipated.

On September 20, 1946, the State Department announced that American military and naval personnel

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were being withdrawn within six months, and that an agreement had been reached with Iceland to retain civilian personnel at Keflavik Airport to maintain communication by the northern air route with American forces in Germany. American-built bases were then returned to Iceland, and military technicians were replaced by civilians and Icelanders.

64 ¶ White House Statement Announcing the President's Appointment of William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information. July 11, 1941

THE President today, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, appointed William J. Donovan Coordinator of Information.

In his capacity as Coordinator, Mr. Donovan will collect and assemble information and data bearing on national security from the various departments and agencies of the Government and will analyze and collate such materials for the use of the President and such other officials as the President may designate.

Mr. Donovan's task will be to coordinate and correlate defense information, but his work is not intended to supersede or to duplicate, or to involve any direction of or interference with, the activities of the General Staff, the regular intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or of other existing departments and agencies.

NOTE: The blitz attack in 1940 by Hitler which carried his armies to the English Channel showed how successfully Germany had weakened resistance through the propaganda of fear and the fifth column. The President sent William J. Donovan to England to report on the methods and effects of the German strategy of terror, and he returned in August, 1940, to report to the President on the devastating results and techniques of this form of warfare.

Again in late 1940 and early 1941, the President sent Donovan to the Mediterranean and Balkan areas, where he obtained firsthand information on the weapons of psychological warfare. It was apparent that the United States and the other democracies had to sharpen their

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own weapons and devise new ones, in order to roll back the wave of Nazi propaganda and carry the war of words and morale to the Axis.

On May 20, 1941, the President had established the Office of Civilian Defense; one of its functions was the maintenance of domestic morale and the dissemination of information to States and local communities (see Item 42 and note, this volume). At the same time, the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics (see note to Item 154, pp. 699-700, 1940 volume) was providing an information program for Latin America. It soon became apparent that an agency should be created which could serve the twofold purpose: first, of carrying on unorthodox warfare outside of the Western Hemisphere; and second, of integrating and analyzing for the President the essential military, economic, political, and technological intelligence which was crossing his desk from many sources.

The terms of the foregoing Order were intentionally vague and broad because it was felt inadvisable to publicize in detail the secret intelligence and undercover activities which it was contemplated that the Coordinator of Information would undertake.

Three days after the office of the Coordinator of Information was created, the President in a joint letter to the Coordinator and to the Director of Civilian Defense further defined the responsibilities of the

two agencies in respect to morale and information activities. The President directed that the Office of Civilian Defense confine its morale functions within the United States, while the Coordinator of Information was given the responsibility for international broadcasts (see note to Item 99, this volume, for the text of the President's letter embodying this division of responsibility). By memorandum of the President on October 15, 1941, international broadcasts to the Latin American countries were made the province of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, while the Coordinator of Information was given authority to broadcast to Europe and the Far East.

These broadcasts were supplemented by information distributed through posters, pamphlets, and other media. Headed by Robert E. Sherwood, the Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator of Information beamed America's story abroad to the Axis, and to friendly and neutral peoples.

This new form of warfare, as developed by the Coordinator of Information, harnessed the best researchers, scholars, and specialists, and applied the high standards and methods of United States scholarship to all phases of intelligence. Later, the new concept of warfare developed through subversion of the enemy's morale, and sabotage of his physical assets, using all the tools from open propaganda to actual guerrilla warfare.

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On October 24, 1941, the President wrote to Prime Minister Churchill: "In order to facilitate the carrying out of the work of the Coordinator with respect to Europe and the occupied countries, I have authorized Colonel Donovan to send a small staff to London." This was the start of a series of overseas information offices which later were established in scores of European and Asiatic areas (see Item 27 and note, 1943 volume).

As with all Government agencies, Pearl Harbor signaled a new and more aggressive approach for the Coordinator of Information. The President suggested that in the use of subversion, sabotage, and guerilla warfare the British and American agents work together more closely. He authorized secret funds for the training of saboteurs and special operatives who performed hazardous and highly successful missions in enemy countries. Special training for agents in sabotage and subversion was undertaken with Army and Navy personnel. As a result, invaluable work was performed behind the lines in both theaters of war.

After Pearl Harbor, the gathering of intelligence by the Coordinator of Information for Army and Navy use was greatly accelerated. Among the host of its studies which gave immeasurable aid to the military were those of weather conditions in the Aleutian Islands, the capacity of supply routes to Russia, African railroads, German manpower, sail-

ing directions for the area surrounding the Caroline Islands, and hundreds of other background analyses. The work of the Coordinator of Information was also related closely to the strategic decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Gradually, the mechanisms for waging psychological warfare emerged into powerful weapons which prepared the way for our military and naval forces. Tied in closely with a portion of the work of the Coordinator of Information in this field were the activities of the Economic Defense Board (later the Board of Economic Warfare; see Item 71 and note, this volume) and several other agencies engaged in direct economic measures designed to weaken the enemy. After we entered the war, the President concluded that it was necessary to integrate and unify the function of providing war information at home and abroad. He felt that the conduct of information activities resulted in too many conflicting statements, duplications in the use of facilities and sources, and lack of attention to a planned information policy which would speak the voice of America effectively. He decided that this could only be accomplished through a unification of information services, including the foreign information activities of the Coordinator of Information. Accordingly, he created the Office of War Information (see Item 67 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the

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Office of War Information and its work).

Concurrently with the establishment of the Office of War Information, the President by Military Order established the Office of Strategic Services to carry on the intelligence and other non-information activities of the Coordinator of In-

formation (see Item 68 and note, 1942 volume, for a discussion of the work of the Office of Strategic Services). The Office of Strategic Services was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff administratively, but continued to submit reports directly to the President.

65 ¶ The President Blacklists 1,800 Latin American Firms Deemed to Be Aiding Germany or Italy. Proclamation No. 2497.

July 17, 1941

I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 415) as amended and Section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714) as amended and by virtue of all other authority vested in me, and by virtue of the existence of a period of unlimited national emergency and finding that this Proclamation is necessary in the interest of national defense, do hereby order and proclaim the following:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of State, acting in conjunction with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of Export Control, and the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, shall from time to time cause to be prepared an appropriate list of

(a) certain persons deemed to be, or to have been acting or purporting to act, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of, or under the direction of, or under the jurisdiction of, or on behalf of, or in collaboration with Germany or Italy or a national thereof; and

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(b) certain persons to whom, or on whose behalf, or for whose account, the exportation directly or indirectly of any article or material exported from the United States, is deemed to be detrimental to the interest of national defense.

In similar manner and in the interest of national defense, additions to and deletions from such list shall be made from time to time. Such list and any additions thereto or deletions therefrom shall be filed pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Register Act and such list shall be known as "The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals."

SECTION 2. Any person, so long as his name appears in such list, shall, for the purpose of Section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, and for the purpose of this Proclamation, be deemed to be a national of a foreign country, and shall be treated for all purposes under Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, as though he were a national of Germany or Italy. All the terms and provisions of Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, shall be applicable to any such person so long as his name appears in such list, and to any property in which any such person has or has had an interest, to the same extent that such terms and provisions are applicable to nationals of Germany or Italy, and to property in which nationals of Germany or Italy have or have had an interest.

SECTION 3. The exportation from the United States directly or indirectly to, or on behalf of, or for the account of any person, so long as his name appears on such list, of any article or material the exportation of which is prohibited or curtailed by any proclamation heretofore or hereafter issued under the authority of Section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940, as amended, or of any other military equipment or munitions, or component parts thereof, or machinery, tools, or material, or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing, or operation thereof, is hereby prohibited under Section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940, as amended, except (1) when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, or in Proclamation No. 2465 of March 4, 1941, as the case may be, and (2) when the

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Administrator of Export Control under my direction has determined that such prohibition of exportation would work an unusual hardship on American interests.

SECTION 4. The term "person" as used herein means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other organization.

The term "United States" as used herein means the United States and any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, including the Philippine Islands, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia and any other territory, dependency, or possession of the United States.

SECTION 5. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed in any manner to limit or restrict the provisions of the said Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, or the authority vested thereby in the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General. So far as the said Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, is concerned, "The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals," authorized by this Proclamation, is merely a list of certain persons with respect to whom and with respect to whose property interests the public is specifically put on notice that the provisions of such Executive Order are applicable; and the fact that any person is not named in such list shall in no wise be deemed to mean that such person is not a national of a foreign country designated in such Order, within the meaning thereof, or to affect in any manner the application of such order to such person or to the property interests of such person.

NOTE: A dramatic and effective recognition of the fact that World War II had its economic and propaganda fronts was the novel device used by the President of blacklisting firms hostile to the Allies and friendly to the Axis.

For many years before the war, the Nazis had planned and carried out an insidious, world-wide campaign of economic aggression. Hit-

ler converted Germany's vast structure of foreign commerce and finance into weapons of economic penetration into foreign countries, not for the purpose of carrying on normal, peaceful foreign trade but to tie the national economies of foreign countries to the Axis. While the German General Staff was building up a powerful military machine, German industry proceeded

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to spread its tentacles abroad as part of the Nazi master plan. How important German business was to the Nazis' plan of warfare was vividly demonstrated in the trials, held in the summer and fall of 1947, of the officials of I. G. Farbenindustrie.

As part of the Nazi plan, German firms were maneuvered into a dominant position in important international cartels, pools, syndicates, and other monopolistic arrangements in order to pyramid their influence. These efforts were liberally accompanied by propaganda, by bribery, force, and by threat of force in order to achieve their objectives.

Even after a Nation had severed its official relations with Germany, and the German diplomatic representatives had departed, the Nazi businessmen remained on the job abroad, spreading their propaganda and attempting to buy support and extend the economic control of the Nazi party. For example, German banks abroad were more than financial institutions; they collected donations to the Nazi party fund, and if in many cases individuals hesitated in making these contributions, the Nazi organization threatened retaliation upon relatives and property in Germany.

The world-wide network of Axis firms also assisted in disposing of currency and securities which had been stolen in the occupied countries, smuggled precious war materials into Germany, collected and transmitted information concerning

ship movements and war plans of the United Nations, arranged for secret German submarine bases, provided hiding places for escaped Nazi seamen, and maintained clandestine wireless stations for direct communication with Germany and the other Axis powers. These Axis firms also subsidized newspapers and radio stations, fostered local Nazi political and semi-military organizations, tried to impress on the neutral countries the magnitude of German military victories, and generally carried on these activities behind a front of economic and social functions. In the Western Hemisphere, they sought to foster cooperation by some of the other American Republics with the Axis countries, or at least to secure a detached "neutrality" on the part of these countries.

In recognition of these facts, the President issued a series of proclamations, the first on July 17, 1941, printed above. This proclamation established a Proclaimed List of individuals and firms that had been operating in a variety of ways on behalf of the totalitarian powers and against the security of this hemisphere. This blacklist included Axis-subsidized newspapers, radio stations, and motion-picture houses; manufacturers and dealers in drugs, electrical goods, hardware, chemicals; banks, insurance companies, railroads, mines — and every field of business activity upon which the Axis drew for support.

The Proclaimed List was adminis-

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tered by an interdepartmental committee comprising representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department. As soon as a name or firm was added to the Proclaimed List there was set in motion the entire machinery of American economic warfare against it.

The Treasury Department froze all assets which the firm possessed in this country, and all movement of its funds in any of our 15,000 banks was halted. The Economic Defense Board (later the Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration) denied export licenses and other economic facilities to it. Then customs officials were notified to intercept any goods in transit which were connected with it. The Department of Commerce advised American concerns known to deal with the firm that action had been taken by the United States Government to put it on the blacklist. The Office of Censorship was also directed to monitor all communications relating to the firm. In every way possible, it was denied all trade and facilities which this Government was in a position to control.

The procedure was effective. Many Axis-supported firms were successfully boycotted by countries

and firms friendly to the democratic cause, and were driven out of business. The Axis was deprived of many of the raw materials which it had to import from neutral countries in order to maintain its war machine.

The tests of inclusion on the Proclaimed List were evidence of enemy control, participation in Axis activity, Nazi party affiliation, contribution to Axis funds, distribution of propaganda, or participation in the evasion of Allied controls. Individuals and firms were removed from the list when their names had been cleared by thorough investigation which established their reliability.

As the war went on, the Proclaimed List of blacklisted firms and individuals grew until it reached its peak on July 28, 1944, when it included 15,446 persons and firms. These were located in the twenty other American Republics, the six neutral European countries (Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Liechtenstein, and Eire) and their possessions in Africa and the Far East, and four Near Eastern countries (Morocco, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq). From that date until after the end of the war, the list declined, and it was officially terminated on July 8, 1946.

66 ¶ The President Urges the Congress to Extend the One-Year Limit on Service of Selectees. July 21, 1941

To the Congress:

LAST year the Congress of the United States recognizing the gravity of the world situation held that common prudence required that American defense, at that time relatively very weak, be strengthened in its two aspects. The first called for the production of munitions of all kinds. The second called for the training and service of personnel. The Selective Training and Service Act authorized the annual induction into military service of a maximum of 900,000 men for this training and service, of whom 600,000 are now in the Army. The Congress also authorized the induction into service of the National Guard, the Reserve officers, and other reserve components of the Army of the United States.

In the absence of further action by the Congress, all of those involved must be released from active service on the expiration of twelve months. This means that beginning this autumn about two-thirds of the army of the United States will begin a demobilization.

The action taken last year was appropriate to the international situation at that time. It took into consideration the small size and the undeveloped state of our armed forces. The National Guard, which then formed the bulk of these forces, had to be seasoned, its technical training and general efficiency greatly improved. The ranks of the National Guard and the Regular Army had to be brought to full strength; and, in addition, the Army required for its tremendous expansion the services of approximately 50,000 Reserve officers.

In effect, two steps were taken for the security of the Nation. First, the Selective Service Act initiated annual military training as a prime duty of citizenship. Second, the organization and training of field armies was begun — training in teamwork —

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company by company, battalion by battalion, regiment by regiment, and division by division. The objective was to have ready at short notice an organized and integrated personnel of over 1,000,000 men.

I need scarcely emphasize the fact that if and when an organized and integrated company, battalion, regiment, or division is compelled to send two-thirds of its members home, those who return to civil life, if called to the colors later on, would have to go through a new period of organization and integration before the new unit to which they were assigned could be depended on for service. The risks and the weaknesses caused by dissolving a trained army in times of national peril were pointed out by George Washington over and over again in his Messages to the Continental Congress.

It is, therefore, obvious that if two-thirds of our present Army return to civilian life, it will be almost a year before the effective Army strength again reaches one million men.

Today it is imperative that I should officially report to the Congress what the Congress undoubtedly knows: that the international situation is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago. It is so grave, in my opinion, and in the opinion of all who are conversant with the facts, that the Army should be maintained in effective strength and without diminution of its effective numbers in a complete state of readiness. Small as it is in comparison with other armies, it should not suffer any form of disorganization or disintegration.

Therefore, we would be taking a grave national risk unless the Congress were to make it possible for us to maintain our present full effective strength and during the coming year give training to as many additional Americans as we can. When immediate readiness for service becomes more and more a vital precautionary measure, the elimination of approximately two-thirds of our trained soldiers, and about three-fourths of the total officer personnel, would be a tragic error.

Occasional individuals, basing their opinions on unsupported evidence or on no evidence at all, may with honest intent assert

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that the United States need fear no attack on its own territory or on the other Nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from without.

Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous opinion of those who are daily cognizant, as military and naval officers and as government servants in the field of international relations, that schemes and plans of aggressor Nations against American security are so evident that the United States and the rest of the Americas are definitely imperiled in their national interests. That is why reluctantly, and only after a careful weighing of all facts and all events, I recently proclaimed that an unlimited national emergency exists.

It is not surprising that millions of patriotic Americans find it difficult in the pursuit of their daily occupations and in the normal lives of their families to give constant thought to the implications of happenings many thousands of miles away. It is hard for most of us to bring such events into focus with our own readily accepted and normal democratic ways of living.

That is why I must refer again to the sequence of conquests — German conquests or attacks — which have continued uninterrupted throughout several years — all the way from the coup against Austria to the present campaign against Russia.

Every move up and down and across Europe, and into Asia, and into Africa, has been conducted according to a time schedule utilizing in every case an overwhelming superiority not only in matériel but in trained men as well. Each campaign has been based on a preliminary assurance of safety or non-aggression to the intended victim. Each campaign has been based on disarming fear and gaining time until the German Government was fully ready to throw treaties and pacts to the winds and simultaneously to launch an attack in overwhelming force.

Each elimination of a victim has brought the issue of Nazi domination closer to this hemisphere, while month by month their intrigues of propaganda and conspiracy have sought to weaken every link in the community of interests that should bind the Americas into a great western family.

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I do not think that any branch of the Government of the United States will be willing to let America risk the fate which has destroyed the independence of other Nations. -

We Americans cannot afford to speculate with the security of America.

Furthermore, we have a definite responsibility to every country in the Western Hemisphere — to aid each and every one of them against attack from without the hemisphere. I do not believe that any branch of the American Government would desire today to abrogate our Pan-American pacts or to discard a policy which we have maintained for nearly a century and a quarter.

If we do not reverse this historic policy, then it is our duty to maintain it. To weaken our Army at this particular time would be, in my judgment, an act of bad faith toward our neighbors.

I realize that personal sacrifices are involved in extending the period of service for selectees, the National Guard, and other reserve components of our Army. I believe that provision now can and will be made in such an extension to relieve individual cases of undue hardship, and also to relieve older men who should, in justice, be allowed to resume their civilian occupations as quickly as their services can be spared.

Nevertheless, I am confident that the men now in the ranks of the Army realize far better than does the general public the disastrous effect which would result from permitting the present Army, only now approaching an acceptable state of efficiency, to melt away and set us back at least six months while new units are being reconstituted from the bottom up and from the top down with new drafts of officers and men.

The legislation of last year provided definitely that if national danger later existed, the one-year period of training could be extended by action of the Congress.

I do not believe that the danger to American safety is less than it was one year ago when, so far as the Army was concerned, the United States was in a woefully weak position. I do not believe that the danger to our national safety is only about the same as it was a year ago.

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I do believe — I know — that the danger today is infinitely greater. I do believe — I know — that in all truth we are in the midst of a national emergency.

I am not asking the Congress for specific language in a specific bill. But I can say frankly that I hope the Congress will acknowledge this national emergency either for a specific period or until revocation by the Congress or the President.

The objective is, of course, the all-important issue. It is to authorize continuance in service of selectees, National Guard, and reserve components of the Army and the retired personnel of the Regular Army, with the understanding that, should the exigencies of the situation permit, early return to civil pursuits will follow in due course.

Because of the swiftness of modern events, I think the Congress should also remove the restrictions in regard to the numbers of selectees inducted each year for training and service.

And, in order to reduce individual hardships to a minimum, I urge that the Congress provide that employers be asked to continue to keep jobs open for their employees who have been held in the Army. For my part I will direct the return to civil life of officers and men whose retention on active duty would impose undue hardship and that selectees and enlisted men of the National Guard, who have reached the age of twenty-eight, be transferred from active service to a reserve component as rapidly as possible.

At great cost to the Nation, and at increasing dislocation of private buying, we are accepting the material burdens necessary for our security. In such matters we accept the fact of a crisis in our history.

It is true that in modern war men without machines are of little value. It is equally true that machines without men are of no value at all. Let us consolidate the whole of our defense — the whole of our preparation against attack by those enemies of democracy who are the enemies of all that we hold dear.

One final word: time counts. Within two months disintegration, which would follow failure to take Congressional action,

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will commence in the armies of the United States. Time counts. The responsibility rests solely with the Congress.

NOTE: As originally noted, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (see Items 75, 83, 98, 100, 112, 113, 122 and notes, 1940 volume) limited the period of training for selectees to twelve months. But as the war crisis became increasingly acute, it became apparent that the one-year limit was a serious threat to our security. The enforced, indiscriminate release of men before their units had been fully trained made it difficult to train effective combat teams. At a time when the armed forces needed a greater supply of manpower and a more intensive combined training, the one-year limit was a dangerously inflexible provision.

After an exceedingly sharp debate in the Congress, the Senate by 45-30, and the House of Representatives by a single vote — 203-202 — authorized the President to extend the period of service under the Selective Training and Service Act up to eighteen months. The President approved the Service Extension Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 626) on August 18, 1941.

Acting under the authority of the Act, the President promptly issued Executive Order No. 8862 on August 21, 1941, extending the period of training and active military service to the full eighteen months authorized.

67. (The President Explains Our Policy Concerning the Exportation of Oil to Japan. Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to Volunteer Participation Committee of the Office of Civilian Defense. July 24, 1941

You have a lot of work to do. I haven't prepared any speech, but I do feel very strongly that we must bring home certain things to every part of the country, and that it has got to be done through civilian work. It has got to be done by civilians among civilians. Other things are pretty well organized — production, and the training program — but what we need is to get the people as a whole to realize certain facts.

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The Mayor's [LaGuardia] work is really in two parts. The first is what I call quasi-military — a thing like preparing sandbags; and they may be necessary in certain parts of the country, not necessarily all over. Air-raid alarms, and so forth and so on. That is only part of it that can be done largely through the constituted authorities in the State governments, city and county governments, but beyond that is your work, which is at least equally important — more important.

People in this country unfortunately haven't got enough idea of what modern war means. And it isn't anybody's fault over here that modern war means something entirely different from what it used to be. It is a war between populations, and not alone between armies. That, I think, is something that those in the average home in this country have not yet got through their heads.

We know what is happening in England today. We know the fact that women in London — mothers of families — are just as important in the defense of Britain as men on a destroyer. They are all part of this defense. And I think that we have a long, long ways to go in this country.

We are going to get through you an organization in every community. We can't do it all from Washington. The responsibility, I think, is yours by units — by corps areas. I am going to hold you responsible in these corps areas for what goes on, and I am not going to be put off by people who say, "Well, we couldn't find out about this from Washington." Or, "We don't know who has the jurisdiction." I don't care who has the ultimate jurisdiction. You have. In other words, if you have some problem of organization and you can't find out whether it is being handled by this, that, or the other agency within a State, or a corps area, or a community, I am not going to take that as an excuse. Go ahead and do the thing that you want to do, first; and talk about jurisdiction afterwards.

I am looking for real results. You may have some question about your relationship to State councils of defense, and local councils of defense. I am looking for results. I think they will work with you in almost every part of the country. I don't think

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you are going to have any real trouble, any more than you are going to have sporadic cases of what might be called political trouble.

I don't know, but I have an idea that there are just about as many Republicans in this group as there are Democrats. Frankly — I don't care, except for the fact that this has been a good illustration that this work is non-political. You have labor here. You have capital. You have Negroes here. You have white people. You have got every cross section of American life represented on this Committee.

About this question of politics. Somebody may start talking about it. Don't bring it to me. You are Americans. You don't belong to any party in this work.

I don't know that there is anything else I want to say, except that, quite frankly, I am looking for results from all of you. We will do the best we can. It is going to take a little while to get all the machinery working smoothly. I am inclined to think that you don't want to make mountains out of molehills.

What we want is to get this thing into every family in the United States. And, incidentally, there are a great many people who don't even belong to families, who are off by themselves — individuals. We want you to go after those people and explain the real necessity, and seriousness of this world situation.

There are lots of things that people don't quite understand. You are an information bureau to all of them. And I will give you an example.

Here on the east coast, you have been reading that the Secretary of the Interior, as Oil Administrator, is faced with the problem of not having enough gasoline to go around in the east coast, and how he is asking everybody to curtail their consumption of gasoline. All right. Now, I am — I might be called an American citizen, living in Hyde Park, N. Y. And I say, "That's a funny thing. Why am I asked to curtail my consumption of gasoline when I read in the papers that thousands of tons of gasoline are going out from Los Angeles — west coast — to Japan; and we are helping Japan in what looks like an act of aggression?"

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All right. Now the answer is a very simple one. There is a world war going on, and has been for some time — nearly two years. One of our efforts, from the very beginning, was to prevent the spread of that world war in certain areas where it hadn't started. One of those areas is a place called the Pacific Ocean — one of the largest areas of the earth. There happened to be a place in the South Pacific where we had to get a lot of things — rubber — tin — and so forth and so on — down in the Dutch Indies, the Straits Settlements, and Indo-China. And we had to help get the Australian surplus of meat and wheat, and corn, for England.

It was very essential from our own selfish point of view of defense to prevent a war from starting in the South Pacific. So our foreign policy was — trying to stop a war from breaking out down there. At the same time, from the point of view of even France at that time — of course France still had her head above water — we wanted to keep that line of supplies from Australia and New Zealand going to the Near East — all their troops, all their supplies that they have maintained in Syria, North Africa, and Palestine. So it was essential for Great Britain that we try to keep the peace down there in the South Pacific.

All right. And now here is a Nation called Japan. Whether they had at that time aggressive purposes to enlarge their empire southward, they didn't have any oil of their own up in the north. Now, if we cut the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.

Therefore, there was — you might call — a method in letting this oil go to Japan, with the hope — and it has worked for two years — of keeping war out of the South Pacific for our own good, for the good of the defense of Great Britain, and the freedom of the seas.

You people can help to enlighten the average citizen who wouldn't hear of that, or doesn't read the papers carefully, or listen to the radio carefully — to understand what some of these apparent anomalies mean. So, on the information end, I think you have got just as great a task as you have in the actual organization work.

Now on this organization — to come back to that for a minute —

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it is amazing the number of letters I get here in the White House — and my wife in the White House — from men and women in literally every county in the United States — who are pleading to be told what they can do to help. They honestly are ready to work.

So my message to you is: Act as starters of this “horse race.”

NOTE: The President chose this informal gathering of the Volunteer Participation Committee of the Office of Civilian Defense as the occasion to explain why we had ex-ported oil to Japan during a time when she was engaged in aggression. The foregoing is a stenographic text of the President's extemporaneous remarks.

68 ¶ The President Freezes Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States. White House Statement and Executive Order No. 8832. July 26, 1941

Statement:

IN VIEW of the unlimited national emergency declared by the President, he has today issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of various European countries were frozen on June 14, 1941. This measure, in effect, brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under the control of the Government, and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the Order.

This Executive Order, just as the Order of June 14, 1941, is designed among other things to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States and trade between Japan and the United States, in ways harmful to national defense and American interests, to prevent the liquidation in the United States of assets obtained by duress or conquest, and to curb subversive activities in the United States.

At the specific request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and

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for the purpose of helping the Chinese Government, the President has, at the same time, extended the freezing control to Chinese assets in the United States. The administration of the licensing system with respect to Chinese assets will be conducted with a view to strengthening the foreign trade and exchange position of the Chinese Government. The inclusion of China in the Executive Order, in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese Government, is a continuation of this Government's policy of assisting China.

Executive Order:

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 415), as amended, and by virtue of all other authority vested in me, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended, by changing the period at the end of subdivision (j) of Section 3 of such Order to a semicolon and adding the following new subdivision thereafter:

(k) June 14, 1941 —

China, and
Japan.

NOTE: In a series of Executive Orders, the first of which was issued after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark, the President had frozen the assets of Axis-invaded countries and other Nations in which Axis influence existed. These freezing orders were issued to prevent the assets from being seized and used by aggressor Nations. (See Item 27 (a), pp. 131-134, 1940 volume, and Item 54 and note, this volume, for prior Executive Orders freezing the assets which belonged

to European countries and which were located in the United States.)

At the request of China, freezing controls were also extended to include Chinese assets located in the United States. The freezing of Chinese assets was part of the over-all program of financial aid to China (see Item 140 and note, pp. 587-595, 1940 volume). This action prevented Japan from using the occupied areas in China as a loophole for evading our freezing control.

Japanese assets in the United

69. *Philippine Forces Under U.S. Commands*

States were frozen concurrently (see Item 67, this volume, for the President's action placing President's discussion of the use of an embargo on the shipment of aviation fuel, gasoline, and oil to Japan the oil embargo against Japan).

69 ¶ Military Order Placing Land and Sea Forces of Philippines Under United States Commands.

July 26, 1941

UNDER and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States, by section 2(a)(12) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 457), and by the corresponding provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines: *Provided*, that all naval components thereof shall be placed under the command of the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, United States Navy.

This order shall take effect with relation to all units and personnel of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, from and after the dates and hours, respectively, indicated in orders to be issued from time to time by the General Officer, United States Army, designated by the Secretary of War.

70 ¶ The President Asks the Congress for Price Control Legislation to Avert the Danger of Inflation. July 30, 1941

To the Congress:

INFLATIONARY price rises and increases in the cost of living are today threatening to undermine our defense effort. I am, therefore, recommending to the Congress the adoption of measures to deal with this threat.

We are now spending more than \$30,000,000 a day on defense. This rate must and will increase. In June of this year we spent about \$808,000,000 — more than five times the \$153,000,000 we spent in June, 1940. Every dollar spent for defense presses against an already limited supply of materials.

This pressure is sharply accentuated by an ever-increasing civilian demand. For the first time in years many of our workers are in the market for the goods they have always wanted. This means more buyers for more products which contain steel and aluminum and other materials needed for defense. Thus a rapidly expanding civilian demand has been added to a vast and insistent demand by the Government.

Those who have money to spend are willing to bid for the goods. The Government must and will satisfy its defense needs. In such a situation, price advances merely determine who gets the scarce materials, without increasing the available supply. We face inflation, unless we act decisively and without delay.

The consequences of inflation are well known. We have seen them before.

Producers, unable to determine what their costs will be, hesitate to enter into defense contracts or otherwise to commit themselves to ventures whose outcome they cannot foresee. The whole production machinery falters.

Speculators, anticipating successive price advances, withhold commodities from essential military production.

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Costs to the Government increase, and with it the public debt.

Increases in the workers' cost of living, on the one hand, and excessive profits for the manufacturer, on the other, lead to spiraling demands for higher wages. This means friction between employer and employed.

Great profits are reaped by some, while others, with fixed and low incomes, find their living standards drastically reduced and their lifelong savings shrunken. The unskilled worker, the white-collar worker, the farmer, the small businessman, and the small investor all find that their dollar buys ever less and less.

The burden of defense is thrown haphazardly and inequitably on those with fixed income or whose bargaining power is too weak to secure increases in income commensurate with the rise in the cost of living.

And over all hovers the specter of future deflation and depression, to confuse and retard the defense effort and inevitably to aggravate the dangers and difficulties of a return to a normal peacetime basis.

Economic sacrifices there will be and we shall bear them cheerfully. But we are determined that the sacrifice of one shall not be the profit of another. Nothing will sap the morale of this Nation more quickly or ruinously than penalizing its sweat and skill and thrift by the individually undeserved and uncontrollable poverty of inflation.

Our objective, therefore, must be to see that inflation, arising from the abuse of power to increase prices because the supply is limited and the demand inflexible, does not occur during the present emergency.

Today we stand, as we did in the closing months of 1915, at the beginning of an upward sweep of the whole price structure. Then, too, we enjoyed relative stability in prices for almost a year and a half after the outbreak of war abroad. In October, 1915, however, prices turned sharply upward. By April, 1917, the wholesale price index had jumped 63 percent; by June, 1917, 74 percent; and by June, 1920, it was nearly 140 percent over the October, 1915, mark.

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The facts today are frighteningly similar.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of 28 basic commodities, by the end of June had advanced 50 percent beyond its August, 1939, level. It has increased 24 percent since January of this year.

Since August, 1939, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of 900 wholesale prices has advanced $17\frac{1}{2}$ percent. It has increased 10 percent since January of this year. In the past 60 days wholesale prices have risen more than five times as fast as during the preceding period since the outbreak of the war abroad.

Since August, 1939, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of the cost-of-living has advanced $5\frac{1}{2}$ percent. It has increased $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent since the beginning of this year, and the upward pressure is now intense. In a single month, from the middle of May to the middle of June, the cost-of-living jumped 2 percent. During the last quarter the increase in the cost-of-living was greater than during any similar period since the World War. But even yet the index does not fully reflect past increases, and only in a few months will it respond to current increases.

In 1915 the upward price movement proceeded unchecked so that when regulation was finally begun it was already too late. Now we have an opportunity to act before disastrous inflation is upon us. The choice is ours to make; but we must act speedily.

For twelve months we have tried to maintain a stable level of prices by enlisting the voluntary cooperation of business, and through informal persuasive control. The effort has been widely supported because far-sighted business leaders realize that their own true interest would be jeopardized by runaway inflation. But the existing authority over prices is indirect and circumscribed, and operates through measures which are not appropriate or applicable in all circumstances. It has further been weakened by those who purport to recognize need for price stabilization yet challenge the existence of any effective power. In some cases, moreover, there has been evasion and bootlegging; in other cases the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply has been openly defied.

Faced now with the prospect of inflationary price advances,

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legislative action can no longer prudently be postponed. Our national safety demands that we take steps at once to extend, clarify, and strengthen the authority of the Government to act in the interest of the general welfare.

Legislation should include authority to establish ceilings for prices and rents, to purchase materials and commodities when necessary, to assure price stability, and to deal more extensively with excesses in the field of installment credit. To be effective, such authority must be flexible and subject to exercise through license or regulations under expeditious and workable administrative procedures. Like other defense legislation, it should expire with the passing of the need, within a limited time after the end of the emergency.

The concept of a price ceiling is already familiar to us as a result of our own World War experience. Prices are not fixed or frozen; an upper limit alone is set. Prices may fluctuate below this limit, but they cannot go above it.

To make ceiling prices effective it will often be necessary, among other things, for the Government to increase the available supply of a commodity by purchases in this country or abroad. In other cases it will be essential to stabilize the market by buying and selling as the exigencies of price may require.

Housing is a commodity of universal use, the supply of which cannot speedily be increased. Despite the steps taken to assure adequate housing for defense, we are already confronted with rent increases ominously reminiscent of those which prevailed during the World War. This is a development that must be arrested before rent profiteering can develop to increase the cost of living and to damage the civilian morale.

Of course there cannot be price stability if labor costs rise abnormally. Labor has far more to gain from price stability than from abnormal wage increases. For these are likely to be illusory, and quickly overtaken by sharp rises in living costs which fall with particular hardship on the least fortunate of our workers and our old people.

There will always be need for wage adjustments from time to

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time to rectify inequitable situations. But labor as a whole will fare best from a labor policy which recognizes that wages in the defense industries should not substantially exceed the prevailing wage rates in comparable non-defense industries where fair labor policies have been maintained. Already through the efforts of the National Defense Mediation Board and wage stabilization committees wage standards are being established and a measure of wage stability is being brought to particular industries. It is expected that such activities will be continued, extended, and made increasingly effective.

I recognize that the obligation not to seek an excessive profit from the defense emergency rests with equal force on labor and on industry, and that both must assume their responsibilities if we are to avoid inflation.

I also recognize that we may expect the wholehearted and voluntary cooperation of labor only when it has been assured a reasonable and stable income in terms of the things money will buy, and equal restraint or sacrifice on the part of all others who participate in the defense program. This means not only a reasonable stabilization of prices and the cost of living but the effective taxation of excess profits and purchasing power. In this way alone can the Nation be protected from the evil consequences of a chaotic struggle for gains which must prove either illusory or unjust, and which must lead to the disaster of unchecked inflation.

NOTE: Price control had its inception in the establishment of the Price Stabilization Division of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense (see Item 53, pp. 241-250, 1940 volume). As the pressure on prices became more acute, the President by Executive Order established the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (see Item 26 and note, this volume). Through the issuance of a number

of formal price schedules and by securing the informal and voluntary cooperation of several businesses and industries, the O.P.A.C.S. made a valiant effort to curb price rises. In certain areas, this effort met with considerable success; but without adequate statutory authority it was impossible for O.P.A.C.S. to obtain compliance with price regulations and exercise a firm control over inflation. In addition, there

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was no statutory basis for rent control.

As indicated by the President in the foregoing message, mounting defense expenditures and rising civilian and governmental demands were furnishing new threats to price stability. The data presented by the President on the rapid rise in wholesale prices and the cost of living showed that Congressional action was required if prices were to be kept under adequate control.

Even before the issuance of the Executive Order establishing O.P.-A.C.S. drafts of proposed new price control legislation were being prepared in the Price Stabilization Division. This drafting and redrafting continued throughout the spring and early summer of 1941 and was continued under O.P.A.C.S. Many conferences were held during June and July, 1941, with Congressional leaders for the purpose of perfecting the details of the proposed bill.

On August 1, 1941, two days after the foregoing message of the President, the bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Steagall, and on August 8 was introduced in the Senate by Senator Glass. The bill in modified form passed the House on November 28, 1941, by a vote of 224-161. The bill passed the Senate on January 10, 1941, by a vote

of 84-1. In a letter to the Senate majority leader, Senator Alben Barkley, the President expressed his opposition to a pending amendment which would put the Office of Price Administration under board control rather than under a single administrator. The Act which passed provided for a single administrator, as the President had recommended. There was some sentiment to include wage control as well as price control in the new Act, but it was not included in the original legislation.

The final vote on the conference report in the House of Representatives on January 26 was 286-112 and in the Senate 65-14 on the following day. The President signed the Emergency Price Control Act (56 Stat. 23) on January 30, 1942.

(See Item 12 and note, 1942 volume, for the President's statement on signing the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, an account of the provisions of that Act, and an account of the accomplishments of the Office of Price Administration. See Item 73 and note, this volume, for the curb on installment buying and consumer credit imposed by the Federal Reserve Board in following out the recommendations of the President in the foregoing message of July 30, 1941, to the Congress.)

71 ☉ The Economic Defense Board Is Established. Executive Order No. 8839.

July 30, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, by virtue of the existence of an unlimited national emergency, and for the purpose of developing and coordinating policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The term "economic defense," whenever used in this Order, means the conduct, in the interest of national defense, of international economic activities including those relating to exports, imports, the acquisition and disposition of materials and commodities from foreign countries including preclusive buying, transactions in foreign exchange and foreign-owned or foreign-controlled property, international investments and extensions of credit, shipping and transportation of goods among countries, the international aspects of patents, international communications pertaining to commerce, and other foreign economic matters.

2. There is hereby established an Economic Defense Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall consist of the Vice President of the United States, who shall serve as Chairman, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce. The Chairman may, with the approval of the President, appoint additional members to the Board. Each member of the Board, other than the Chairman, may designate an alternate from among the officials of his Department, subject to the continuing approval of the Chairman, and such alternate may act for such member in all matters relating to the Board.

3. In furtherance of such policies and objectives as the Presi-

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dent may from time to time determine, the Board shall perform the following functions and duties:

a. Advise the President as to economic defense measures to be taken or functions to be performed which are essential to the effective defense of the Nation.

b. Coordinate the policies and actions of the several departments and agencies carrying on activities relating to economic defense in order to assure unity and balance in the application of such measures.

c. Develop integrated economic defense plans and programs for coordinated action by the departments and agencies concerned and use all appropriate means to assure that such plans and programs are carried into effect by such departments and agencies.

d. Make investigations and advise the President on the relationship of economic defense (as defined in paragraph 1) measures to postwar economic reconstruction and on the steps to be taken to protect the trade position of the United States and to expedite the establishment of sound, peacetime international economic relationships.

e. Review proposed or existing legislation relating to or affecting economic defense and, with the approval of the President, recommend such additional legislation as may be necessary or desirable.

4. The administration of the various activities relating to economic defense shall remain with the several departments and agencies now charged with such duties but such administration shall conform to the policies formulated or approved by the Board.

5. In the study of problems and in the formulation of programs, it shall be the policy of the Board to collaborate with existing departments and agencies which perform functions and activities pertaining to economic defense and to utilize their services and facilities to the maximum. Such departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board in clearing proposed policies and measures involving economic defense considerations and shall

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supply such information and data as the Board may require in performing its functions. The Board may arrange for the establishment of committees or groups of advisers, representing two or more departments and agencies as the case may require, to study and develop economic defense plans and programs in respect to particular commodities or services, geographical areas, types of measures that might be exercised, and other related matters.

6. To facilitate unity of action and the maximum use of existing services and facilities, each of the following departments and agencies, in addition to the departments and agencies represented on the Board, shall designate a responsible officer or officers, subject to the approval of the Chairman, to represent the department or agency in its continuing relationships with the Board: The Departments of the Post Office, the Interior, and Labor, the Federal Loan Agency, the United States Maritime Commission, the United States Tariff Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Resources Planning Board, the Defense Communications Board, the Office of Production Management, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the Administrator of Export Control, the Division of Defense Aid Reports, the Coordinator of Information, and such additional departments and agencies as the Chairman may from time to time determine. The Chairman shall provide for the systematic conduct of business with the foregoing departments and agencies.

7. The Chairman is authorized to make all necessary arrangements, with the advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the responsibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set forth in this Order, and to make final decisions when necessary to expedite the work of the Board. He is further authorized, within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Board by the President, to employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary

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supplies, facilities, and services. The Chairman may, with the approval of the President, appoint an executive officer.

NOTE: On July 2, 1940, the President had approved an export control act (54 Stat. 714), which prohibited the export, except on special license, of strategic and critical items necessary for the national defense (see Item 66, pp. 277-281, 1940 volume). Under the provisions of this Act, the President appointed an Administrator of Export Control, who took immediate steps to embargo munitions, materials, and machinery necessary to strengthen our own forces. This action, of course, did not prevent the shipment of materials under license to our allies.

By midsummer of 1941, the swift accumulation of events necessitated more positive measures for the economic defense of the United States. Japanese purchases of copper in South America, and German purchases of mercury in Mexico, increased sharply as the Axis Nations began to acquire these and other critical materials from the Western Hemisphere for their war machines. It became evident that tighter control was necessary to prevent the shipment of war materials to Axis sources, and to buy existing stocks of critical materials in foreign countries before the Axis could reach them. It was also necessary more rigidly to control foreign exchange and international investments and patents, and to bring the full power of economic controls to

bear on strengthening the national defense.

To accomplish these several pressing purposes, the President made the first of a series of moves to unify the administration of the Government's foreign economic controls in the interests of defense and war. The Economic Defense Board, established in the foregoing Executive Order, was set up as a policy and advisory agency, with responsibility for operation of the different controls remaining in the various executive departments and agencies concerned with economic defense programs.

Shortly after the establishment of the Economic Defense Board, its powers and functions were expanded by Executive Order No. 8900, issued September 15, 1941. That Order transferred to the Economic Defense Board the Office of Export Control and the export control functions exercised by the Department of State. This, in effect, transformed the Economic Defense Board from an agency purely devoted to planning to an agency also engaged in active operations. At the same time, the Board intensified its program for preventing shipments to Axis-dominated countries of critically needed metals and other materials necessary for total defense.

On November 22, 1941, with the approval of the President, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,

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Nelson A. Rockefeller, was appointed as an additional member of the Economic Defense Board because of the growing importance of the Government's economic program in this hemisphere. The Economic Defense Board moved to support hemispheric defense, exporting to the other Americas some materials not immediately needed in our own defense effort, subsidizing South American airlines in order to prevent the air shipment of quartz, platinum, diamonds, and mica to Italy, and taking various other moves to bolster the economies of the Latin American Nations.

Meanwhile, under the stimulus of the Economic Defense Board, other Government agencies were acting vigorously to carry out the policies expressed in the foregoing Executive Order. Various subsidiary R.F.C. corporations proceeded to acquire strategic and critical materials through loans and direct purchases. Stockpiles of natural rubber and critical minerals and metals were set up — not always, in the light of subsequent events, with sufficient dispatch or in sufficient quantities — long before Pearl Harbor. These stockpiles were built up not only for the immediate use of the United States in the defense effort but also to prevent the Axis powers from obtaining these vital materials.

Through various increases in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank (see Item 71 and note,

pp. 303-305, 1940 volume), extensive loans were made for the development of resources and of strategic materials in countries in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, through its loans, the Export-Import Bank provided a market for Latin American products which otherwise would have found their way to Germany.

The Procurement Division of the Treasury Department purchased great quantities of chrome, industrial diamonds, manganese, manila fiber, mercury, mica, optical glass, quartz crystals, quinine sulphate, tin, and tungsten.

On December 17, 1941, the name of the Economic Defense Board was changed to the Board of Economic Warfare. The transition from defense to war was, of course, marked by a more intensive activity by the Board in the waging of economic warfare.

One of the immediate tasks undertaken by the Board of Economic Warfare after Pearl Harbor was to press for an expansion of procurement and development of critical war materials in South America. This had become essential because the conquest by Japan of so many parts of the Far East had cut the United States off from sources of rubber and quinine and from a large percentage of tin, palm oil, sisal, tungsten, chrome, and many other commodities. German advances had also cut off other important supplies, including Russian manganese, nickel and iron ore in

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the Scandinavian countries, and smelting and refining facilities in the Low Countries.

The supply problem was aggravated by the disruption of merchant shipping following Pearl Harbor. The shipment of lend-lease materials necessarily had top priority, and this left few bottoms to carry strategic materials to us from South America.

In the early months of 1942, however, the considerable number of Federal agencies engaged in various economic warfare activities was beginning to cause confusion, overlapping, and loss of efficiency. To meet these defects of administration which had developed, the President issued Executive Order No. 9128 on April 13, 1942, and on May 20, 1942, supplemented this Order with a statement. By the Order and statement, the President defined the relationships between the Board of Economic Warfare and the Department of State (see Item 53 and note, 1942 volume).

The Board of Economic Warfare was organized into an Office of Imports, an Office of Exports, and an Office of Economic Warfare Analysis.

The Office of Imports was responsible for the procurement, under directives of the War Production Board, of strategic materials, including metals, minerals, rubber, foodstuffs, textiles. Preclusive operations, designed to keep strategic material from the enemy, were executed by the U. S. Commercial

Company, which was chartered by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on March 12, 1942.

The Office of Exports carried on the work which had been initiated by the Administrator of Export Control and had been assigned to the Economic Defense Board by Executive Order No. 8900 (September 15, 1941). The President was interested in transforming export control into a positive instrument; he felt that it should not only stop unnecessary exports but also encourage filling the essential needs of friendly countries. Accordingly, in considering whether to grant a license for exports, this Office investigated to make sure that the export would not fall into Axis hands, and analyzed whether the export would benefit the war effort of the country for which it was destined, whether it was needed abroad to assist the production of goods required by the United States, how much it would reduce American supply of needed materials, and whether adequate shipping existed to transport the commodity.

At the close of 1942, after the War Production Board established its controlled-materials plan (see Item 9 and note, 1942 volume) for the programmed rationing of the supplies of raw material, the Board of Economic Warfare planned its export programs more strictly in order to satisfy only the most urgent needs.

The third major office in the Board of Economic Warfare, the

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Office of Economic Warfare Analysis, formulated reports on the economic weaknesses of the economy of Axis countries, supplied economic information for import and export operations with reference to Latin America, and late in 1942 commenced studies of the German and Japanese economies as guides to strategic bombing and preclusive buying. The Office also assisted in the enforcement of a blockade against Germany, and later engaged in economic planning in cooperation with military authorities on the subject of reconstruction of the countries to be liberated from Axis domination.

The tasks faced by the Board of Economic Warfare were enormous. Rich as the United States is in natural resources and industrial ingenuity, our domestic supply of many commodities was running short. Before the war was over, it became necessary to procure materials and elements the very names of which few people had heard before the war. The problem was of great complexity. In some cases we needed more than the world could supply before the war; accordingly, new sources had to be found and developed. These new sources could not be dug out of books, but had to be found by technical personnel — economic detectives in a real sense — whom the Board of Economic Warfare sent to wild and inaccessible regions of South America, Africa, and Asia. Once discovered, the sources had to be devel-

oped, and miners and operators encouraged to take unusual wartime risks. As a result of these little-known but invaluable activities, the rate of import into the United States reached an annual total of manganese ore, chrome, zinc metal and metal in concentrates, refined lead and lead concentrates, and copper all several times the rate of prewar imports.

The Board of Economic Warfare was successful in concluding agreements with the South American countries by which the United States agreed to purchase the exportable surpluses of certain critical materials, and the South American countries agreed not to ship any of these critical materials to Axis sympathizers. Similar agreements were concluded with a number of foreign countries. Through these agreements, the economic door to many materials in neutral countries was rather completely closed in the face of the Axis.

One of the most critical problems faced by the Board of Economic Warfare was that of rubber. Before the war, the United States had imported and consumed half a million tons of crude rubber, over half of the world's production. Most of this had come from the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. When the Japanese conquest of the Far East cut off these sources, sources for only a small amount of crude rubber were left to the United States. At the same time, military requirements for rubber

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soared. The Rubber Reserve Company of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had built up a stockpile of 800,000 tons by December 13, 1941. Agreements for the purchase and development of rubber in Latin American countries were rapidly concluded. Although in this area, as in some others, there were disagreements between the Board of Economic Warfare and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, particularly in the field of synthetic rubber development (see Item 77 and note, 1943 volume), the significant fact is that the United States did obtain the rubber necessary for its rising military requirements.

The need for further consolidation of the agencies engaged in international economic affairs became urgent in 1943. Accordingly, the Board of Economic Warfare was merged into the new Office of Economic Warfare, which also embraced a number of the subsidiary corporations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (see Item 77 and note, 1943 volume). Following additional studies of the agencies engaged in the international eco-

nomie field, the President issued Executive Order No. 9380 on September 25, 1943, establishing the Foreign Economic Administration. Included in the new Foreign Economic Administration were the functions formerly exercised by the Board of Economic Warfare (see Item 104 and note, 1943 volume).

Although, before the war was ended, the Economic Defense Board had gone through a series of reorganizations and evolutions, there can be no question of the enormous significance of its contributions. Established by the foregoing Executive Order several months before Pearl Harbor, the Economic Defense Board was another strong piece of evidence of the President's ability to foretell the need for the basic organizations and draw the plans which were to carry the war to a successful conclusion. Usually unnoticed by most of the public, lacking the drama of the actual war on the battlefronts or the sabotage behind the lines, economic warfare was nevertheless one of the most far-flung and successful of our wartime activities.

72 ¶ The Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs Is Created. Executive Order No. 8840. July 30, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Manage-

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ment with respect to the unlimited national emergency declared by the President on May 27, 1941, and to provide for the development of commercial and cultural relations between the American Republics and thereby increasing the solidarity of this hemisphere and furthering the spirit of cooperation between the Americas in the interest of hemisphere defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, at the head of which there shall be a Coordinator appointed by the President. The Coordinator shall discharge and perform his duties and responsibilities under the direction and supervision of the President. The Coordinator shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs shall:

a. Serve as the center for the coordination of the cultural and commercial relations of the Nation affecting hemisphere defense.

b. Formulate and execute programs, in cooperation with the Department of State which, by effective use of governmental and private facilities in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press, and the cinema, will further the national defense and strengthen the bonds between the Nations of the Western Hemisphere.

c. Formulate, recommend, and execute programs in the commercial and economic fields which, by the effective use of governmental and private facilities, will further the commercial well-being of the Western Hemisphere.

d. Assist in the coordination and carrying out of the purposes of Public Resolution No. 83 approved June 15, 1941, entitled "To authorize the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to assist

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the Governments of American Republics to increase their military and naval establishments, and for other purposes.”

e. Review existing laws and recommend such new legislation as may be deemed essential to the effective realization of the basic cultural and commercial objectives of the Government's program of hemisphere solidarity.

f. Exercise and perform all powers and functions now or heretofore vested in the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, established by order of the Council of National Defense on August 16, 1940.

g. Keep the President informed with respect to progress made in carrying out this Order; and perform such other related duties as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to it.

3. In the study of problems and in the execution of programs, it shall be the policy of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs to collaborate with and to utilize the facilities of existing departments and agencies which perform functions and activities affecting the cultural and commercial aspects of hemisphere defense. Such departments and agencies are requested to cooperate with the Coordinator in arranging for appropriate clearance of proposed policies and measures involving the commercial and cultural aspects of Inter-American affairs..

4. Within the limits of funds appropriated or allocated for purposes encompassed by this Order, the Coordinator may contract with and transfer funds to existing governmental agencies and institutions and may enter into contracts and agreements with individuals, educational, informational, commercial, scientific, and cultural institutions, associations, agencies, and industrial organizations, firms, and corporations.

5. The Coordinator is authorized and directed to take over and carry out the provisions of any contracts heretofore entered into by the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, established by order of the Council of National Defense on August 16, 1940. The

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Coordinator is further authorized to assume any obligations or responsibilities which have heretofore been undertaken by the said Office for and on behalf of the United States Government.

6. There is hereby established within the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs a Committee on Inter-American Affairs, consisting of the Coordinator as Chairman, one designee each from the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce, the President of the Export-Import Bank, and such additional representatives from other agencies and departments as may be designated by the heads of such departments or agencies at the request of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The Committee shall consider and correlate proposals with respect to the commercial, cultural, educational, and scientific aspects of hemisphere defense relations, and shall make recommendations to the appropriate Government departments and agencies.

7. The Coordinator may provide for the internal organization and management of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The Coordinator shall obtain the President's approval for the establishment of the principal subdivisions of the Office and the appointment of the heads thereof. The Coordinator may appoint such committees as may be required for the conduct of the activities of his office.

8. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated to the Coordinator or as may be allocated to him by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities, and services. However, the Coordinator shall use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available to him through the Office for Emergency Management.

NOTE: The uninterrupted, sweeping victories of the Nazi armies in the summer of 1940 presented an immediate threat to the Latin American flank of the United States. Axis agents had already started to establish a fifth column there; they spread propaganda against the United States in a drive to create dissension in the Western

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Hemisphere. The Axis had also attempted, through the purchase of Latin American commodities with blocked currency which could only be spent in Germany, to make the Latin American economy dependent on trade with Germany. The softening-up process was already in its first stages.

This situation led to the establishment, on August 16, 1940, by order of the Council of National Defense, of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics (see note to Item 154, pp. 699-700, 1940 volume). Nelson A. Rockefeller was appointed Coordinator.

The foregoing Executive Order shortened the name of the agency, placed it within the Office for Emergency Management, and gave it additional important powers—especially the power to “formulate, recommend, and execute programs in the commercial and economic fields.”

The military defense aspects of the Coordinator's Office were most important during its early period of operation; they became relatively less important as the immediate threat to the security of the United States receded. Similarly, greater emphasis was placed on short-range emergency measures in the early history of the Office; the emphasis shifted later in the war, and it became possible to concentrate greater attention on the long-

range aspects of economic and cultural relations.

One of the immediate emergency economic measures taken by other agencies was the purchase of surpluses which were piling up in the Latin American Republics because of the elimination of European markets. The United States purchased wool, cotton, and strategic materials such as Chilean copper (see Item 71 and note, this volume; and Item 104 and note, 1943 volume, for accounts of the acquisition by the United States of strategic and critical materials and preclusive purchasing by the Economic Defense Board, Board of Economic Warfare, and Foreign Economic Administration). The Export-Import Bank also made loans to Latin American countries to assist in the development of their resources, the stabilization of their economies, and the marketing of their products (see Item 71 and note, pp. 303-305, 1940 volume).

The work of the Inter-American Development Commission was closely related to that of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (see the Presidential statement on inter-American economic cooperation, June 21, 1940, Item 63, pp. 273-274, 1940 volume). The Commission, which was supported by national commissions in many of the other American Republics, was financed by grants-in-aid from the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and it made technical studies, compiled basic information, and

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aided in the development of mineral resources, the marketing of agricultural and forest products, and the establishment and development of industrial plants.

The severe shortages in shipping caused by the success of German submarine warfare led the President to form a Committee on Inter-American Shipping, on which were represented the Maritime Commission, War, Navy, and State Departments, and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The President authorized an R.F.C. loan of \$10,000,000 to the C.I.A.A. for the purchase of vessels and the construction of a number of wooden ships to ease the shipping shortage. A few ships were acquired and constructed, but before the program was fully under way the German submarine threat had been overcome, and the shipping situation improved.

The Coordinator's Office took the lead in stimulating the rehabilitation and improvement of the Mexican railway system, which could not transport the needed strategic materials which the United States was importing from the Central American countries. The Transportation Department of the C.I.A.A. also sponsored railway missions to other Latin American countries to improve their railway transportation systems. Progress was also made by C.I.A.A. and other Federal agencies in the development of aviation and highways in this area.

The improvement of health and sanitation in the American Republics was sponsored by C.I.A.A. both for the long-term betterment of conditions in the Western Hemisphere and for the protection of our own troops and civilian workers, as well as natives engaged in mining or producing the strategic materials which were being shipped to the United States. In the following letter, dated March 24, 1942, the President instructed C.I.A.A. to proceed with the health and sanitation program:

The White House
Washington
March 24, 1942

"My dear Mr. Rockefeller:

"As President of the United States I hereby direct you, as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, to formulate and execute a program to aid and improve the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of Mexico, Central and South America and the outlying Islands, including the West Indies. The duties and responsibilities in this connection will be to carry out measures for the control and prevention of disease, sanitation, sewage disposal, housing, improvement of food and water supplies, building of roads, highways, transportation facilities and public works, nutrition, general medical treatment, and the education and training deemed necessary to achieve these objectives, together with such additional measures as you may deem necessary or advisable to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the inhabitants. In discharging these duties and responsibilities you are directed to work in cooperation with the State, War and Navy Departments and to utilize such other governmental, inter-

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national and private facilities as you deem advisable in order effectively to carry out the program. You are further directed to consult with and cooperate to the fullest extent with the Governments of and private agencies in Mexico, Central and South America and the outlying Islands including the West Indies. For the discharge of the foregoing duties I have directed the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate to the Office for Emergency Management \$25 million pursuant to my letter of February 20, 1942.

"Please arrange to transmit copies of this letter to all interested Government departments and agencies.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,
Commerce Department Building,
Washington, D. C."

Pursuant to this letter, the C.I.A.A. established a subsidiary corporation, known as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Most of the health and sanitation operations were conducted through cooperative agreements with the Governments of the other American Republics. Under these agreements, a unit (or *servicio*) representing the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Government of the country involved was usually established within the ministry of the country in which operations were to be conducted. Examples of the type of program conducted by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs included malaria control in Panama and the Dominican Republic; the construction of new water-supply systems in

Peru and several other American Republics; the improvement and extension of the sewerage system in Quito, Ecuador; the elimination of unsanitary conditions in public markets; slum clearance; construction of modern hospitals; establishment of cooperative public health programs and health centers; laboratories for tropical disease research; the resettlement of population from drought-stricken areas; the training of doctors and nurses; and a general program of public health education throughout the area.

Closely related to the C.I.A.A. programs of health and sanitation was the food supply and nutrition program. As in the case of the health and sanitation work, cooperative agreements were signed with the countries concerned, and local personnel, materials, and labor were extensively used. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs contracted for the production of food for the Army in Panama, thus not only reducing the amount of food required to be transported from the United States but also stimulating local agriculture. Tools, seed, insecticides, and fertilizers were made available to producers at low costs. Groups of technicians aided the local countries in improving the quality of their product, learning reliable methods of packing and shipping, and improving nutrition in the area. Through demonstrations and other forms of training, the food supply division of C.I.A.A.

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contributed to the general improvement in agricultural techniques.

Through the radio, press, pamphlets, posters, and newsreels, as well as through privately owned information agencies, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs counteracted the efforts of the Nazi propagandists in Latin America and also supported an informed public opinion in the Western Hemisphere. Under the sponsorship of C.I.A.A., the illustrated magazine *En Guardia*, printed in Portuguese, Spanish, and French, was circulated free in the Latin American countries. The magazine emphasized American military power and later issues were increasingly devoted to the long-range program and objectives of hemispheric solidarity. Over half a million copies were circulated in the later editions. The C.I.A.A. also published *American News Letter*, a bi-weekly résumé of American events and announcements; it was circulated to about 13,000 selected readers. In addition, some 1,000 newspapers throughout Latin America were supplied with free feature materials.

The Coordinator's Office prepared materials and features for short-wave broadcasts to the American Republics, and stimulated the efforts of private facilities in broadcasting to these areas. After the establishment of the Coordinator of Information on July 11, 1941 (see Item 64 and note, this volume) and the granting of authority to him for international broadcasts,

jurisdictional disputes arose concerning which office should have primary responsibility for broadcasts to the American Republics.

On October 16, 1941, the President resolved the jurisdictional conflict by sending the following memorandum to the Coordinator of Information:

"It appears that some question has been raised as to the fields of responsibility of your work and that of Nelson Rockefeller's organization.

"I continue to believe that the requirements of our program in the hemisphere are quite different from those of our programs to Europe and the Far East. In order that information, news, and inspirational matter going to the other American Republics, whether by radio or other media, may be carefully adapted to the demands of the hemisphere, it should be handled exclusively by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in cooperation with the Department of State.

"The physical arrangement with the radio companies for use of facilities should be previously agreed upon by you and Nelson and jointly negotiated with the companies by the two of you.

"Cooperation with the Department of State by you and Nelson will avoid misunderstandings and insure the proper directives on basic questions of foreign policy."

With the encouragement of C.I.A.A., the National Broadcasting Company and the Columbia Broadcasting System made contracts to build a network of some 200 local stations which rebroadcast in the American Republics' short-wave programs received from the United

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States. The power of the United States stations was increased and the quality and quantity of their Latin American news were raised.

Motion pictures, newsreels, and documentary films were distributed by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs throughout the Latin American Republics. The C.I.A.A.'s Motion Picture Division also stimulated the production of motion pictures in the American Republics which could be exhibited effectively in the United States; it persuaded Latin American producers to eliminate Axis-sponsored or -produced motion pictures; and it encouraged the motion-picture industry in the United States to produce more feature pictures, short subjects, and newsreels about the United States for distribution throughout the hemisphere.

In the spring of 1942, the President proceeded with plans to consolidate the Federal information agencies into a new Office of War Information, which was established by Executive Order No. 9182 on June 13, 1942 (see Item 67 and note, 1942 volume). Although initially it had been considered logical to include the information activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Office of War Information, several weeks before the issuance of the O.W.I. Executive Order the President concluded that the information activities of C.I.A.A. were so closely related to the entire program of that organization in fostering the soli-

arity of the American Republics that it would be inadvisable to separate them out. Accordingly, the C.I.A.A. was permitted to retain its information functions.

As described in the note to Item 154, p. 700, 1940 volume, considerable work was done before the war by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the field of cultural relations and the stimulation of science and education. After Pearl Harbor these activities were curtailed and were confined largely to projects of an emergency nature. Funds and scholarships were allotted to strengthen United States schools in Latin America and to establish and expand libraries and cultural institutes in the other American Republics. The Inter-American Educational Foundation was organized as a subsidiary corporation to develop the educational program of C.I.A.A. The Foundation and the Science and Education Division of C.I.A.A. carried out an extensive program involving the translation of books and articles published in the United States for distribution in the other American Republics, interchange of teachers and students, vocational training, the sending of technicians to the American Republics to assist in the development of education, the development of community schools, and the teaching of the English language abroad.

To foster a better understanding of Latin American affairs in the

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United States, the C.I.A.A. sponsored a number of centers in this country where motion pictures, informational material, speakers, and other means were used to explain to the people of the United States what was happening in the other American Republics, and their customs and modes.

By Executive Order No. 9532 on March 23, 1945, the name of the

Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was changed to "Office of Inter-American Affairs," but its functions remained the same. On April 10, 1946, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9710 terminating the Office of Inter-American Affairs, and its functions were transferred to the Department of State, effective May 20, 1946.

73 ¶ The Federal Reserve Board Is Directed to Curb Installment Purchasing. Executive Order No. 8843. August 9, 1941

WHEREAS a large volume of credit is being devoted to financing and refinancing purchases of consumers' goods and services through extensions of credit that usually are made to individuals and to a large extent are on an installment payment basis; and

WHEREAS the conditions under which such credit is available have an important influence upon the volume and timing of demand, not only for the particular goods and services purchased on credit but also for goods and services in general; and

WHEREAS liberal terms for such credit tend to stimulate demand for consumers' durable goods the production of which requires materials, skills, and equipment needed for national defense; and

WHEREAS the extension of such credit in excessive volume tends to generate inflationary developments of increasing consequence as the limits of productive capacity are approached in more and more fields and to hinder the accumulation of savings available for financing the defense program; and

WHEREAS the public interest requires control of the use of installment credit for financing and refinancing purchases of consumers' durable goods the production of which absorbs resources

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needed for national defense, in order (a) to facilitate the transfer of productive resources to defense industries, (b) to assist in curbing unwarranted price advances and profiteering which tend to result when the supply of such goods is curtailed without corresponding curtailment of demand, (c) to assist in restraining general inflationary tendencies, to support or supplement taxation imposed to restrain such tendencies, and to promote the accumulation of savings available for financing the defense program, (d) to aid in creating a backlog of demand for consumers' durable goods, and (e) to restrain the development of a consumer debt structure that would repress effective demand for goods and services in the post-defense period; and

WHEREAS in order to prevent evasion or avoidance of this Order and such regulations as may be prescribed to effectuate its purposes, means should also be available for regulating the use of other installment credit and other forms of credit usually extended to consumers or on consumers' durable goods; and

WHEREAS it is appropriate that such credit be controlled and regulated through an existing governmental agency which has primary responsibilities with respect to the determination and administration of national credit policies:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, and by virtue of all other authority vested in me, and in order, in the national emergency declared by me on May 27, 1941, to promote the national defense and protect the national economy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

ADMINISTRATION

SECTION 1. (a) The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (hereinafter called the Board) is hereby designated as the agency through which transfers of credit between and payments by or to banking institutions (as defined herein pursuant to section 5(b) of the aforesaid Act) which constitute, or arise directly or indirectly out of, any extension of credit of a type

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set out in section 2(a) of this Order shall be investigated, regulated, and prohibited.

(b) The Board shall, whenever it deems such action to be necessary or appropriate, take any lawful steps herein authorized and such other lawful steps as are within its power to carry out the purposes of this Order, and may, in administering this Order, utilize the services of the Federal Reserve Banks and any other agencies, Federal or State, which are available and appropriate.

(c) In order to facilitate the coordination of the Board's functions under this Order with other phases of the program for national defense and for protecting the national economy, there shall be a committee consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Federal Loan Administrator, and the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, or such alternate as each shall designate, and such other members as the President shall subsequently appoint. The Board shall maintain liaison with the committee, and in formulating policies with respect to down payments, maturities, terms of repayment, and other such questions of general policy shall consult with the committee and take into consideration any suggestions or recommendations it may make.

REGULATIONS

SECTION 2. (a) Whenever the Board shall determine that such action is necessary or appropriate for carrying out the purposes of this Order, the Board shall prescribe regulations with respect to transfers and payments which constitute, or arise directly or indirectly out of, any extension of installment credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any consumers' durable good except a residential building in its entirety; and the Board may in addition, to the extent deemed by it to be desirable and feasible in order to prevent evasion of such regulations as may be so prescribed or in order to control forms of credit the use of which might defeat the purposes of this Order and such regulations, prescribe regulations with respect to transfers and pay-

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ments which constitute, or arise directly or indirectly out of, (1) any other extension of installment credit, or (2) any other extension of credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any consumers' durable good, or (3) any other extension of credit in the form of a loan other than a loan made for business purposes to a business enterprise or for agricultural purposes to a person engaged in agriculture. Such regulations may be prescribed by the Board at such times and with such effective dates as the Board shall deem to be in accordance with the purposes of this Order.

(b) Such regulations may from time to time, originally or by amendment, regulate or prohibit such transfers and payments or exempt them from regulation or prohibition and may classify them according to the nature of the transactions or goods or persons involved or upon such other basis as may reasonably differentiate such transfers and payments for the purposes of regulations under this Order, and may be made applicable to one or more of the classes so established; and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such regulations may require transactions or persons or classes thereof to be registered or licensed; may prescribe appropriate limitations, terms, and conditions for such registrations or licenses; may provide for suspension of any such registration or license for violation of any provision thereof or of any regulation, rule, or order prescribed hereunder, may prescribe appropriate requirements as to the keeping of records and as to the form, contents, or substantive provisions of contracts, liens, or any relevant documents; may prohibit solicitations by banking institutions which would encourage evasion or avoidance of the requirements of any regulation, license, or registration under this Order; and may from time to time make appropriate provisions with respect to —

(1) The maximum amount of credit which may be extended on, or in connection with any purchase of, any consumers' durable good;

(2) The maximum maturity, minimum periodic payments, and maximum periods between payments, which may be stipulated in connection with extensions of credit;

(3) The methods of determining purchase prices or market

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values or other bases for computing permissible extensions of credit or required down payments; and

(4) Special or different terms, conditions, or exemptions with respect to new or used goods, minimum original cash payments, temporary credits which are merely incidental to cash purchases, payment or deposits usable to liquidate credits, and other adjustments or special situations.

(c) On and after the effective date of any regulation prescribed by the Board with respect to any extension of credit of a type set out in section 2(a), and notwithstanding the provisions of any other proclamation, order, regulation, or license under the aforesaid Act, all transfers and payments which are in violation of such regulation shall be and hereby are prohibited to the extent specified in such regulation.

(d) Neither this Order nor any regulation issued thereunder shall affect the right of any person to enforce any contract, except that after the effective date of any such regulation every contract which is made in connection with any extension of credit and which violates, or the performance of which would violate, any provision of such regulation (other than a provision designated therein as being for administrative purposes), and every lien, pledge, seller's interest in a conditional sale, or other property interest, subject to the provisions of such contract or created in connection therewith, shall be unenforceable by the person who extends such credit or by any person who acquires any right of such person in such contract; provided that such disability shall not apply to any person who extends such credit, or acquires such right for value, in good faith and without knowing or having reason to know the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was or would be such a violation.

REPORTS

SECTION 3. Reports concerning the kinds, amounts, and characteristics of any extensions of credit subject to this Order, concerning transfers and payments which arise out of any such ex-

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tensions of credit, or concerning circumstances related to such extensions of credit or such transfers or payments or to the regulation thereof, shall be filed on such forms, under oath or otherwise, at such times and from time to time, and by such persons, as the Board may prescribe by rule, regulation, or order as necessary or appropriate for enabling the Board to perform its functions under this Order. The Board may require any person to furnish, under oath or otherwise, complete information relative to any transaction within the scope of this Order, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters, or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person.

DEFINITIONS

SECTION 4. For the purposes of this Order, unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms shall have the following meanings, provided that the Board may in its regulations give such terms more restricted meanings:

(a) "Person" has the meaning set forth in section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended.

(b) "Transfers and payments" means "transfers of credit between and payments by or to banking institutions."

(c) "Banking institution" means any person engaged as principal, agent, broker, or otherwise, in the business of making or holding extensions of credit and includes, without limitation, any bank, any loan company, any finance company, or any other person engaged in the business of making or holding extensions of credit whether as a vendor of consumers' durable goods or otherwise.

(d) "Consumers' durable good" includes any good, whether new or used, which is durable or semi-durable and is used or usable for personal, family, or household purposes, and any service connected with the acquisition of any such good or of any interest therein.

(e) "Extension of credit" means any loan or mortgage, any

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installment purchase contract, any conditional sales contract, or any sale or contract of sale under which part or all of the price is payable subsequent to the making of such sale or contract; any rental-purchase contract, or any contract for the bailment or leasing of property under which the bailee or lessee either has the option of becoming the owner thereof or obligates himself to pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the value thereof; any contract creating any lien or similar claim or property to be discharged by the payment of money; any purchase, discount, or other acquisition of, or any extension of credit upon the security of, any obligation or claim arising out of any of the foregoing; and any transaction or series of transactions having a similar purpose or effect.

(f) An extension of credit is an extension of "installment credit" if the obligor undertakes to repay the credit in two or more scheduled payments or undertakes to make two or more scheduled payments or deposits usable to liquidate the credit, or if the extension of credit has a similar purpose or effect, or if it is for the purpose of financing a business enterprise which makes such extensions of credit.

(g) An extension of credit is "for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any consumers' durable good" if it is directly or indirectly for the purpose of financing or refinancing the purchase of any consumers' durable good or is directly or indirectly secured by any consumers' durable good, or if the extension of credit has a similar purpose or effect, or if it is for the purpose of financing a business enterprise which makes such extensions of credit.

PENALTIES

SECTION 5. Whoever willfully violates or knowingly participates in the violation of this Order or of any regulation prescribed hereunder, shall be subject to the penalties applicable with respect to violations of section 5(b) of the said Act of October 6, 1917, as amended.

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NOTE: In the months following the beginning of the defense program, the pressure of demand began to push up the prices of consumer goods. The level of employment, wage payments and incomes were all rising, and it became necessary to impose measures which would check inflation, make additional funds available to finance the defense program, and insure that the productive resources of the Nation were shifted to defense industries.

For these reasons, the foregoing Executive Order was issued to regulate consumer credit, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was designated as the agency to effect the regulation. On August 21, 1941, the Federal Reserve Board issued Regulation W, the primary objective of which was to limit buying on the installment plan.

Consumer credit control was only one of the means of combating inflation. On April 27, 1942, the President, in a message to the Congress, advanced a seven-point anti-inflation program (see Item 47 and note, 1942 volume). In order to keep the cost of living from spiraling upward, the President recommended as one of the seven points the discouragement of credit and installment buying and the encouragement of the paying of debts, mortgages, and other obligations. Following this message, the Federal

Reserve Board amended Regulation W further to strengthen and expand the control over consumer credit. Prior to the President's anti-inflation message, Regulation W had applied only to installment sales and to loans repayable in installments. Effective on May 6, 1942, the regulation was extended to include sales made on charge accounts and loans repayable in single payments. At the same time, the maximum length of most installment payments was reduced to twelve months, and consumers were required to pay at least one-third of the total cost in their down payment.

When the Federal Reserve Board began limiting consumer credit in accordance with the terms of the foregoing Executive Order, the total volume of consumer credit in the United States was approximately \$10,000,000,000. This amount decreased to about \$4,900,000,000 in the early months of 1944 and then increased gradually to about \$6,700,000,000 at the end of 1945. The regulation by the Federal Reserve Board doubtless played a large part in the decrease in the total volume of consumer credit. But this decrease in credit was mainly due to reduced production of consumers' durable goods and the increase in cash buying during the war.

74 (The Atlantic Charter. Official Statement on Meeting Between the President and Prime Minister Churchill. August 14, 1941

THE President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea.

They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high ranking officers of their military, naval, and air services.

The whole problem of the supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression has been further examined.

Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union.

The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite Government of Germany and other Governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

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Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

(Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all Nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;)

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all Nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the Nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by Nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such Nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

NOTE: During the first World War, while he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the President had met Winston Churchill in London. As the crisis facing the democracies of the world deepened in the second World War the President thought it advisable, indeed neces-

74. *Official Statement on Atlantic Charter*

sary, to have a face-to-face meeting with the British Prime Minister. Prior to the Atlantic Conference, Harry L. Hopkins as the President's personal representative had visited Churchill in London to discuss the preliminary arrangements, and had also visited Stalin in Moscow to appraise Russia's ability to resist the recent Nazi invasion.

The Roosevelt-Churchill meetings took place August 9-12 aboard the American cruiser *Augusta* and the British battleship *Prince of Wales* at sea near Argentina, Newfoundland.

Before embarking for his meetings with Churchill, the President had mapped out his ideas on the form and spirit of a joint declaration of the English-speaking democracies. By emphasizing that any postwar order should be based on principles of freedom, justice, security, and access to raw materials and natural resources, the President felt that the peoples of the world would derive new hope in their resistance to Nazism.

In discussing the terms of the proposed declaration, the British were anxious to include a strong condemnation of Japanese aggression, as well as to formulate joint plans to curb further Japanese expansion. At the time the President was not willing to take such an uncompromising position, which might incite Japan to immediate war.

The President made a number of independent changes, deletions,

and additions in the Atlantic Charter as it went through its various drafts. In particular, the President wrote in the declaration that the world must abandon the use of force, and eliminated certain other provisions which might give the American public the impression that the Atlantic Charter cloaked secret agreements and commitments of the United States to Great Britain. The advocacy in the Atlantic Charter of "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security" was a forerunner of the United Nations.

There was considerable disagreement over the wording of the Charter provision for free access to raw materials. Churchill and the British representatives favored a weakened version of this point, on the grounds that the agreement of the British Dominions would have to be obtained before the Prime Minister could commit them. The President felt that a positive statement was advisable in order to insure freer international trade. To expedite the approval of the Atlantic Charter, without the necessity of clearance with the Dominions, the economic declaration in the final document was agreed upon as a compromise.

The question of the form of the agreement and the announcement thereof arose at discussions on August 11. The President proposed that statements be released simultaneously in England and the United States, quoting the text of the At-

75. *Message Asking for Moscow Conference*

Atlantic Charter and explaining the circumstances of its preparation. This is the way it was announced. In later years, it was noted that the document did not contain signatures and formal seals (see Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume). Since it was in no sense a treaty or a pact or an agreement, but rather a statement of principles, this omission was of course immaterial. It was not a formal document. It was rather a general statement, developed by a careful series of discussions among the President, Prime Minister Churchill, and other high officials of the United States and Great Britain.

Those who looked to the document to find a detailed guide to postwar boundary settlements and international economic machinery,

of course, did not find them itemized; this was not the purpose of the Charter. It was intended to publicize to the world the kind of peace for which the opponents of Nazism were fighting. The conferences were the start of a long series of fruitful meetings between the President, Churchill, and their staffs.

The twenty-six signers of the United Nations Declaration on January 1, 1942, pledged themselves to observe the "common program of purposes and principles" embodied in the Atlantic Charter (see Item 1 and note, 1942 volume). For other references to the Atlantic Charter, see Items 76, 77, and 78, this volume; Item 82, 1942 volume; Item 90, 1943 volume; and Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume.

75 (Joint Roosevelt-Churchill Message Asking for Moscow Conference. August 15, 1941

WE HAVE taken the opportunity afforded by the consideration of the report of Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defense that you are making against the Nazi attack. We are at the moment cooperating to provide you with the very maximum of supplies that you most urgently need. Already many shiploads have left our shores and more will leave in the immediate future.

We must now turn our minds to the consideration of a more long-term policy, since there is still a long and hard path to be traversed before there can be won that complete victory without which our efforts and sacrifices would be wasted.

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The war goes on upon many fronts and before it is over there may be further fighting fronts that will be developed. Our resources, though immense, are limited, and it must become a question as to where and when those resources can best be used to further to the greatest extent our common effort. This applies equally to manufactured war supplies and to raw materials.

The needs and demands of your and our armed services can only be determined in the light of the full knowledge of the many factors which must be taken into consideration in the decisions that we make. In order that all of us may be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of our joint resources, we suggest that we prepare for a meeting to be held at Moscow, to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you. If this conference appeals to you we want you to know that pending the decisions of that conference we shall continue to send supplies and material as rapidly as possible.

We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union and we feel, therefore, that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter on planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

(Delivered by the United States and British Ambassadors to Joseph Stalin, President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)

NOTE: On July 13, 1941, Harry L. Hopkins departed on a flight to meet with Prime Minister Churchill in London, in order to lay the foundations for the forthcoming Atlantic Conference. While in London, Hopkins cabled the President on July 25 asking whether a trip to Moscow would be advisable, and

the President immediately approved such a trip. Hopkins arrived in Moscow July 30 for a three-day series of meetings with Stalin and high Russian officials.

During the Atlantic Conference, the President and Churchill drafted the foregoing message to Stalin suggesting that a conference at Moscow

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would enable the Allied powers to apportion their joint resources in order to mobilize the greatest striking power against Hitlerism. At the end of September, W. Averell Harriman headed the American delegation which joined a British group on a mission to Moscow (see Item 80, this volume for the President's press conference remarks on the Moscow meeting; see Item 93 and note, this volume, for the President's letter of introduction which Harriman presented to Stalin).

76 (The Seven Hundred and Sixty-first Press Conference. August 16, 1941

(*The meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill — Aid to Russia — Lend-lease — Newspaper coverage of Charter meeting.*)

(This press conference was held aboard the U.S.S. *Potomac* on the President's return from his meeting in the Atlantic with Prime Minister Churchill.)

THE PRESIDENT: I am glad to see you. How are you?

Q. Very well, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, all of you got here all right. . . .

Q. Could you tell us where this conference with Mr. Churchill was held?

THE PRESIDENT: I cannot, for obvious reasons. I had better make one or two things clear in the beginning. Names of ships are out. I suppose it has been published. The Prime Minister was there on the *Prince of Wales* and I was there on the *Augusta*, but outside of that, nothing about ships, nothing about times, dates, and nothing about locations. All those things for perfectly obvious reasons, which I don't have to explain.

Things of that kind cause trouble, if you make known the exact location on the high seas of the President and the Prime Minister. However, it was foggy between North Haven and Rockland, and while it's open season out there, no submarine fired a torpedo at us as far as we could see, and we are here safely.

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You want to know certain things, I suppose. The easiest thing to do is to give you what we might call the impressions that stand out. I think the first thing in the minds of all of us was a very remarkable religious service on the quarterdeck of the *Prince of Wales* last Sunday morning. There was their own ship's complement, with three or four hundred blue-jackets and marines from American ships, on the quarterdeck, completely intermingled, first one uniform and then another uniform. The service was conducted by two chaplains, one English and one American, and, as usual, the lesson was read by the captain of the British ship. They had three hymns that everybody took part in, and a little ship's altar was decked with the American flag and the British flag. The officers were all intermingled on the fantail, and I think the pictures of it have been released. The point is, I think everybody there, officers and enlisted men, felt that it was one of the great historic services. I know I did.

Q. That was on the *Augusta*?

THE PRESIDENT: No, on the *Prince of Wales*. Conferences were held between — you know who was with me, there is no reason why that shouldn't come out now: the Chief of Staff, General Marshall; Chief of Air Corps, General Arnold; General Burns, he is in charge of the Lease-Lend program; and Colonel Bundy of the Army.

Q. Who is he, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I think he is War Plans, Army War Plans. Then from the Navy: Admiral Stark, Admiral King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet; Admiral Turner, of the War Plans Section, Navy Department; Captain Sherman, Operations; and then, of course, my own staff, General Watson, Admiral McIntire, and Captain Beardall. And two civilians, Mr. Hopkins and myself.

Q. Your two sons?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that was just pure luck. Happened to catch them after we got there.

Q. Mr. Elliott and Franklin, Jr.?

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Also Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Welles from the State Department. And the British, of course, had what might be called "opposite numbers" in practically every case in that list that I have mentioned. The conferences were held between the opposite numbers in groups, but they were held partly on the *Augusta* and partly on the *Prince of Wales*. Actually the conferences between the Prime Minister and me were all held, except one, on the *Augusta*. It was a little bit difficult for me in getting over on the *Prince of Wales*.

Q. How long was Mr. Churchill actually with you?

THE PRESIDENT: That I can't tell you for obvious reasons.

Q. Can you tell us the genesis of the whole plan, who originated it?

THE PRESIDENT: The thing has been talked about since last February, and would have taken place a good deal earlier, had it not been for the campaign in Greece, and the campaign in Crete. You might say it was somewhat delayed, about three months, over the original intention.

Q. Was it your idea, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I should say it was our joint idea.

Q. Mr. President, the announcements after the conference spoke of peace aims. The conferences themselves seemed to be conferences of possible procedure in defense of —

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a bit of a narrow way of looking at things. Put it this way: that the conferences were primarily an interchange of views relating to the present and the future — a swapping of information, which was eminently successful.

I think one of the subjects which perhaps all overlooked, both in the statements and comments, was the need for an exchange of what might be called views relating to what is happening to the world under the Nazi regime, as applied to other Nations. The more that is discussed and looked into, the more terrible the thought becomes of having the world as a whole dominated by the kind of influences which have been at work in the occupied or affiliated Nations. It's a thing that

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needs to be brought home to all of the democracies, more and more.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us anything about the actual implementation of those broad declarations, now?

THE PRESIDENT: Interchange of views, that's all. Nothing else.

Q. We might assume that you have complete understanding with Mr. Churchill on all aspects of the world situation, including the Far East?

THE PRESIDENT: When you come down to localities, I don't suppose there is a single section or a single continent that was not discussed at one time or another, in all the conferences you ever heard of.

Q. Are we any closer to entering the war, actually?

THE PRESIDENT: I should say, no.

Q. May we quote directly?

THE PRESIDENT: No, you can quote indirectly.

Q. Mr. President, is Russia bound to subscribe to this eight-point program?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Will she be?

THE PRESIDENT: Nobody ever suggested it until you did.

Q. Can you tell us anything about aid to Russia?

THE PRESIDENT: You know just as much about it as I do, or Mr. Churchill, for discussion. Last year two commentators entirely overlooked two factors — one was geography, and the other was goods and munitions.

We did discuss the fitting in of Russian needs to the existing production program, and we also discussed what might be called the fact that the Russian needs might be divided into two categories. The first is material which is immediately available, to get there during this summer's campaign, and on the assumption that winter will bring at least a partial halt to campaigns in Russia. The other part is the materials and munitions which can be got to Russia by the time the spring campaign opens, and the fitting in of all of that to our own domestic needs and other lease-lend orders.

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Q. You have no doubt the Russian resistance will continue into winter?

THE PRESIDENT: I guess from that there is a sort of an assumption in there. . . .

Q. May I ask whether another lend-lease appropriation is in sight?

THE PRESIDENT: The answer is just what it has been for the last month. We are still studying it. And regarding the place where we will ask for more money, there is a certain amount of the present fund which we cannot allocate at this particular time. Certain sums have been set aside by act of Congress for things like food, and of course food supplies don't have to be — like wheat for instance — don't have to be manufactured months ahead of time. A certain amount of money is being withheld from the first lend-lease appropriation to take care of agricultural needs during the next few months. We haven't got up any list of things. They have been working on it. . . .

Q. One thing, Mr. President, were any steps taken to document this meeting for history, from the American point of view?

THE PRESIDENT: I will have to talk off the record — not for use, literally, not for use. There is no reason why you fellows shouldn't know. The reason I can't use it is that it would be discourteous. The whole point of the original arrangement was, as you know, secrecy, for perfectly obvious naval reasons, and I didn't take any newspapermen. Neither did I take any cameramen. But when we got there we found that there was a moving-picture man who goes around with Mr. Churchill, and he says he is very different from ours. Mr. Churchill travels with no newspapermen whatsoever, but he does travel with a regular Ministry of Information motion-picture man, which is the regular British custom, and I think he is a Government employee and not a press association, and nearly all the moving pictures that you see of Mr. Churchill were taken by Government men and then given to the press. We found that he had this man who customarily travels with him, and

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I was able to find, from Navy personnel, one or two people who took some pictures which were sent down to Steve [Early] and have been released.

On the question of writing, why, I never assumed for a minute that there would be an official historian, and the Ministry of Information in England, at the last minute, had sent two gentlemen who they insisted were not newspapermen, they were people who wrote books. I said, "Good God, I've got a whole lot of people who are not only newspapermen, but have written books too!" If I had known, I would have done it too. So they are two gentlemen who were literary gentlemen. They were told very definitely by me, and they acceded to it, if these two literary gentlemen ever wrote anything over there inside of a year, about this conference, that they were to give it to the three American press associations, in London, free of charge. That was about the best I could do. If they do write anything, the three press associations will get their stuff. That is the agreement, whether they are going to write for publication or British Naval Archives. I have protected you as best I could, having been taken by surprise.

I think on the three press associations, there is no particular reason why you shouldn't let your London offices know that you are aware of the fact that there were two literary gentlemen who were put on board by the British Ministry of Information, and that they have agreed with me that any release from the pens of either of those gentlemen goes to our three press associations. I couldn't think of any better way to cover it. I can't say, "*Mea culpa*," because it was the other fellow's "*culpa*."

NOTE: See Item 74 and note, this volume, for the official statement on the Atlantic Conference. For other presidential statements on the Atlantic Charter, see Items 77 and 78, this volume; Item 82, 1942 volume; and Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume.

77 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Sixty-second
Press Conference (Excerpts). August 19, 1941

(Conference with Lord Beaverbrook — Secrecy of Meeting with Prime Minister — Results of meeting — Overoptimism and overpessimism — Overemphasis on trivia — War buildings in Washington — The Pentagon Building.)

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us anything about your conference with Lord Beaverbrook?

THE PRESIDENT: We talked about the general problems of need and supply. And I told him that I had asked, before I left — oh, about three weeks ago — our own Army and Navy to make another survey of actual production deliveries — needs and deliveries — not only through 1942 but also for 1943, and that I would be very glad if the British would do the same thing. We probably will have the Chinese needs and certain Russian needs.

In other words, try to get, as of this time a new picture going further into the future than we have gone up to the present. We had a survey, of course, of that kind about a year ago, and it's time that we had a new picture, a year having gone by. And the British will give us their figures pretty soon, and I will get our own figures pretty soon. Then we will put the whole thing together and draw a line and add it up.

Q. The final military part on production and needs?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Oh, yes.

Q. Mr. President, does that assume that this war is going to go through 1943?

THE PRESIDENT: If necessary.

Q. Mr. President, would you care to take up with your press conference anything in connection with your high seas conference? In other words —

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think there is —

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Q. You must have seen or heard of reports. Is there anything that you care to clarify?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I don't think so. I don't think it is necessary for me to go into any criticism such as I think Alben Barkley is making this afternoon on the Senate floor — in regard to certain newspaper articles. That is neither here nor there, but on the whole I do want to say this: that the whole idea of my getting away without telling you people about it was, from my point of view, based on the security and safety of the Prime Minister and his staff; and the joke was that his consideration of secrecy was based on his conception of the safety of the President of the United States and his staff. (*Laughter*) And you might say that between the two there was agreement that it should be kept secret.

And there were a great many reasons why the press should put two and two together, on the ground of the absence of certain people from their usual haunts. And I of course have not the slightest objection to stories that were based on guesses and implications that something was happening, because these people were away, because those guesses were all stated in the press that they were guesses. There wasn't any assertion, except one or two radio commentators that I happened to hear. There was no assertion that either the Prime Minister or I had definitely gone to a certain place.

There were surmises. Well, surmises are perfectly legitimate if they are labeled surmises. I think that the press ought to be congratulated on the restraint that they showed during that blackout week in using only the surmises, and nothing else. On the whole — the whole thing was very well kept. And of course there was a great difficulty afterwards in keeping certain details as to location and times, and so forth, until the British Prime Minister could get home.

Well, now, he is safely home, so the thing is all right, except that I think it was generally agreed that the actual timing, and the actual location, should not be given out until a good while later, possibly the end of the war, for the reason

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that there are so many — what shall I say? — scientific considerations to be taken into consideration — radio signals, just for example. It is better not to give information which would be of advantage to the Axis powers. . . .

Q. Mr. President, I think a great many people have the idea that the war — as carried on between Nations at war — on our side — will be — there will be more to it — more punch to it — more actively engaged. Is that a good surmise?

THE PRESIDENT: Help for the democracies of the world, yes.

Q. As a result of this conference, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In other words, it clarified many, many things. It discussed operations. As I said the other day, in practically every section of the whole world — and it has brought a — what shall I say? — a better meeting of the minds on needs, and the fight that the democracies are putting up against Nazism. . . .

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us whether the Prime Minister seemed confident that Britain can win the war, without our entry?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that that kind of question is a useful kind of question, because it is too — it is too "headliney," without any substance to it. You know what I mean. I can tell you, off the record, what the answer is, but I think it would be a great mistake to quote me as quoting Winston Churchill that they are going to win the war.

Off the record, I can say: Yes — that he is extremely confident, in the long run — in the very long pull. But at the same time — mind you this is off the record — at the same time, both he and I did talk over a tendency in — that goes with democracies for the population as a whole — the peoples that make up democracy — to be on the crest of the wave one minute, and in the depths of despair the next minute. It comes from our type of civilization. You don't find that in dictatorship countries, where individual thinking is almost entirely eliminated, by decree.

As an example, there was, as we all know, one reason for

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this vote the other day — mind you this is all off the record — there had been a feeling growing actually, because Russia had done a lot better than anybody expected, not only the press but the generals. (*Laughter*) And there was general “hooray boy” stuff that Russia was doing so much better than expected. Thereupon, everybody in the lightness of their hearts under the democratic system said: “Oh, isn’t that perfectly grand! Now let us — let us slow up a bit. Everything is going to be all right. Russia is going to come through.”

Now of course that is a terribly, terribly dangerous tendency. And there was a little of that feeling, I think, over in England itself — as much as to say: “This thing is all right now.”

And of course that can’t be justified, if you know all the facts. On the contrary, when you’re winning, or when things look a little bit better, that’s the time for you to redouble your efforts. If you think the thing through, there is a chance to redouble your efforts and go a little bit faster.

And — I wonder if I have got it — I have got an interesting thing — you might like to use it. See if I can find it. (*Looks through the papers in his workbasket*) It’s a thing I dug out of Carl Sandburg’s *Lincoln* [*The War Years*] the other day, something he said to some ladies who came in to see him at the end of the first year of the war, in 1862. If you will bear with me for a minute, I will try to find this. (*Still looking*) Here it is.

- This is Sandburg’s Volume One; 1862. Statement of Lincoln — (*Reading*)

“1862 — to Mrs. Mary A. Livermore, Chicago. ‘I have no word of encouragement to give!’ was the slow, blunt reply. ‘The military situation is far from bright; and the country knows it as well as I do.’

“The women were silent. They knew it was a heart-to-heart talk, that he was telling them what he could not well tell the country, that he was frankly relieving the burden of an overweighted mind. It was a silence of a moment, but ‘deep and painful,’ said Mrs. Livermore.

“The President went on ‘The fact is the people have not yet made up their minds that we are at war with the South.’”

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— mind you, this is a whole year later

“They have not buckled down to the determination to fight this war through; for they have got the idea into their heads that we are going to get out of this fix somehow by strategy! That’s the word — *strategy!* General McClellan thinks he is going to whip the Rebels by strategy; and the army has got the same notion. They have no idea that the War is to be carried on and put through by hard, tough fighting, that it will hurt somebody; and no headway is going to be made while this delusion lasts.’”

That is rather an interesting parallel. Lincoln’s belief that this country hadn’t yet waked up to the fact that they had a war to win, and Lincoln saw what had been going on. Well, there are quite a lot of things for us to think about in this day and age.

Q. Mr. President, would that very narrow vote on the draft bill indicate that perhaps there are others who hadn’t waked up to the war?

THE PRESIDENT: I think there are a lot of people who haven’t waked up to the danger. A great many people.

Q. Mr. President, if you were going to write a lead on that, how would you do it? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: I’d say, “President Quotes Lincoln” — (*Laughter*) — “And Draws Parallel.” . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I will read you something else which will be good for your souls. This is a letter I got this morning from an old friend of mine. (*Reading*):

“Inevitably, constant misuse can rob some phrases of their noble meaning. Therefore, regard for truth compels one to say that somewhere in the Atlantic you did make some history, and like all historic events, it was not what was said or done that defined the scope of the achievement. It is the forces, the impalpable, the spiritual forces, the hopes, the expressions, and the dreams, and the endeavors that are released. That’s what matters. And so all that is implied is the fact that you and Churchill met in the circumstances under which you did.

“The aims for which you met, that is the vital achievement from all — from which all else will flow. We live by symbols and we can’t too often recall them. And you two in that ocean, freed from all the tawdry accompaniment of cheap journalism” —

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(*laughter*)— I told you this is good for your souls — some of you, I mean —

“ — in the setting of that Sunday service, gave meaning to the conflict between civilization and arrogant, brute challenge; and gave promise more powerful and binding than any formal treaty could, that civilization has brains and resources that tyranny will not be able to overcome.

“All this talk of press and picture releases, and what not, are the merest trivia.”

That’s what I was coming down to — “the merest trivia.” Now that applies, in the last analysis, to whether so and so’s going into O.P.M., or somebody’s going into O.P.A.C.S. That’s *trivia*. There are so many bigger things, and the more we can get away from the trivia, in trying to get out of this great world danger, the better it will be. (*Continuing reading*)

“The deed and the spirit and the invigoration breathed there in the hearts of men will endure and will kindle actions toward the goal of ridding the world of this horror.”

So much for the trivia.

Q. Who was that, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: A friend. (*Loud laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, who is going to determine what is trivia?

THE PRESIDENT: Why, you fellows. Who else?

Q. There is a great deal of it gotten out.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Perfectly true.

Q. Mr. President, here is a real, trivial question. Can you say anything about the new War Department building in Arlington? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is of interest to not only the Washington papers. I think it ought to be of interest to everybody. I haven’t got the bill yet. And I have talked with the Director of the Budget about it, and I have had a number of memoranda, a number of pleas on one side. And tomorrow I am going to see General Somervell [Brehon B. Somervell], to hear the story on the other side.

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My present inclination is not to accept that action by the Congress. I don't say it is the final decision, because I haven't heard the other side yet, but there are some of you that I told over a year ago an old story to.

When I first came down here in 1933, I said I didn't think I would ever be let into the Gates of Heaven, because I had been responsible for desecrating the parks of Washington. Back in the fall of 1917, the Navy Department needed space, and I took up with President Wilson the possibility of building a temporary building — wooden building — down here on the Oval. And he said, "Why do you select that site?" I said, "Mr. President, because it would be so unsightly right here in front of the White House, that it just would have to be taken down at the end of the war." "Well," he said, "I don't think I could stand all that hammering and sawing right under my front windows." He said, "Can't you put it somewhere else?" So I said, "Of course. Put it down in Potomac Park." "Well," he said, "put it down there and we will get rid of it."

And then came up the question — they located it in the park — then came up the question of the dangers of a wooden building. And the President decided it should be a fireproof building; and I got hold of the Turner Construction Company, and they did a perfectly amazing job, as you know. Well, that was finished in the spring of 1918. That is 23 years ago, and the building is just as solid as the day it was built. There was nothing temporary about it; and then it was so good that we went ahead and put the Munitions Building right alongside.

It was a crime — I don't hesitate to say so — it was a crime for which I should be kept out of Heaven, for having desecrated the whole plan of, I think, the loveliest city in the world — the Capital of the United States. Now, a part of that plan, of course, as it developed over the years, created the great National Cemetery. General Lee's old place. And Ar-

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lington is known and loved throughout the length and breadth of the land.

The whole scheme of things was that people on this side of the river — I don't know how many tens of thousands of tourists there are every day here in this town — they go along down here by the river, and they look across to this lovely water front on the other side, and an unobstructed view of Arlington Cemetery — the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier — Lee's Homestead, and everything else.

And here it is — under the name of emergency, it is proposed to put up a permanent building, which will deliberately and definitely, for one hundred years to come, spoil the plan of the National Capital. Quite aside from any question of access to it, or where people live, how you get across the bridge, or anything else, I think that I have had a part in spoiling the national parks and the beautiful water front of the District once, and I don't want to do it again.

There are various other ways of handling the problem of space in the District. I'm going back to the consideration of another possibility. As you know, the plan six or seven years ago was accepted to build the new War Department on this side of the Naval Hospital, and build the Navy Department on the other side of the Naval Hospital. And I sort of felt that I was perhaps squaring myself with the Good Lord by building those two buildings during my Administration, and being able to take down the present Navy Building and Munitions Building in the park.

Now, I am perfectly willing for the War Department, which does need space very much, to go ahead and add some more at the present location for the War Department, and start right in and build the building which has been labeled for the Navy Department on the other side of the Naval Hospital hill. Turn that new Navy Department building over to the War Department until peace comes in the world. And when that time comes, the Army of course will cut down tremendously on its employees, and the Navy will be able to go back to its own building. Actually on footage — square feet

78. *Report to Congress on Atlantic Conference*

— the thing can be worked out pretty well. This building that is proposed on the other side of the river is much larger actually than we need in Washington. Besides which, it spoils the planning of 150 years.

NOTE: After the Atlantic Conference, Lord Beaverbrook (British Minister of Aircraft Production) came back to Washington for additional meetings with American officials and to prepare for the forthcoming conference at Moscow

(see Item 93 and note, this volume).

For additional accounts of the Atlantic Charter and its significance, see Items 74, 76, and 78, this volume; Item 82, 1942 volume; and Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume.

78 ¶ The President Reports to the Congress on His Atlantic Meeting with Prime Minister Churchill. August 21, 1941

To the Congress:

OVER a week ago I held several important conferences at sea with the British Prime Minister. Because of the factor of safety to British, Canadian, and American ships and their personnel no prior announcement of these meetings could properly be made.

At the close, a public statement by the Prime Minister and the President was made. I quote it for the information of the Congress and for the record:

(Here follows the Atlantic Charter, Item 74, this volume.)

* * *

The Congress and the President having heretofore determined through the Lend-Lease Act on the national policy of American aid to the democracies which east and west are waging war against dictatorships, the military and naval conversations at these meetings made clear gains in furthering the effectiveness of this aid.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister and I are arranging for con-

79. *Message to Convention of Young Democrats*

ferences with the Soviet Union to aid it in its defense against the attack made by the principal aggressor of the modern world — Germany.

Finally, the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is worth while for our type of civilization to seek. It is so clear cut that it is difficult to oppose in any major particular without automatically admitting a willingness to accept compromise with Nazism; or to agree to a world peace which would give to Nazism domination over large numbers of conquered Nations. Inevitably such a peace would be a gift to Nazism to take breath — armed breath — for a second war to extend the control over Europe and Asia to the American Hemisphere itself.

It is perhaps unnecessary for me to call attention once more to the utter lack of validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi Government.

It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles includes of necessity the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive.

NOTE: For additional accounts of this volume; Item 82, 1942 volume; the Atlantic Charter and its significance, see Items 74, 76, and 77, and Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume.

79 ¶ “Against Naked Force the Only Possible Defense Is Naked Force” — Message to the National Convention of Young Democrats.

August 21, 1941

DEMOCRACY has a new significance these days, for the word, whether spelled with a capital or a small “D,” has merged the meaning of both.

79. *Message to Convention of Young Democrats*

In its world-wide application, it means the defense of the great freedoms against the encroachment and attack of the dark forces of despotism which would reenslave the globe by turning back the clock of progress half a thousand years.

Domestically, democracy represents the efforts to continue and improve the condition of the individual, to protect the gains toward liberty — social and economic — that we have attained throughout the century and a half of the life of our Republic. Though the definitions differ in phrase, the objectives in the two fields are identical.

Across both oceans, on the oceans, and above the oceans the struggle is one of armed forces, with the ghastly result of destruction and slaughter on a scale unparalleled in modern history. It had to be so.

Against naked force the only possible defense is naked force. The aggressor makes the rules for such a war; the defenders have no alternative but matching destruction with more destruction, slaughter with greater slaughter.

At home, for a time we cherished the vain hope that the war would let us alone; inexorable events abroad taught us that there could be no safety in passivity; no sanctuary in isolation. So we were forced to disrupt our industrial fabric; not only to arm ourselves to the teeth; to become the armory for the democracies, for it soon became evident that only by defeating the sinister powers of cynical conquest, before they reach our shores, could we even have the slightest chance of staying out of actual war.

Unfortunately, here, as abroad, there were and are appeasers and compromisers who contend for treaties with forces that make a mock of treaties; for agreements with forces that forswear promises and pledges at their convenience. Granted that there are some who are making the progress of our national defense difficult, who are sincere in their beliefs that in some mysterious way peace may come with inaction, or inadequate action — what they advocate is none the less perilous to national security. Their horror of war is not more intense than that of those of us who are

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convinced that only by having the brigand Nations stopped abroad is there safety for the Americas.

As to what steps are required to stop the Nazis, I certainly am more inclined to accept the judgment of our Army and Navy experts, who have devoted a lifetime to the study of defending America, than I am to consider the judgment of even the most sincere exponent of the idea that we can occupy a water-tight compartment in a world filled with war.

I, like the rest of you, hoped that domestic politics would play no part in our defense measures. To some extent our hopes are realized — a multitude of the opposition party is serving the cause zealously and efficiently — but on the other hand, the votes in Congress on the various steps in our preparedness show that partisan politics is still rampant.

There are a very few who still wear a Democratic label who have joined the obstructionists. I think these are in the wrong party.

I would be the last person to dispute or limit the right of every citizen to have his own opinion and express it, and I know you are with me as to the preservation of that utmost freedom. But whether an individual against the principles and policies of a political party retains the right of membership in that party is a different question.

Patriotism is immensely more important than party loyalty, but when party loyalty goes hand in hand with devotion to our country, and a determination to keep that country free and safe, there is no division of allegiance.

I have implicit faith in the youth of this country; I have no doubt where you stand. I only ask you to keep your ranks clear and clean of whatever subversive influences add to our country's peril or make more difficult its protection.

80 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Sixty-third Press Conference (Excerpts). August 22, 1941

(Senator Byrd and production progress — America First speeches — Hamilton Fish — Plans for Moscow Conference.)

Q. Good morning, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. How is everybody? Did you have a nice ride?

Q. Indeed.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think after this performance we can put the lid on. There should be no further news. I am not going to guarantee anything. I won't see Mr. Churchill over the week end, or Mr. Mackenzie King, or any other Prime Minister. You might play golf, as a suggestion. I don't think there is any news.

Oh yes there is too. I entirely forgot. I heard about and read that speech by Senator Byrd, giving figures on defense production, and I sent it to the War Department to ask for a check on the figures, and the War Department said that most unfortunately all of the figures, except on planes, are completely inaccurate, and somebody — unfortunately — has misled the Senator. But the War Department for obvious reasons can't give out the exact figures, but they gave me certain illustrations on things that they said it's all right to make public, which illustrations are examples of all of the other cases — of figures to use, except airplanes.

The Senator said that not a single tank had gone to England. Actually, we have turned over to the British hundreds of tanks of modern design produced during the last year. Some of these tanks, as we all know, are in Egypt, and the papers have had various stories on the excellence of their performance. They are with the British in Egypt.

In the case of anti-aircraft guns, the Senator said the program provides for an average monthly delivery of only four 90-mm. guns a month during the balance of this year. The

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program actually calls for a monthly delivery of 61 for the four remaining months of this year, and the War Department believes that they will be met. In other words, there is a certain difference between the figure 4 and the figure 61.

And another example is the 37-mm. anti-tank gun. The Senator said that these guns will be produced only at the rate of 15 a month. Actual production in July was 72. August production will be 160, September 260, and October 320.

Q. What was the Senator's figure on that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Fifteen. There seems to be a certain discrepancy between the figure 15 and the figures that I have just given. Even if you add a zero to 15 you would still be way below the actual numbers. Fourth, the Senator said that only fifteen 81-mm. mortars will be produced in the immediate months ahead. In July there were actually, instead of 15, there were 221 produced, and in August the figure is 340.

Q. Excuse me, Mr. President, what type of gun was that?

THE PRESIDENT: Eighty-one-mm. mortar — now you know as much as I do — and the figures for September and October will be even larger than 340, so there would seem to be somewhat of a difference between the figure 15 and the figure 340. The figures, of course, on the airplanes, are substantially correct, except that he said that the production of military planes progressively declined in the months of June and July, which is not strictly true. The number of training planes increased and the others remained steady — the military planes, because there were certain changes in design, and the testing of the new design to meet lessons that were learned this spring. . . . But the fact that remains — that statement as a whole in every single item, except planes, was full of discrepancies that ran just as high as those discrepancies which the War Department says it's all right to mention. . . .

Q. Mr. President, Congressman Fish and Dr. MacCracken of Vassar both addressed recent America First rallies, and Fish has pointed out — has gotten to the point now where he was

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quoted as saying that if Germany should lose, why America — America would suffer through loss of markets and buying power.

THE PRESIDENT: If Germany loses?

Q. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: So, he thinks we wouldn't lose if Germany won. (*He laughs*) I don't think any comment that could be printed is necessary.

Q. Of course, Dr. MacCracken has taken the point of view that —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) You know, once upon a time there was a fellow — this you might use only as background — there was a fellow who had a great deal more information and was a much more reasoning person than any of the people — I won't say Fish or MacCracken — it's obvious whom I am talking about. His name is Senator Borah — in many ways a very great statesman, and certainly with experience and information that was far better than most of the speakers. And he was the gentleman who in July, 1939 — the famous conference upstairs — after the Secretary of State, who had still more information than he had, said that, "From our information we really believed regretfully that a war would break out that year," turned to the Secretary of State and said, "I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, my information is better than yours. There will be no war this year." And yet he had been on the Foreign Relations Committee and everything else, and had been there for years and years — nearly forty years. In the Senate he certainly had far more information than any of these people that are going around making speeches today; and of course his error has become a classic.

Q. Walter Lippmann says that these Senators — the Foreign Relations groups — are people that got us into trouble over a long period of years.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and a good many other people have got us in trouble over a period of years.

Q. Mr. Fish is on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. Maybe that qualifies him to make a few errors.

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THE PRESIDENT: I think — off the record — that is probably correct. (*Laughter*) . . .

Q. Mr. President, have you heard directly from Mr. Stalin on the proposal of the three-party conference on supplies?

THE PRESIDENT: You have all the stuff.

Q. Have you got to the point yet, sir, of naming your commission?

THE PRESIDENT: Not yet.

Q. How soon?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. The time hasn't been set.

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) The State Department is taking it up all the time.

Q. Mr. President, off the record, is any written reply called for on that?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. Off the record, the reply in effect has been made, because when the — this has to be off the record — I think it has been printed. I don't know, but there is no use to bring the subject up again. It isn't news. When the message was delivered by Steinhardt [Laurence A. Steinhardt, U. S. Ambassador to Russia] and Cripps, Mr. Stalin informally thanked them very much for it and then made an oral reply which was taken down, the same thing as a written reply. You might call it a formal oral reply, and was taken down by way of what the diplomats would say, an "*aide-mémoire*." There is no difference between that and a written one. Same thing. . . .

Q. Mr. President, on this production matter, do you feel that over-all the production has been satisfactory from a military point of view?

THE PRESIDENT: It has never been satisfactory.

Q. But it has not lagged behind the program?

THE PRESIDENT: Behind estimates? In some things it is ahead of estimates, and some things behind. Of course, that is on the assumption always that the original estimates were right. There is always the human possibility that they were too

81. *Veto of Wheat Marketing Quotas Bill*

low. And there is the possibility in some other cases that they were too high. But on the actual estimates the averages were up too. I don't think anybody has asked Mr. Knudsen in the last two or three months. I should think somebody ought to ask him. You remember he talked about airplanes and gave the figure of 85 percent of the estimates. Quite a long while ago. And what his present estimate is, I don't know, but pretty close to the estimate. The original estimate I think was 1,500 planes in — first of July, and they were up to 1,465 as I remember it at that time. That is a monthly production. . . .

NOTE: See Item 96, p. 391, 1939 volume, for the President's press conference remarks following Senator Borah's claim that his sources of "private information" indicated there would be no European war in 1939.

See Item 75 and note, this volume, for the joint Roosevelt-Churchill message asking for a Moscow Conference; see also Item 93 and note, this volume, for an account of the Moscow Conference.

81 ¶ The President Vetoes a Bill Relating to Wheat Marketing Quotas. August 25, 1941

To the House of Representatives:

I AM RETURNING herewith, without my approval, a bill (H. R. 5300) entitled "An Act relating to wheat marketing quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, to provide for withholding from the normal channels of trade and commerce Government-owned cotton and wheat of the 1940 and previous crops, and to provide 85 per centum of parity with respect to peanuts of the 1941 crop."

It is my conviction that approval of the measure would seriously and adversely affect the Agricultural Adjustment Program and the attendant policies which have been so beneficial to our farmers during the past few years.

81. Veto of Wheat Marketing Quotas Bill

One provision of this act would permit the farmers to dispose of, as feed, without penalty, an indefinite amount of wheat produced in excess of their farm acreage allotments for 1941. This provision would place a premium on non-compliance with the wheat program, constitute a breach of faith with the large majority of farmers who complied with the program, and so relax the control features of the farm program as to adversely affect future participation therein.

Even more objectionable is the provision which would direct the Commodity Credit Corporation to acquire title to all cotton and wheat of the 1940 and previous crops in which it has an interest, and to hold these commodities for an indefinite period. The goal of the Administration's agricultural policy has been parity prices for the farmers and this has been accepted by the producers, the consumers, and the Congress as fair and reasonable. I do not feel that farmers would wish this acceptance destroyed by action designed to force prices above parity through the arbitrary withholding of Government-owned stocks from the normal channels of trade and commerce.

Recently, I approved legislation enacted by the Congress authorizing the Commodity Credit Corporation to make loans at a rate of 85 percent of the parity prices of the five basic agricultural commodities, which, in addition to agricultural conservation payments and authorized parity payments, will enable the growers of these crops to realize parity for their 1941 production. Parity, however, is only one of two elements of income. The other is volume sold. The ultimate effect of this bill would be to restrict the volume of the products sold and thus shrink the use of and the market for these commodities. Moreover, in times such as these no one can foresee how soon these Government-owned stocks may be needed.

The Commodity Credit Corporation should be free to dispose of the commodities acquired under the loan programs in an orderly manner. Otherwise, it will be impossible to maintain an "Ever-Normal Granary" to protect farmers against surpluses and consumers against scarcity. Restriction of this authority of the Corporation would greatly increase its losses, nullify the effec-

82. *Seven Hundred and Sixty-fourth Press Conference*

tiveness of existing programs, and, by breaking faith with consumers, be inconsistent with our present price control efforts.

In my judgment, this bill is contrary to sound governmental policy and the long-time best interests of both farmers and consumers.

82 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Sixty-fourth Press Conference (Excerpts). August 26, 1941

(Mission to China on lend-lease — Storage of Government records — Campaign of rumors against lend-lease — Oil supply — Organization for priorities control.)

THE PRESIDENT: The first thing I have is a statement, which you needn't take down. Steve sent it down to be put on the mimeograph — one page. *(Paraphrasing):*

“This Government is prepared to send a military mission to China. The mission will be sent for the purpose of assisting in carrying out the purposes of the Lease-Lend Act. Being organized and will operate under the direction of the Secretary of War. The chief will be Brigadier General John Magruder. The function of the mission will be to study in collaboration with Chinese and other authorities the military situation in China, and need of Chinese Government for matériel. Formulate recommendations regarding types and quantities of items needed; to assist and procure in this country and deliver to China such matériel; to instruct in the use and maintenance of articles thus provided. Give advice and suggestions of appropriate character toward making Lend-Lease assistance to China as effective as possible in the interests of the United States, of China, and of the world effort to resistance to movements of conquest by force. Sending this mission is in keeping with, and on a parallel line to, sending a similar mission to the Soviet Union. The purposes of the two missions are identical.”

That is, of course, with the exception of the Lend-Lease Act which does not apply to the Soviet Union. *(Reading)*

“General Magruder has had long experience in China. Has twice served there as Military Attaché. He will be working on familiar ground, among

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people he knows well, and to whom he is well known. An adequate staff of thoroughly qualified officers will accompany General Magruder."

Q. Mr. President, your announcement says that these men will collaborate with Chinese and "other authorities." Can you explain the "other authorities?"

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, but I will make a guess: That it probably applies to the method of getting material to China which might have to go, for example, through Burma. That would be other authorities, wouldn't it?

Q. How about the Russians?

THE PRESIDENT: Same thing.

Q. When would they really leave?

THE PRESIDENT: I think inside of about two weeks. . . .

Q. How soon do you expect to appoint the Russian mission?

THE PRESIDENT: Soon.

Q. Nothing unusual in delaying that, is there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not a thing. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The only other thing I have got is this. We have in the Government an enormous number of papers, which are not archives. They are records. Well, there is all the difference in the world. Archives are supposed to be really tremendously important papers relating to our national history, and rather limited in their total scope. On the other hand, there are millions and millions of records which are occasionally looked at, but which are not of general historical importance, but which are of family or genealogical importance. For instance, we have, I think, somewhere around three million individual jackets of the Civil War soldiers. And the tendency of any department is to hang on. It's not merely acquisitive, but it is retentive.

And here are these three million jackets. Now the individual soldiers that served in the Civil War, actually they are referred to about ten a day, that is all. In other words, one filing clerk can handle the whole thing and get them out as needed. We have public lands records on the development of the great West — as far back as 1820 or 1830 — I think the In-

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terior Department has jurisdiction over them. There are millions and millions of those and only ten or fifteen of them referred to in the course of the day. They are records rather than archives, and what we need is a great records building. The Census records, they are dead. The Census records going back as far as, I think, 1790. Those are records, and they certainly are not archives. They ought not to be kept in the building devoted to current administration.

Now, my thought is that this new War Department building over there would be built on extremely simple lines, and that when this emergency is over, and the War Department reverts to a peacetime status, they will be able to come back here to their regular place in this triangle which we are developing, and that in peacetime this building over there, of two million, or two and a quarter million feet, should be the — I think the word is repository — for the records — the dead records of all these departments.

I always think of this retentive spirit. I went over, in pursuance of this subject — two or three years ago — to the State Department one afternoon — after all the people had gone home — because they assured me that in the State Department over here they only had very current records. Nothing more than four or five years old. Everything else was stored. Well, frankly, I didn't believe it, and I went over there, and I got into a wheel chair, and I wheeled through various rooms, and came to a closed door which had been separated off.

One of these great doors was opened up, and there was a great, big, long room — oh, I suppose six or eight people had worked there in the course of the day — nobody there, they had all gone home — and along the sides of the room and stacked out into the middle of the room were hundreds of square feet of filing cabinets. So at random I said, "Open that one." And in there it happened to be a case that was devoted to consular reports of the years 1907 to 1911, on the "History and Future of the Mongolian Pony." (*Laughter*) It's very nice, but it wasn't exactly current, or of great importance at

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that particular time. It was a record story, and it ought not to have been in that building, while the State Department was yelling for more space. They had it right there. So I hope that this new building, when this emergency is over, will be used as a records building for the Government. . . .

Q. Mr. President, there are rumors that lend-lease has been misused. Would you care to comment on those rumors?

THE PRESIDENT: Where?

Q. There have been printed rumors.

THE PRESIDENT: I mean — but where?

Q. One of them that I read in a local paper was that the British had run up large bills at a local restaurant — whisky — liquor.

THE PRESIDENT: Where?

Q. The restaurant? Occidental Restaurant.

THE PRESIDENT: I am very certain that that was never charged to lend-lease. And I suppose it's a perfectly fair thing to say, in view of these columns — I think it has got to the point where it can be said, in view of your raising the question, that there can be no doubt that there is an organized campaign to spread rumors, distortions of half-truths, and I fear falsehoods — you probably know the word — being launched by certain forces to sabotage the program of aid to opponents of Hitlerism. And the column which you quote is probably a very good example of what I am talking about. Of course it is perfectly absurd to make any allegations along the lines like that, because they just plain aren't true. It is awfully easy to make allegations and they're read all over the country. Don't say that it is a denial on my part or on anybody else's part.

I think it is a perfectly fair thing to say that all stories of that kind are, as I remarked before, vicious rumors, or distortions of fact, or falsehoods. Now, in other words, that is not a denial. You know my old complaint about things. The denial method is awfully easy for the press to use, but the actual fact is that this type of story — in certain types of newspapers — ought to be labeled for what it is, and the story is the labeling of them as falsehoods, and the spreading of rumor

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for purposes of sabotage rather than the denial. Denial does not make any difference one way or the other. It's just plain dirty falsehood. Might just as well call it by its right name.

Q. Are you familiar with an article — I think it was published in *Time*? The report of it was that lend-lease money had been utilized by English interests in such a way that the product of this transaction interfered with or competed with American-made goods.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Of course, what the origin of it was is this, that they did have — dating back a long time — long before any lend-lease program, or anything like that, where they were trying to build up their own foreign exchange, they had some contracts down there — I think it was the Argentine — which required certain steel to carry the contract. And in the performance of this contract — it was entered into long before lend-lease — they did deliver the material, which was part steel, in carrying out the contract. Now, nobody in their wildest dreams could say that that was selling lend-lease material.

Q. Was it American steel that they sent down there?

THE PRESIDENT: No. It was their own steel, but of course they imported steel from us. . . .

Q. That same kind of thing is coming out with regard to tankers now. Stories that the British have tankers in commercial use, which is being picked on in the Senate.

THE PRESIDENT: Being what?

Q. Well, it's being kicked around in the Senate that the British are using tankers for commercial purposes, while we are not.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course that is the kind of variation — you have got to tell me where. We ran down the other question. We said, "Where?" to the person who asked the question about the steel, and we narrowed it down finally and we agreed it was steel to the Argentine. I think on the tankers in commercial use, where?

Q. They are basing their argument, Mr. President, on total figures of tankers in existence at the start of the war — estimated

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sinkings according to official figures, and they say that there will be more in commercial service than they have got — more than they need for war use.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, that does not hold water, that kind of statement. It means nothing. When you deduct from total figures you do not know where the rest of it is going.

Q. Can you answer this question? Has the British Government asked for — for any more tankers? The rumor's out — 70 or 100 tankers.

THE PRESIDENT: I couldn't tell you. I can only tell you in terms of merchant ships. I think the story was in today's paper about the laying down of more ways for more merchant ships. Now some of them may be tankers.

Q. No. This is a statement which came from the Senate anonymously. The anonymous Senator said that 70 tankers — I know the story said 100 oil tankers — for carrying oil would be taken from America for British needs. Do you happen to know anything about that at all?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. As a matter of fact, of course, on the oil situation, there are two reasons to believe that in the East this question of domestic oil will be better by spring. The two reasons are the fact that there will be a lot more tankers launched and put into commission by then, on the assumption that the sinkings don't increase, and we will have a greater number available; and the second is that the two pipelines will be in use sometime this spring. Of course that will help.

Q. Mr. President, has Judge Rosenman reported to you yet on his study of the O.P.M. and O.P.A.C.S. priorities trouble?

THE PRESIDENT: We are nearly ready to tell you something. The papers are now being worked on. And the problem, of course — this particular problem is the problem of priorities. And there are a great many factors that enter into priorities. There is domestic use, and what is very important is the fact that in addition to domestic use there are other things like South American Good-Neighbor policy and this new Economic Defense Board.

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There is the problem of China, and, I think, equally important, is the problem of working out the use of priorities, putting people to work in industries that have those plants that have to close down, or transfer to other defense projects, or the substitution of other things for the plant itself to make. And that is being worked out, so that while there may be, in the next few weeks, a certain amount of hardship, I think to tide it over we will have to use unemployment insurance for a while, until we get the organization perfected so that there will be a little leeway of thirty days or sixty days before any given plant is closed down for lack of materials; and that during those thirty days, or sixty days, the Federal authorities, the State authorities, and the local authorities will all cooperate to put those people to work somewhere else, as near by as possible, or in the same plant on other things. . . .

NOTE: See Item 83 and note, this volume, for the establishment and functions of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, which the President set up after I had concluded a study of defense organization during the early weeks of August.

83 ¶ The Supply Priorities and Allocations Board Is Created. Executive Order No. 8875. August 28, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the unlimited national emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, and for the purpose of assuring effective coordination of the priority powers and supply allocation activities of the Federal Government in furtherance of and in conformity with the basic defense policies of the President, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Office of Production Management, in addition to the

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responsibilities and duties described in paragraph 2 of Executive Order No. 8629 of January 7, 1941, is authorized and directed to discharge and perform the following responsibilities and duties, subject to such policies or regulations as the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, hereinafter described, may from time to time determine:

a. Serve as the coordinating center for the execution of the powers and activities of the several departments and agencies relating to priorities; in this connection, review, clear, and approve for execution all requests or proposals originating from other Federal agencies, private industry, or other sources for priority action with respect to the procurement, production, transmission, or transportation of materials, articles, power, fuel, and other commodities; issue or provide for the issuance of all priority orders, warrants, certificates, or ratings with respect to the supply, production, transmission, or transportation of materials, articles, power, fuel, and other commodities; and, with reference to specific priority authorities vested by law in established departments and agencies of the Government, certify to such departments and agencies, when the Office of Production Management deems such action necessary to national defense, that preferential treatment is essential for certain materials, commodities, facilities, or services.

b. Perform the functions and exercise all the power, authority, and discretion conferred upon the President by Public No. 89, 77th Congress, 1st session, entitled "An Act to amend the Act approved June 28, 1940, entitled 'An Act to expedite the national defense, and for other purposes,' in order to extend the power to establish priorities and allocate material," approved May 31, 1941.

c. In consultation with the United States Maritime Commission, determine when, to what extent, and in what manner priorities shall be accorded to deliveries of material as provided in section 2(a)(3) of Public No. 46, 77th Congress, 1st session, an Act entitled "To make emergency provision for certain activities of the United States Maritime Commission,

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and for other purposes," approved May 2, 1941. Deliveries of material shall take priority as provided in said Act in accordance with such determinations and the orders issued in pursuance thereof by the Office of Production Management.

d. Continue to perform the functions and exercise all the power, authority, and discretion conferred on the President by section 2(a) of the Act entitled "An Act to expedite national defense and for other purposes," approved June 28, 1940.

2. The Office of Production Management may exercise the powers, authorities, or discretion conferred upon it by this Order through such officials and in such manner as it may determine, subject to such policies or regulations as the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board may from time to time determine.

3. In order to assure unity of policy and coordinated consideration of all relevant factors involved in the supply and allocation of materials and commodities among the various phases of the defense program and competing civilian demands, there is hereby established within the Office for Emergency Management a Supply Priorities and Allocations Board. The Board shall consist of the Director General and Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Special Assistant to the President supervising the defense aid program, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, and the Chairman of the Economic Defense Board. The Chairman of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board shall be designated by the President from among the members of the Board. The President shall also appoint an Executive Director of the Board, who will preside in the absence of the Chairman.

4. The Office of Production Management shall make available to the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board upon request, such staff, statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other services and facilities as may from time to time be required by the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board to perform its duties hereunder.

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5. Consistent with the basic defense policies of the President, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board shall:

a. Determine the total requirements of materials and commodities needed respectively for defense, civilian, and all other purposes; establish policies for the fulfillment of such requirements, and, where necessary, make recommendations to the President relative thereto.

b. Determine policies and make regulations governing allocations and priorities with respect to the procurement, production, transmission, or transportation of materials, articles, power, fuel, and other commodities among military, economic defense, defense aid, civilian, and other major demands of the total defense program.

6. The Office of Production Management through its Division of Priorities or any other of its divisions or subdivisions shall formulate general plans and programs providing for allocations and priorities with respect to the procurement, production, transmission, or transportation of materials, articles, power, fuel, and other commodities among military requirements, economic defense needs, total civilian demands, defense aid needs, and other major elements of the total defense program. Such general plans and programs shall be submitted to the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board for approval or modification.

7. There shall be within the Office of Production Management a Division of Civilian Supply to be in charge of a Director appointed by the Office of Production Management with the approval of the President. The Division of Civilian Supply shall represent civilian interests relating to the supply and priority activities of the Office of Production Management. It shall formulate plans and programs providing for the equitable distribution among competing civilian demands of the materials, articles, power, fuel, and other commodities made available by the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board for civilian use. Such plans and programs shall be submitted through the Office of Production Management to the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board for approval or modification.

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8. The title of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, established by Executive Order No. 8734 of April 11, 1941, is hereby changed to Office of Price Administration.

9. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to include the power to determine the disposition or transfer of any defense articles to the Government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States, as provided in Public No. 11, 77th Congress, 1st session, entitled "An Act further to promote the defense of the United States and for other purposes," approved March 11, 1941.

10. The Priorities Board of the Office of Production Management described in paragraph 5 of Executive Order No. 8629, establishing such Office, is hereby abolished.

11. Executive Orders No. 8629 of January 7, 1941, and No. 8734 of April 11, 1941, are hereby amended accordingly, and any conflicting provisions of these or other Executive Orders are hereby rescinded.

NOTE: Shortly after the invasion of France and the Low Countries, the President decided to reconstitute the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense under statutory authority conferred during the first World War. (See Item 53, pp. 241-250, 1940 volume for the President's discussion at a press conference of the establishment and function of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense.) Seven commissioners comprised the reconstituted National Defense Advisory Commission; one commissioner was charged with advising the President in respect to industrial materials; a second, in respect to industrial production; a third, in respect to labor and employment; a fourth, in

respect to agriculture; a fifth, in respect to transportation; a sixth, in respect to price stabilization; and the seventh, in respect to consumer protection.

The administrative machinery for the defense program was strengthened in January, 1941, with the establishment of the Office of Production Management, which took over the work of the commissioners on industrial materials, industrial production, and labor and employment. (See Items 153 and 154, pp. 679-702, and note, 1940 volume, for an account of the organization and activities of the Office of Production Management.) Subsequently, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply was established on April 11, 1941, as a successor to

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the functions of the commissioners on price stabilization and consumer protection of the National Defense Advisory Commission (see Item 26 and note, this volume, for an account of the establishment and functions of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply). This left the N.D.A.C. with functions relating only to agriculture and transportation.

International events moved quickly during 1941 and placed new burdens on defense machinery and facilities. The enactment of Lend-Lease in March, the invasion of the Balkans in April, and the invasion of Russia in June all presented new challenges to defense production. As the defense program intensified, requirements mounted and shortages became more and more evident. It soon became apparent that careful planning and control were imperative in order to distribute our resources in such a way as to satisfy the most essential needs of the national defense industries, and to sacrifice the least essential needs. But this shift from the civilian luxuries to the war production necessities was not easy, for there were substantial elements of the public, of industry, and of the lawmakers, who were not yet prepared to recognize the urgencies of the day.

In the months following its establishment in January, 1941, the Office of Production Management focused its energies upon the mobilization of industry for military production.

The O.P.M. in general ignored production for essential civilian needs; it did not plan for the allocation of those materials and commodities which remained after the demands of military production had been met in order to assure continued production of civilian essentials. Increasingly larger amounts of consumer goods were withdrawn from potential civilian supply as the demands of Lend-Lease and national defense mounted. In April, 1941, the imperative function of allocating civilian supply was assigned to the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply because of the close economic relationship between civilian supply and price control, and also because the O.P.M. was devoting only a small amount of attention to civilian needs.

This division of functions soon led to conflict between O.P.M. and O.P.A.C.S. O.P.A.C.S. adopted the view that it had the responsibility of developing plans for the allocation of civilian supply in order to insure the most equitable distribution of scarce materials. These allocations were submitted to O.P.M. for that agency to execute through the exercise of its authority to issue priorities. O.P.M., however, insisted that it was not possible to draw a sharp line between civilian needs and national defense needs, and that, therefore, control over military production and civilian supply should be a unified process directed by a single agency.

But through the later months of

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1941, the economy of the United States tightened in order to achieve the "impossible" in defense production. Speed and clarity of action became essential. Yet neither speed nor clarity existed as long as it was necessary for O.P.A.C.S. to clear an increasing number of priority actions with O.P.M. before carrying them out. O.P.A.C.S. began to find that there was often a marked difference in its own point of view toward the necessity for curtailment of civilian supply and the point of view of the businessmen in O.P.M. who fought the cutting of civilian supplies. The result was conflict.

Such a conflict arose, for example, when Leon Henderson, O.P.A.C.S. Administrator, and William S. Knudsen, Director General of O.P.M., differed as to the amount by which the auto industry should cut production. There was indeed a sharp and public clash between Knudsen and Henderson on this issue. The dispute raised the fundamental question of what administrative machinery could be devised to take into account the requirements not only of military production, of lend-lease, and of other forms of economic warfare, but also of civilian supply. Some machinery was necessary to make a selection among, and to integrate, all these demands.

A further issue between O.P.M. and O.P.A.C.S. arose over the composition and use of industry advisory committees by O.P.M. These committees were attached to O.P.M.

in order to furnish advice on production and requirements problems. It was originally intended that O.P.A.C.S. would also make use of the same committees in order to avoid a duplicate set of committees for each agency. As the differences in point of view between O.P.M. and O.P.A.C.S. intensified, O.P.A.C.S. proposed to set up its own committees, thus further confusing the relationships between Government and industry.

An account of these interagency disputes is necessary properly to report the ultimate evolution of the administrative machinery which was to govern our war production and economy. But the disputes must not obscure the fact that the national defense program was making giant strides in the summer of 1941. The tooling-up period had been completed; non-essential industries were rapidly being converted to military production; but American industry was not yet meeting the high goals of defense production set by the President. The experience of mid-1941 demonstrated that the President needed more effective machinery to perform the vexing tasks of planning and directing the defense effort in order to achieve the maximum results.

The President concentrated his attention on this problem of defense organization in the early summer of 1941. At that time, and shortly before he left for his Atlantic Charter meeting with Prime Minister Churchill (see Items 74

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and 78, this volume), he called me to Washington, D. C., to study the problems and to draft details of a reorganization. I worked on the questions for several weeks. The President had to defer final action until he had returned from his meeting. After his return, further discussions were held with officials of the Bureau of the Budget, O.P.M., O.P.A.C.S., the War and Navy Departments, Maritime Commission, Interior Department, Commerce Department, and other agencies. The President recognized that it was necessary to set up a new organization which would do a more effective job and at the same time give due consideration to the personalities available to fill the key posts.

This was probably the most difficult of any of the administrative reorganizations on which I worked during the Roosevelt administrations. It was difficult because there were so many competing demands and personalities involved. It was difficult because we were not yet actually at war, and the great patriotic disinterestedness of later months had not yet developed. There had been no basic decisions made as yet on the question of how America's resources should be allocated among civilians, the military, lend-lease, and the other claimants.

When I got down to Washington, one of the first things I did after examining the problem with the President was to confer indi-

vidually with the heads of the interested agencies and other individuals. Every now and then I would report to the President and tell him of the progress I was making, and the recommendations that the various Federal officials had made. Often I would check with him over cocktails, or at dinner, or at odd moments during the day.

Those unfamiliar with governmental affairs cannot appreciate the long negotiations which must precede the final formulation of any Executive Order which has to do with reshuffling administrative agencies and functions. Even after the major decisions are reached, there must follow many conferences with the interested departments and agencies in order to spell out the precise terms of the Order. This is necessary not only because the terms of the Order must be made consistent with the body of previous law and orders which govern the operation of an agency, but also because the Order must be written so that all departments and agencies can cooperate wholeheartedly in carrying it out. After talking individually with agency heads and others I would call groups of individuals from different agencies for White House conferences so as to iron out differences among them and try to get agreement. I also encouraged the agencies to get together themselves and present me with their joint conclusions. The Bureau of the Budget often acted

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as moderator and catalytic agent at these inter-agency conferences.

In Washington, one soon discovers that certain individuals have breadth of vision in governmental affairs, while others, although patriotic and public-spirited, seldom see beyond the limits of the needs and desires of their own agency. In working out the decisions and details of these reorganizations, I conceived it as my role to act for the President in such a way that he would not have to be burdened by many conferences or the working out of compromises. In doing this, it was necessary to adopt a point of view which was somewhat broader than that of the competing agencies, yet which recognized that the agencies themselves had to administer the Order after it was written. There were very many men who had broad perspective — such as Wayne Coy (then Liaison Officer for Emergency Management, who had the confidence of the President), Director of the Bureau of the Budget Harold D. Smith, and others — who gave me invaluable help in this reorganization. Valuable ideas and suggestions were also offered by others within the existing agencies such as William S. Knudsen, Sidney Hillman, Donald M. Nelson, Sidney Weinberg, David Ginsburg, and others.

During these negotiations I was impressed by the ideas presented by Leon Henderson, at that time Director of O.P.A.C.S. I have a very vivid recollection of the vigor and

gusto with which Leon pounded the table in the White House cabinet room, presenting his convictions that civilian luxuries would have to go by the boards if our production program was to be effective. Events subsequently proved the soundness of his contentions.

Along about mid-August, the ideas for the new agency had become fairly well crystallized and we started working out the terms of the Order itself. I asked the Bureau of the Budget to prepare several alternative drafts to show the President, along with charts of the contemplated organization. In this work, the men in the Bureau of the Budget, particularly men like Donald C. Stone and Bernard L. Gladieux, were very helpful not only because of their ability, but also because of their over-all point of view.

The resolution of the issues was embodied in the foregoing Executive Order, which established the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board. Vice President Wallace served as Chairman of the Board (in addition to his services as Chairman of the Economic Defense Board); its members were the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, William S. Knudsen and Sidney Hillman (Director General and Associate Director General, respectively, of the Office of Production Management), Price Administrator Leon Henderson, and Harry L. Hopkins (Special Assistant to the President supervising the lend-lease

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program). In this way each interest which had a claim to materials was represented: military, lend-lease, economic warfare, civilian. Donald M. Nelson was appointed Executive Director of the new Board; he also was designated Director of the Priorities Division of O.P.M. S.P.A.B. was given power to make policy decisions on dividing the available supply of materials between military needs, lend-lease needs, and civilian needs. It also was empowered to determine the policies relating to allocations of supply among the various civilian industries and users in the United States. While S.P.A.B. was given authority to establish policies in the allocation of materials, final power to determine the distribution of finished matériel — such as planes, guns, and ships — remained with the President. The administration of the policies established by the S.P.A.B., through the issuance of priority certificates to carry out these purposes, rested with O.P.M. The day-by-day administration of specific priorities and the passing on specific priority applications (of which several thousands were forwarded every week) was administered by the Priorities Division of O.P.M., under the direction of Donald M. Nelson.

Under the foregoing Executive Order, the Division of Civilian Supply was transferred from O.P.A.C.S. to O.P.M., but Price Administrator Leon Henderson was placed in charge of the Division. By these

means, the functions of priority control and civilian supply were merged while at the same time full recognition was given to the necessity for curtailment of civilian consumption where it interfered with military needs. With the transfer of the Division of Civilian Supply, the name of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply was changed to Office of Price Administration.

After the issuance of the foregoing Order, the industry committees and advisory committees existing in O.P.M. and O.P.A.C.S. were consolidated so that on questions of priorities, allocations, and production the several industries affected had one unified contact with the Government.

It was recognized that the operation of the priorities system would result in the dislocation of the economy by forcing factories which manufactured non-defense materials to curtail their work and in some cases shut down. Therefore, after the issuance of the Order, O.P.M. took steps to promote subcontracting and the farming out of defense orders among smaller industries. It also assisted non-defense plants to qualify themselves to take defense orders by making minor changes in their equipment and machine tools. In addition, the Labor Division of O.P.M. established committees representing management, labor, and Government to deal with the orderly transfer of workers from non-defense jobs to defense jobs. Silk

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workers and workers in the automobile industry were among the first group to be transferred on a wide scale through the assistance of the Labor Division of O.P.M. (see Item 44 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the establishment and functions of the War Manpower Commission in the field of manpower utilization).

In the slightly more than three months which intervened between the establishment of S.P.A.B. and the attack at Pearl Harbor, the new Board set the Nation's sights on full industrial mobilization and performed a careful allocation of the strategic and critical materials needed for defense, lend-lease, and civilian needs. S.P.A.B. initiated a number of measures to review requirements for raw materials and to augment existing supplies. It placed useful pressure on the military services to revise upward their estimates of necessary raw materials. On the basis of new data on over-all requirements, S.P.A.B. on October 2, 1941, ordered an increase in steel capacity by ten million tons a year — an order which paid large dividends in greatly increased production of all kinds after we had entered the war.

A number of decisions by S.P.A.B. in the fall of 1941 further limited civilian production and placed the emphasis, in a favorite phrase of the President, on "first things first." On October 9, 1941, S.P.A.B. placed restrictions on non-essential building and construction, and on October 21 it forbade the

use of copper in most products for civilian use. Similar limitations and prohibitions were placed on the consumer durable goods industries. Orders were issued limiting the production of refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and metal office furniture and equipment.

Throughout the fall of 1941, S.P.A.B. took numerous steps to further the work of the Economic Defense Board (see Item 71 and note, this volume), and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration (see Item 105 and note, this volume). Following the approval of the Moscow Protocol by the President on October 7, 1941, providing for the supply of certain American defense materials to Russia, S.P.A.B. on October 23, 1941, issued the necessary orders for the allocation of equipment and materials to fulfill the terms of the Protocol.

The Supply Priorities and Allocations Board provided a stimulus to defense production by substituting careful planning and a more unified effort in place of jurisdictional conflict and insufficient attention to planned objectives. After Pearl Harbor, S.P.A.B. continued in existence for a little over one month, when both the O.P.M. and the S.P.A.B. were replaced by a unified organization for the centralized control of war production — the War Production Board. (See Item 9 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the establishment and functions of the War Production Board.)

84 ¶ Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to
Roosevelt Home Club, Hyde Park, New
York. August 30, 1941

You know, I don't know whether I like being called a landlord. I say this though, that if I have to be landlord, and if he has to be tenant, I would rather have Moses [Smith] as a tenant than any man I have ever known. But just think of it — he has not cut down the trees; he has not burned up the house; and the fields are in better condition than the day he came. And, incidentally, what is very, very important, from my point of view, all the time that Moses has been here, he has never given me a headache.

I am awfully glad to see you all again, and it occurs to me that this is not the twelfth anniversary of the Club, so much as it is the third meeting of ours since this world has been convulsed with all kinds of dangers, and they are not over yet. And it is very possible that they may be even more serious at this moment than they were at the end of August, and the beginning of September, 1939.

And yet, here we are in this scene that is essentially a scene of peace, living almost normal lives. A scene that I suppose could be duplicated, not the Home Club part of it, but the fact of the gathering, the fact of the general picture of the countryside, could probably be duplicated in 20,000 communities in the United States, on a million farms, with good roads going past them, just like this somewhat over-burdened road out there. In other words, it is a natural, normal American scene of peace, and in a community we are mighty proud of, but always with the thought that there are tens of thousands of other communities, that the people living in them are equally proud of, where in any of the communities — including our own — if we think back fifty years — I can do that — some of you can too — we look back and think of the changes that have occurred through peaceful processes in that half-century.

Think of the improvements, not merely the physical improve-

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ments, but the whole of the standard of life, the way it has improved in this past fifty years. Go back and think about things — right in this town fifty years ago.

Coming over here, I stopped one minute to look at a very delightful little stone gatehouse for the new Library, with Mr. John McShain, who is giving it to the Library, and we were looking at stone walls. And it reminded me — I told him of the fact — when I was a boy, we were able to get plenty of people to re-lay a stone wall for a dollar a rod. You older people can remember that. And a man working pretty hard, not eight hours but ten hours a day, could lay one rod for one dollar, in one day. And I remember Henry Myers came down — a lot of you remember him — came down and complained to my father that for masons it had gotten to such a pass that he had to pay them two dollars a day.

Think of the condition of the roads in this country. I don't mean that our efficient Superintendent of Highways is referred to, but I mean fifty years ago. Well, there were certain periods of the year where it was almost worth your life to go out driving behind a pair of horses. Think of the old lamps in the houses. Think of all of the other things which are dead and gone nowadays. Compare the life that everybody lived fifty years ago with what it is today. Well, there are a great many physical objects. We are very proud of them. Some of them are quite new. Right up here to the north is a new high school. We are all mighty proud of it. A little way south is a new grade school, and in the village another grade school. There are still some people that think that the one-room, one-teacher, little individual school-house gives the best education in the world. Well, it did once, when there wasn't any other kind. But I think all of us are happy in the fact that in our town today we have as good equipment for the education of our children as is possible to get anywhere in the United States.

So we have a great deal to be thankful for, including the fact that this is still a peaceful gathering — the third time in succession.

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I think all of us pray that next year that — as Moses said — we may have to move into the field to get enough room — that we will still be able to say that.

Yet, as you know, it isn't all in our keeping. It isn't all our decision. This morning I got a letter — going to read it to you in a minute or two — it's evidence of what very observing eyes have seen around this world of ours.

Now I would like very, very much to tell you a great many things, such as the development of the airplane program, and the tank program, and the shipping program; to tell you about all of the details of our problems in the far waters of the Pacific; to tell you all kinds of details about those very wonderful days — tremendously interesting days — that I spent with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill. I would like to tell you all about those things.

But, here's my trouble: My hands are tied. The reason why my hands are tied is this: It's the press. This group of old and very good friends of mine, writing for papers, taking stills, grinding out movies, travel with me all the time, day and night. And the reason that I went up to that distant spot in the Atlantic was to give them a rest.

And they went up, while people said I disappeared. Well, I suppose that's the newspaper way of saying it. It happens to be true; I did. They went up to a hotel in Swampscott, where there was good golf and boating, and everything else, expecting to get a holiday. And then some enterprising person in England discovered that the Prime Minister had gone; and furthermore discovered that their Chief of Staff had gone; and that the Chief of their Air Corps had gone; and the Chief Sea Lord of the Admiralty had gone; and somebody must have had real imagination — real intelligence. They put those four fellows together, and they figured out that they had all gone! Disappeared! Well, they made a great to-do about it. Why should all these particular four people disappear like that? So they put something about it in the paper, and sent it in to Washington; and some terribly enterprising newspaper editors around the country began send-

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ing telegrams to the boys of mine up in Swampscott. "Where's the President?" "Well," they said, "he's on a boat." And then they sent another telegram back, "Very, very important, check and find the boat." Well, they couldn't. I was three hundred and twenty miles at sea at that moment. And then some enterprising newspaperman in Washington found that my Chief of Staff was gone, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Arnold of Aviation. They had gone too. And, by Jove, that shows the value and the brilliance of a free press. They not only put two and two together, but they put two more, and two more, until they added it up to eight.

And the poor fellows at Swampscott were being bombarded day and night with telegrams from Washington, "What about it?" They couldn't find me on the golf course; they couldn't find me any place near there; but they were kept up all day and all night, trying to find me — in Swampscott.

So this week, I knew they had been working awfully hard — they hadn't really had any holiday, and I told them yesterday down in Washington that there wouldn't be any news on Saturday afternoon from what I would say to the Home Club. So you see how my hands are tied. I want to tell you all about the program; I want to tell you about Japan; I want to tell you about the meeting with Churchill; and I can't do it.

So I am hoping they will have time enough this afternoon to go down to Poughkeepsie and write the story and get back in time to have a picnic over there at the Val Kill Cottage, and that is why I am going to help them. I am going to help them to fill in the story that they have to send over the wire, by giving them something that is all prepared for them.

I think it will interest you, incidentally. It is the letter I was telling you about. It happens to be from a woman, a woman who is an exceedingly good observer and, because of the occupation of her husband, has been all over the world, in different posts — the kind of a life that in the last fifteen or twenty years has allowed her to observe things in Europe and Asia and Africa and South America.

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And she got back here the other day — her children are in this country, of school age — and her husband is still in foreign parts, very much on the job. And when she got back she sent me this letter. I think it explains a little bit what is going on from the point of view of a person who has seen it with her own eyes — not somebody like the fellow that Moses said bought the farm next door, but somebody who has seen things in this world at first-hand; who knows geography and knows other countries. And sometimes, you know, the judgment of people who see with their own eyes, and have the largest number of sources of information — sometimes their judgment happens to be better than the judgment of people who don't have the same opportunity.

She writes:

"I am at this summer resort with my children whom I have not seen for many months. It is terrifying, coming from Europe, to realize that many of these people in their unruffled existence seem to have no idea of what hangs over their heads today. They put themselves in a posture where they cannot squawk about what they don't want to see. They go about their 'daily dozens' " —

which is a good phrase, applying not only to physical gymnastics, but I think mental gymnastics as well —

"ignoring the threatening heel of human beings who want to destroy the freedom — the normal life — to which they have been accustomed.

"They cannot see that the Hitlers of the world are waging war by exploiting social unrest, exploiting decent human progress by the use of armed power for their own aggrandizement.

"Having seen with my own eyes the cruel and ruthless sweep of the dictator armies through Europe in the first year of the war; having contact with the expansion of that sweep to Africa and Asia during the second year of the war — and especially because personal, practical experience proves the point — I know that world domination, including of necessity the Americas, is the definite planned purpose of the dictators.

"Finally, I want to say to you that in Europe or Africa or Asia there is not a Nation of those who have suffered abuse whose people are not aware of what America stands for. They believe in America despite all the propaganda that is fed to them. They know they will never be exploited by America. They pray daily that America will save itself by helping greatly

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to defeat Hitlerism. They pray for this because it seems to them that that is the only way in which peoples everywhere can attain peace and live in peace.”

I suppose that's the thought that we all have. John Mack expressed it; Moses Smith expressed it. We all feel it down deep in our hearts that we want to keep America so that in all the years to come, long after we have gone, long after there isn't any Home Club any more, somebody in this township — perhaps on this lawn — will be able to hold a party like this, just as we are doing it today, just as we hope we will all come back next year, and do it again.

On such occasions we have had some “visiting fireman” with us. Last year it was Frank Walker, and I think on that occasion I announced his appointment as Postmaster General of the United States.

Well, Harry Hopkins — Harry is a resident at Hyde Park. I don't have to introduce him. I am still trying to sell him a farm.

But we have got a very distinguished visitor with us. I might almost call him the Prime Minister of a part of America, a part of the United States. Mr. Munoz Marin is the President of the Senate of Puerto Rico.

85 ¶ “We Shall Do Everything in Our Power to Crush Hitler and His Nazi Forces” — Labor Day Radio Address. September 1, 1941

ON THIS day — this American holiday — we are celebrating the rights of free laboring men and women.

The preservation of these rights is vitally important now, not only to us who enjoy them — but to the whole future of Christian civilization.

American labor now bears a tremendous responsibility in the winning of this most brutal, most terrible of all wars.

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In our factories and shops and arsenals we are building weapons on a scale great in its magnitude. To all the battle fronts of this world these weapons are being dispatched, by day and by night, over the seas and through the air. And this Nation is now devising and developing new weapons of unprecedented power toward the maintenance of democracy.

Why are we doing this? Why are we determined to devote our entire industrial effort to the prosecution of a war which has not yet actually touched our own shores?

We are not a warlike people. We have never sought glory as a Nation of warriors. We are not interested in aggression. We are not interested — as the dictators are — in looting. We do not covet one square inch of the territory of any other Nation.

Our vast effort, and the unity of purpose that inspires that effort, are due solely to our recognition of the fact that our fundamental rights — including the rights of labor — are threatened by Hitler's violent attempt to rule the world.

These rights were established by our forefathers on the field of battle. They have been defended — at great cost but with great success — on the field of battle, here on our own soil, and in foreign lands, and on all the seas all over the world.

There has never been a moment in our history when Americans were not ready to stand up as free men and fight for their rights.

In times of national emergency, one fact is brought home to us, clearly and decisively — the fact that all of our rights are interdependent.

The right of freedom of worship would mean nothing without freedom of speech. And the rights of free labor as we know them today could not survive without the rights of free enterprise.

That is the indestructible bond that is between us — between all of us Americans: interdependence of interests, privileges, opportunities, responsibilities — interdependence of rights.

That is what unites us — men and women of all sections, of all races, of all faiths, of all occupations, of all political beliefs. That is why we have been able to defy and frustrate the enemies who believed that they could divide us and conquer us from within.

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These enemies all know that we possess a strong Navy — a Navy gaining in strength. They know that that Navy — as long as the navies of the British Empire and the Netherlands and Norway and Russia exist — can together guarantee the freedom of the seas. These enemies know also that if these other navies are destroyed, the American Navy cannot now, or in the future, maintain the freedom of the seas against all the rest of the world.

These enemies know that our Army is increasing daily in its all-round strength.

These enemies know that today the chief American fighters in the battles now raging are those engaged in American industry, employers and employees alike.

These enemies know that the course of American production in the past year has shown enormous gains and that the product of these industries is moving to the battle fronts against Hitlerism in increasing volume each day.

But these enemies also know that our American effort is not yet enough — and that unless we step up the total of our production and more greatly safeguard it on its journeys to the battlefields, these enemies will take heart in pushing their attack in fields — old and new.

I give solemn warning to those who think that Hitler has been blocked and halted, that they are making a very dangerous assumption. When in any war your enemy seems to be making slower progress than he did the year before, that is the very moment to strike with redoubled force — to throw more energy into the job of defeating him — to end for all time the menace of world conquest and thereby end all talk or thought of any peace founded on a compromise with evil itself.

And we know that a free labor system is the very foundation of a functioning democracy. We know that one of the first acts of the Axis dictatorships has been to wipe out all the principles and standards which labor had been able to establish for its own preservation and advancement.

Trade unionism is a forbidden philosophy under these rule-or-ruin dictators. For trade unionism demands full freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Trade unionism has helped to

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give to every one who toils the position of dignity which is his due.

The present position of labor in the United States as an interdependent unit in the life of the Nation has not come about by chance. It has been an evolutionary process of a healthy democracy at work.

Hitler has not worked that way. He will not — he cannot work that way. Just as he denies all rights to individuals, he must deny all rights to groups — groups of labor, of business — groups of learning, of the church. He has abolished trade unions as ruthlessly as he has persecuted religion.

No group of Americans has realized more clearly what Nazi domination of the world means than has organized labor — what it means to their standard of living, their freedom — their lives. No group has a greater stake in the defeat of Nazism, in the preservation of the fundamental freedoms, in the continuance of democracy throughout the world.

We have already achieved much; it is imperative that we achieve infinitely more.

The single-mindedness and sacrifice with which we jointly dedicate ourselves to the production of the weapons of freedom will determine in no small part the length of the ordeal through which humanity must pass.

We cannot hesitate, we cannot equivocate in the great task before us. The defense of America's freedom must take precedence over every private aim and over every private interest.

Yes, we are engaged on a grim and perilous task. Forces of insane violence have been let loose by Hitler upon this earth. We must do our full part in conquering them. For these forces may be unleashed on this Nation as we go about our business of protecting the proper interests of our country.

The task of defeating Hitler may be long and arduous. There are a few appeasers and Nazi sympathizers who say it cannot be done. They even ask me to negotiate with Hitler — to pray for crumbs from his victorious table. They do, in fact, ask me to become the modern Benedict Arnold and betray all that I hold

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dear — my devotion to our freedom — to our churches — to our country. This course I have rejected — I reject it again.

Instead, I know that I speak the conscience and determination of the American people when I say that we shall do everything in our power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces.

American workers, American farmers, American businessmen, American churchpeople — all of us together — have the great responsibility and the great privilege of laboring to build a democratic world on enduring foundations.

May it be said on some future Labor Day by some future President of the United States that we did our work faithfully and well.

86 ¶ The President Establishes the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services. Executive Order No. 8890. September 3, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President with respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, for the purpose of assuring adequate health and welfare services to meet needs of the national defense program, it is hereby ordered:

1. The term "health and welfare services" as used in this Order means all health, welfare, medical, nutrition, recreation, and related services including those aspects of education under the jurisdiction of the Federal Security Agency.

2. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, at the head of which the Federal Security Administrator shall serve as Director. The Director shall discharge and perform his responsibilities and duties

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under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director shall receive no salary or other remuneration as such, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

3. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Office shall:

a. Serve as the center for the coordination of health and welfare services made available by the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and other agencies public and private, to meet the needs of State and local communities arising from the defense program; and take necessary steps to secure the cooperation of the appropriate Federal departments and agencies relative thereto.

b. Make available to States and localities, upon request, the services of specialists in health and welfare activities to assist in the planning and execution of such local and State programs.

c. Study, plan, and encourage measures designed to assure the provision of adequate defense health and welfare services to the citizens of the Nation during the period of the emergency, and coordinate studies and surveys made by Federal departments and agencies with respect to these fields.

d. Keep the President informed with respect to progress made in carrying out this Order; and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to it.

4. The Director may provide for the internal organization and management of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services. He shall obtain the President's approval for the establishment of the principal subdivisions of the Office and the appointment of the heads thereof.

5. In the study of problems and in the discharge of its functions and responsibilities it shall be the policy of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services to collaborate with and to utilize, in so far as practicable, the facilities and services of existing departments and agencies which perform related functions.

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Furthermore, it shall be the policy of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services in carrying out its functions and duties to work with and through the State and local defense councils and other appropriate State and local agencies, and in this connection to cooperate and work in conjunction with the Office of Civilian Defense in its relationships with State and local groups.

6. There shall be in the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services a Health and Medical Committee to consist of a Chairman to be appointed by the President, the Surgeon General of the Army, the Surgeon General of the Navy, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, the Chairman of the Committee on Medical Research of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and such others as the President may from time to time determine. The Committee shall advise the Director regarding the health and medical aspects of national defense exclusive of medical research and assist in the coordination of health and medical activities affecting national defense. The members of the Committee shall serve as such without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

7. The Director is authorized to appoint such advisory committees and subcommittees, with respect to particular aspects of health, welfare, nutrition, recreation, and related activities, as he may find necessary or desirable to assist him in the performance of his duties. Such advisory committees may include representatives from Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, private organizations, and the public at large. The members of advisory committees shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

8. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated or allocated to the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services by the President, the Director may employ necessary personnel

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and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services through the Federal Security Agency. The Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services may use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available through the Office for Emergency Management.

NOTE: On November 28, 1940, the President designated the Federal Security Administrator, Paul V. McNutt, as Coordinator of Health, Welfare, and Related Defense Activities. (See Item 124 and note, pp. 525-529, 1940 volume.) The Office of the Coordinator originally operated under the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense (see Item 53, pp. 241-250, 1940 volume, and Item 154 and note, pp. 689-702, 1940 volume). But as the defense program accelerated, the President gave independent status to the several offices and divisions which had been established under the Advisory Commission. By the foregoing Executive Order, the functions of the Coordinator of Health, Welfare, and Related Defense Activities were expanded and the name of the agency changed to Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services.

During its period of operation, the Office strengthened the war programs of the Federal, local, and private agencies engaged in health, medical, welfare, education, nutrition, and recreation activities. It worked closely with the Office of Civilian Defense and its State and local defense councils (see Item 42

and note, this volume); with the Federal Works Agency, which constructed local community facilities under funds provided by the Lanham Act (see Item 8 and note, this volume); with the United States Public Health Service; the Office of Education; the Social Security Board; the Children's Bureau, and the National Resources Planning Board.

The O.D.H.W.S. assisted communities in organizing to meet their local needs which grew out of the war emergency and provided them with technical assistance. In cases where no other public or private agency could furnish the needed service, the O.D.H.W.S. itself did so.

Three main divisions operated within the Office: the Division of Nutrition, the Division of Physical Fitness, and the Division of Health and Welfare. The activities of the Nutrition Division were transferred to the Department of Agriculture by Executive Order No. 9310 on March 6, 1943, because of the close relationship between this work and the work being carried on in the Department of Agriculture. The Division of Physical Fitness was added to O.D.H.W.S. by

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transfer from the Office of Civilian Defense on February 26, 1942. The Division of Health and Welfare was the most active part of O.D.H.W.S. This Division did valuable work during the war in assisting local communities in the organization and operation of their recreation facilities. It also performed a major part in the program to control and combat venereal disease in congested war production centers and in areas and communities surrounding Army and Navy posts. Another valuable and quite different contribution made by this versatile Division was the organization of local day-care facilities for the children of mothers employed in essential war work.

By Executive Order No. 9338, issued by the President on April 29, 1943, the name of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services was changed to the Office of Community War Services.

As was the case with its predecessor agencies, the activities of the Office of Community War Services were primarily of a coordinating nature. It worked largely through other public and private departments and agencies and through the existing facilities of States and local communities. On the request of States and localities, the Office provided technical specialists in planning and organizing local activities in the fields of recreation, social protection, day care, and physical fitness.

Toward the end of the war, the

work of the Office of Community War Services took on new importance as the demobilization of the armed forces and the closing down of war industries caused new community tensions and created new problems in respect to young people. Much of the work formerly carried on by the Committee on Congested Production Areas (see Item 34 and note, 1943 volume), was taken over by the Office of Community War Services. The Office assisted communities to solve a series of war-created problems, such as traffic congestion, overcrowded housing, sewage disposal, unsanitary restaurant conditions, inadequate medical facilities, and increasing rate of venereal disease.

During the war period, the Office worked in approximately 2,500 communities. The Recreation Division of the Office had the responsibility of supervising some 1,700 U.S.O. centers and 1,200 independent servicemen's centers; it assisted the Federal Works Agency in the protection and proper use of 454 Federal recreation buildings; it assisted approximately 6,000 industrial plants in providing recreation programs for their employees; it assisted in the establishment of over 3,000 youth recreation centers; and it provided a wide variety of other recreational services to a number of local communities.

The Social Protection Division of the Office continued the activities of the former Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services in the

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suppression of prostitution and the curbing of venereal disease. The Committee on Physical Fitness, initially a part of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, later was transferred to the Office of the Federal Security Administrator, where it functioned until its liquidation on June 30, 1945.

Except for the Recreation Division, which carried on its responsibility in relation to the U.S.O., and the recreation buildings which had been erected by the Federal Works Agency, the Office of Community War Services was terminated June 30, 1946.

87 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Sixty-seventh Press Conference (Excerpts).

September 5, 1941

(The attack on the U.S.S. Greer — Importance of maintaining secrecy on production figures.)

THE PRESIDENT: You will all be asking about the attack of yesterday, so we might as well clear that up first.

There is nothing to add, except that there was more than one attack, and that it occurred in daylight, and it occurred definitely on the American side of the ocean. This time there is nothing more to add except two thoughts I have. I heard one or two broadcasters this morning, and I read a few things that have been said by people in Washington, which reminded me of a — perhaps we might call it an allegory.

Once upon a time, at a place where I was living, there were some school children living out in the country who were on their way to school, and somebody undisclosed fired a number of shots at them from the bushes. The father of the children took the position that there wasn't anything to do about it — search the bushes, and take any other steps — because the children hadn't been hit. I don't think that's a bad illustration, in regard to the position of some people this morning.

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The destroyer — it is a very, very fortunate thing that the destroyer was not hit in these attacks. And I think that is all that can be said on the subject today.

Q. Mr. President, there is one thing that occurred to me, and I wondered if you could clear that up: Was the identification of our ship solely by that little flag astern, or were there other ships going with this destroyer? Were there larger ships that made identification much easier?

THE PRESIDENT: She was alone at the time, clearly marked. Of course an identification number was on her, plus the flag. And the fact remains that, as I said before, there was more than one attack.

Q. Mr. President, does that mean more than one torpedo, or —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) More than one attack.

Q. On the same ship, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: On the same ship. . . .

Q. Is there anything to account, sir, for the bad aim? Any naval explanation of that? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: That is — that question is a little bit beyond my power to answer. . . .

Q. What did you say, sir, about being on the — you said on the American side of the ocean?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Plainly on the American side?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. As one landlubber to a sea expert, is it at all possible for a submarine commander to make a mistake of identification in broad daylight at that torpedo distance? Do you care to answer that?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose it could be put this way: If a submarine had its periscope up above the surface, do you see, there is no excuse for the wrong identification. And, of course, most torpedoes are fired from a visual sight of the objective. That means you have got to have your periscope up above the surface. There is, of course, another way: As you know, every — almost all Navy ships — German included

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— or Italian — have listening devices, and they can hear the propellers, or machinery, of the other ships at some distance. Therefore, it is physically possible for a submarine to fire at a sound.

Q. Well, is it accurate?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course it isn't nearly as accurate as if you see what you are shooting at.

Q. I see.

Q. Mr. President, how would you class this incident with regard to a shooting war?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well, those are hypothetical questions. I said that was all there was to be said about it.

Q. As another landlubber, I would like to ask a question here. Is it possible for a destroyer to be on the American side of the Atlantic, and still be within the zone delineated by Mr. Hitler as a belligerent zone?

THE PRESIDENT: Such a zone — of course, in the first place, we have never been notified of it, and in the second place it was said to be a blockade. Well, of course, everybody knows that a blockade is never recognized unless it is effective.

Q. Mr. President, could you say whether the *Greer* in promptly firing back, or promptly counterattacking, behaved in accordance with its instructions — in accordance with our policy?

THE PRESIDENT: Any information to the contrary —. What would you do if somebody fired a torpedo at you? (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, can you say whether there was more than one attacker?

THE PRESIDENT: More than one attack, I said.

Q. Mr. President, was the periscope above the water in this case?

THE PRESIDENT: That I can't talk about at the present time. It makes no difference if it was below that they fired at an unknown ship. If it was below the water and they fired at an unknown ship, we would make every effort to discover the identity of the ship. Well, what would you do, again?

Q. Mr. President, is any search of bushes being made out there?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes. In other words, I don't go along with

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the father of those children. You might almost say that the schoolteacher is searching the bushes.

Q. Who is he?

THE PRESIDENT: (*adding*) Even where a father wouldn't.

Q. Mr. President, can you say at this time whether any alteration has been made in orders to the naval vessels?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no.

Q. You can't say, or it hasn't been —

THE PRESIDENT: No. Nothing's been done.

Q. Going back to this occurrence at sea. At one time, if a vessel was attacked they were going to tell poppa. They don't do that any more.

THE PRESIDENT: I know it. Isn't that a funny thing? (*Laughter*)

Q. They don't wait for the parent to say, "Go ahead, boys."

THE PRESIDENT: That's right. Poppa only gets — I mean the schoolteacher only gets burnt on Tuesday afternoon and Friday morning. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, what is the schoolteacher going to do if they find this marauder? What can be done? Seriously, can you discuss that?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose eliminate him. Try to.

Q. That's the idea.

THE PRESIDENT: "Eliminate" is a reasonably good word.

Q. I am confused as to who is the schoolteacher.

THE PRESIDENT: I am the schoolteacher. Call "poppa" some of these people that are saying, "Forget it. The children were not hit."

Q. Mr. President, what were the conditions of light? . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Daylight.

Q. Good daylight?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.

Q. No fog?

THE PRESIDENT: Good visibility. Put it that way.

Q. How about it?

THE PRESIDENT: Now, let's see, what else have we got? Oh, yes, here's one thing I want to talk to you about, because I think it's a pretty good illustration. . . .

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I suppose we had better make this off the record entirely, not even background, because it is something between us.

Several months ago, the *Malaya* came into New York Harbor on Sunday morning, in broad daylight. Well, Frank Knox was talking to some of you over at the Department about not publishing ship movements, and they did a stupid thing in having the *Malaya* come in, and five million people see it. And there were certain newspapers in this country who said, "Why should we live up to the request of the Secretary of the Navy about ship movements? Everybody knows it — a lot of people see ships moving around."

And it was explained very carefully at that time that if there were German spies in this country, and everything is published in the newspapers, all the "head fellow" has to do is to sit at his desk and read all about everything from the papers. He doesn't have to hire anybody. He gets the whole thing right there. In other words, all he is is a clipping bureau. And he is able to receive the information at no cost which he gets through the American press.

Well, we all understood that at that time. And since that particular episode, there have been a lot of British, and some Canadian, and some other ships that have come in here for repairs, and the press has been just one thousand per cent good about it. They have been perfectly fine in not listing these ships.

Well, we all knew that the *Illustrious* was down at Norfolk, and we didn't say a word about it, except a few — one or two types of papers — until this young fellow Mountbatten went down the other day, and the Navy Department said it was perfectly all right, so long as it had been general knowledge for several months, to mention the fact that the *Illustrious* is at Norfolk.

Now, when it comes down to the other question of the turn-out of certain supplies, like planes, if we give out a monthly statement, the German fellow behind the desk can get it all from the paper. And as you know, we have given it out

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through the O.P.M. on planes, but we haven't given out other figures on things like depth charges, and machine guns, and so forth and so on. It has been pretty well kept.

Yesterday I had a very interesting talk with the Attorney General, and Edgar Hoover, and they showed me — I have it in my hand — some German information — that is to say it's a German request of some of the German agents in this country, showing that things that you and I know about are still not in the possession of the German Government, except through very careful search — in other words, the hiring of spies to find out what the production is, and where it's going.

They have sent out certain requests to their agents in this country — asking for a breakdown of the total number of airplanes produced during a given month; how many of this type of pursuit plane; how many of that type; how many this type of bomber; how many the other type of bomber; how many training planes. And then a second series of questions sent to all their agents: Where are they going? What is the destination of these planes? Is it American Army? Is it Great Britain? Is it Canada? Is it Africa? Is it Near East? Is it the Far East? They all want to know.

And from our point of view, I think we all recognize that if we hand out all this information every month, not only planes but tanks, and so forth and so on, it makes the German information task vastly easier. And that is why the question is an important one. It helps Germany, if we give out all the details and figures.

Now I am not shutting down on certain totals at this time, but the question is going to arise as soon as we know that the increase in planes during the month of August was about — what was it? — 390?

Q. Three hundred ninety-four.

THE PRESIDENT: Three hundred ninety-four — four hundred planes more than the previous month. Now there are a lot of people who know they can get the stuff around, fairly well, even to the breakdown. You can probably — by snooping

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around in a perfectly legitimate way — get that breakdown, find out how many planes there were of different types, how many training planes; how many big bombers; how many small bombers, etc. And if it is published it is going to be of definite aid to the Axis powers.

Now, there is no particular reason why those figures could not properly be given to the Committees of the Congress, with the understanding that they will not be made public.

Now, off the record that is rather a difficult job, but nevertheless, the legislative branch of the Government is entitled to certain information in working out new appropriations, and if there is any leak from up there, well, it certainly isn't the fault of the administrative branch of the Government.

Neither would it be the fault of the press, if the press did not publish it, and that is why I am going just to throw out the suggestion at this time — without anything like a formal request — the suggestion that we consider pretty carefully publishing in the press figures of production in this country, on the ground that it would be definitely of aid to the Axis powers. O.P.M.'s been giving that out. I think probably that the Army ought not to give out any statement about tanks. Actually, and again off the record, the number of tanks produced this past month has shown a very, very great rise over the figure of the previous month, and the month before that. I think it's a mistake to aid the Axis powers by giving the actual figures.

Q. Mr. President, could I ask a question while we are off the record? I would like to get your opinion on this, because it has been advanced by Senator Byrd and other people, that hold that it is more important to drag this — any deficiency, out in the open, at this stage of procedure, and get it corrected, than it is to keep that kind of information, at this stage, from the Germans. Have you — what is your idea on that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think probably that in those cases of the deficiencies you must depend in the first instance on going to

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the departments concerned to get their figures. In other words, being accurate in the first instance, getting the real, actual facts.

And that is why — I am still off the record — we are talking about improving our information service in two lines. First, through the public, and secondly for members of the House and the Senate, so that instead of going to one man, and another man, and getting figures that are based on different facts, different methods — as you always can — they will get something absolutely authoritative from one bureau of the Government — that probably would be Lowell Mellett's Bureau — which would get the figures that everybody could agree on.

If you go around — I have often used the example — an airplane may come out of a factory, complete so far as that factory is concerned. Now, some agency of the Government may very easily put that down as a completed plane. All right. Now, suppose there are two other steps. The factory doesn't put the artillery on the plane, and the plane may sit there without any guns. Well, the fellow that is doing the gun work, as soon as he gets the guns onto that plane, he will call it a completed plane. And then there is the navigational instrument fellow, and he will, just as soon as he gets his navigational instruments on the plane — he will say the plane's completed. But, suppose the plane hadn't got any propeller? Now, as soon as the propeller fellow in charge of that has got a propeller on the plane, he calls it complete.

In other words, we have to have a basis to go on, a criterion as to what is a completed plane. And that is why you can get all kinds of different figures, whether you are a member of the Senate or a member of the press. And what we are trying to do now is standardize it, and lay down rules as to what is a completed plane. Well, that has never been done. I think it will help everybody. . . .

Q. Mr. President, is there some way of figuring a standard of

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measurement on these things? After all, I think the people, certainly the editors and readers, are interested in the comparison.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. They don't remember from one week to another how many planes were produced, but they do want to know about any progress.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. (*continuing*) Have you been able to work out either a horse-power or gun-power method, in order to show progress, and still not disclose the type of plane? Or would it be possible that — after this information is known to all, to make it public? We have to guess at figures on bombers because that seems to be the great interest. How many of these planes are trainers which come off like Chevrolets; and how many come off are bombers, which are Rolls Royces?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, that's the information the Germans are crazy to get.

Q. I was just wondering —

THE PRESIDENT: If we could get the thing explained to the American people — I suppose next month I will go on the air and explain it to the American people.

Let me give you an example: A year ago there was a certain figure that we hoped we would get — had hope we would reach — in other words a line going on up — constantly increased production. Well, those were totals. Let us say, for example, that instead of putting it in total of airplanes, you put it in total of man-hours. Now, that's a much more important thing, and sufficiently difficult to explain, and made infinitely more difficult to explain because there are a whole lot of people — columnists, and so forth — who would want deliberately to leave that end of it out in what they are telling the American people.

If you have last year's figures that were based on — well, it was considering military needs of the time, and the great bulk of the planes were pursuit planes, fighter planes. All

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right. In the last three or four months all the military authorities here, and on the other side, and our observers said, "You are making too many pursuit planes and not enough bombers." Right.

Now a bomber must take some figure — it is not a correct figure because I don't know what the figure is, but a bomber takes, let us say, three times as many man-hours to turn out as a pursuit plane. Therefore, Q.E.D., if you have the same number of man-hours, you will turn out only one third in bombers as you would have turned out in pursuit planes. Therefore, it throws last year's figures, I suppose, into the discard.

Now, we are increasing, of course, on our bomber output, but it is only in the last five months that we have been changing over, and there is a certain lag on that change-over, of course. You can't simply issue an order Monday and have it start on Tuesday. We are not making as many pursuit planes. We are making more bombers, but with the same number of man-hours. I think people will be able to understand that.

Q. Mr. President, I think you agree we are up against the problem —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Oh sure.

Q. (*continuing*) For instance, it may be charged in defense production, that if we can't run these figures, we are using — adopting a partisan attitude on it. There is a problem there. Do you agree, sir, on the figures, how difficult it is?

THE PRESIDENT: I do. It's a real problem. You see, I am not asking anything special, except that you recognize that there is a problem. . . .

NOTE: See also Item 88, this volume, for the President's radio address commenting further on the torpedoing of the *Greer*.

The problem of securing accurate facts and figures on defense pro-

duction, which the President discussed in the foregoing press conference, was one of the reasons for his establishment of the Office of Facts and Figures (see Item 99 and note, this volume).

88 ¶ “When You See a Rattlesnake Poised to Strike, You Do Not Wait Until He Has Struck Before You Crush Him” — Fireside Chat to the Nation. September 11, 1941

THE Navy Department of the United States has reported to me that on the morning of September fourth the United States destroyer *Greer*, proceeding in full daylight toward Iceland, had reached a point southeast of Greenland. She was carrying American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable.

She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at the *Greer*, followed later by another torpedo attack. In spite of what Hitler's propaganda bureau has invented, and in spite of what any American obstructionist organization may prefer to believe, I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her.

Our destroyer, at the time, was in waters which the Government of the United States had declared to be waters of self-defense — surrounding outposts of American protection in the Atlantic.

In the North of the Atlantic, outposts have been established by us in Iceland, in Greenland, in Labrador and in Newfoundland. Through these waters there pass many ships of many flags. They bear food and other supplies to civilians; and they bear matériel of war, for which the people of the United States are spending billions of dollars, and which, by Congressional action, they have declared to be essential for the defense of our own land.

The United States destroyer, when attacked, was proceeding on a legitimate mission.

If the destroyer was visible to the submarine when the torpedo was fired, then the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Nazis to

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sing a clearly identified American warship. On the other hand, if the submarine was beneath the surface of the sea and, with the aid of its listening devices, fired in the direction of the sound of the American destroyer without even taking the trouble to learn its identity — as the official German communiqué would indicate — then the attack was even more outrageous. For it indicates a policy of indiscriminate violence against any vessel sailing the seas — belligerent or non-belligerent.

This was piracy — piracy legally and morally. It was not the first nor the last act of piracy which the Nazi Government has committed against the American flag in this war. For attack has followed attack.

A few months ago an American flag merchant ship, the *Robin Moor*, was sunk by a Nazi submarine in the middle of the South Atlantic, under circumstances violating long-established international law and violating every principle of humanity. The passengers and the crew were forced into open boats hundreds of miles from land, in direct violation of international agreements signed by nearly all Nations including the Government of Germany. No apology, no allegation of mistake, no offer of reparations has come from the Nazi Government.

In July, 1941, an American battleship in North American waters was followed by a submarine which for a long time sought to maneuver itself into a position of attack. The periscope of the submarine was clearly seen. No British or American submarines were within hundreds of miles of this spot at the time, so the nationality of the submarine is clear.

Five days ago a United States Navy ship on patrol picked up three survivors of an American-owned ship operating under the flag of our sister Republic of Panama — the *S.S. Sessa*. On August seventeenth, she had been first torpedoed without warning, and then shelled, near Greenland, while carrying civilian supplies to Iceland. It is feared that the other members of her crew have been drowned. In view of the established presence of German submarines in this vicinity, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the identity of the flag of the attacker.

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Five days ago, another United States merchant ship, the *Steel Seafarer*, was sunk by a German aircraft in the Red Sea two hundred and twenty miles south of Suez. She was bound for an Egyptian port.

So four of the vessels sunk or attacked flew the American flag and were clearly identifiable. Two of these ships were warships of the American Navy. In the fifth case, the vessel sunk clearly carried the flag of our sister Republic of Panama.

In the face of all this, we Americans are keeping our feet on the ground. Our type of democratic civilization has outgrown the thought of feeling compelled to fight some other Nation by reason of any single piratical attack on one of our ships. We are not becoming hysterical or losing our sense of proportion. Therefore, what I am thinking and saying tonight does not relate to any isolated episode.

Instead, we Americans are taking a long-range point of view in regard to certain fundamentals and to a series of events on land and on sea which must be considered as a whole — as a part of a world pattern.

It would be unworthy of a great Nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or to become inflamed by some one act of violence. But it would be inexcusable folly to minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear that the incident is not isolated, but is part of a general plan.

The important truth is that these acts of international lawlessness are a manifestation of a design which has been made clear to the American people for a long time. It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas, and to acquire absolute control and domination of these seas for themselves.

For with control of the seas in their own hands, the way can obviously become clear for their next step — domination of the United States — domination of the Western Hemisphere by force of arms. Under Nazi control of the seas, no merchant ship of the United States or of any other American Republic would be free to carry on any peaceful commerce, except by the condescending grace of this foreign and tyrannical power. The Atlantic Ocean

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which has been, and which should always be, a free and friendly highway for us would then become a deadly menace to the commerce of the United States, to the coasts of the United States, and even to the inland cities of the United States.

The Hitler Government, in defiance of the laws of the sea, in defiance of the recognized rights of all other Nations, has presumed to declare, on paper, that great areas of the seas — even including a vast expanse lying in the Western Hemisphere — are to be closed, and that no ships may enter them for any purpose, except at peril of being sunk. Actually they are sinking ships at will and without warning in widely separated areas both within and far outside of these far-flung pretended zones.

This Nazi attempt to seize control of the oceans is but a counterpart of the Nazi plots now being carried on throughout the Western Hemisphere — all designed toward the same end. For Hitler's advance guards — not only his avowed agents but also his dupes among us — have sought to make ready for him footholds and bridgeheads in the New World, to be used as soon as he has gained control of the oceans.

His intrigues, his plots, his machinations, his sabotage in this New World are all known to the Government of the United States. Conspiracy has followed conspiracy.

For example, last year a plot to seize the Government of Uruguay was smashed by the prompt action of that country, which was supported in full by her American neighbors. A like plot was then hatching in Argentina, and that Government has carefully and wisely blocked it at every point. More recently, an endeavor was made to subvert the Government of Bolivia. And within the past few weeks the discovery was made of secret air-landing fields in Colombia, within easy range of the Panama Canal. I could multiply instance upon instance.

To be ultimately successful in world mastery, Hitler knows that he must get control of the seas. He must first destroy the bridge of ships which we are building across the Atlantic and over which we shall continue to roll the implements of war to help destroy him, to destroy all his works in the end. He must

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wipe out our patrol on sea and in the air if he is to do it. He must silence the British Navy.

I think it must be explained over and over again to people who like to think of the United States Navy as an invincible protection, that this can be true only if the British Navy survives. And that, my friends, is simple arithmetic.

For if the world outside of the Americas falls under Axis domination, the shipbuilding facilities which the Axis powers would then possess in all of Europe, in the British Isles, and in the Far East would be much greater than all the shipbuilding facilities and potentialities of all of the Americas — not only greater, but two or three times greater — enough to win. Even if the United States threw all its resources into such a situation, seeking to double and even redouble the size of our Navy, the Axis powers, in control of the rest of the world, would have the manpower and the physical resources to outbuild us several times over.

It is time for all Americans, Americans of all the Americas to stop being deluded by the romantic notion that the Americas can go on living happily and peacefully in a Nazi-dominated world.

Generation after generation, America has battled for the general policy of the freedom of the seas. And that policy is a very simple one — but a basic, a fundamental one. It means that no Nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world at great distances from the actual theater of land war unsafe for the commerce of others.

That has been our policy, proved time and time again, in all our history.

Our policy has applied from the earliest days of the Republic — and still applies — not merely to the Atlantic but to the Pacific and to all other oceans as well.

Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance — an act of aggression — against that historic American policy.

It is now clear that Hitler has begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless force and by wiping out every vestige of international law, every vestige of humanity.

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His intention has been made clear. The American people can have no further illusions about it.

No tender whisperings of appeasers that Hitler is not interested in the Western Hemisphere, no soporific lullabies that a wide ocean protects us from him — can long have any effect on the hard-headed, far-sighted, and realistic American people.

Because of these episodes, because of the movements and operations of German warships, and because of the clear, repeated proof that the present Government of Germany has no respect for treaties or for international law, that it has no decent attitude toward neutral Nations or human life — we Americans are now face to face not with abstract theories but with cruel, relentless facts.

This attack on the *Greer* was no localized military operation in the North Atlantic. This was no mere episode in a struggle between two Nations. This was one determined step toward creating a permanent world system based on force, on terror, and on murder.

And I am sure that even now the Nazis are waiting to see whether the United States will by silence give them the green light to go ahead on this path of destruction.

The Nazi danger to our Western world has long ceased to be a mere possibility. The danger is here now — not only from a military enemy but from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, all religion.

There has now come a time when you and I must see the cold, inexorable necessity of saying to these inhuman, unrestrained seekers of world conquest and permanent world domination by the sword: "You seek to throw our children and our children's children into your form of terrorism and slavery. You have now attacked our own safety. You shall go no further."

Normal practices of diplomacy — note writing — are of no possible use in dealing with international outlaws who sink our ships and kill our citizens.

One peaceful Nation after another has met disaster because each refused to look the Nazi danger squarely in the eye until it actually had them by the throat.

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The United States will not make that fatal mistake.

No act of violence, no act of intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact two bulwarks of American defense: First, our line of supply of matériel to the enemies of Hitler; and second, the freedom of our shipping on the high seas.

No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.

We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. But neither do we want peace so much, that we are willing to pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on legitimate business.

I assume that the German leaders are not deeply concerned, tonight or any other time, by what we Americans or the American Government say or publish about them. We cannot bring about the downfall of Nazism by the use of long-range invective.

But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. They are a menace to the free pathways of the high seas. They are a challenge to our sovereignty. They hammer at our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag — symbols of our independence, our freedom, our very life.

It is clear to all Americans that the time has come when the Americas themselves must now be defended. A continuation of attacks in our own waters, or in waters that could be used for further and greater attacks on us, will inevitably weaken our American ability to repel Hitlerism.

Do not let us be hair-splitters. Let us not ask ourselves whether the Americas should begin to defend themselves after the first attack, or the fifth attack, or the tenth attack, or the twentieth attack.

The time for active defense is now.

Do not let us split hairs. Let us not say: "We will only defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds in getting home, or if the crew and the passengers are drowned."

This is the time for prevention of attack.

If submarines or raiders attack in distant waters, they can at-

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tack equally well within sight of our own shores. Their very presence in any waters which America deems vital to its defense constitutes an attack.

In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow — first.

Upon our naval and air patrol — now operating in large number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean — falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas — now. That means, very simply, very clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships — not only American ships but ships of any flag — engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders.

This situation is not new. The second President of the United States, John Adams, ordered the United States Navy to clean out European privateers and European ships of war which were infesting the Caribbean and South American waters, destroying American commerce.

The third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, ordered the United States Navy to end the attacks being made upon American and other ships by the corsairs of the Nations of North Africa.

My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. It is inescapable.

It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas that are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.

But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.

The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy — at once.

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The sole responsibility rests upon Germany. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it.

That is my obvious duty in this crisis. That is the clear right of this sovereign Nation. This is the only step possible, if we would keep tight the wall of defense which we are pledged to maintain around this Western Hemisphere.

I have no illusions about the gravity of this step. I have not taken it hurriedly or lightly. It is the result of months and months of constant thought and anxiety and prayer. In the protection of your Nation and mine it cannot be avoided.

The American people have faced other grave crises in their history — with American courage, and with American resolution. They will do no less today.

They know the actualities of the attacks upon us. They know the necessities of a bold defense against these attacks. They know that the times call for clear heads and fearless hearts.

And with that inner strength that comes to a free people conscious of their duty, and conscious of the righteousness of what they do, they will — with Divine help and guidance — stand their ground against this latest assault upon their democracy, their sovereignty, and their freedom.

NOTE: See also Item 87, this volume, for the President's press conference discussion of the torpedoing of the *Greer*.

89 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Seventieth Press Conference (Excerpts). September 23, 1941

(Sinking of Pink Star — Arming of merchant ships — Seamen's strike.)

THE PRESIDENT: I just got word from the Navy Department that that ship that the State Department told you about this morning was sunk on Friday last, at 23 hours and 25 minutes G.M.T. (Greenwich Mean Time) on Friday night, which of course, if you work it out for the position of the ship at the time, was Saturday morning, obviously — 23:25, for those of

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you who don't go on a 24-hour day, means 11:25 P.M. And G.M.T. means Zero time, or Greenwich time; which translated into the position of the ship would be two or three hours' difference in time. I am wrong on that — it wouldn't have been Saturday morning, it would be early in the evening [Friday] at that time.

Q. Nine o'clock.

THE PRESIDENT: The latitude was 61 (degrees) 36 (minutes). North. The longitude was 35 (degrees) 07 (minutes) West. And for those of you who haven't got maps, it was about 275 miles northeast of Cape Farewell, which is the southern tip of Greenland.

Q. Northeast?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Obviously it could not be northwest, because then it would have been the other side of Greenland. . . .

Q. What was that longitude?

THE PRESIDENT: Thirty-five (degrees) 07 (minutes).

Q. Mr. President, any indication as to what happened to the crew?

THE PRESIDENT: No word as to whether there are any survivors or not. The only information we have is that it was a submarine attack, and the ship was in company with a Canadian-escorted convoy.

Q. Was the ship bound for Britain, or for Iceland, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Iceland.

Q. How did you get the word on this?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I can tell you that.

Q. Mr. President, was it a general cargo, or any specific cargo?

THE PRESIDENT: General cargo.

Q. Mr. President, do you think that these ships that are being sunk so rapidly, should be provided with some measures of self-defense?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a pending question. In other words, this whole thing — if we look at it from the point of view of each little detail, aren't we rather greatly overlooking, or tending to overlook the main objective, which is national defense?

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And by going into the details of this, that, or the other thing, aren't we drawing a "red herring" across the objective of national defense?

It has been made perfectly clear what is happening in this world today. The world is facing the most outrageous movement in all history, literally all history of the world up to the present time — recorded history.

A certain group of people is trying to dominate the whole world, and we are trying to defend the Americas against that attempted domination.

Congress has made it perfectly clear that a part of that defense is to try to help, in every way we can, those people who are conducting active war against this attempted domination of the world. It is part of our work. We are doing all we can to help them and, incidentally, to prevent the dictators from gaining footholds, or acquiring positions where they could immediately and directly threaten us. That is why we have American troops in Iceland today. That is why we are keeping the lanes open. That is why we are trying to get stuff over to England safely, for their use — munitions, and foodstuffs — to keep them going in this battle.

I don't think that there is much argument that is justified — with honesty — in trying to obscure the main objectives, by talking about whether the ship was in convoy, or was not; whether the ship was armed, or was not; whether the ship was carrying the Panama flag, or the United States flag. They are just "red herrings" drawn across the trail of the main purpose of this hemisphere. Thank you. That's all for today.

Q. You can always squelch a poor reporter. If it is a matter of details, suppose we look at some of the details. Isn't it easier to defend the Administration's position, and the United States, with guns on the ships than without?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is.

Q. Is that a fair question?

THE PRESIDENT: I think you are right, and I think probably that we are heading toward the arming of American merchant

89. *Seven Hundred and Seventieth Press Conference*

ships, and possibly the providing of arms to the merchant ships of—let us say—other American Nations. This particular ship [*Pink Star*] did carry a gun. Panama registry. American ownership.

Q. May I ask a question of fact? In history, on this thing, the arming of merchant ships was an ordinary affair, under international law, was it, or not? Under a plain principle of international law, but before we had the Neutrality Act?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, absolutely and clearly. Now, you take the examples that I have used of the so-called quasi-war against France in 1798. Nearly all of our merchant ships were armed, and a great many of them, because of their armament, beat off French privateers. Same way in the War of 1812; a great many of our merchant ships were armed, and in accordance with, as you say, international law beat off the attacks of British privateers. And there were a great many cases of privately owned American ships, that were armed for voyages into the Mediterranean, which beat off the attacks of Barbary corsairs. There isn't any question about that. According to present law that is forbidden.

Q. Mr. President, if we are going to arm merchant ships, we have got to amend the present Neutrality Law, that is right?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right.

Q. Then is it going to be piecemeal repeal on that from now on, or are you going—

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Well, that's the thing that's under consideration at the present time, but there probably won't be any decision on it until next week.

Q. That's bigger than a "red herring"?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In other words, the problem is how much we will ask in the way of repeal.

Q. Mr. President, while we are on the subject of merchant ships, have you anything to say regarding the seamen's strike?

THE PRESIDENT: The seamen's strike is being certified this afternoon at the request of the Maritime Commission, and by the Department of Labor, to the National Mediation Board. . . .

89. *Seven Hundred and Seventieth Press Conference*

Of course it is perfectly clear that those ships have got to move. They simply can't be kept tied up.

Q. Would it be possible then, Mr. President, for the Maritime Commission to take over the majority of the merchant lines?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we can go into that at the present time. I don't think you can go into method or detail at the present time, but you can use the statement that I said that the ships have got to move. They can't be kept tied up because of labor disputes. And at the same time, the trouble is being referred to the National Mediation Board, to see if it can be amicably settled.

Q. And the ships have got to move?

THE PRESIDENT: But the ships have got to move.

Q. Mr. President, to refresh our memory, when you were in the Navy in 1917, were merchant vessels armed by a fiat of the Government, or did it go to Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there was a filibuster up to the fourth of March. Then, when the special session began, and almost immediately afterwards —

Q. (*interposing*) In the meantime, President Wilson said he had the power. Could he do it?

THE PRESIDENT: He did it. And more than that, I remember distinctly that beginning about the fifth of February, when I got back from Haiti and Santo Domingo, with the approval of Mr. Daniels [Josephus Daniels, then Secretary of the Navy] we went ahead ordering the guns with which to arm the ships.

Q. Mr. President, that was between the fourth of March and the seventh of April that we went ahead with it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Congress convened around the fifth or sixth of April.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that's right.

Q. Mr. President, have you already ordered the guns for arming our merchant ships?

THE PRESIDENT: The answer to that is that we are building every type of gun that is useful — that can be used — as fast as we can do it, under the present appropriations and orders. . . .

90. *Address Celebrating Liberty Fleet Day*

NOTE: In the foregoing press conference, the President indicated that the time had come when it would be desirable to arm merchant ships. See Item 94 and note, this volume, for the President's message

to the Congress asking for that authority.

See also Item 91, this volume, for the President's discussion of the cargo of the torpedoed *Pink Star*.

90 ¶ "There Must Be Liberty, World-Wide and Eternal" — Address in Celebration of Liberty Fleet Day. September 26, 1941

THIS is a memorable day in the history of American shipbuilding — a memorable day in the emergency defense of the Nation. Today, from dawn to dark, fourteen ships are being launched — on the Atlantic, on the Pacific, and on the Gulf, and among them is the first Liberty ship, the *Patrick Henry*.

While we are proud of what we are doing, this is certainly no time to be content. We must build more cargo ships and still more cargo ships — and we must speed the program until we achieve a launching each day, then two ships a day, fulfilling the building program undertaken by the Maritime Commission.

Our shipbuilding program — not only that of the Maritime Commission, but of the Navy — is one of our answers to the aggressors who would strike at our liberty.

I am speaking today not only to the shipworkers in the building yards on our coasts, on our Great Lakes, and on our rivers — not only to the thousands who are present at today's launchings — but also to the men and women throughout the country who live far from salt water or shipbuilding.

I emphasize to all of you the simple, historic fact that throughout the period of our American life, going way back into Colonial days, commerce on the high seas and freedom of the seas has been a major reason for our prosperity and the building up of our country.

To give you one simple example: It is a matter of history that

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a large part of the capital which in the middle of the past century went into the building of railways and spread like a network into the new undeveloped areas across the Mississippi River, across the Plains and up into the Northwest, was money which had been made by American traders whose ships had sailed the seas to the Baltic, to the Mediterranean, to Africa and South America, and to Singapore and China itself.

Through all the years after the American Revolution your Government reiterated and maintained the right of American ships to voyage hither and yon without hindrance from those who sought to keep them off the seas or drive them off the seas. As a Nation we have realized that our export trade and our import trade had a definitely good effect on the life of families, not only on our coasts but on the farms and in the cities a hundred or a thousand miles from salt water.

Since 1936, when the Congress enacted the present Merchant Marine Law, we have been rehabilitating a Merchant Marine which had fallen to a low level. Today we are continuing that program at accelerated speed.

The shipworkers of America are doing a great job. They have made a commendable record for efficiency and speed. With every new ship, they are striking a telling blow at the menace to our Nation and the liberty of the free peoples of the world. They struck fourteen such blows today. They have caught the true spirit with which all this Nation must be imbued if Hitler and other aggressors of his ilk are to be prevented from crushing us.

We Americans as a whole cannot listen to those few Americans who preach the gospel of fear — who say in effect that they are still in favor of freedom of the seas but who would have the United States tie up our vessels in our ports. That attitude is neither truthful nor honest.

We propose that these ships sail the seas as they are intended to. We propose, to the best of our ability, to protect them from torpedo, from shell, or from bomb.

The *Patrick Henry*, as one of the Liberty ships launched today, renews that great patriot's stirring demand:

91. *Seven Hundred and Seventy-first Press Conference*

“Give me liberty or give me death.”

There shall be no death for America, for democracy, for freedom! There must be liberty, world-wide and eternal. That is our prayer — our pledge to all mankind.

91 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Seventy-first Press Conference (Excerpts). September 30, 1941

(*The Pink Star — Allocations on foreign shipments — Freedom of religion in Russia — Social Security.*)

THE PRESIDENT: This is rather an old story for headline artists, but it is quite interesting, I think. It relates to a ship that was sunk four or five days ago, and therefore it is hardly front-page stuff now, but it is still interesting.

You were asking about the cargo of the *Pink Star*. And what I want to emphasize is that the ship was bound for Iceland, and then was going to put ashore, on Iceland, part of the cargo, for the population, and for the troops in Iceland, then was going on to Great Britain.

But what I want to emphasize in some of these figures is what it means to American defense, and the fact that it has got to be replaced. The orders have got to be started on their way again. The material has got to be purchased, which may take some time, because we may have to wait our turn. And eventually the replaced cargo will go on its way, in another ship.

Most of this cargo was food, which of course, I suppose, is contraband of war, under some rules, because the maintenance of the bodies of a Nation which is fighting for its existence is rather important. You can't eat tanks, or guns, or planes, and food was the principal part of the cargo of this ship.

For instance, she carried enough cheddar cheese to feed more than three and a half million laborers for a whole week

91. Seven Hundred and Seventy-first Press Conference

under the current British rations. This cheese on this little boat — she was a little boat — represented one year's milk production of more than 2,000 cows.

Then she carried powdered milk, the equivalent of more than 432,000 quarts.

She carried evaporated milk, a year's production of 300 cows. The equivalent of more than a million and a quarter quarts of fresh milk.

She carried concentrated orange juice, enough to supply the vitamin C requirements of 91,000 individuals for twelve days.

She carried pork products, representing approximately 8,000 hogs. And she carried lard, representing the by-product production from some 87,000 hogs.

She carried corn, representing the production of more than 600 acres. She carried tractors that could have plowed up 715 acres a day, and mechanical potato diggers that could have dug up 250 acres a day.

Then she carried a very small amount of what might be called military supplies. The metallic links for machine-gun belts, which of course is a very small matter in bulk, but every belt has to have metallic links. Enough of those little links to arm ten squadrons of fighter planes.

And she carried some small machine tools, enough to require the labor of 300 workers for four months. These tools were primarily for use in making aircraft engines.

Now all of that has to be reordered. As I said, some of it can be bought quickly off shelves, and other parts will have to be manufactured. Start all over again. And that shows one reason why we consider it rather necessary, for our own American defense, to get things of that kind over to the people who are doing the actual fighting, which is first, of course, for their own preservation, but of almost equal importance to the defense of the United States. And I say, that's a pretty stale story; but there it is. . . .

Q. Mr. President, a question along that line: You stated some-

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time ago, sir, that your "rule of thumb" policy was fifty-fifty on shipping our defense armament abroad.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Since that time Russia has been invaded, and we have a mission in Moscow that promises the greatest aid possible. Can you tell us anything about a new "rule of thumb" under present conditions?

THE PRESIDENT: No. That's still the "rule of thumb." And of course, as I said, being a "rule of thumb," it does not mean fifty-fifty on every single item. Probably average fifty-fifty, and in some cases, where there seem to be immediate and emergency needs, we are increasing the 50 percent that is going abroad on certain items, and perhaps decreasing it on others at the same time. A certain proportion of items which had been allocated to Great Britain has now been reallocated to Russia.

Q. Mr. President, at the time you gave us that fifty-fifty rule, you were talking specifically about aircraft. Does that still apply?

THE PRESIDENT: I was talking about everything.

Q. Does that still apply?

THE PRESIDENT: On some things; some not.

Q. Mr. President, you mean allocate it under the Lend-Lease Act?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, no. . . .

Q. Mr. President, the State Department got out a letter from the Polish Ambassador today showing that the Russians are going to allow the Poles to have their own churches.

THE PRESIDENT: I have just got the mimeographed State Department letter, but I also got it from another source this morning.

Q. Would you care to make any comment on it?

THE PRESIDENT: No. It speaks for itself. As I think I suggested a week or two ago, some of you might find it useful to read Article 124 of the Constitution of Russia.

Q. What does that say, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I haven't learned it by heart sufficiently to

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quote — I might be off a little bit, but anyway: Freedom of conscience, freedom of religion. Freedom equally to use propaganda against religion, which is essentially what is the rule in this country, only we don't put it quite the same way.

For instance, you might go out tomorrow to the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue, down below the Press Club, and stand on a soapbox and preach Christianity, and nobody would stop you. And then, if it got into your head, perhaps the next day preach against religion of all kinds, and nobody would stop you. . . .

Q. Mr. President, do you think Russia will be able to hold out this winter?

THE PRESIDENT: Now, honestly — do you expect me to answer a question of that kind?

Q. I thought you might like to encourage them.

THE PRESIDENT: It's what they call a "rhetorical" question. Right?

Q. Mr. President, do you think this is an opportune time to revise the Social Security structure to increase taxes?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I took that up this morning, and they have gone back to do some more homework. And it seems probable that pretty soon I will make a recommendation to the Congress for a more generally inclusive law, to cover a great many people in this country who are not covered at the present time, in various groups outside of the strictly industrial groups, which are the only ones covered at the present time; and seeking to accomplish two things:

The first is to make the coverage as wide as possible. That means unemployment insurance and old-age pensions.

And the second is to try to work out a method by which the Federal aid will be extended more greatly to the poorer States, which, because of very, very low taxable values, very low average earning power on the part of the individual, are literally unable to comply with the matching method which is now in force.

As you know, the richer States are fully capable of supplementing the Federal Government contributions, so that the

91. *Seven Hundred and Seventy-first Press Conference*

old-age people can get as high as \$30 a month. Whereas, in some States, the per capita wealth, or earning power, is so low that all they can pay out of the State treasury is somewhere around \$4.00 or \$6.00 a month. And of course those are areas where there is the lowest per capita income, which really are most in need of a better standard of living. And we are looking for some formula, which has already been pretty well worked out, by which that can be accomplished.

In other words, we will reverse the old idea "To him that hath shall be given" and go to help the people that "hath not." . . .

Q. Mr. President, will this cost a great deal in taxes?

THE PRESIDENT: It might be, yes. Larger contributions.

Q. Mr. President, at the time of your Budget Message, the per capita income formula was —

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. — under consideration.

THE PRESIDENT: That was the one they were working on. Well, we haven't got this thing in shape yet, even for a message, but the idea is that this would be put in as a message to this Congress, with the twofold hope that if a more widely established Social Security is passed, and relatively soon, it is going to help in two ways:

First, it is going to be a slight deterrent against inflation. Of course you all understand that. And the other reason is that when the emergency is over, and we come to the readjustment period, the more people we have under a standard Social Security system, the easier the transition is going to be.

NOTE: See Item 89, this volume, for the President's initial press conference remarks on the torpedoing of the *Pink Star*.

92 (Radio Address Urging Support for Community Mobilization for Human Needs.

October 3, 1941

ONCE more I am making a straightforward, simple appeal to the people of our country to support a great annual event — the Community Mobilization for Human Needs. Many of you do not recognize this name but it represents the tying together of hundreds of local community efforts known as “community chests” or “community funds” or “welfare drives.” These represent consolidations of many thousands of local charities run by churches, social welfare organizations, health associations, and many others.

The American people have given generously in the past — very generously.

But this year I hope the American people will give more than ever before.

That is because, in a great world threat to our future, we must, for ourselves and our country, preserve and make secure our values and the strength of our institutions.

It is true that more people are at work in our land today than ever before. It is true that our national income is rising. But it is still true that millions of our fellow citizens are still undernourished, ill clad and poorly housed. And bad health maims too many of our American households.

We must build up, not merely our Army and our Navy, but we must build up the well-being of our civilian population.

In past years we have done this through a great humanitarian revival. This year we must do it for the added reason that adequate national defense definitely needs it.

Once more I point out to you that the Federal Government cannot and ought not to try to cover the whole field of social service. Private agencies in every locality are essential not only for the good of the sick and the children and the mothers and the poor but they are of the utmost importance in instilling

93. *Letter Introducing Harriman to Stalin*

charity, or greater love of our fellow beings in the hearts of all of us as individuals.

We can afford to be better neighbors to our neighbors. We can afford to give support to those noble men and women whose lives are devoted to the help of their fellows.

It would be a calamity for the Nation and for its future if private charity did not exist and grow. That is why I am asking each and every person in every town and village and on every farm to contribute something, large or small, toward this great and proven service. You will be helping to build a stronger and a better America. When I have said that, I have said all that is necessary for it is a spiritual as well as a practical appeal to the better natures of my fellow citizens.

93 ¶ The President Writes a Letter Introducing
W. Averell Harriman to Stalin. October 8, 1941

My Dear Mr. Stalin:

THIS note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow.

Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion.

Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies.

I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including your own.

I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance.

Yours very sincerely,

94. *Arming of Merchant Ships*

NOTE: At the time of the Atlantic Conference, the President and Churchill had jointly suggested to Stalin that a conference in Moscow would help materially in mapping the Allied effort against Hitlerism (see Item 75 and note, this volume). The President named W. Averell Harriman as the head of the American delegation, which with the British arrived in Moscow at the end of September. The release of the foregoing letter was delayed until the safe return of the respective delegations.

The major accomplishment of

this Moscow conference was the signing of the First (Moscow) Protocol by American, British, and Russian representatives, setting forth details of lend-lease items to be supplied to Russia in her fight against Hitler (see Items 96, 111, and notes, this volume, for fuller discussion of lend-lease aid to Russia).

A full account of the Moscow conference of September, 1941, is set forth in Chapter XVIII of *Roosevelt and Hopkins* by Robert E. Sherwood.

94 (The President Asks the Congress to Authorize the Arming of Merchant Ships and to Revise the Neutrality Act.

October 9, 1941

To the Congress:

IT IS OBVIOUS to all of us that world conditions have changed violently since the first American Neutrality Act of 1935. The Neutrality Act of 1939 was passed at a time when the true magnitude of the Nazi attempt to dominate the world was visualized by few persons. We heard it said, indeed, that this new European war was not a real war, and that the contending armies would remain behind their impregnable fortifications and never really fight. In this atmosphere the Neutrality Act seemed reasonable. But so did the Maginot Line.

Since then — in these past two tragic years — war has spread from continent to continent; very many Nations have been conquered and enslaved; great cities have been laid in ruins; mil-

94. *Arming of Merchant Ships*

lions of human beings have been killed, soldiers and sailors and civilians alike. Never before has such widespread devastation been visited upon God's earth and God's children.

The pattern of the future — the future as Hitler seeks to shape it — is now as clear and as ominous as the headlines of today's newspapers.

Through these years of war, we Americans have never been neutral in thought. We have never been indifferent to the fate of Hitler's victims. And, increasingly, we have become aware of the peril to ourselves, to our democratic traditions and institutions, to our country, and to our hemisphere.

We have known what victory for the aggressors would mean to us. Therefore, the American people, through the Congress, have taken important and costly steps to give great aid to those Nations actively fighting against Nazi-Fascist domination.

We know that we could not defend ourselves in Long Island Sound or in San Francisco Bay. That would be too late. It is the American policy to defend ourselves wherever such defense becomes necessary under the complex conditions of modern warfare.

Therefore, it has become necessary that this Government should not be handicapped in carrying out the clearly announced policy of the Congress and of the people. We must face the truth that the Neutrality Act requires a complete reconsideration in the light of known facts.

The revisions which I suggest do not call for a declaration of war any more than the Lend-Lease Act called for a declaration of war. This is a matter of essential defense of American rights.

In the Neutrality Act are various crippling provisions. The repeal or modification of these provisions will not leave the United States any less neutral than we are today, but will make it possible for us to defend the Americas far more successfully, and to give aid far more effectively against the tremendous forces now marching toward conquest of the world.

Under the Neutrality Act, we established certain areas as zones of combat into which no American flag ships could proceed. Hit-

94. *Arming of Merchant Ships*

ler proclaimed certain far larger areas as zones of combat into which any neutral ship, regardless of its flag or the nature of its cargo, could proceed only at its peril. We know now that Hitler recognizes no limitation on any zone of combat in any part of the seven seas. He has struck at our ships and at the lives of our sailors within the waters of the Western Hemisphere. Determined as he is to gain domination of the entire world, he considers the entire world his own battlefield.

Ships of the United States and of other American Republics continue to be sunk, not only in the imaginary zone proclaimed by the Nazis in the North Atlantic, but also in the zoneless South Atlantic.

I recommend the repeal of section 6 of the Act of November 4, 1939, which prohibits the arming of American flag ships engaged in foreign commerce.

The practice of arming merchant ships for civilian defense is an old one. It has never been prohibited by international law. Until 1937 it had never been prohibited by any statute of the United States. Through our whole history American merchant vessels have been armed whenever it was considered necessary for their own defense.

It is an imperative need now to equip American merchant vessels with arms. We are faced not with the old type of pirates but with the modern pirates of the sea who travel beneath the surface or on the surface or in the air destroying defenseless ships without warning and without provision for the safety of the passengers and crews.

Our merchant vessels are sailing the seas on missions connected with the defense of the United States. It is not just that the crews of these vessels should be denied the means of defending their lives and their ships.

Although the arming of merchant vessels does not guarantee their safety, it most certainly adds to their safety. In the event of an attack by a raider they have a chance to keep the enemy at a distance until help comes. In the case of an attack by air, they have at least a chance to shoot down the enemy or keep the enemy

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at such height that it cannot make a sure hit. If it is a submarine, the armed merchant ship compels the submarine to use a torpedo while submerged — and many torpedoes thus fired miss their mark. The submarine can no longer rise to the surface within a few hundred yards and sink the merchant ship by gunfire at its leisure.

Already we take many precautions against the danger of mines — and it seems somewhat incongruous that we have authority today to “degauss” our ships as a protection against mines, whereas we have no authority to arm them in protection against aircraft or raiders or submarines.

The arming of our ships is a matter of immediate necessity and extreme urgency. It is not more important than some other crippling provisions in the present Act, but anxiety for the safety of our crews and of the almost priceless goods that are within the holds of our ships leads me to recommend that you, with all speed, strike the prohibition against arming our ships from the statute books.

There are other phases of the Neutrality Act to the correction of which I hope the Congress will give earnest and early attention. One of these provisions is of major importance. I believe that it is essential to the proper defense of our country that we cease giving the definite assistance which we are now giving to the aggressors. For, in effect, we are inviting their control of the seas by keeping our ships out of the ports of our own friends.

It is time for this country to stop playing into Hitler's hands, and to unshackle our own.

A vast number of ships are sliding into the water from American shipbuilding ways. We are lending them to the enemies of Hitlerism and they are carrying food and supplies and munitions to belligerent ports in order to withstand Hitler's juggernaut.

Most of the vital goods authorized by the Congress are being delivered. Yet many of them are being sunk; and as we approach full production requiring the use of more ships now being built it will be increasingly necessary to deliver American goods under the American flag.

94. *Arming of Merchant Ships*

We cannot, and should not, depend on the strained resources of the exiled Nations of Norway and Holland to deliver our goods nor should we be forced to masquerade American-owned ships behind the flags of our sister Republics.

I earnestly trust that the Congress will carry out the true intent of the Lend-Lease Act by making it possible for the United States to help to deliver the articles to those who are in a position effectively to use them. In other words, I ask for Congressional action to implement Congressional policy. Let us be consistent.

I would not go back to the earlier days when private traders could gamble with American life and property in the hope of personal gain, and thereby embroil this country in some incident in which the American public had no direct interest. But, today, under the controls exercised by the Government, no ship and no cargo can leave the United States, save on an errand which has first been approved by governmental authority. And the test of that approval is whether the exportation will promote the defense of the United States.

I cannot impress too strongly upon the Congress the seriousness of the military situation that confronts all of the Nations that are combating Hitler.

We would be blind to the realities if we did not recognize that Hitler is now determined to expend all the resources and all the mechanical force and manpower at his command to crush both Russia and Britain. He knows that he is racing against time. He has heard the rumblings of revolt among the enslaved peoples — including the Germans and Italians. He fears the mounting force of American aid. He knows that the days in which he may achieve total victory are numbered.

Therefore, it is our duty, as never before, to extend more and more assistance and ever more swiftly to Britain, to Russia, to all peoples and individuals fighting slavery. We must do this without fear or favor. The ultimate fate of the Western Hemisphere lies in the balance.

I say to you solemnly that if Hitler's present military plans are brought to successful fulfillment, we Americans shall be forced

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to fight in defense of our own homes and our own freedom in a war as costly and as devastating as that which now rages on the Russian front.

Hitler has offered a challenge which we as Americans cannot and will not tolerate.

We will not let Hitler prescribe the waters of the world on which our ships may travel. The American flag is not going to be driven from the seas either by his submarines, his airplanes, or his threats.

We cannot permit the affirmative defense of our rights to be annulled and diluted by sections of the Neutrality Act which have no realism in the light of unscrupulous ambition of madmen.

We Americans have determined our course.

We intend to maintain the security and the integrity and the honor of our country.

We intend to maintain the policy of protecting the freedom of the seas against domination by any foreign power which has become crazed with a desire to control the world. We shall do so with all our strength and all our heart and all our mind.

NOTE: In the years between 1935 and 1939, several so-called "neutrality" acts were enacted by the Congress in what subsequently proved to be a quixotic effort to withdraw and isolate the United States from the effects of international developments. Although refraining from vetoing the legislation, the President publicly expressed his doubts concerning this type of legislation at the time he signed the first Neutrality Act of 1935 (see Item 117 and note, pp. 345-347, 1935 volume). The President felt that legislation prohibiting the export of arms, munitions, and implements of war to belligerent countries did

not contribute to the peace of the world, but that, on the contrary, it hobbled efforts of the United States to discourage lawless aggression and to exert influence in behalf of peace. Even before the outbreak of the European war, the President had asked for a revision of neutrality legislation, but Congress declined to act until after the Nazis had invaded Poland and Czechoslovakia. Three weeks after the outbreak of the European war, the President called a special session of Congress and urged the repeal of the arms embargo (see Item 130 and note, pp. 512-525, 1939 volume). Legislation repealing the

94. *Arming of Merchant Ships*

arms embargo was approved by the President on November 4, 1939.

In the months following the enactment of new "neutrality" legislation in November, 1939, the United States rapidly shifted from a neutral Nation to one whose very preservation was linked with victory for the democracies. Effective aid was extended to the democratic countries fighting totalitarianism; this aid was, of course, intensified after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March, 1941. During 1941 there were a series of attacks by German submarines and aircraft on American merchant vessels. The frequency and boldness of these attacks grew during the summer of 1941, and the President decided to ask the Congress to repeal the prohibition against arming merchant ships in order that the ships could defend themselves.

In desperate efforts to cut off lend-lease shipments from the United States to the democracies, Hitler pushed his submarines, surface raiders, and aircraft far out into the Atlantic area. His purpose was to intimidate American shipping and force it to stay off the seas. German raiders had few compunctions about firing on unarmed ships. In these circumstances, it was suicidal to allow our ships to proceed unarmed. To prohibit American ships from entering belligerent ports was obviously to do precisely what Hitler wished, for his plain purpose was to sweep from the seas all American shipping with its lend-

lease cargoes for the embattled democracies.

The Neutrality Act of 1939 had been enacted by the Congress in the belief that if the arming of merchant ships and the movement of American cargoes and vessels to belligerent ports were prohibited, the chance of being drawn into a conflict by "incidents" would be reduced.

This was not the result. A number of such "incidents" did occur. In 1941 American vessels were torpedoed or fired on by German vessels — despite the provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1939. Nevertheless, neither the country nor the Government became hysterical over these incidents (perhaps in part because that portion of the press which is most adept at provoking a synthetic hysteria was during this period the most virulently isolationist).

In practice, the neutrality legislation sent defenseless American ships onto the high seas, inviting enemy vessels and aircraft to come within close range and attack. Hitler soon began to attack American shipping in areas within the Western Hemisphere, and closer and closer to the United States itself. Further, the neutrality legislation, by prohibiting American vessels from entering belligerent ports, seriously interfered with our lend-lease program, and forced the use of many time-consuming submarines to deliver the goods to the democracies.

95. *Seven Hundred and Seventy-fourth Press Conference*

It would have been foolhardy for America to withdraw its ships from the high seas and thus enable the Nazis to win an easy victory.

Immediately prior to the passage of legislation carrying out the recommendations of the President embodied in the foregoing message, the President addressed a letter to the Speaker and Majority Leader of the House of Representatives renewing his recommendation (see Item 115 and note, this volume).

The House of Representatives passed the joint resolution carrying out the President's recommendation by a vote of 212-194; and the Senate voted in its favor by 50-37. On November 17, 1941, the President approved the legislation permitting the arming of American merchant ships and removing the restrictions against sending American vessels and cargoes into belligerent ports (55 Stat. 764).

95 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Seventy-fourth Press Conference (Excerpts). October 10, 1941

(Salvage drive results in the White House — Aluminum shortage — Navy Day — Selective Service rejections and rehabilitation plans — National health — Federal aid to education.)

THE PRESIDENT: I have a lot of things for you today, for a change.

Charity begins at home. This morning Mr. Crim, Head Usher of the White House, came to me and said that he had been rummaging around in the basement, and had turned up about half a ton of copper and brass waste. Now, if that happens in the White House, isn't it reasonable to assume that an awful lot of Government-owned metal, which is not only usable but extremely useful, is lying around all through Washington, and in other Government buildings, and other parts of the country?

This particular metal happened to be some valves and joints, and things like that, that were put aside many years ago, with the idea that they might possibly be used. They are out of date, and they are going to be sent down to the Navy Yard to be melted up. And I am asking Mr. Peters, the Building Superintendent for the District, to go around and

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make a search, and see what else he can dig up in the way of metals like copper and brass, things we are short of, and deliver them to the nearest point where they can be melted up for Government use. And one building in which you can dig up a half a ton — a thousand pounds — is pretty good. And we hope to do our own housecleaning, so that we can't be charged with not being thorough.

Q. Sounds like Calvin Coolidge.

THE PRESIDENT: Sounds just like President Coolidge all right.

(*Laughter*)

Q. Do you plan to melt up any brass hats? (*Loud laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are doing that now, and we have a much politer term for it. We call it "liquidating." (*Laughter*) Essentially the same thing. . . .

Q. I want to ask about aluminum, when the time comes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What about aluminum?

Q. There have been criticisms that the aluminum campaign was a fake, or a phony, that it was not necessary — in very bald language. Do you care to say anything about that?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course it is necessary, because we are terribly short of aluminum in every part of the world. Now, how much actually came in as a result of that campaign you will have to find out from the people who ran it. It was very successful on the whole.

And, the next point is that I am going to broaden out Navy Day, the twenty-seventh of October. I think it should be broadened out. The same way next year — Army Day — we will broaden that out. And the thought is that on the twenty-seventh of October we will call it Navy and Total Defense Day, and I probably am going to go down to the hotel here to a dinner — I think it is under the auspices of the Navy League — and say a few kind words into the microphone.

Number three, I have the checkup on the people who were disqualified under the Selective Service Act for physical, mental, or educational reasons. There were about a million young men rejected, which is about 50 percent, just under — a frac-

95. Seven Hundred and Seventy-fourth Press Conference

tion of a point under 50 percent of all those who were called. That is a pretty serious thing. Something the country ought to take unto itself. The breakdown of this 50 percent, or a million men, is roughly somewhat as follows:

About a hundred thousand of them were turned down because they couldn't meet the fourth-grade educational requirements. Of the other 900,000, they were rejected because of physical or mental disability. So on the basis of that 900,000, this memo shows the percentages of rejection for physical or mental reasons. Dental defects — teeth — 188,000. Little over 20 percent of them. That is the principal trouble. Defective eyes 13 and something. Cardiovascular diseases — well, I will call it heart and circulation — relatively the same thing — 10 percent. Musculo-skeletal defects 6.8 percent. Venereal disease 6.3 percent — 57,000 people. Mental and nervous diseases 6.3 percent. Hernia 6.2 percent. Defects of the ears, 4.6 percent. Defects of the feet 4 percent. Defective lungs, including T.B., 2.9 percent. And then a very large miscellaneous group, 17 percent. Those include loss of an arm, or a leg, or an eye, or something of that kind. A very large percentage in the miscellaneous group are caused by accidents.

Of this number, General Hershey estimates that 200,000 out of the 900,000 can be completely rehabilitated and made available for general service in the armed forces. Many of the remainder can be rehabilitated to perform only limited service. Some, because of mental and nervous cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases, and musculo-skeletal defects, are incapable of rehabilitation, or even limited service, and are therefore not being considered under this new rehabilitation program for the Selective Service registrants.

The initial objective, that I decided on yesterday afternoon in this rehabilitation program, will be the 200,000 registrants who can be completely rehabilitated and made available for general military service, at a relatively small cost and a reasonably short period of time.

Certain types of diseases, such as deficiencies of teeth, op-

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erable hernia, venereal diseases, and eyes, and other minor defects, will be corrected in cases where the Army determines that the registrant will then be acceptable for general military service.

It's a long-range thing. It isn't at this time a matter so much of aiding immediate national defense for this year, or the next year, as of getting a stronger race of Americans in the days to come. And that is why this subject is going to be of a good deal of interest in the papers, and to cause people to talk about it. It requires a more detailed study than anything that we have ever attempted. It requires the cooperation of States, and counties, and cities, and townships. And we hope that out of it all, we are going to accomplish something toward the better health of the Nation. One of the phases which we can't approve yet, because we haven't studied it, is the phase that has been talked about a great deal in the past few years, and that is the periodic checkup on everybody.

I suppose, under the Constitution, a person has a right to die at an early age. But I think what we call government, local government, State government, has a right to say to that fellow, "Now, look, don't die. Why don't you get better? Why let this thing go on?" — and know more or less as to whether that individual insists on dying or not. Constitutionally, he has the right to do it. But the Government ought to know what his attitude is. (*Laughter*) . . .

Q. Mr. President, that 100,000 rejected because they haven't a fourth-grade education, are they people who cannot be educated?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. People who are poor, as well as ignorant.

Q. Will anything be done about them?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is of course primarily — always has been — a State matter, because the Federal Government's educational work has always been limited to suggestions, and a clearing house of information for all the States' educational departments. It is primarily a State matter.

Q. (*interposing*) Mr. President —

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THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) Education is a local problem.

Q. Would you not favor Federal aid to education?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't like to say "yes" or "no" to that question.

As we know, there are certain sections of the United States that are so poor that their tax valuations — their assessments — are necessarily insufficient to bring in the revenue to run modern and adequate schools. Now, perhaps some day we may come to some form of Government aid for, not the poorer, but the poorest sections of the United States. As it is, this only proves that they can't afford to educate their own children, but I don't think that the Federal Government ought to undertake running the educational field. A great majority of States have pretty good educational systems. And certainly the richer States do not need any Federal money.

Q. Are the people who are handicapped in health, and in education, grouped in any particular part of the country, or are they pretty —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Well, that depends; there are many classifications. It is perfectly true that the larger part of the people who failed in education come from the South. Now, when you come down to the medical and dental end of it, in some diseases there is a greater proportion in the North. As to some, there is a greater proportion in the West. And some of these cases, the greater proportion is in the South. I don't know. I haven't got the figures, so it's a general guess on my part. I would say, offhand, that on the heart disease thing, and the nervous disorders, you would find a higher percentage coming from the cities than you would from the farms. Now that's just guess. But it is based on what you might call common sense reasoning. We farmers are not so nervous as you city slickers. . . . (*Laughter*)

NOTE: For the President's address on Navy and Total Defense Day, see Item 104, this volume.

96 (White House Statement Announcing That Aid Is Being Hastened to Russia.

October 13, 1941

THE President announced today that within the past few days large amounts of supplies have been sent to Russia. He further stated that all of the munitions, including tanks, airplanes, and trucks, promised at the Moscow Conference for delivery in October, will be sent to Russia before the end of the month.

These supplies are leaving United States ports constantly.

The staffs in the Army and the Maritime Commission have worked over the past week end rushing supplies to the seaboard, and everything possible is being done to send material to Russia to help the brave defense which continues to be made.

NOTE: After the Soviet Union had signed a mutual assistance pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, there had been a sharp reduction in American trade with Russia. The United States had refused export licenses for many machine tools and other industrial equipment. But when Hitler suddenly attacked Russia on June 22, 1941, it was to the obvious self-interest of the United States to extend aid to Russia as a common enemy of Nazism. The aid was proffered promptly.

The President personally checked and approved a press release of the State Department concerning American aid to Russia. This press release, dated June 24, 1941, stated in part: "This government has often stated, and in many of his public statements the President has declared, that the United States

maintains that freedom to worship God as their consciences dictate is the great and fundamental right of all peoples. This right has been denied to their peoples by both the Nazi and the Soviet governments. To the people of the United States this and other principles and doctrines of communistic dictatorship are as intolerable and alien to their own beliefs as are the principles and doctrines of Nazi dictatorship. Neither kind of imposed overlordship can have or will have any support or any sway in the mode of life or in the system of government of the American people." The President wrote in his own hand the closing sentence of this State Department release: "Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas."

A week after the German attack

96. Aid to Russia

on Russia, a special committee was established in the State Department to study the problem of granting new export licenses for shipments to Soviet Russia. This committee comprised representatives of the Division of Defense Aid Reports, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Administrator of Export Control, the Office of Production Management, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, the Maritime Commission, and the Department of State. A small number of export licenses were issued as a result of the decisions of this committee.

But the President, foreseeing the great role which Russia was ultimately to play in the winning of the war, was anxious to expedite aid to Russia. Accordingly, on July 21, 1941, he sent the following letter to Major General James H. Burns, Executive Officer of the Division of Defense Aid Reports:

"My dear General Burns:

"In accordance with arrangements which Mr. Harry Hopkins has worked out with the Department of State at my request, I wish to center the responsibility in your organization, the Division of Defense Aid Reports, for obtaining immediate and substantial shipments of assistance to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"It is of the utmost importance that these shipments go forward in time to reach their destination before the winter makes ocean and land transportation difficult. I have already through the Acting Secretary of State communicated with the Army, stating that I have personally assured the Soviet Amba-

sador that concrete help would be furnished the Soviet Union in the form of such shipments.

"I wish that you would immediately review all the lists of items which have been presented through the State Department by the Soviet Ambassador, with the assistance, where necessary, of representatives of the Army and Navy and of the Office of Production Management and be prepared to give me on Wednesday next, July 23, a list of items which you recommend for delivery and shipment in the immediate future. Will you then within the next week review the remaining items in the same way and give me specific recommendations as to dates of delivery which we may communicate to the Soviet Ambassador.

*Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"*

In response to this letter, a section for Soviet supply was immediately established in the Division of Defense Aid Reports, and on July 23, 1941, this section sent to the President for approval a comprehensive list of supplies for Soviet Russia which totaled \$21,940,000 in value. Concerning this list, the President, on July 25, 1941, wrote one of his frequent memoranda "for 'Pa' Watson":

"To take this up this morning with the Secretary of War, the Acting Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy (if the latter is involved) and get the thing through because there is some mix-up on it, and I would like the thing gotten through by tonight. F.D.R."

Shortly thereafter, a Soviet military mission arrived in Washington to negotiate the transfer of supplies

96. *Aid to Russia*

from our defense industries. Although the President frequently intervened personally to speed the progress of negotiations and the administrative measures necessary to speed supplies to Russia, Soviet representatives were impatient. At least at first, they did not appreciate that the critical American defense needs, the lend-lease needs of other Allied Nations, and the fact that American industry was still far short of its wartime peak in production all contributed to preclude the immediate shipment of very great quantities of munitions and supplies to the Soviet Union.

At the end of July, 1941, the President sent Harry Hopkins as his personal emissary to Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin. Although there was a large body of military opinion in the United States — concurred in by lay opinion as well — which insisted that Russia could not withstand the Nazi onslaught for more than six weeks, Harry Hopkins returned from Moscow convinced that the Russians had the toughness and determination and ability to withstand the German attacks. In the course of two long talks with Hopkins, Stalin presented numerous figures on Russian strength and requirements. Hopkins returned and presented a heartening report at the first Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the Atlantic Charter in mid-August, 1941 (see Items 74, 76, and 78, this volume).

Immediately upon the President's

return to Washington from the Atlantic Charter Conference, he placed his "O.K. — F.D.R." on a second list of supplies for the Soviet Union. Among the items included on this list were aviation gasoline, toluol, machine tools, field telephone wire, shoes, and other supplies. By the end of September, 1941, contracts placed by Russia had reached a dollar value of \$145,710,823.

Soon after the President returned from the Atlantic Charter Conference, it was decided to send an Anglo-American mission to Moscow for developing the details of a long-range supply program for Russia. Late in September this mission, headed by W. Averell Harriman, arrived in Moscow. On October 1, 1941, Mr. Harriman, British Minister of Supply Lord Beaverbrook, and Foreign Commissar Molotov signed the supply agreement which was known as the "First (Moscow) Protocol." Under this agreement, the general terms of a nine months' supply program were concluded, and the United States was pledged to make available at United States centers of production supplies at a value of about one billion dollars.

By the end of October, 1941, Soviet purchases in this country had seriously depleted Russian dollar reserves; Russia's financial position was much like Britain's at the end of 1940 (see note to Item 15, this volume). Since Russia had no further funds available for the purchase of the items pledged in the

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First (Moscow) Protocol, the President, on November 7, 1941, under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act (see Item 111 and note, this volume), declared the defense of the Soviet Union vital to the defense of the United States, and thus placed Russia in a position to receive lend-lease help.

Subsequent to the conclusion of the First (Moscow) Protocol in 1941, three additional protocols were concluded for later periods of the war. Each of these covered American shipments of lend-lease supplies and equipment to Russia.

During 1942, the transportation of our own troops and supplies overseas and the North African invasion placed huge burdens on American shipping. As a result, it became necessary to work out priorities among the supplies to be shipped to Soviet ports. During the summer of 1942, the Russians indicated that they preferred the shipment of military items, raw materials, and industrial items as agreed in the Second (Washington) Protocol. With the loss of the Caucasus in the early fall of 1942, the Soviet Government changed its priority list and requested that food, rather than military and industrial items and raw materials, be given precedence in shipping.

In order to assist in the coordination of the Soviet lend-lease program, the President on October 30, 1942, designated Harry L. Hopkins as chairman of the Soviet Protocol Committee, which included repre-

sentatives of all Government departments and agencies actively engaged in lend-lease operations.

Shortages of flour, sugar, proteins, and fat, resulting from the Nazi occupation of the rich Ukraine area — Russia's best agricultural region — necessitated the shipment of large amounts of food-stuffs to Russia in order to maintain the rations of the Soviet Army. The principal food shipments were wheat, flour, sugar, canned meat, dried peas and beans, lard and vegetable oils, and small amounts of butter. Huge quantities of seeds were delivered to Russia to help her in reestablishing crops in sections of Siberia and behind the Ural Mountains to compensate for the loss of great sections of agricultural land in the Ukraine and Caucasus held by the Germans.

Soon after Pearl Harbor, American equipment was utilized to expand the Persian Gulf ports of Russia for use in supply routes as alternates or additions to the hazardous Murmansk route. The capacity of the Persian Gulf-Iran route by the end of 1942 was three times what it had been at the beginning of the year.

At the end of the war, lend-lease aid valued at \$10,800,000,000 had been shipped to the Soviet Union, nearly one-quarter of the total of all lend-lease aid by the United States. Approximately one-half of these shipments consisted of aircraft, tanks, military motor vehicles, and other munitions — includ-

97. *British Management-Labor Mission*

ing close to 15,000 planes, 7,000 tanks, 52,000 jeeps, 385,000 trucks, and 35,000 motorcycles. Locomotives, freight cars, and other rolling stock were also shipped. Further, a vast amount of communications equipment, including 422,000 field telephones and enough telephone wire to go around the earth more than 50 times, was lend-leased to Russia.

About one-third of the lend-lease exports to the U.S.S.R. were industrial materials and products for the expansion and relocation of Soviet industry. The United States sent hundreds of thousands of tons of armor plate, steel, copper, zinc, TNT, chemicals, and other raw materials for Soviet war production of weapons and fighting equipment. Half a billion dollars' worth of machine tools, electric furnaces, and generators were furnished to help produce planes, guns, tanks, and other munitions. In some cases entire factories, including a tire plant, an aluminum rolling mill,

and fabricating mills, were exported to assist the Russians in expanding their war production.

In order to aid the Russian Army to withstand the severe winters, the United States shipped to Soviet Russia under lend-lease 15,400,000 pairs of Army boots and 63,000,000 yards of woolen cloth.

Since there were few American troops stationed in Russia, there was little occasion for reverse lend-lease aid to be extended to American forces, as it was by others of our Allies. At the end of the war, the total value of reverse lend-lease aid provided by the U.S.S.R. to the United States was estimated at \$3,000,000. This amount was expended for the repair and supply of American merchant ships in Soviet ports, and in assisting American Air Forces shuttle raids against Germany. Russia, under reverse lend-lease, made available bases, food, and supplies for American Air Forces crews and mechanics.

97 ¶ Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to the British Management-Labor Mission (Excerpts).

October 22, 1941

OF COURSE, as you know, I have been with the trade unionists — we don't call it that — but I have been with them for thirty some years. And I always remember the story that I used sometimes in campaign speeches.

Senator Wagner and I were both in the State Senate in 1910-

97. *British Management-Labor Mission*

1911, and we introduced a bill, and were promptly labeled Communists. I think it was Nihilists, as they called them then. An anarchist — literally. And the bill was considered so violently radical that we were just tagged for all time. It was a bill to limit the hours of women and children in industry to 54 hours a week. Just think of that! We sent another bill I got through, the "One Day Rest in Seven" bill, for the State of New York. And in order to get it through I had to compromise. I had to make an exception here and an exception there. The result was that in organized labor I had to exempt and except about half the people from my own bill.

Now again we are making progress. I don't think there is any question but that when the war is over, and you good people win it — with a little help from us — the old system will not come back the way it was before. We will certainly make no loss out of it. We will probably achieve a good many gains out of it, as I see it. It is going to be a better system all the way through.

Of course, I do wish that we could straighten out some of our jurisdictional troubles. We have always had them. And even with the Federation, as you know, we haven't eliminated them altogether. The size of our country is one thing, and you have certain geographical problems, even in Great Britain. Ours, of course, are multiplied ten times — three thousand miles across country, two thousand miles north and south — with its different living conditions, climate, and things like that. But I think the big gain that we have made over the last eight or nine years has been the breaking down of sectional lines. I wish you had visited the South, because that is such an entirely different problem.

I have a place down South, for infantile paralysis. The whole standard is so entirely different. The first year I went down there, for instance, I discovered that the teachers in the local schools were getting two hundred to two hundred and fifty dollars a year. In the North they were getting twelve to fifteen hundred dollars a year. In the North they required some kind of training. In the South they were lucky if they had a grade-school education. And when it came to a first-class white carpenter down there, he would

98. *Endorsement of Fiorello LaGuardia's Reelection*

be glad to take two and a half dollars a day, which was above the standard. He was lucky. He was a millionaire. In our village, he would be a millionaire if he had two hundred and fifty dollars a year. All through the South today, we are beginning to educate them to the idea that if they will raise the scale of wages down there, it will automatically help them, because they can buy more things from the North, and they can make more of their own things down there. So that in these years we couldn't have done all we have done, even in the last two years, unless we had centralized it from all over the country. We say we are going places. We haven't got there yet. . . .

98 ¶ The President Endorses Fiorello LaGuardia for Reelection as Mayor of New York. October 24, 1941

ALTHOUGH my voting residence has always been up-State, I have lived and worked in the City of New York off and on since 1904. I have known and observed New York's Mayors since that time.

I am not taking part in the New York City election but, because the City of New York contains about half the population of my State, I do not hesitate to express the opinion that Mayor LaGuardia and his Administration have given to the City the most honest and, I believe, the most efficient municipal government of any within my recollection. The fact that the City's election has no relationship to national policies, but is confined to civic policies, is attested by the fact that the Constitution of the State provides for the municipal election in off years when neither a Governor nor a President nor members of the House of Representatives or Senate of the United States are to be chosen.

NOTE: In the election following the mayoralty campaign in which the President issued the foregoing statement, the late Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia was reelected for a third term as Mayor of New York. Mayor LaGuardia's total vote on the American Labor, Republican, City Fusion, and United City party tickets was 1,186,518; his opponent,

99. *Office of Facts and Figures*

William O'Dwyer, Democratic candidate, received 1,054,235 votes. O'Dwyer was subsequently elected Mayor in 1945 after LaGuardia's retirement.

The President's support of LaGuardia was typical of his interest in progressive principles and candidates, regardless of party. He felt strongly that LaGuardia was a consistent and able progressive; hence he unhesitatingly supported him in preference to the candidate of the President's own party. He did the same in 1936 and 1942 with respect to Senator Norris. That the President did not do so more often was due to the absence within the Republican Party of candidates of the progressive stamp of Norris and LaGuardia.

Ever since his first presidential campaign, the President had attracted a following of progressive Republicans who rejected the ex-

treme conservatism of the dominant Republican leaders. The President, of course, welcomed the addition of this group of progressives, and in turn frequently supported them in their campaigns. (See Item 156, pp. 431-432, 1936 volume, for the text of the President's address supporting Senator George W. Norris for reelection; see also Item 109, 1942 volume, for the President's endorsement of Senator Norris.)

While, as noted, progressive Republicans — as well as liberal independents — supported the President, by the same token some reactionary Democrats found his principles incompatible with their own and, as a result, crossed to the Republican side. As a consequence, at least on the national level during the President's incumbency, the line of demarcation between the two parties was much clearer than had usually been the case.

99 ¶ The President Establishes the Office of Facts and Figures. Executive Order No. 8922.

October 24, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President with respect to the unlimited emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, and for the purpose of facilitating the dissemination of factual information to the citizens of the country on the progress of

99. *Office of Facts and Figures*

the defense effort and on the defense policies and activities of the Government, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Facts and Figures, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge his responsibilities and duties under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director shall receive no salary or other remuneration for his services, but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Office of Facts and Figures shall formulate programs designed to facilitate a widespread and accurate understanding of the status and progress of the national defense effort and of the defense policies and activities of the Government; and advise with the several departments and agencies of the Government concerning the dissemination of such defense information. The Office of Facts and Figures shall rely upon the services and facilities of existing agencies of the Government for the dissemination of information.

3. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Director, upon his request, such information and data as he may deem necessary to facilitate the most coherent and comprehensive presentation to the Nation of the facts and figures of national defense.

4. There shall be in the Office of Facts and Figures an Advisory Committee consisting of the Director as chairman and such representatives of the Federal Government and other members as he may determine. The members of the Advisory Committee shall serve without compensation, but shall be entitled to necessary travel, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

5. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Office of Facts and Figures, the Director may employ nec-

99. Office of Facts and Figures

essary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services. The Office of Facts and Figures shall use such fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management.

NOTE: With the enactment of the Lend-Lease bill in the spring of 1941, the American arsenal of democracy began speeding aid to the forces fighting Fascism. Many isolationist voices were raised against this policy. With charges and countercharges being hurled, clamoring for public attention, and often confusing the public in respect to the actual facts, it became of first importance that the facts of our policy be presented accurately to the American people.

The Office of Civilian Defense had been established on May 20, 1941 (see Item 42 and note, this volume), and at that time the President envisaged an organization which would not only engage in civilian protection activities, but also sustain morale and maintain a clearinghouse of information on defense activities. When the Coordinator of Information was created (see Item 64 and note, this volume), the President decided to confine O.C.D. to responsibility for sustaining domestic morale and to vest the Coordinator of Information with responsibility for international broadcasts. Following this decision, the President sent this memorandum to the Director of the Office of Civilian Defense:

The White House
Washington
July 14, 1941

Memorandum for Mayor LaGuardia:

"Since my recent discussion with you concerning morale and international broadcast programs, I have given some thought to the manner in which these activities can best be carried on. I now feel that the most effective arrangement will be to divide these activities according to natural fields of interest between your Office of Civilian Defense and Colonel Donovan, whom I have just appointed Coordinator of Information.

"Under this plan, you will be responsible for developing and executing programs necessary to sustain the morale of our people within the national boundaries. Colonel Donovan will assume responsibility in respect to international broadcasts relating to the achievement of morale objectives abroad. Colonel Donovan, as you may know, has already initiated steps to carry on such short-wave broadcasts to other Nations.

"I am sure that these arrangements will prove most satisfactory to both you and Colonel Donovan.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

The Bureau of Facts and Figures, established within the Office of Civilian Defense for the purpose of helping sustain domestic morale, had a stormy life. Although the President had been reluctant to set up a separate morale agency in the

99. *Office of Facts and Figures*

spring of 1941, by the fall of 1941 he felt that the swift development of international events and the full-scale operation of lend-lease aid made it necessary to establish the "Facts and Figures" function on an independent basis.

The central responsibility of the Office of Facts and Figures was to furnish the President with the background domestic intelligence he needed to make decisions on public information matters, and to present to the American people the most accurate and coherent accounts of governmental policy and international developments. To accomplish these purposes, the O.F.F. was designed to be a small advisory agency rather than a central information agency of the operational type.

Six weeks after the establishment of O.F.F. by the foregoing Executive Order the entrance of the United States into the war placed new and heavy burdens upon all Government information and censorship services. The staff and powers of O.F.F. were considerably expanded as the agency entered new fields in an attempt to achieve a better coordination of war information. Much of this coordinating work was attempted through the Committee on War Information, consisting of top representatives of various Federal departments and agencies. The Committee on War Information planned and advised with the various departments and agencies on the most effective war information programs on the do-

mestic front, within the limits of security, including counterpropaganda. The Board of Facts and Figures, largely an internal policy board supplemented by several representatives of outside agencies, formulated the more specific details of information campaigns.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the President became concerned with the number of conflicting public statements made by Federal executive officials. To insure consistency in policy statements, the O.F.F. was authorized to clear speeches by Cabinet officers and top executive officials in advance of their delivery. The O.F.F. also assisted in the coordination of radio programs and the production and distribution of posters, and acted as a clearinghouse for press, radio, and motion-picture industries serving the war effort. Through its Bureau of Intelligence, the O.F.F. also made public opinion surveys and reports on the attitudes and reactions of the American people toward the war effort and the effectiveness of Government information. Throughout the existence of O.F.F. it followed the policy as expressed by its Director, Archibald MacLeish, of pursuing the "strategy of truth" rather than the "strategy of terror" or deceit employed by the propaganda offices of the totalitarian states.

With the outbreak of the war, it became apparent that the advisory powers embodied in the Executive Order establishing the O.F.F. were insufficient to enable it to accom-

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plish an effective job of coordinating war information. The lack of these powers, together with the existence of many other information agencies in the domestic and foreign fields, was the immediate rea-

son for the abolition of the Office of Facts and Figures and the establishment of the Office of War Information on June 13, 1942 (see Item 67 and note, 1942 volume).

100 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Seventy-eighth Press Conference (Excerpts). October 24, 1941

(Increased production program — Secrecy and timing of news — The President in Paris in World War I.)

THE PRESIDENT: You will have to wait a minute and see if I can find something which Steve [Early] says there's a story on. I am not sure whether I can find it or not. *(Laughter)* *(Looking through papers in his workbasket)* That's not it. I guess that's it. I guess I can make something out of it. Yes, that's it. *(Pause)* Just let me take a glance at it. *(Pause)*

Well, now that the Lend-Lease bill has passed both Houses, although it is still in conference, I think it is all right for you to say something about the development and extension of the whole program of supplies for our own Army and Navy for the future, and also under lend-lease. Studies are being made along this line with the eventual objective of looking ahead as far as is possible, because, as you know, things change all the time. It might be called a comprehensive program — call it an all-out program. Those studies have been going on for two or three months, and they are of course not ready for presentation as a whole at this time. That will come later. But, in the meantime, in making these studies, there are certain items that appear to be of immediate importance in the sense that the starting of these particular items was not dependent on the whole program.

One of them, for example, is the question of tanks, and we've agreed on a very great increase of the tank program. I suppose that the tank problem is as good an illustration of what happens in a world war as anything else.

100. *Seven Hundred and Seventy-eighth Press Conference*

About a year ago last spring, all of our Army people, with the best information that could be got from the people who are actively fighting against Hitlerism, caused our experts to lay down a tank program which met with the general approval of everybody, all the experts both here and abroad. And that program was, of course, immediately undertaken, and I might almost say it's in full swing at the present time. Actual deliveries have been made for a good many months, and we are reaching the peak of production in it, according to the original program.

Now, since then, certain factors appeared which nobody could tell about over a year ago. The use of tanks in certain areas, not necessarily all areas, but certain areas, has become more important relatively than was believed a year and a half ago, and that is why for some time we have been working on this increase in the tank program. The Army will give me the actual request for funds of which the tank item is the largest. Many thousands more tanks, and of course, in addition, certain other critical items of ordnance connected with tanks, are part of the developing program which I hope to have — I won't say in final form, because nothing is final, but it is in a fairly complete, rounded picture. . . .

I can't give you any actual figures, except that the program on, for instance, tanks, will be vastly greater than it is today, and it is realistic. It will mean the increase of output in existing plants, and will probably mean new plants. These are known immediate needs of essential ordnance items. And probably the request for this will go up fairly soon, with an appropriation to be put into the next appropriation bill. . . .

Q. Mr. President, it was just a short time ago that you told us that you were going to give the totals of aircraft production hereafter, but not break it down into categories —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) I don't think we will give you even the totals.

Q. I was wondering what was making the change?

100. *Seven Hundred and Seventy-eighth Press Conference*

THE PRESIDENT: Because it's information that the other side would like to have. . . .

Q. Mr. President, there have been some discussions in the defense agencies of doubling the heavy bomber program too. Can you tell us anything about that?

THE PRESIDENT: No. That's what they would like to know, too.

Q. Mr. President, might it be said that you try to conceal large numbers given you instead of small numbers? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: It reminds me — I don't know — I have probably told you this story many times before.

During the World War in the early summer of 1918, we were getting an awful lot of men over to Europe. Of course, they weren't equipped. We all know that. We didn't send any artillery with them, and we didn't send any planes with them, so when they got there they had to be furnished with French or British equipment. Still an awful lot of men to keep secret, and we were pretty happy about the whole thing. They were actually being landed.

And we had a policy, as you know, of complete secrecy about numbers, and that lasted all through the early summer of 1918. And everybody was asking the same question: "Why this secrecy? Does it mean an awful lot of men, or are they behind schedule?"

Well, I got over to Paris in early July, and they had a meeting of the Inter-Allied Naval Council, and of the Army end of it, and they talked a couple of days as to whether the time hadn't come to do a little boasting. And so we came out with a big splurge announcing that we had got — I don't know what it was — a million and a quarter men, actually in France. And I was deputed to receive the French press, and tell them that the Navy, in cooperation with the British and the French, had very greatly cut down on submarine sinkings, and that our Navy had a complete line of anti-submarine aircraft patrol the whole length of the west coast of France, Bay of Biscay, et cetera.

And the French press came in, and I told them the story,

and I made it just as big as I possibly could. In other words, the psychological moment had arrived, which made it perfectly clear to Germany that they couldn't win under any possible circumstances. And it's a question of timing. And the thing went through, and of course it leaked back to Germany and probably was done in just about the right way.

I personally had a little episode that was very funny. I received the French press at 11:00 A.M. in the hotel. And the people in charge of it had prepared one end of the room as a bar, with all the champagne and *hors d'œuvres*, et cetera, that you could put on it.

Well, I went in there. It was a great, big room. And the French press arrived at 11:00 A.M., and they were all in full dress suits, with white ties. (*Laughter*) And they weren't the working newspapermen — a few were — nearly all of them were the *rédacteurs* — the editors — of the papers. They were having the privilege of being received by "*Monsieur le Ministre*." Apparently it created the most awful furor.

Well, I had a translator there, and he started in trying to translate. He couldn't translate it, so I sat on the edge of the table, and in perfectly awful French told the story. "Well," I said, "go ahead and ask questions." Well, that was something that they had never heard of in the newspaper business in France — asking questions of a "*Ministre*." Unheard of. So they asked a few questions, and I answered them as far as I was allowed to. And then at the end, one of these editors in the full dress suit said, "*Monsieur le Ministre*, is it really true that in Washington the members of the Cabinet receive the press once a day?" I said, "Yes. Twice a day." (*Laughter*) At the time I thought nothing of it.

Next morning I went around to breakfast with old man Clemenceau, and as I went into the room, Clemenceau came at me, just like a tiger, with his claws out — (*holding up his hands*). He said, "Ah, you overthrow my Government. You overthrow my Government." (*Laughter*) "You lose the war." Well, I was horrified. I said, "Oh my, what have I done?" He said, "The French news men, they come — they want to see

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me — they want to see me and my Cabinet once a day, and some of them say twice a day.” (*Laughter*) “I will resign first.” (*More laughter*) So I darn near overthrew the Government and lost the war. . . .

Q. Mr. President, we have a story that one or two papers issued, about a seaman in Honolulu who said he passed through the Red Sea. His ship, he said, was subjected to a very severe Nazi bombing. He said that they couldn't hit a bull with a bass fiddle, but indicated that there is a great deal of that in that area. Are you aware of that, or have you had anything on that line?

THE PRESIDENT: No. The only thing I heard on that was that Hitler had been going to one of the few prominent Jews left in Germany, and told him that he could stay, if he would explain to him how Moses managed to get the waters to stand aside and let the Children of Israel across. (*Laughter*)

101 ¶ The President Denounces the Nazi Murder of French Hostages. October 25, 1941

THE practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world already inured to suffering and brutality. Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed of another. Unable to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks the Nazis characteristically slaughter fifty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would “collaborate” with Hitler or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning.

The Nazis might have learned from the last war the impossibility of breaking men's spirit by terrorism. Instead they develop their “*lebensraum*” and “new order” by depths of frightfulness which even they have never approached before. These are the acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win. Frightfulness can never bring peace to Europe. It only sows the seeds of hatred which will one day bring fearful retribution.

102. *Message to Foreign Policy Association*

NOTE: For additional statements and 100 and notes, 1942 volume; by the President on war crimes, and Item 122 and note, 1943 volume; and the action taken as a result of these statements in the trial and punishment of war criminals, see Items 83 and Item 24 and note, 1944-1945 volume.

102 (A Message to the Foreign Policy Association. October 25, 1941

EVERY school child knows what our foreign policy is. It is to defend the honor, the freedom, the rights, the interests, and the well-being of the American people. We seek no gain at the expense of others. We threaten no one, nor do we tolerate threats from others. No Nation is more deeply dedicated to the ways of peace; no Nation is fundamentally stronger to resist aggression.

When mighty forces of aggression are at large, when they have ruthlessly overrun a continent, when we know that they seek ultimately to destroy our freedom, our rights, our well-being, everything for which this Government stands, our foreign policy cannot remain passive. There are a few persons in this country who seek to lull us into a false sense of security, to tell us that we are not threatened, that all we need to do to avoid the storm is to sit idly by — and to submit supinely if necessary. The same deadly virus has been spread by Hitler's agents and his Quislings and dupes in every country which he has overrun. It has helped immeasurably.

The American people are not easily fooled; they are hard-headed realists and they fear no one. A free people with a free press makes up its own mind. In this process free discussion of the facts and issues involved, such as that which you are sponsoring, is of the greatest value. We do not take orders as to what we shall think; we judge the facts for ourselves and decide what course we must follow. We reach decisions slowly, but when they are made they are backed by the determination of 130,000,000 free Americans and are inexorable.

Our people have decided, and they are constantly becoming more determined, that Hitler's threat to everything for which

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we stand must be struck down. We have followed and are following a policy of giving aid to other Nations which are actively resisting aggression. This policy is sound common sense, but it represents merely a method, certainly not an end in itself.

The real end, the inescapable end, is the destruction of the Hitler menace. In achieving that end, our responsibility is fully as great as that of the peoples who are fighting and dying for it. I know that our country will not shrink from that responsibility nor quail before whatever sacrifices it may demand.

103 ¶ The President Asks John L. Lewis to
Avert the Strike in the Captive Coal Mines.
October 26-27, 1941

October 26, 1941

Dear Mr. Lewis:

I ACKNOWLEDGE your letter of yesterday. You say that you do not feel warranted in recommending an additional extension of the temporary agreement to keep the captive mines in operation pending a final settlement of the controversy. I must ask you to reconsider this decision.

In this crisis of our national life there must be uninterrupted production of coal for making steel, that basic material of our national defense. That is essential to the preservation of our freedoms, yours and mine; those freedoms upon which the very existence of the United Mine Workers of America depends.

Mr. Myron Taylor is prepared to meet with you on Wednesday, to see if you and he in private and personal conference can work out a peaceful solution of the problem. You have agreed to confer with Mr. Taylor. During such conferences the production of coal for steel-making by the mine workers under the established wage scales of the Appalachian agreement should continue in the broad interest of the safety and defense of the Nation.

I am, therefore, as President of the United States, asking you

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and your associated officers of the United Mine Workers of America, as loyal citizens, to come now to the aid of your country. I ask that work continue at the captive coal mines pending the settlement of the dispute.

Very sincerely yours,

October 27, 1941

My dear Mr. Lewis:

I am sorry that in your letter to me early this afternoon you have not replied to my request that, in the interest of the defense of our country, the captive coal mines be kept running.

Whatever may be the issues between you and Mr. Taylor or you and Mr. Morgan, the larger question of adequate fuel supply is of greater interest and import to the national welfare. There is every reason for the continuance of negotiations. There is no reason for stoppage of work.

It is, therefore, essential that the mining of coal should go on without interruption.

For the third time your Government, through me asks you and the officers of the United Mine Workers to authorize an immediate resumption of mining.

Very sincerely yours,

NOTE: "Captive coal mines" are mines owned by, and producing coal only for, a steel company. The labor disputes which involved the captive coal mines from September to December, 1941, continued without compromise until they wrecked the governmental machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes in vital defense industries — the National Defense Mediation Board. (For an account of the organization and functions of the Na-

tional Defense Mediation Board, see Item 20 and note, this volume.)

Involved in the dispute between the United Mine Workers of America and the bituminous coal operators were 53,000 miners. The critical issue in the dispute was whether the workers in the captive mines should be guaranteed a "union shop" which requires that workers join, and remain members of, the union after they have been hired.

The United Mine Workers on

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September 15, 1941, called a strike at the mines of all companies which had not signed union shop contracts. National Defense Mediation Board hearings on the issues began on September 17, and two days later the Board made an interim recommendation that the strikers return to work for thirty days and that hearings before the Board continue. In accordance with the recommendation, the miners returned to work on September 22.

On October 24, the Board panel issued an announcement that it was unwilling to enforce its recommendations and, instead, insisted that the disputants conclude a voluntary agreement. In general, the Board panel suggested two alternatives: (1) that the dispute should be referred for final decision to the full National Defense Mediation Board of eleven members; or (2) that the question of a union shop be referred to an arbitrator jointly selected by representatives of the companies and union.

Simultaneously, the President took further steps to continue the mining of coal. Through the Chairman of the Board, William H. Davis, the President requested that the mines remain open pending settlement of the dispute. In a beligerent letter on October 25, John L. Lewis, the President of the United Mine Workers, rejected the plea of the President of the United States that the 53,000 workers in the captive coal mines remain on the job during negotiations.

In the foregoing letters of October 26 and October 27, the President made further appeals to Mr. Lewis urging him to reconsider his decision to strike while the negotiations were still continuing. But Lewis defied the President and called out the workers in the captive coal mines on October 27 in a strike which lasted until November 3, 1941.

In the course of this strike, the President on October 29 called a conference at the White House attended by Lewis, Myron C. Taylor (former Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Steel Corporation), and William H. Davis (Chairman of the National Defense Mediation Board). It was agreed that the entire membership of eleven public, industry, and labor members of the National Defense Mediation Board should consider the merits of the dispute and during such consideration the mines would be reopened. Consideration of a labor dispute by the full membership of the Board was a step taken only in serious and unusual cases, since almost all of the Board's work was carried on through small panels. By the use of such panels it was possible to consider several cases at one time.

On November 3, the 53,000 miners returned to work. Meanwhile, the full membership of the Board was considering the dispute. It sat in almost continuous session until November 10, 1941, when it voted 9-2 against the union's de-

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mand for a union shop in the captive mines. The two C.I.O. members of the Board, who had constituted the minority, shortly thereafter resigned from the Board and the five C.I.O. alternate members also resigned. Without C.I.O. representation, the National Defense Mediation Board, for all practical purposes, was at an end. (See Items 130 and 135 and notes, this volume, for discussions of the Labor-Management Conference, out of which

new governmental machinery for the peaceful settlement of wartime labor disputes resulted.)

The President acted quickly after the resignation of the C.I.O. members from the Board. He called a meeting of union and steel industry officials at the White House on November 14, 1941. For his statement to this meeting and for his subsequent actions, see Item 116 and note, this volume.

104 ¶ “We Americans Have Cleared Our Decks and Taken Our Battle Stations” — Navy and Total Defense Day Address. October 27, 1941

FIVE months ago tonight I proclaimed to the American people the existence of a state of unlimited national emergency.

Since then much has happened. Our Army and Navy are temporarily in Iceland in the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Hitler has attacked shipping in areas close to the Americas in the North and South Atlantic.

Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One American destroyer was attacked on September fourth. Another destroyer was attacked and hit on October seventeenth. Eleven brave and loyal men of our Navy were killed by the Nazis.

We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot.

America has been attacked. The *U.S.S. Kearny* is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this Nation.

Illinois, Alabama, California, North Carolina, Ohio, Louisi-

ana, Texas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arkansas, New York, and Virginia — those are the home states of the honored dead and wounded of the *Kearny*. Hitler's torpedo was directed at every American, whether he lives on our sea coasts or in the innermost part of the country, far from the seas and far from the guns and tanks of the marching hordes of would-be conquerors of the world.

The purpose of Hitler's attack was to frighten the American people off the high seas — to force us to make a trembling retreat. This is not the first time that he has misjudged the American spirit. That spirit is now aroused.

If our national policy were to be dominated by the fear of shooting, then all of our ships and those of our sister Republics would have to be tied up in home harbors. Our Navy would have to remain respectfully — abjectly — behind any line which Hitler might decree on any ocean as his own dictated version of his own war zone.

Naturally we reject that absurd and insulting suggestion. We reject it because of our own self-interest, because of our own self-respect, and because, most of all, of our own good faith. Freedom of the seas is now, as it has always been, a fundamental policy of your Government and mine.

Hitler has often protested that his plans for conquest do not extend across the Atlantic Ocean. His submarines and raiders prove otherwise. So does the entire design of his new world order.

For example, I have in my possession a secret map made in Germany by Hitler's Government — by the planners of the new world order. It is a map of South America and a part of Central America, as Hitler proposes to reorganize it. Today in this area there are fourteen separate countries. But the geographical experts of Berlin have ruthlessly obliterated all existing boundary lines; they have divided South America into five vassal states, bringing the whole continent under their domination. And they have also so arranged it that the territory of one of these new puppet states includes the Republic of Panama and our great life line — the Panama Canal.

That is his plan. It will never go into effect.

This map, my friends, makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America but against the United States as well.

Your Government has in its possession another document, made in Germany by Hitler's Government. It is a detailed plan, which, for obvious reasons, the Nazis did not wish and do not wish to publicize just yet, but which they are ready to impose, a little later, on a dominated world — if Hitler wins. It is a plan to abolish all existing religions — Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jewish alike. The property of all churches will be seized by the Reich and its puppets. The cross and all other symbols of religion are to be forbidden. The clergy are to be forever liquidated, silenced under penalty of the concentration camps, where even now so many fearless men are being tortured because they have placed God above Hitler.

In the place of the churches of our civilization, there is to be set up an International Nazi Church — a church which will be served by orators sent out by the Nazi Government. And in the place of the Bible, the words of *Mein Kampf* will be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ. And in the place of the cross of Christ will be put two symbols — the swastika and the naked sword.

The god of Blood and Iron will take the place of the God of Love and Mercy. Let us well ponder that statement which I have made tonight.

These grim truths which I have told you of the present and future plans of Hitlerism will of course be hotly denied tonight and tomorrow in the controlled press and radio of the Axis powers. And some Americans — not many — will continue to insist that Hitler's plans need not worry us — that we should not concern ourselves with anything that goes on beyond rifle shot of our own shores.

The protestations of these few American citizens will, as usual, be paraded with applause through the Axis press and radio during the next few days, in an effort to convince the world that the majority of Americans are opposed to their duly chosen Government, and in reality are only waiting to jump on Hitler's band wagon when it comes this way.

104. Navy and Total Defense Day Address

The motive of such Americans is not the point at issue. The fact is that Nazi propaganda continues in desperation to seize upon such isolated statements as proof of American disunity.

The Nazis have made up their own list of modern American heroes. It is, fortunately, a short list. I am glad that it does not contain my name.

All of us Americans, of all opinions, in the last analysis are faced with the choice between the kind of world we want to live in and the kind of world which Hitler and his hordes would impose upon us.

None of us wants to burrow under the ground and live in total darkness like a comfortable mole.

The forward march of Hitler and of Hitlerism can be stopped — and it will be stopped.

Very simply and very bluntly — we are pledged to pull our own oar in the destruction of Hitlerism.

And when we have helped to end the curse of Hitlerism we shall help to establish a new peace which will give to decent people everywhere a better chance to live and prosper in security and in freedom and in faith.

Every day that passes we are producing and providing more and more arms for the men who are fighting on actual battlefronts. That is our primary task.

And it is the Nation's will that these vital arms and supplies of all kinds shall neither be locked up in American harbors nor sent to the bottom of the sea. It is the Nation's will that America shall deliver the goods. In open defiance of that will, our ships have been sunk and our sailors have been killed.

I say that we do not propose to take this lying down.

That determination of ours not to take it lying down has been expressed in the orders to the American Navy to shoot on sight. Those orders stand.

Furthermore, the House of Representatives has already voted to amend a part of the Neutrality Act of 1937, today outmoded by force of violent circumstances. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has also recommended the elimination of other

hamstringing provisions in that Act. That is the course of honesty and of realism.

Our American merchant ships must be armed to defend themselves against the rattlesnakes of the sea.

Our American merchant ships must be free to carry our American goods into the harbors of our friends.

Our American merchant ships must be protected by our American Navy.

In the light of a good many years of personal experience, I think that it can be said that it can never be doubted that the goods will be delivered by this Nation, whose Navy believes in the tradition of "Damn the torpedoes; full speed ahead!"

Our Nation will and must speak from every assembly line, from every coal mine — the all-inclusive whole of our vast industrial machine. Our factories and our shipyards are constantly expanding. Our output must be multiplied.

That output cannot be hampered by the selfish obstruction of any small but dangerous minority of industrial managers who perhaps hold out for extra profits, or for "business as usual." And it cannot be hampered by the selfish obstruction of a small but dangerous minority of labor leaders who are a menace — for labor as a whole knows that that small minority is a menace — to the true cause of labor itself, as well as to the Nation as a whole.

The lines of our essential defense now cover all the seas; and to meet the extraordinary demands of today and tomorrow our Navy grows to unprecedented size. Our Navy is ready for action. Indeed, units of it in the Atlantic patrol are in action. Its officers and men need no praise from me.

Our new Army is steadily developing the strength needed to withstand the aggressors. Our soldiers of today are worthy of the proudest traditions of the United States Army. But traditions cannot shoot down dive bombers or destroy tanks. That is why we must and shall provide, for every one of our soldiers, equipment and weapons — not merely as good but better than that of any other army on earth. And we are doing that right now.

For this — and all of this — is what we mean by total national defense.

The first objective of that defense is to stop Hitler. He can be stopped and can be compelled to dig in. And that will be the beginning of the end of his downfall, because dictatorship of the Hitler type can live only through continuing victories and increasing conquests.

The facts of the year 1918 are proof that a mighty German army and a tired German people can crumble rapidly and go to pieces when they are faced with successful resistance.

Nobody who admires qualities of courage and endurance can fail to be stirred by the full-fledged resistance of the Russian people. The Russians are fighting for their own soil and their own homes. Russia needs all kinds of help — planes, and tanks, and guns, and medical supplies and other aids — toward the successful defense against the invaders. From the United States and from Britain, she is getting great quantities of these essential supplies. But the needs of her huge armies will continue — and our help and British help will also continue!

The other day the Secretary of State of the United States was asked by a Senator to justify our giving aid to Russia. His reply was: "The answer to that, Senator, depends on how anxious a person is to stop and to destroy the march of Hitler in his conquest of the world. If he were anxious enough to defeat Hitler, he would not worry about who was helping to defeat him."

Upon our American production falls the colossal task of equipping our own armed forces, and helping to supply the British, the Russians, and the Chinese. In the performance of that task we dare not fail. And we will not fail.

It has not been easy for us Americans to adjust ourselves to the shocking realities of a world in which the principles of common humanity and common decency are being mowed down by the firing squads of the Gestapo. We have enjoyed many of God's blessings. We have lived in a broad and abundant land, and by our industry and productivity we have made it flourish.

There are those who say that our great good fortune has betrayed us — that we are now no match for the regimented masses who have been trained in the Spartan ways of ruthless brutality. They say that we have grown fat, and flabby, and lazy — and that we are doomed.

But those who say that know nothing of America or of American life.

They do not know that this land is great because it is a land of endless challenge. Our country was first populated, and it has been steadily developed, by men and women in whom there burned the spirit of adventure and restlessness and individual independence which will not tolerate oppression.

Ours has been a story of vigorous challenges which have been accepted and overcome — challenges of uncharted seas, of wild forests and desert plains, of raging floods and withering droughts, of foreign tyrants and domestic strife, of staggering problems — social, economic, and physical; and we have come out of them the most powerful Nation — and the freest — in all of history.

Today in the face of this newest and greatest challenge of them all, we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations. We stand ready in the defense of our Nation and in the faith of our fathers to do what God has given us the power to see as our full duty.

NOTE: By the time the President delivered the foregoing address on Navy and Total Defense Day at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C., he was convinced that American entry into the war was almost unavoidable. He had sincerely believed when the European War started in September, 1939, that it would be possible for America to stay out (see the President's press conference remarks on this subject, Item 115, pp. 455-458, 1939 volume). He also believed throughout

1940 that America could stay out. Developments during 1941 gradually changed the President's mind. I do not recall that there was any specific date or specific incident which can be cited to pinpoint the change in the President's thinking, but I am convinced that by the time of the foregoing address he felt that American entry was nearly inevitable.

This was the most outspoken speech which the President delivered before Pearl Harbor, especially

his declaration that "the shooting has started." To drive home again to the American people the danger which threatened the United States and civilization itself, the President cited the two startling Nazi documents which blueprinted Hitler's plans to carve up South and Central America and to subjugate the church and set up a Nazi religion.

In his Navy and Total Defense Day address, the President consciously employed propaganda for three purposes: (1) to put the Germans on notice that our Navy

would "shoot on sight," and that we were fully prepared for action; (2) to convince the American people that, despite the propaganda being spread by isolationists and "America Firsters," the potential strength of American productive capacity could outmatch the Axis, and that the Allied cause was not hopeless; and (3) to sustain the morale of all of America's embattled Allies, and to keep up the hope and spirit of the enslaved peoples of Europe.

105 ¶ The Office of Lend-Lease Administration Is Established. Executive Order No. 8926.

October 28, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, by the Act of March 11, 1941, entitled "An Act to promote the defense of the United States" (hereafter referred to as the Act), and by the "Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941," and acts amendatory or supplemental thereto, in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President in respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, and in order to provide for the more effective administration of those Acts in the interests of national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There shall be in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Lend-Lease Administration, at the head of which shall be an Administrator, appointed by the President, who shall receive compensation at such rate as the President shall approve, and, in addition, shall be en-

titled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Administrator is hereby authorized and directed, pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, to exercise any power or authority conferred upon the President by that Act and by the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, and any acts amendatory or supplemental thereto, with respect to any Nation whose defense the President shall have found to be vital to the defense of the United States: *Provided*, That the master agreement with each Nation receiving lend-lease aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions under which such Nation is receiving such aid, shall continue to be negotiated by the State Department, with the advice of the Economic Defense Board and the Lend-Lease Administration.

3. The Administrator shall make appropriate arrangements with the Economic Defense Board for the review and clearance of those lend-lease transactions which in the judgment of the Board affect the economic defense of the United States as defined in Executive Order No. 8839 of July 30, 1941.

4. Within the limitation of such funds as may be made available for that purpose, the Administrator may appoint one or more Deputy or Assistant Administrators and other personnel, delegate to them any power or authority conferred by these orders, and make provision for such supplies, facilities, and services as shall be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order. In so far as practicable, the Lend-Lease Administration shall use such general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management or other agencies of the Government.

5. Executive Order No. 8751 of May 2, 1941, establishing the Division of Defense Aid Reports and defining its functions and duties, is hereby revoked.

105. *Office of Lend-Lease Administration*

NOTE: The enactment of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941, was the statutory embodiment of the President's policy to make America the great arsenal of democracy (see note to Item 152, pp. 673-678, 1940 volume, and Items 15, 37, and 52 and notes, this volume, for an account of the origin of lend-lease and of the early administration of the Act). From the passage of the Lend-Lease Act until May 2, 1941, lend-lease was administered by the President's Liaison Committee. On May 2, 1941, the President by Executive Order established the Division of Defense Aid Reports (see Item 37 and note, this volume).

The foregoing Executive Order abolished the Division of Defense Aid Reports and established the new Office of Lend-Lease Administration under the direction of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Harry L. Hopkins remained in the White House Office as Special Assistant to the President on lend-lease matters.

Before the Office of Lend-Lease Administration was created, the President directly and personally participated in all lend-lease negotiations. After the new Office had been established, the President delegated to the Lend-Lease Administrator, with two exceptions, all of the powers which had been conferred upon the President by the Lend-Lease Act. The President himself retained the right to determine which foreign Nations should be eligible for lend-lease aid; and the Department of State remained re-

sponsible for negotiating lend-lease agreements with foreign countries, in consultation with the Lend-Lease Administrator and the Economic Defense Board.

In the summer of 1943, circumstances led to administrative and personnel changes in the organizations handling foreign economic affairs. At that time, an acrimonious jurisdictional and personal dispute arose between Jesse Jones and Henry Wallace over the jurisdictions of Mr. Jones's Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Mr. Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare in the field of procurement of strategic and critical materials abroad. Sumner Welles had resigned as Under Secretary of State; the former Lend-Lease Administrator, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., had been appointed to succeed Mr. Welles; and there was pending the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, of which ex-Governor Herbert H. Lehman of New York was to become the head. (See Items 77 and 104 and notes, 1943 volume.)

These events hastened the consolidation of administration of foreign economic affairs which was achieved by the creation of the Foreign Economic Administration on September 25, 1943 (see Item 104 and note, 1943 volume). Included among the functions transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration were those relating to lend-lease; and those functions remained in F.E.A. until after the war's end.

105. *Office of Lend-Lease Administration*

On October 20, 1945, the Foreign Economic Administration was abolished and lend-lease functions were transferred to the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner in the Department of State.

The creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the combined boards — including the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, the Combined Production and Resources Board, and the Combined Food Board — played a substantial part in making the organization of lend-lease operations more cohesive by the integration at the top level of the needed information and requirements (see Items 11 and 62 and notes, 1942 volume, for an account of the work of the several combined boards). The Munitions Assignments Board, which was composed of British and American representatives, also assisted in expediting lend-lease by advising on all allocations of munitions which came from British and American production. As had been the procedure under the Division of Defense Aid Reports (see Item 37 and note, this volume), under the Office of Lend-Lease Administration materials, munitions, food, and supplies were procured for lend-lease export by the War and Navy Departments, Maritime Commission, Treasury Procurement, Department of Agriculture, and various other Federal departments and agencies.

Any Nation became eligible for lend-lease aid upon the President's

declaration that the defense of the Nation was vital to the defense of the United States. Nations so designated then submitted requests to the United States for lend-lease supplies needed by them. Before filling such requests, the United States determined whether the specified supplies were necessary for the prosecution of the war, whether they were available in this country, and whether they would be put to better use in the prosecution of the war by the requesting Nation, by the United States, or by any other of the Allies.

Under the terms of the master lend-lease agreements concluded with the Nations receiving lend-lease aid, those Nations agreed to contribute "reverse lend-lease aid" (see Item 124 and note, 1943 volume), and to make settlements for the American lend-lease supplies after the war.

Of course, a major problem in the execution of lend-lease was delivering the supplies. Our supply lines were thousands of miles long. Both Germany and Japan were usually able to deliver goods to their troops over very short supply lines. On the other hand, American lend-lease materials had to cross the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean and, after the ocean voyage, had to be carried overland to their destination. Before final delivery there were, more often than not, days or even weeks of perilous voyages through submarine-infested waters and journeys

105. Office of Lend-Lease Administration

across difficult terrain exposed to Axis air attacks.

The largest amount of lend-lease shipments was made to Great Britain and the United Kingdom. As of September 30, 1946, the value of lend-lease supplies shipped to the British Empire totaled \$31,392,000,000, or 61.29 percent of the total amount of lend-lease aid advanced to all countries by the United States. Ordnance, aircraft, tanks, vehicles, ships and other craft, and other materials of a direct military nature represented approximately one-half of the lend-lease shipments to Britain; the rest was divided between industrial materials and agricultural products. As of September 30, 1946,

close to five billion dollars of reverse lend-lease aid had been extended by Britain to the United States. This included rations for our American troops, airfields, barracks, hospitals, storage depots, aviation gasoline, and other needed supplies for our Air Forces, and shipping services, transportation, and communications facilities.

Next to the British Empire, Russia received the greatest amount of lend-lease aid from the United States (see Item 96 and note, this volume for an account of lend-lease aid to Russia). The following table shows the total amount of lend-lease aid, by countries, through September 30, 1946:

LEND-LEASE AID, BY COUNTRY (Thousands of Dollars)

Country	Mar. 11, 1941, to V-J Day (Sept. 2, 1945)	Sept. 2, 1945, to Sept. 30, 1946	Total, Mar. 11, 1941, to Sept. 30, 1946
British Empire	\$30,949,870	\$442,491	\$31,392,361
U. S. S. R.	11,058,833	239,050	11,297,883
France and Possessions	2,842,082	391,777	3,233,859
China	870,435	694,263	1,564,698
Netherlands and Possessions	182,000	66,896	248,896
Belgium	90,278	68,320	158,598
Greece	71,697	3,907	75,604
Norway	45,820	6,683	52,503
Yugoslavia	32,000	36	32,036
Turkey	27,397	60	27,457
Saudi Arabia	14,988	2,543	17,531
Poland	16,874	80	16,954
Liberia	7,237	0	7,237
Ethiopia	5,152	100	5,252

105. Office of Lend-Lease Administration

LEND-LEASE AID, BY COUNTRY — *Continued*

(Thousand of Dollars)

Country	Mar. 11, 1941, to V-J Day (Sept. 2, 1945)	Sept. 2, 1945, to Sept. 30, 1946	Total, Mar. 11, 1941, to Sept. 30, 1946
Iran	4,798	0	4,798
Iceland	4,797	12	4,809
Egypt	1,016	44	1,060
Czechoslovakia	349	154	503
Iraq	4	0	4
American Republics:			
Argentina	0	0	0
Bolivia	5,155	456	5,611
Brazil	326,913	4,738	331,651
Chile	21,499	381	21,880
Colombia	8,120	7	8,127
Costa Rica	155	0	155
Cuba	6,083	10	6,093
Dominican Republic	1,594	20	1,614
Ecuador	6,979	562	7,541
Guatemala	1,779	0	1,779
Haiti	1,437	6	1,443
Honduras	374	0	374
Mexico	38,468	149	38,617
Nicaragua	902	0	902
Panama	84	0	84
Paraguay	1,963	2	1,965
Peru	18,553	480	19,033
Salvador	894	0	894
Uruguay	7,132	9	7,141
Venezuela	4,407	11	4,418
Not charged by country	1,900,805	189,939	2,090,744
Total lend-lease aid	\$48,578,923	\$2,113,186	\$50,692,109

The following table shows the total amounts of lend-lease aid to all countries through September 30, 1946, broken down by the nature of the supplies:

105. *Office of Lend-Lease Administration*

LEND-LEASE AID, BY CATEGORY

March 11, 1941-September 30, 1946

Category	Amount
Ordnance	\$ 1,433,601,000
Ammunition	<u>2,957,410,000</u>
Aircraft:	
Bombers	\$ 2,692,592,000
Pursuit and fighter planes	1,783,824,000
Other planes	844,417,000
Total	<u>\$ 5,320,833,000</u>
Aeronautical material:	
Spare engines and parts	\$ 1,146,868,000
Propellers and parts	245,010,000
Other equipment	1,855,840,000
Total	<u>\$ 3,247,718,000</u>
Ordnance vehicles and parts:	
Tanks	\$ 2,595,067,000
Other ordnance vehicles	848,786,000
Spare engines and parts	338,100,000
Total	<u>\$ 3,781,953,000</u>
Motor vehicles and parts:	
Trucks	\$ 1,829,758,000
Automobiles	2,275,000
Other vehicles and parts	714,902,000
Total	<u>\$ 2,546,935,000</u>
Watercraft:	
Combatant vessels	\$ 1,663,846,000
Naval auxiliary and small craft	994,989,000
Merchant vessels	899,302,000
Other equipage, services, supplies, and materials	499,305,000
Total	<u>\$ 4,057,442,000</u>
Petroleum products	\$ 2,731,199,000
Military clothing	639,036,000
Signal equipment and supplies	1,236,888,000
Engineer equipment and supplies	808,648,000
Chemical warfare equipment	236,551,000
Other military equipment and supplies	<u>966,763,000</u>

105. Office of Lend-Lease Administration

LEND-LEASE AID, BY CATEGORY — *Continued*

March 11, 1941-September 30, 1946

Category	Amount
Industrial equipment and commodities:	
Machine tools	\$ 888,484,000
Agricultural implements	102,305,000
Electrical equipment and supplies	421,868,000
Railroad equipment and supplies	545,564,000
Iron and steel	1,224,883,000
Copper and brass	248,118,000
Aluminum	162,662,000
Silver	293,006,000
Other metals and minerals	519,641,000
Fertilizers	20,961,000
Other chemicals	299,384,000
Rubber and rubber products	107,034,000
Textiles and clothing	198,960,000
Timber products	238,774,000
Other equipment and commodities	3,088,979,000
Total	<u>\$ 8,360,623,000</u>
Food:	
Dairy products and eggs	\$ 1,749,690,000
Meat and fish	2,010,640,000
Fruits and vegetables	522,320,000
Grain and cereals	302,428,000
Sugar	225,677,000
Lard, fats, and oils	645,389,000
Other foodstuffs	372,572,000
Total	<u>\$ 5,828,716,000</u>
Other agricultural products:	
Cotton	\$ 519,487,000
Tobacco	272,112,000
Seeds	50,139,000
Other products	11,175,000
Total	<u>\$ 852,913,000</u>
Total transfers	<u>\$45,007,229,000</u>
Services rendered	<u>\$ 3,594,136,000</u>

105. Office of Lend-Lease Administration

LEND-LEASE AID, BY CATEGORY — *Continued*

March 11, 1941-September 30, 1946

Category	Amount
Lend-lease costs not charged to foreign Governments:	
Production facilities in United States	\$ 720,388,000
Transfers to Federal agencies	747,683,000
Losses on inventories and facilities	11,763,000
Administrative expenses	35,486,000
Miscellaneous charges	575,424,000
Total	<u>\$ 2,090,744,000</u>
Total lend-lease aid	<u>\$50,692,109,000</u>

The following table shows the nature and amount of supplies and materials received by the United States through reverse lend-lease aid:

REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID RECEIVED BY THE UNITED STATES, BY CATEGORY
(Cumulative to September 30 1946)

Category	Amount
Capital installations	\$1,664,915,000
Foodstuffs	512,875,000
Clothing	91,089,000
Petroleum and coal products	1,684,629,000
Air Force supplies and equipment	474,622,000
Other military supplies and equipment	1,189,739,000
Shipping and other transportation	1,349,421,000
Other services	504,744,000
Raw materials and food shipped to United States	347,288,000
Total	<u>\$7,819,322,000</u>

Expenditures by the United States for lend-lease aid comprised about 16 percent of our total war expenditures. That resulted in incalculable benefits to the United States. Lend-lease aid immeasurably strengthened the striking power of the Allied forces, reduced the number of American troops and supplies it was necessary to send and maintain abroad, and above all saved hundreds of thousands of

American lives. During the period when Great Britain was withstanding the Nazi onslaught alone, lend-lease aid was a major factor in lifting and sustaining British morale. After the attack on Russia in June, 1941, lend-lease aid to Russia was at first principally a great morale factor; later, it furnished the supplies without which the Soviet victories might have been impossible. During 1941, the lend-lease program stimulated American industry to produce and expand its capacity to such an extent that it was later better able to meet the huge wartime demand for supplies and munitions.

After the war was over and time came to settle the accounts of lend-lease, the United States was determined to avoid the political and economic mistakes of our international debt experience during the 1920's. Agreements were concluded very soon after the end of the war with all countries except Russia and her satellites; by 1949, no settlement of the wartime lend-lease accounts with Russia and her satellites had been reached.

These lend-lease settlements were based on the principle that goods lost, destroyed, or consumed in fighting our common enemies and achieving the common victory, should create no continuing financial obligations. In the case of articles of postwar civilian utility retained by foreign countries, or in

the case of articles contracted for before V-J Day and delivered after the end of the war, payment was to be made to the United States, usually spread over a period of years.

In most cases, merchant and naval ships which were lend-leased during the war were returned to the United States after the war. Strictly military items remained with the recipient governments, with the United States retaining the technical right to step in and recapture such items or prevent their transfer to a third power without our consent. In the settlement agreements, many of which included disposals of United States Army and Navy surpluses located in the countries concerned, the practice was followed of permitting the remaining indebtedness to be discharged in part by the delivery of buildings and other property for the use of United States diplomatic missions in the country concerned and, in a few cases, by financing the local currency costs of educational programs.

In the light of the actual accomplishments of lend-lease, only those who were hopeless isolationists or embittered haters of President Roosevelt failed to recognize that without lend-lease, as conceived and carried through by the President, ultimate victory would have been long delayed, if not completely impossible.

106 ¶ Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to
Conference of Dutchess County School
Teachers, Hyde Park, New York.

November 3, 1941

I FEEL rather embarrassed at being in the presence of so much learning. It is a very auspicious day for me, because it is the first time that I have been on this platform, and it is the first time that I have seen the auditorium filled. I am happy that we have at last put through in this town of ours, and the north part of the town of Poughkeepsie, a consolidated school system. We were at it a long time. But things in a democracy do take a long time, and it is a mighty good thing that they do. I think that this town, for example, is a lot better off for having talked about whether it wanted a consolidated school district in place of nine, or eleven or fourteen little school districts.

I think it is better we talked about that for ten or fifteen years than if we had belonged to the kind of society where somebody way up on top — some dictator — had said to the Town of Hyde Park fifteen years ago, "You have got to have one." It is a pretty good illustration of the difference between the kind of government — kind of social setup — that we have been accustomed to for several hundred years and this new thing that is called a "new order" for the world, something in which the people themselves — fathers and mothers and children for that matter — have nothing to say. Somebody up on top proclaims himself wiser than the aggregate of what we call public opinion.

I don't think we are ever coming to this "new order" of the world in this country, and I hope very much that the rest of the world won't be forced into it, because if the rest of the world were forced into it, this country of ours would become a little oasis, where all the old things were still going on, but it would be pressed on on all sides by this so-called "new order" world. We like to do things, talk about them, fight about them among our-

selves, say pretty awful things to each other, and finally work things out.

It always reminds me — this system of ours — of a remark that James Bryce, the famous historian, made in my presence in Washington, when Uncle Ted was President. We were talking about different forms of government, and Lord Bryce, who was the British Ambassador and had a twinkle in his eye — as is very essential for all people, not alone Ambassadors — said, “You know, you people in this country and in Canada, and other places where there are democracies, are singularly fortunate in having a Federal system.” And we all said, “Why?”

“Well,” he said, “you have many States in this country, and somebody comes along, and one of those States has a bright idea, something that sounds perfectly grand, something very novel, something that the people in that particular State grab ahold of on election day and put into effect. And sometimes it is an awfully good idea, and sometimes it is a pretty poor idea.”

And as he said, “Perhaps I shouldn’t refer to the States of the Union as dogs, but it is a little bit like the idea of trying it on the dog, and if it works, it will spread to other States, and if it doesn’t work, it will stop right there, and some day be repealed.”

If you look back into our history as a country for a hundred and fifty years, you will find that a great many things that today we are accepting as part of our lives and part of our system have been brought forward in just that way. First they have been tried on the dog, and they worked. Then they have been tried in several other places, and they worked. And gradually they extended to the body politic of the United States.

Take my own memory of schools in this township of ours. A great many years ago, when I was a boy, my father was one of the school trustees for many years, and he used to take me, when I was eight or ten years old, to sit outside the little old schoolhouse in the village to hold the horses. And I remember one day he came out of the school saying, “Well, they beat me.”

He said, “They voted me down. You know I have tried to put a course in carpentry into this school for a long time.”

Carpentry for the boys. But nobody had ever heard of teaching

carpentry to the boys, and besides that a course in carpentry would not have brought any money in from Albany, from the Board of Regents. So, in place of carpentry, the School Board voted a course from which they got many dollars from Albany — a course in comparative anatomy.

Then I got back home, and my father said, "I wanted to have a course in the basement of the school, for the girls, in cooking and sewing."

My dear mother was very much interested in that. They turned it down. Nobody had ever heard of teaching cooking and sewing to girls. They were supposed to pick it up at home. Some of them did, but a lot of them didn't. And in place of that — they could get no money for that — they put in a course in German and French literature.

So, you see, I have gone through many experiences. And yet today almost every school in this State, and most other States, is teaching a lot of practical things that were not taught in the earlier days. But I wonder — in view of the complexity of our civilization — whether our schools are keeping up with the growth of that complexity. In other words, while we are more practical in the curriculum in every school and most colleges in this country, are we practical enough? That is what I want to say a few words about.

I know that some of the things that I am going to mention have been done — partially. But I raise the question as to whether they have been done sufficiently — as to whether we can't be more practical in turning out boys and girls from high school in a more practical way to meet the things that they are going to meet as soon as they go to work, and as soon as they go out into life.

I always think of that case of my own, when I had gone through school, and gone through college, and then gone to a law school for three years — duly admitted to the bar — a full-fledged lawyer. I went to a big law office in New York, and somebody the day after I got there said, "Go up and answer the calendar call in the Supreme Court tomorrow morning. We have such and such a case on."

I had never been in a court of law in my life, and yet I was a

full-fledged lawyer. Perhaps I was lucky not to have been in a court before that.

Then the next day somebody gave me a deed of transfer of some land. He said, "Take it up to the County Clerk's office." I had never been in a county clerk's office. And there I was, theoretically a full-fledged lawyer. A member of a so-called learned profession. I always have my doubts about the word "learned," but at least it was a profession.

Now there is an awful lot of this in this life; a lot of people who go out into life, whether they go to work, or get married, or go to high school or go to college or a professional school. They are going out into life unprepared for many things that happen to the average man or woman with comparative frequency — things in their own community and their own county that definitely affect their lives.

Always in the past we could say, "Well, they learned this or that from experience." But of course we know that learning things by experience is a costly way of doing it. I wonder whether there aren't ways in which we can improve our knowledge of things that touch our lives before we graduate from high school.

Just for example, take our own county. I wonder whether the high school students in this town could not be taken into our county seat. This is done a little, but it could be done so much more.

Take the subject of government. I should like to see every boy and girl in this school taken down to see one of the courts in Poughkeepsie — I hope for the first time. The City Court, the County Court, the Supreme Court — yes, the Police Court in Poughkeepsie. I should like to see them taken into the Surrogate's Court. You know there are a lot of teachers in this county that have never been inside the Surrogate's Court. Learn what the settlement of an estate means. Learn about trust funds that are set up. Learn something about the machinery. There are lots of other places to visit that most of us really don't know about. I am one of the guilty people myself.

Take the health system of this county. Well, we know about it

106. *Remarks to Dutchess County Teachers*

rather vaguely, but all of us ought to know what we are doing, and what we are not doing, for public health.

Then there is the county highway system. Take the various other portions of the county government — the District Attorney's office and the city government in the City of Poughkeepsie. That is only the beginning of it. After all, that is just one side that touches us. Government touches us all. We would know more about our taxes and what they are for if we knew our county government better.

There are a lot of other things. Think, for example, how few people know anything about a department store. How is it run? I am very sure that the department stores in the City of Poughkeepsie would be only too glad to have high school classes come in there and learn how a department store is run. The problem of the chain store and why it differs from other stores. The problem of the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker in their own professions, because more and more they are becoming professions that you have got to know a lot about, if you are going to succeed. How many people in this high school know anything about the running of a great industrial plant? The cream separator plant down here. Do we all know where their raw materials come from? Do we know how the different parts that go into a cream separator are manufactured? Do we know how they are assembled? And finally, do we know how they are sold to the public?

And then, just as another example — banking. I think the banks in Poughkeepsie — they might have to have some special guards, but I hope not — would be glad to have as visitors classes that come from round about the county — classes that would be taken behind the cage, and be told by the president of the bank how the bank is run and what the bank does with your money, and mine, as depositors. It is an amazing thing that in 1932, early 1933, when the banks began closing all over the place, one chief reason for the closing of those banks was that everybody all of a sudden went there at the same time to get his money out.

And the banks had to close. It wasn't until the banks all had to be closed and the thing was explained to them that the people

of this country put their money back into the banks. They didn't realize that a bank does not take your money and put it in the safe and keep it there against the day when you may call for it. They didn't realize that the wheels of industry were dependent on banking loans, that your money in that bank, nearly all of it, was passed right on by the bank to home builders and industries, and all kinds of things that make the wheels go round in our country.

I should like to go behind the cage of a bank and learn a lot more about it than I know today. There are so many things that I could talk about along that line. I have only sketched the idea. We are beginning to do it a little, but not enough.

I suppose it will come as a shock to most of us if we realize what a very large percentage of foodstuffs that we eat in the Town of Hyde Park comes from New York City. Now that is an amazing thing when you begin to think it over. Things that are grown on the farm come to Dutchess County from New York City.

Oh, to be sure, they come from all over the United States, but it makes us wonder a little bit as to whether those foodstuffs couldn't be grown in greater volume in our own county and help out our own prosperity. Those are things that affect the lives of every family in this township. If we take that kind of interest in our own lives we begin to figure out and think our economics through — national economics. Well, of course, there is no such thing, I have always claimed, as a proven system of economics. I took economics courses in college for four years, and everything that I was taught was wrong. The economics of the beginning of this century are completely out of date. Why? Experience. Things have happened. Wars have gone on. World trade is a very different thing from what it was, and national economics — so-called — is a very different thing from what it was in the old days. We are groping. We are reaching upward to meet a given situation today which may be entirely different six months from now. But at the same time, if we look into our own economics at home, we get an interest in the economics of the country.

I remember the first year I went down to Warm Springs, about seventeen years ago. I was awakened every night for two or three

nights, about half-past one in the morning, by a very heavy railroad train going through town. And as it went through town, the fireman had his hand on the whistle and woke up everybody. What he had intended to do was to salute the young lady in town that he was engaged to. But he woke everybody else up.

I went down to the station, after two or three nights of being waked up, and I said to the stationmaster, "What's that train that goes through at half-past one in the morning, that makes that awful noise?"

"Well," he said, "that's the milk train. Milk and cream."

And I said, "Where is it going?"

"Oh, it's going down to Florida, to Miami, Tampa, Palm Beach."

I said, "That's very interesting."

Knowing, of course, that the climate in South Florida does not make it exactly a favorable dairy country, I said to him in the way of conversation, "Where does it come from, North Georgia?"

"Oh, no," he said, "it doesn't come from North Georgia. It comes from Wisconsin."

I said, "What? Nearly two thousand miles — milk and cream for Florida."

Well, it was milk raised in Wisconsin, taken down in refrigerator cars, through Illinois and a corner of Indiana and a corner of Ohio — all dairy States, and through Kentucky — which certainly is a dairy State, and Tennessee, and then into the North of Georgia, which is a grand country for making any kind of dairy products. But none is made there. And they carried that milk and cream down through Georgia and into Florida.

Now, something is wrong with that kind of national economics. I use that just as an illustration. If we get interested in those problems at home our interest will extend to the county, and then to the Hudson River Valley, and then the rest of the State of New York, so to the East, and the Middle West and the other parts of the Nation.

I hope very much that education is going to keep pace in the next few years with the demands of our modern civilization that is proceeding at a pace that is faster than it has ever moved be-

fore. I think we Americans are proud of this system of life of ours. It is a system that has been challenged, challenged by those people who would impose a new and different system. It is my belief, in meetings like this, that people can get together and swap ideas, even if it takes ten or fifteen years to get things through, if we are headed along the course that we follow with the definite intention of keeping on striving for newer and better things in the good old-fashioned democratic processes, republican processes — both spelled with small letters.

If we do that, these boys and girls of ours who are reaching maturity are going to be very happy that the old people were able to look far enough ahead to make sure that our American system will last for hundreds and hundreds of years.

I am glad to have been here. I wish I could come back here, and yet it probably would not be a good thing, because if I came back here — I have that rather disagreeable mentality — if I came back here — got away from Washington, I would probably start in to try to reform Dutchess County. I don't think that the county does need reforming, or the Town of Hyde Park, but I probably would try to do it, nevertheless.

So I hope you will bear with me in these days when I really do come back here — very soon — to live, if I continue at least to take a real interest. If I still try to get people to do things too fast, or do them my way, and not theirs, I hope that you people will be the first to tell me to “go way back and sit down.”

107 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Eighty-first Press Conference (Excerpts). November 3, 1941

(Diplomatic relations with Germany — New York mayoralty campaign — Hyde Park elections — Roosevelt Library — A tree at Hyde Park.)

Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question, off the record if necessary. Lots of people who think just as you do on this war issue also think that a continuance of diplomatic relations with Germany is a form of dishonesty. Could you elaborate your thoughts for background?

107. Seven Hundred and Eighty-first Press Conference

THE PRESIDENT: No. Only off the record. I would have to make it completely off the record.

As you know, we have taken the position — the Secretary of State was repeating it the other day — that we are actually and truly only acting on the defense. That's all. That is literally true on all the oceans, and various other places. There are a great many other things to support that, that haven't come out.

Well, one of the dispatches this morning showed a very definite attempt on the part of Germany to establish itself, by the infiltration method, in a little place called Liberia. Well, that's a thing we can't use, because the Liberian Government realizes exactly what the purpose was — establishing an airline down there. Liberia, of course, is awfully close to South America. It's just another step. And it depends entirely on how you like to look at it. Is it an attack, or isn't it? In one sense it is an attack, because it is the first stage of the development of German control, probably down to a point directly opposite South America.

And as I say, there are constant instances of trying to spread their power all over the world which are not "shooting" down there, but it's a very definite attempt to attack the Americas. You know the point of view. And naturally we are resisting for the purpose of our own defense, and hemisphere defense.

And the question always arises here. We don't want a declared war with Germany because we are acting in defense — self-defense — every action. And to break off diplomatic relations — why, that won't do any good. I really frankly don't know that it would do any good. It might be more useful to keep them the way they are.

Q. There is the thought that in that way the situation would be brought home very directly to the American people.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I think the American people understand it pretty well. After all, in days like this, you don't do things for the sake of the record. And that is about all it would be.

Q. Why can't stuff like that Liberian incident be published, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, because it isn't the time to do it. Publishing things of this kind is a question of timing, as you will probably see in the course of the next two or three days.

Q. Mr. President, there isn't any more you could say about this New York mayoralty contest, is there? They seem to be doing some awfully harsh talking down there.

THE PRESIDENT: A lot of hard talking. I got a report yesterday that there was a story in New York that I had repudiated what I had said about the Mayor. And that story was being circulated. Of course there is absolutely nothing, not one word or vestige of truth in it. I think that is all. . . .

Q. Mr. President, are you going to vote? About the usual hour tomorrow morning, I mean.

THE PRESIDENT: I think so. We haven't worked it out yet. I think Mrs. Roosevelt and I will go up there about, I would say, eleven or twelve o'clock.

Q. Yes, sir. I don't assume you have anything much to say about the local election campaigns?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I can't say anything out loud about it. But for your own private information, Mr. Van Wagner [Elmer Van Wagner] — I think he has been an awfully good Supervisor of the Town. We have two people that are running for Superintendent of Highways, and they are both named Marshall, isn't that right?

Q. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I hope the Marshall who is in now will stay in, because I think the roads are — I drive over them a great deal — are in better shape than I have seen them for a long time.

Q. Those two Marshalls, Mr. President — regarding those two Marshalls, did you ever hear about the time Tuxedo Park voted unanimously the Socialist ticket? They got a new voting machine, and the handle of the Socialist came down over the Republican. They all voted wrong. (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: I love it. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, we were looking over some of the exhibits out there, while we were waiting. How is the Library [Franklin

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D. Roosevelt Library] getting along? Lots of people coming up?

THE PRESIDENT: Getting along. Much larger attendance than we had expected. I think the figure for the first four months was about 40,000.

Q. Is that total for the first four months?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And of course Mr. Shipman is getting a little bit worried because there are so many more things that we are getting, that we are already faced, or will be soon, with the question of adequate space. A great many people don't realize it, but the space we have will fill up very quickly from material that is now in Washington — about six or seven million manuscripts. Of course the general public doesn't see the manuscripts.

Q. What are those, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would say — those manuscripts I would say are not only mine, but papers that I have been associated with, started back in 1910. Nearly three years in Albany. Then after that, the Navy files through 1920. And then, of course, a great many political files, like the campaign of 1920, and the Madison Square Garden convention in 1924, and the Houston convention in 1928. And then my campaign in 1928 for Governor, and the four years of Albany papers. Then, of course, the White House files. Then all you have to do on that is to go downstairs in the White House and look at what hasn't come up yet. There is an awful lot hasn't come up, but a great many already in the stacks. Then, of course, besides that, there are a very large number of my own books, and those are in the stacks too.

And those are constantly being added to. For instance, we are getting a great many supplementary dovetailing documents and reports from different parts of the Government. Just for example, I got a telephone call yesterday from Dr. Buck, who has been the Archivist, who has been given, for permanent keeping, the old Navy Department files. They haven't got room in the Navy Building any more for them;

the files go back to the French war, and Tripoli War, and the War of 1812. And as soon as Dr. Buck gets them, he is going to have them microfilmed.

Q. That's the new system?

THE PRESIDENT: That's the new system. Have them all microfilmed, and as I understand it, he will have, I think, three copies made. They will keep one in a different part of the Archives Building, and they will put another one in the Navy Department Building. And they will send one copy up here, so that if anything should ever happen to the originals, we should still have the microfilm. Of course they take up a certain amount of room.

And then — well, there are a lot of things. Remember N.R.A.? Well, those files are down in Washington. They oughtn't to come here, but the more important N.R.A. files are going to be microfilmed and the copy will be brought up here, because a lot of this dovetails in with my papers. So any student would be able to get here a pretty large portion of everything that has been connected with the Administration, and not have to run around all over the place to get something here or something there. . . .

Q. There's a slight argument among the boys this morning on how old is the tree in front, out there, that is chained up — the limbs?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the story has been printed, but it is rather an interesting one. I had a tree man here about twenty years ago with a similar tree, about the same age.

And he counted the rings and figured out that the tree started to grow about 1640, which is three hundred years, and then he advanced the extremely interesting theory that the tree obviously grew under field conditions. In other words, not in a forest — in those early years — because the lower limbs started out at a very low level, and branched out fifty or more feet on all sides of the tree. So it must have been an open space. It meant almost necessarily that this was a field, and if it was a field, then it was an Indian field. Therefore there was an Indian encampment, or village, right here.

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Q. In other words, an accidental tree grew, so to speak?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It had to grow up under field conditions, and the only fields in the East in those days were Indian cultivated fields. Everywhere else were woodlands. . . .

Q. What is that tree?

THE PRESIDENT: White oak. They are all white oaks. And I think it is rather an interesting thing. Of course, we find all kinds of arrowheads. Right on the drive we dug up a deer bone — a shin bone that had been made into a needle. And we have quite a lot of arrowheads and things like that that are dug up.

Q. Isn't it one of our oldest parts of America up here — in terms of history then?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes. This county did not get settled until 1690, something like that, so it couldn't have been a white man's field. It must have been an Indian's field. Of course the other side of the river was settled about 1640, over in Ulster County.

Q. Mr. President, have you decided when you are going to send a request to Congress for the vastly increased tank production, about which you talked a fortnight ago?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know.

Q. You haven't got to the point where you will use your draft then?

THE PRESIDENT: Not yet.

Q. That is just a part of the general raising of the sights?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, part of the whole thing. Yes. There isn't any time being lost, because of course they are still awarding actual contracts on some of the old money. It isn't all actually contracted for yet.

NOTE: For the text of the President's endorsement of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia for reelection as Mayor of New York, see Item 97 and note, this volume.

For additional discussion of the

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, see Item 156 and note, pp. 629-643, 1938 volume; Item 158, pp. 580-582, 1939 volume; and Item 61 and note, this volume.

108 ¶ Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks
Delivered on Election Night at Hyde Park,
New York. November 4, 1941

THIS is one night that we will all of us remember. My memory goes back to the past century and as far as I know this is the first time since about 1871 that we have carried the town for the whole Democratic ticket. And I think the one explanation is that the two present members, the Supervisor and the Superintendent of Highways, have given such good service during the past two years that the electorate of the town decided that a few more like them wouldn't do any harm.

I said in the school yesterday that I was always starting something, and now that Elmer [Elmer Van Wagner] is in, with a Town Board, I am going to make a suggestion which even he hasn't heard of. I am going to suggest that we have for the Town of Hyde Park nothing in the way of an official planning board, but at least a group of citizens who would be called on from time to time to act as a planning board for the whole town.

The reason I am saying that is because the town is growing so fast, and there are so many new problems being presented to us from time to time, that in the long run it will pay us if we plan for the future. I don't think it will mean any increase in taxes, if we plan. And at the same time, when we do something, it will be in accordance with an effort to guess into the future, and do things that we won't have to re-do because of failure to plan ahead.

I think the time has come to do it. Up in Rhinebeck they have had a planning board for some time, and they have invited opinions from all kinds of people. They asked me to go up there this afternoon, because I was a neighbor and believed in planning. They have the problem of a new high school, as you know. And I went over a number of sites with the school trustees, to tell them what I thought of their relative merits. I don't pretend to be an expert, but as between the two best sites, I voted in favor

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of the bigger site; because we people know from our own experience that one of the best things we ever did was to get school property with enough playground. We have it today in all three of our new schools.

And so I hope that with this new Town Board we can look into the future a little bit more than we have before. We are all going to watch them like hawks. We are going to be on their trail every minute. And we might as well admit that the responsibility for the new government of this town for the next two years is going to lie in the hands of these Democratic candidates who have been duly elected today.

I think that we ought to have had tonight — of course it caught us by surprise, we weren't ready for it — we ought to have had the largest amount of red fire that we have ever had on Election Day night.

So I can properly say in behalf of the majority of the voters — men and women of the Town of Hyde Park — that we congratulate today's winners and wish them all the good luck in the world.

May I say one other thing in closing, and that is this. You know there are other democracies in the world besides the United States. Quite a number of them. There is one democracy from which the ancestors of a great many people in the Town of Hyde Park came — Holland. We are awfully happy today to be the hosts — this whole town — of Princess Juliana of the Netherlands. I have been driving her around through this township yesterday and today.

I am glad she saw an American polling place this morning — how we voted — the mechanics of it. I am glad she saw a Democratic victory tonight. Her mother, the Queen of the Netherlands, reigns over just as much of a democracy as we have in the United States, where people vote just the way we do, where things are decided by a congress that is not very different from ours — a country that today unfortunately, most unfortunately, hasn't any democratic processes left under the heel of an invader.

And I think all of us hope — for the Princess and for her

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mother — that the day will come very soon when they will go back to their home in the Netherlands, to join with the life of that great democracy — one of the earliest of all of the democracies of the world.

NOTE: Every year that the President went home to Hyde Park to vote, he was greeted on Election Night by local torchlight paraders who visited his home — usually to extend congratulations. The President always appeared on his front porch to deliver a homey, extem-

poraneous speech to his home-town friends. The foregoing remarks were delivered on an unusual occasion, for 1941 was the first year in many years that the entire town had been carried for the Democratic ticket.

109 (The President Names Harold L. Ickes
Solid Fuels Coordinator for National
Defense. November 5, 1941

AS THE defense effort progresses it becomes increasingly urgent to assure that the supply of solid fuels will be adequate and that they will be readily available at consuming points when required for military, industrial, and civilian purposes. Difficult problems are already arising with respect to their supply and availability for such uses. These problems require the efficient and carefully coordinated development, production, distribution, utilization, transportation, and handling of solid fuels.

You have in your Department extensive information and facilities with respect to solid fuels. I refer particularly to the Bituminous Coal Division, the Bureau of Mines, and the Geological Survey. In addition, in your capacity as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense you have important functions with respect to oil and gas. It is essential that the handling of solid fuel and of oil and gas problems should be closely coordinated in the present emergency.

I am, therefore, requesting that you as the Secretary of the Interior shall act as Solid Fuels Coordinator for National Defense in performing the following duties:

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1. Obtain currently from the appropriate defense and other Federal agencies, from the various States and their subdivisions, and from any other sources, private or governmental, information as to the military and civilian needs for solid fuels;

2. Obtain currently from the solid fuels industries and from any other sources, governmental or private, information relating to development, production, supply, availability, distribution, utilization, transportation, and handling of solid fuels;

3. Make recommendations to the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, the Office of Production Management, the Office of Price Administration, the transportation agencies of the Federal Government and to any other appropriate Federal departments and agencies concerning measures relating to the production, storage, pooling, transportation, distribution, marketing, and consumption of solid fuels for the purpose of promoting the maintenance of a ready and adequate supply at reasonable prices;

4. In cooperation with the solid fuels and related industries and with consumers of solid fuels, and in coordination with the Office of Production Management, carry on such programs as will promote economy and efficiency in the development, production, distribution, utilization, transportation, and handling of solid fuels, and as will facilitate the operation of the solid fuels industries so as to meet the requirements of the national defense program;

5. Advise and make recommendations to the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, the Office of Production Management, and other appropriate defense agencies with respect to the material, equipment, and supplies which will be required by the solid fuels industries in producing, transporting, and distributing the tonnage needed for civilian and defense purposes;

6. Make other recommendations to appropriate Federal departments and agencies concerning measures affecting the supply and availability of solid fuels as may seem necessary from time to time.

In carrying out these responsibilities, the determinations of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board and of the Office of Production Management will, of course, govern as to the re-

quirements for national defense, direct and indirect, and as to the establishment and administration of priorities and allocations.

The heads of the agencies and departments concerned are being informed of this designation and I am requesting that they inform you in advance of any action proposed which may affect the maintenance of an adequate supply of solid fuels and of all meetings or conferences dealing with these problems.

I anticipate that you will use your present staff in the discharge of these responsibilities to the fullest extent possible. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available, you may make provision for the necessary services and facilities and you may employ necessary additional personnel, including the appointment or designation, with my approval, of an assistant to whom you may make any necessary delegation of functions.

NOTE: After the first World War excessive productive capacity, coupled with increased competition from other types of fuel, had gravely affected the financial stability of the coal industry. The anthracite and bituminous coal industries were further dislocated by violent labor disturbances.

For these and other reasons, by 1941 there was grave doubt whether the coal industry would produce in great enough quantity to meet the requirements of national defense. Developments during 1941 made the problem of adequate supply of coal more acute. The coal industries had been increasingly mechanized, but, since the materials were being used elsewhere in the national defense program, it became difficult for producers to obtain the necessary equipment in 1941. A strike in the bituminous coal industry in the

spring of 1941 had further cut production. And the problem was made still more acute by the inability of the railroads to transport the entire tonnage ordered from the mines.

The continued expansion of defense requirements, and a shifting from the use of oil and other fuels to coal, indicated that unless early action were taken the defense program might be seriously handicapped by shortages of bituminous and anthracite coal. In the summer of 1941, management and labor representatives from both the bituminous and the anthracite coal industries recommended to the President that the coal industries be regulated centrally by the Government with respect to production, distribution, priorities, prices, and other matters relating to the furtherance of the national defense program.

109. Solid Fuels Coordinator for National Defense

As indicated by the President in the foregoing letter, one of the factors which led to the appointment of Secretary of the Interior Ickes as Solid Fuels Coordinator for National Defense (which title was changed on May 25, 1942, to Solid Fuels Coordinator for War) was the close relationship between solid fuels, on the one hand, and oil and gas, on the other, over which Mr. Ickes already had authority as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense. (See Item 47 and note, this volume, for the President's letter naming Secretary Ickes Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, and an account of the creation of the Office of Petroleum Coordinator.) In addition, the Department of the Interior was the logical agency in this task because of detailed information and experience which it had accumulated in dealing with solid fuels problems.

During 1942, 582,700,000 tons of bituminous coal and 60,328,000 tons of anthracite coal were produced. This total was somewhat greater than required for consumption and export during 1942. Therefore, it was not necessary to formulate controlled distribution programs; and the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator maintained only a small staff.

Profiting by the experience of the Fuel Administration during World War I the Solid Fuels Coordinator determined to prevent the coal shortage which had occurred during the last war owing to a breakdown of transportation. Dur-

ing 1942 he instituted a campaign to stimulate large industrial enterprises to stock as much coal as possible during the spring and summer of 1942 in order to spare the country's railroads additional transportation burdens during the fall and winter. This policy was also designed to give to the consumers of coal the protection of having adequate stockpiles available in the event that transportation breakdowns or other interruptions of production should occur. Despite increased consumption, at the end of 1942 the Nation possessed the largest stockpile of bituminous coal in its history — approximately 90,874,000 tons, which exceeded by about 15,000,000 tons the previous 1927 record. Without this stockpile, the country would have been hard pressed to weather the 1943 work stoppages without numerous industrial shutdowns.

In addition to its "buy now" campaign for the purchase of coal for stockpiling purposes, the Coordinator's Office stimulated the early start of navigation over the Great Lakes in the spring of 1942 in order to speed coal to its ultimate consumers. The Coordinator's Office also encouraged the formation of industry committees to facilitate the tidewater transshipment of coal.

To encourage closer relations between the Coordinator's Office and the solid fuels industries, the Solid Fuels Advisory War Council, comprising seventeen representatives of labor, management, distribution,

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transportation, and the consumers, was established in the spring of 1942. This advisory group met once a month in Washington and was extremely helpful to the Solid Fuels Coordinator in his formulation of policies.

As oil production expanded and the requirements for coal mounted, the coal-producing fields began to feel the pinch of shortages in the supply of equipment and skilled labor. Requirements for coal started to overtake productive capacity. Through the intervention of the Solid Fuels Coordinator, the work week in the coal mines was lengthened from five to six days in the western, and later the eastern, areas

of the country. For a short period, these measures increased the production rate, but it soon became evident that greater powers of control would be necessary if a general coal shortage was to be avoided. Accordingly, the President instituted discussions early in 1943 leading to the issuance of Executive Order No. 9332 on April 19, 1943, abolishing the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator for War and establishing the Solid Fuels Administration for War. (See Item 39 and note, 1943 volume, for an account of the establishment and function of the new Solid Fuels Administration for War.)

110 ¶ “The American People Have Made an Unlimited Commitment That There Shall Be a Free World” — Address to the Delegates of the International Labor Organization.

November 6, 1941

TAKING part in a conference of the I.L.O. is not a new experience for me. It was exactly at this time of the year, in 1919, that the I.L.O. had its first conference in Washington. And at that time apparently someone had fallen down on the job of making the necessary physical arrangements for the conference. And at last someone picked on the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy to help. I had to find office space in the Navy Building, as well as supplies and typewriters, to get that conference started.

I well remember that in those days the I.L.O. was still a dream. To many it was a wild dream. Who had ever heard of Govern-

ments getting together to raise the standards of labor on an international plane? Wilder still was the idea that the people themselves who were directly affected — the workers and the employers of the various countries — should have a hand with Government in determining these labor standards.

Now 22 years have passed. The I.L.O. has been tried and tested. It has passed childhood; it is now grown up. Through those extravagant years of the twenties it kept doggedly at the task of shortening the hours of labor, protecting women and children in agriculture and industry, making life more bearable for the merchant seamen, and keeping the factories and mines of the world more safe and fit places for human beings to work in.

Then through the long years of depression it sought to bring about a measure of security to all workers by the establishment of things like unemployment insurance and old-age insurance systems; and again to set the wheels of industry in action through the establishment of international public works, rational policies of migration of workers, and the opening of the channels of world trade.

Now for more than two years you have weathered the vicissitudes of a world at war. Though Hitler's juggernaut has crowded your permanent staff out of its own home at Geneva, here in this new world, thanks in large part, I like to think, to the efforts of our friend, John Winant, you have been carrying on. And when this world struggle is over, you will be prepared to play your own part in formulating those social policies upon which the permanence of peace will so much depend.

Today you, the representatives of more than 33 Nations, meet here in the White House for the final session of your conference. It is appropriate that I recall to you, who are in a full sense a parliament for man's justice, some words that were written in this house by a President who gave his very life for the cause of justice. Nearly eighty years ago, Abraham Lincoln said: "The strongest bond of human sympathy, outside of the family relation, should be one uniting all working people, of all Nations, and tongues, and kindreds."

The essence of our struggle today is that man shall be free. There can be no real freedom for the common man without enlightened social policies. In the last analysis, they are the stakes for which democracies are today fighting.

So your concern is the concern of all democratic peoples. To many of your member states, adherence to the I.L.O. has meant great sacrifice. There is no greater evidence of the vitality of the I.L.O. than the loyal presence here today of the representatives of the Nations which suffer under the lash of the dictator. I welcome those representatives, especially.

I extend the hand of courage to the delegates of those labor organizations whose leaders are today languishing in concentration camps for having dared to stand up for the ideals without which no civilization can live. Through you, the delegates from these despoiled lands, the United States sends your people this message: "You have not been forgotten; you will not be forgotten."

We in the United States have so far been called upon for extremely limited sacrifices, but even in this country we are beginning to feel the beginnings of the pinch of war. Some of these names may be unfamiliar to you, but the workers of Manitowoc, Wisconsin, for example, who used to make aluminum utensils, have had to sacrifice their jobs in order that we may send planes to Britain and Russia and China. Rubber workers in a hundred scattered plants have had to sacrifice their opportunities for immediate employment in order that there may be ships to carry planes and tanks to Liverpool and Archangel and Rangoon. Tens of thousands of automobile workers are being shifted to other jobs in order that the copper which might have been used in automobiles may carry its deadly message from the mills of the Connecticut Valley to Hitler. And with all this, still we have not yet made substantial sacrifices in the United States.

We have not, like the heroic people of Britain, had to withstand a deluge of death from the skies. Nor can we even grasp the full extent of the sacrifices that the people of China are making in their struggle for freedom from aggression. We have in

amazement witnessed the Russians opposing the Nazi war machine for four long months and more — opposing it at the price of uncounted dead and a scorched earth.

Most heroic of all, however, has been the struggle of the common men and women of Europe, from Norway to Greece, against a brutal force which, however powerful, will be forever inadequate to crush the fight for freedom.

As far as we in the United States are concerned, that struggle shall not be in vain. The epic stand of Britain, of China, and of Russia receives the full support of the free people of the Americas. The people of this Nation, and of all the rest of the American Republics, insist upon their right to join in the common defense.

To be sure, there are still some misguided — unenlightened — that is putting it politely — some people of that kind among us — thank God they are but few — both industrialists and leaders of labor, who place personal advantage above the welfare of their Nation. There are still a few who place their little victories over one another above triumph against Hitlerism. There are still some who place the profits that they may make from civilian orders above their obligation to the national defense. And there are still some who deliberately delay defense output by using their “economic power” to force the acceptance of their demands, rather than use the established machinery for the mediation of industrial disputes.

Yes, they are but few. They do not represent the great mass of American workers and employers. The American people have made an unlimited commitment that there shall be a free world. And against that commitment, no individual and no group shall prevail.

The American workman does not have to be convinced that the defense of the democracies is his defense. Some of you, from the conquered countries of Europe, and from China, have told this conference with the eloquence of anguish, how all that you have struggled for — the social progress that you and your fellow men have achieved — is being obliterated by the barbarians.

I need not tell you that one of the first acts of the Fascist and Nazi dictators — at home and in conquered countries — was to abolish free trade unions and to take away from the common people the right of association. Labor alone did not suffer. Free associations of employers were also abolished. Collective bargaining has no place in their system; neither has collaboration of labor and industry and government.

Nor need I tell you that the Nazi Labor Front is not a labor union but an instrument to keep labor in a state of permanent subjection. Labor under the Nazi system has become the slave of the military state.

To replace Nazi workers shipped to the front, and to meet the gigantic needs of her total war effort, Nazi Germany has imported about two million foreign civilian laborers. They have changed the occupied countries into great slave areas for the Nazi rulers. And at this moment Berlin is the principal slave market of all the world.

The American workman has no illusions about the fate that awaits him and his free labor organizations if Hitler should win. He knows that his own liberty and the very safety of the people of the United States cannot be assured in a world that is three-fourths slave and one-fourth free. He knows that we must furnish arms to Britain, to Russia, and to China and that we must do it now — today.

And we know by now that our place — the place of the whole Western Hemisphere — in the Nazi scheme for world domination has been marked on the Nazi timetable. The choice we have to make is this: Shall we make our full sacrifices now, produce to the limit, and deliver our products today and every day to the battlefields of the entire world? Or shall we remain satisfied with our present rate of armament output, postponing the day of real sacrifice — as did the French — until it is too late?

The first is the choice of realism — realism in terms of three shifts a day; the fullest use of every vital machine every minute of every day and every night; realism in terms of staying on the job and getting things made, and entrusting industrial griev-

ances to the established machinery of collective bargaining — the machinery set up by a free people.

The second choice is the approach of the blind and the deluded who think that perhaps we could do business with Hitler. For them there is still “plenty of time.” To be sure, many of these misled individuals honestly believe that if we should later find that we can’t do business with Hitler, we will roll up our sleeves later — later — later. And their tombstones would bear the legend “Too late.”

In the process of working and fighting for victory, however, we must never permit ourselves to forget the goal that is beyond victory. The defeat of Hitlerism is necessary so that there may be freedom; but this war, like the last war, will produce nothing but destruction unless we prepare for the future now. We plan now for the better world that we aim to build.

If that world is to be a place in which peace is to prevail, there must be a more abundant life for the masses of the people of all countries. In the words of the document that you know of under the name of the Atlantic Charter, we “desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all Nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.”

There are so many millions of people in this world who have never been adequately fed and clothed and housed. By undertaking to provide a decent standard of living for these millions, the free peoples of the world can furnish employment to every man and every woman who seeks a job.

And so we are already engaged in surveying the immediate postwar requirements of a world whose economies have been disrupted by war.

We are planning not to provide temporary remedies for the ills of a stricken world; we are planning to achieve permanent cures — to help establish a sounder world life.

To attain these goals you and I know will be no easy task. Yes, their fulfillment will require “the fullest collaboration between all Nations.” We have learned too well that social problems and

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economic problems are not separate watertight compartments in the international field any more than in the national sphere. In international, as in national, affairs economic policy can no longer be an end unto itself. It is merely a means for achieving social objectives.

There must be no place in the postwar world for special privilege for either individuals or Nations. And again in the words of the Atlantic Charter: "All states, great or small, victor or vanquished" must have "access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

In the planning of such international action the I.L.O. with its representation of labor and management, its technical knowledge and experience, will be an invaluable instrument for peace. Your organization will have an essential part to play in building up a stable international system of social justice for all peoples everywhere. As part of you, part of your great world organization, the people of the United States are determined to respond fully to the opportunity and the challenge of this historic responsibility, so well exemplified at this historic meeting in this historic home of an ancient democracy.

NOTE: For other presidential references to the International Labor Organization, see Item 61, pp. 181-182, 1935 volume; Item 74, pp. 223-225, 1936 volume; Item 75, pp. 280-282, 1937 volume; Item 70, pp. 371-374, 1938 volume; Item 61, pp. 269-271, 1940 volume; and Item 30 and note, 1944-1945 volume.

111 ¶ The President Finds That the Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Is Vital to the Defense of the United States and Directs the Lend-Lease Administrator to Expedite the Transfer of Supplies to Russia. November 7, 1941

ON NOVEMBER 7, 1941, I addressed a letter to His Excellency President Kalinin in which I congratulated him upon the national anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and expressed the admiration of the people of the United States for the "valiant and determined resistance of the Army and people of the Soviet Union" and the determination of the United States that the "sacrifices and sufferings of those who have the courage to struggle against aggression will not have been in vain."

In that letter I assured President Kalinin "of the desire of the Government and people of the United States to do everything possible to assist your country in this critical hour."

In accordance with that pledge and pursuant to the power conferred upon me by the Lend-Lease Act, I have today found that the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is vital to the defense of the United States. I therefore authorize and direct you to take immediate action to transfer defense supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Lend-Lease Act and to carry out the terms of my letter of October 30, 1941, to Premier Stalin.

I should appreciate it if you would work out as quickly as possible details of this program with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

NOTE: The foregoing authorization to Administrator Stettinius resulted in qualifying Russia for lend-lease aid. Under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, a Nation became eligible for aid under the Act

only upon a declaration by the President that the defense of the Nation was vital to the defense of the United States. Prior to the foregoing declaration by the President, a considerable amount of aid had

112. *Thanksgiving Day Proclamation*

been made available to Russia on loans and credit and by direct Russian purchasing of American materials.

In the fall of 1941, dollar supply which was available to Russia for purchases in the United States had almost run dry, and it became necessary to make Russia eligible for lend-lease in order that supplies could be kept flowing to the Soviet

without interruption. This was the effect of the foregoing finding and request. (For a comprehensive account of the origin and administration of lend-lease aid to Russia, and a summary of the total amount of such aid, see note to Item 96, this volume. For an account of lend-lease aid to other countries, see Items 15, 52, and 105 and notes, this volume.)

112 ¶ Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Proclamation No. 2522. November 8, 1941

I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate and set aside Thursday, the twentieth day of November, 1941, as a day to be observed in giving thanks to the Heavenly Source of our earthly blessings.

Our beloved country is free and strong. Our moral and physical defenses against the forces of threatened aggression are mounting daily in magnitude and effectiveness.

In the interest of our own future, we are sending succor at increasing pace to those peoples abroad who are bravely defending their homes and their precious liberties against annihilation.

We have not lost our faith in the spiritual dignity of man, our proud belief in the right of all people to live out their lives in freedom and with equal treatment. The love of democracy still burns brightly in our hearts.

We are grateful to the Father of us all for the innumerable daily manifestations of His beneficent mercy in affairs both public and private, for the bounties of the harvest, for opportunities to labor and to serve, and for the continuance of those homely joys and satisfactions which enrich our lives.

Let us ask the Divine Blessing on our decision and determination to protect our way of life against the forces of evil and slavery which seek in these days to encompass us.

113. *Anti-Inflationary Tax Legislation*

On the day appointed for this purpose, let us reflect at our homes or places of worship on the goodness of God and, in giving thanks, let us pray for a speedy end to strife and the establishment on earth of freedom, brotherhood, and justice for enduring time.

113 ¶ The President Urges the Enactment of Anti-Inflationary Tax Legislation.

November 8, 1941

I UNDERSTAND that the Secretary of the Treasury recently consulted with you and other Congressional leaders about the inflation problem and the urgency of prompt tax legislation to counteract the inflationary pressures arising from the defense program. It seems clear that if we are to prevent a further sharp increase in the cost of living and in the cost of the defense program itself, we must take immediate steps to absorb a large amount of purchasing power through additional taxes, and incidentally to pay cash for a greater part of our defense production. We must remember that taxation is a necessary complement of price control legislation because the continuing effectiveness of price control is largely dependent upon the restriction of the demand for goods.

If these taxes are to restrain inflation they should be directed mainly at that part of the national income which is being devoted to the purchase of civilian goods, and should be of a character that will not increase the cost of these goods. Purchasing power so far exceeds actual and potential production of civilian goods that vigorous steps must be taken to reduce purchasing power more nearly to the level of production capacity.

Inflation is itself a most inequitable type of taxation. It grants no exemptions and recognizes no hardships—though a well-drafted tax bill can do both. I very much fear that unless we start within two or three months to withdraw through taxes a

113. *Anti-Inflationary Tax Legislation*

larger part of the current national income an even greater part may evaporate through inflation, and the upward spiral may gain such momentum that it will be difficult to regulate, despite all efforts through price control and similar measures. I do hope you will be able to help us with this problem now.

Honorable Robert L. Doughton,
Chairman, House Committee on
Ways and Means

NOTE: Despite the passage of the Revenue Act of 1941 on September 20, 1941 (see Item 36 and note, this volume), the inflationary pressures on prices intensified as the shortage of civilian supplies became more acute and as incomes increased from defense jobs. In the fall of 1941, the Congress was still considering emergency price control legislation (see Item 70, this volume) to strengthen the control of the Office of Price Administration over inflationary price influences. (See Item 26 and note, this volume, for an account of the work of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply.) In these circumstances, the President decided that additional tax measures were necessary to aid in combating inflation. Accordingly, he sent the foregoing message to the Congress.

Pearl Harbor enormously increased Federal war expenditures.

As a result, tax plans had to be scrapped in favor of a far more drastic program to raise additional revenues. In his annual budget message of 1942 (see Item 3 and note, 1942 volume), the President recommended that \$7,000,000,000 of additional revenue be raised through taxes. As estimates of war expenditures soared during 1942, still greater taxes were recommended. The Revenue Act of 1942, approved October 21, 1942 (56 Stat. 798), included steeply increased individual income taxes, corporation taxes, estate and gift taxes, excise taxes, a special 5 percent victory tax withheld at the source, and numerous other measures designed to raise a greater amount of revenue.

(For additional presidential statements on wartime taxes see Items 51 and note, 1943 volume, and Item 14 and note, 1944-1945 volume.)

114 ¶ *Address at Arlington National Cemetery
Commemorating Armistice Day.*

November 11, 1941

You who have served, you serve today.

Among the great days of national remembrance, none is more deeply moving to Americans of our generation than the eleventh of November, the anniversary of the Armistice of 1918, the day sacred to the memory of those who gave their lives in the war which that day ended.

Our observance of this anniversary has a particular significance in the year 1941.

For we are able today as we were not always able in the past to measure our indebtedness to those who died.

A few years ago, even a few months, we questioned, some of us, the sacrifice they had made. Standing near the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Sergeant York of Tennessee on a recent day spoke to such questioners. "There are those in this country today," said Sergeant York, "who ask me and other veterans of World War Number One, 'What did it get you?'"

Today we know the answer — all of us. All who search their hearts in honesty and candor know it.

We know that these men died to save their country from a terrible danger of that day. We know, because we face that danger once again on this day.

"What did it get you?"

People who asked that question of Sergeant York and his comrades forgot the one essential fact which every man who looks can see today.

They forgot that the danger that threatened this country in 1917 was real — and that the sacrifice of those who died averted that danger.

Because the danger was overcome they were unable to remember that the danger had been present.

114. *Address at Arlington National Cemetery*

Because our armies were victorious they demanded why our armies had fought.

Because our freedom was secure they took the security of our freedom for granted and asked why those who died to save it should have died at all.

“What did it get you?”

“What was there in it for you?”

If our armies of 1917 and 1918 had lost there would not have been a man or woman in America who would have wondered why the war was fought. The reasons would have faced us everywhere. We would have known why liberty is worth defending as those alone whose liberty is lost can know it. We would have known why tyranny is worth defeating as only those whom tyrants rule can know.

But because the war had been won we forgot, some of us, that the war might have been lost.

Whatever we knew or thought we knew a few years or months ago, we know now that the danger of brutality and the danger of tyranny and slavery to freedom-loving peoples can be real and terrible.

We know why these men fought to keep our freedom — and why the wars that save a people's liberties are wars worth fighting and worth winning — and at any cost.

“What did it get you?”

The men of France, prisoners in their cities, victims of searches and of seizures without law, hostages for the safety of their masters' lives, robbed of their harvests, murdered in their prisons — the men of France would know the answer to that question. They know now what a former victory of freedom against tyranny was worth.

The Czechs know the answer too. The Poles. The Danes. The Dutch. The Serbs. The Belgians. The Norwegians. The Greeks.

We know it now.

We know that it was, in literal truth, to make the world safe for democracy that we took up arms in 1917. It was, in simple truth and in literal fact, to make the world habitable for decent

115. *Amendment of the Neutrality Act*

and self-respecting men and women that those whom we now remember gave their lives. They died to prevent then the very thing that now, a quarter of a century later, has happened from one end of Europe to the other.

Now that it has happened we know in full the reason why they died.

We know also what obligation and duty their sacrifice imposes upon us. They did not die to make the world safe for decency and self-respect for five years or ten or maybe twenty. They died to make it *safe*. And if, by some fault of ours who lived beyond the war, its safety has again been threatened, then the obligation and the duty are ours. It is in our charge now, as it was America's charge after the Civil War, to see to it "that these dead shall not have died in vain." Sergeant York spoke thus of the cynics and the doubters: "The thing they forget is that liberty and freedom and democracy are so very precious that you do not fight to win them once and stop. You do not do that. Liberty and freedom and democracy are prizes awarded only to those peoples who fight to win them and then keep fighting eternally to hold them."

The people of America agree with that. They believe that liberty is worth fighting for. And if they are obliged to fight they will fight eternally to hold it.

This duty we owe, not to ourselves alone, but to the many dead who died to gain our freedom for us — to make the world a place where freedom can live and grow into the ages.

115 ¶ The President Renews Request for Amendment of the Neutrality Act.

November 13, 1941

My dear Mr. Speaker and Mr. McCormack:

I HAD had no thought of expressing to the House my views of the effect, in foreign countries and especially in Germany,

of favorable or unfavorable action on the Senate amendments.

But in view of your letter, I am replying as simply and clearly as I know how.

In my message of October 9 I definitely recommended arming of ships and removing the prohibition against sending American flag ships into belligerent ports. Both I regard as of extreme importance — the first I called of immediate importance at that time. Another month has gone by, and the second I regard today as of at least equal importance with the first.

In regard to the repeal of Sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality Act, I need only call your attention to three elements. The first concerns the continued sinking of American flag ships in many parts of the ocean. The second relates to great operational advantages in making continuous voyages to any belligerent port in any part of the world; thus in all probability increasing the total percentage of goods — foodstuffs and munitions — actually delivered to those Nations fighting Hitlerism. The third is the decision by the Congress and the Executive that this Nation, for its own present and future defense, must strengthen the supply line to all of those who are today keeping Hitlerism far from the Americas.

With all of this in mind, the world is obviously watching the course of this legislation.

In the British Empire, in China, and in Russia — all of whom are fighting a defensive war against invasion — the effect of failure of the Congress to repeal Sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality Act would be definitely discouraging. I am confident that it would not destroy their defense or morale, though it would weaken their position from the point of view of food and munitions.

Failure to repeal these sections would, of course, cause rejoicing in the Axis Nations. Failure would bolster aggressive steps and intentions in Germany, and in the other well-known aggressor Nations under the leadership of Hitler.

Judging by all recent experience, we could, all of us, look forward to enthusiastic applause in those three Nations based on

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the claim that the United States is disunited, as they have so often prophesied.

Our own position in the struggle against aggression would be definitely weakened, not only in Europe and in Asia, but also among our sister Republics in the Americas. Foreign Nations, friends and enemies, would misinterpret our own mind and purpose.

I have discussed this letter with the Secretary of State and he wholeheartedly concurs.

May I take this opportunity of mentioning that in my judgment failure of the House to take favorable action on the Senate amendments would also weaken our domestic situation. Such failure would weaken our great effort to produce all we possibly can and as rapidly as we can. Strikes and stoppages of work would become less serious in the mind of the public.

I am holding a conference tomorrow in the hope that certain essential coal mines can remain in continuous operation. This may prove successful.

But if it is not successful, it is obvious that this coal must be mined in order to keep the essential steel mills at work. The Government of the United States has the backing of the overwhelming majority of the people of the United States, including the workers.

The Government proposes to see this thing through.

Very sincerely yours,

NOTE: On October 9, 1941, the President had sent a special message to the Congress asking that the Neutrality Act of 1939 be amended to allow the arming of American merchant ships and the sending of American cargoes and vessels into belligerent ports (see Item 94 and note, this volume). The Senate passed legislation embodying the amendatory legislation requested by the President. The road for the legislation in the House of Representatives, however, was rougher. During the debate in the House on the President's recommendation, a large bloc of isolationist members denounced the proposal as virtual entry into the war. On the evening of November 12, 1941, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and House Majority Leader John W. McCormack wrote the following letter to the President:

116. *The Captive Coal Mines Strike*

"A number of members have asked us what effect failure on the part of the House to take favorable action on the Senate's amendments would have upon our position in foreign countries, and especially in Germany.

"Some of these members have stated that they hoped you would make a direct expression upon this matter."

The foregoing message from the President was in response to this

inquiry. Speaker Rayburn left the chair to address the House of Representatives and to read the President's letter to the members of the House. A few minutes after he had concluded his remarks, the House by a vote of 212-194 passed the resolution carrying out the recommendation of the President. The President signed his approval on November 17, 1941 (55 Stat. 764).

116 (The President Directs Management and Labor to Resume Collective Bargaining Covering Coal Mines Producing for Steel Production. November 14, 1941

I HAVE asked you gentlemen to come here this morning to give you certain facts covering the business of the Government of the United States operating under the Constitution. I will ask you when I have finished to withdraw, either to the Cabinet room or some place of your own choice — in order to confer in a final effort to insure continued production of coal for the manufacture of steel.

In the first place, we all know that the United States is in a state of national emergency. The present and future defense of the United States and of this hemisphere is at stake. It is essential to national safety that we continue the defense production program without delay, and at top speed.

Coal for steel plants is a necessity because steel is an essential in the manufacture of munitions. Therefore, the cessation of production in the coal mine industry would create a further danger to American defense, because at this vital time it would slow up production of war materials.

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I think that conclusion is unmistakable, and is approved by the overwhelming majority of Americans.

Because it is essential to national defense that the necessary coal production be continued and not stopped, it is therefore the indisputable obligation of the President to see that this is done.

In spite of what some people say, I seek always to be a constitutional President.

If legislation becomes necessary toward this end the Congress of the United States will without any question pass such legislation. And as some of you know, the pressure on me to ask for legislation during the past couple of months, for one reason or another, has been not only constant, but it has been very heavy.

I am telling you this with absolutely no element of threat. To this conference I am stating a simple fact. I hope, therefore, that you will work out some method for the continued production of coal.

In regard to the collective bargaining, which I am asking you to resume at the end of this meeting, I have two suggestions for you to consider.

The first is that you continue negotiations, with the hope that you can arrive at a conclusion, and that if you do not arrive at a conclusion, you will submit the point, or points, at issue to an arbiter, or arbiters, or anybody else with any other name, and that in the meantime coal production continue.

The second is that you consider other methods relating to employment. As I understand it, the wage question and the check-off are not involved in this at all.

I tell you frankly that the Government of the United States will not order, nor will Congress pass legislation ordering, a so-called closed shop. It is true that by agreement between employers and employees in many plants of various industries the closed shop is now in operation. This is a result of the legal collective bargaining, and not of Government compulsion on employers or employees. It is also true that 95 percent or more of the employees in these particular mines belong to the United Mine Workers Union.

The Government will never compel this 5 percent to join the Union by a Government decree. That would be too much like the Hitler methods toward labor.

I must reiterate that because of the need of continuing and speeding up the defense needs of the United States, because they are so clearly involved, and because lack of coal for our steel plants would injure the defense of the Nation, it is a national necessity that the production of this coal be continued without delay.

And so I am asking you — I never threaten — I am asking you to please talk over this problem of continuing coal production. If you can't agree today, please keep on conferring tomorrow and Sunday. I don't want any action that is precipitate. I want every chance given.

And let me have some kind of report on Monday next — a report of agreement, or at the least a report that you are making progress.

NOTE: Strikes and labor disputes in the captive coal mine industry during the fall of 1941 occurred over the issue whether there should be a union shop for the 53,000 workers engaged in the captive mines (see Item 103 and note, this volume, for a discussion of the issues and initial developments in this controversy).

The foregoing statement by the President, issued three weeks before Pearl Harbor, was one of a series of several personal efforts by him to achieve a settlement of the captive coal mines dispute. How serious and knotty was this dispute is indicated by the fact that the United Mine Workers in these mines went out on strike on three different occasions during the fall of 1941, and all of the resources of the National Defense Mediation

Board failed to bring about a settlement.

Following the statement of the President, the union and steel industry officials held three days of fruitless negotiations during the period November 14-16, and on November 17 the 53,000 miners again went out on strike. The strike then spread to many commercial mines in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky. The National Defense Mediation Board had exhausted its facilities for dealing with the dispute, since after the Board's 9-2 decision of November 10 against a union shop the two C.I.O. members, who had voted in the minority, had resigned from the Board.

Therefore, the President on November 18 sent the following letter to Mr. Lewis and the steel execu-

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tives offering two alternatives: (1) that the union shop issue be kept in suspense during the period of national emergency or (2) that binding arbitration be undertaken.

"Gentlemen:

"At my conference with you November 14 I asked you to consider two suggestions. First, I urged that you continue negotiations and that, if you did not arrive at a conclusion, you submit the point or points at issue to an arbitrator or arbitrators or anybody else with a different name, and that in the meantime coal production in the captive mines continue. Second, I urged that you consider other matters relating to employment, as the wage question and check-off were not involved.

"You have now informed me that the negotiations broke down without an agreement. The point in dispute has not been submitted to arbitration. Production of coal at the captive mines has been interrupted by strike.

"It is, of course, absolutely clear that no one is asking the coal miners to give up their union recognition or their union wage scales or their union working conditions.

"Under the auspices of the National Defense Mediation Board, certain agreements were reached by the coal operators and the United Mine Workers of America for the Appalachian area and for other areas.

"Under these agreements the United Mine Workers are recognized as the sole bargaining agent for all the workers in and about the mines. The agreements fix the highest basic daily wage and the highest tonnage rates paid miners anywhere in the world. They provide in many other ways for the security of the mine worker under union auspices. They include union check weighmen, union grievance machinery and mine committees, union

participation in improved safety practices in the mines and in hospitalization. They eliminate scrip abuses. They provide annual vacations with pay, and other benefits. The steel companies have agreed to all these provisions and are prepared to sign the agreements.

"A single issue, that of the closed shop, remains in dispute, but this issue concerns only 5 per cent of the mine workers employed in the captive mines, which is one-half of 1 per cent — one worker out of every 200 — of all the mine workers in the United States.

"The National Defense Mediation Board has recommended that these non-union workers voluntarily join the United Mine Workers of America and share with their fellow workers the burdens as well as the benefits of the union, and I have personally endorsed this suggestion.

"The operators also have given to the Mediation Board the assurance in most positive terms that they are not now opposed to, and do not intend to oppose, the voluntary growth of union membership at their mines.

"The issue in dispute, however strong the feeling about it may be, does not justify a stoppage of work in a grave national crisis.

"The protective wage clause of the Appalachian agreement has no bearing on this controversy. If the United Mine Workers sign with the operators of the captive mines an agreement which includes no provision for a closed shop, not a single miner will lose any benefit or advantage which he now enjoys under the Appalachian agreement. The closed-shop contracts that have already been signed will stand.

"In order still further to open the way for settlement of the dispute in the captive mines, I am doing two things:

"(1) I am informing all those coal operators who have signed an agreement with the closed-shop provisions and the nonstrike penalty clause that

they will be expected in the interest of national defense to continue to operate under those agreements without change.

"(2) I am asking all the operators of the captive mines to reaffirm their assurances by notice to each of their employees that they are not opposed to union organization or collective bargaining, and that they do not wish to discourage or stand in the way of any employee who chooses to join the United Mine Workers of America.

"But work in the captive mines must recommence.

"I repeat what I said to the conference last Friday:

"'Because it is essential to national defense that the necessary coal production be continued and not stopped, it is therefore the indisputable obligation of the President to see that this is done.'

"I am therefore asking all of you, as patriotic Americans, to accept one or the other of the following alternatives:

"(a) Allow the matter of the closed shop in the captive mines to remain in status quo for the period of the national emergency, all other parts of the Appalachian agreement applying, or

"(b) Submit this point to arbitration, agreeing in advance to accept the decision so made for the period of the national emergency without prejudice to your rights in the future.

"For the common good, for the maintenance of defense production, it is imperative that one of these two alternatives be chosen and faithfully performed.

"I am sending a similar letter to the United Mine Workers' representatives.

Yours sincerely,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

The steel companies immediately accepted the President's proposal. Mr. Lewis replied to the President on November 18 that he could not

pass on the alternatives without a meeting of the National Policy Committee of the United Mine Workers of America. On November 22, the President presented Mr. Lewis with a *fait accompli* and announced the appointment of a three-member board of arbitration, in the following letter:

"November 22, 1941

Dear Mr. Lewis:

"On November 18 I addressed a letter to the several steel companies and to the United Mine Workers of America, parties to the dispute in regard to the captive mines. In the public interest, I suggested two possible solutions to that dispute. Proposal (b) of that letter was as follows: 'Submit this point to arbitration, agreeing in advance to accept the decision so made for the period of the national emergency without prejudice to your rights in the future.'

"Since that time the steel companies have advised me of their acceptance of my proposal (b), and you have advised me that the matter would be considered by your national policy committee today. In completion of this arrangement, I am appointing today a board of three members consisting of Dr. John R. Steelman, as the public representative, Mr. Benjamin Fairless, representative of the steel industry, and Mr. John L. Lewis, representing the mine workers. Dr. Steelman possesses the qualifications essential to the task of public representative and is of unquestioned integrity. Messrs. Fairless and Lewis rate as experts in their fields and are competent to represent their respective viewpoints of this controversy. I am suggesting that this Board begin its work immediately and remain in continuous session until this task is completed.

"May I request an immediate reply

117. *Army Forces in Dutch Guiana*

and acceptance from your national policy committee?

Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

On the same day, Mr. Lewis wrote the President that the National Policy Committee of the United Mine Workers of America unanimously accepted the President's proposal to refer the captive mines controversy to the Board appointed by the President, consisting of Dr. John R. Steelman, representing the public, and Messrs. Benjamin F. Fairless and John L. Lewis, representing the steel companies and the United Mine Workers, respectively. Meanwhile, the National Policy Committee also

recommended that all mine workers employed in the captive and commercial mines return to work immediately.

The Board of Arbitration appointed by the President chose Dr. John R. Steelman, Director of the U. S. Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, as its Chairman. By a two-to-one vote of the Board of Arbitration, Benjamin F. Fairless dissenting, a union shop was directed for the captive coal mines. This decision was handed down on December 7, 1941, the same day that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. Thus ended almost four months of strikes, negotiations, and disputes in the captive coal mine industry.

117 (White House Statement Announcing Army Forces in Dutch Guiana.

November 24, 1941

THE bauxite mines in Surinam furnish upwards of 60 percent of the requirements of the United States aluminum industry which is vital to the defense of the United States, the Western Hemisphere, and the Nations actively resisting aggression.

It is therefore necessary that the safety of these mines should be as completely assured as present conditions demand.

In normal circumstances the Government of the Netherlands would, for the purpose of strengthening further the defenses of Surinam, draw on the armed forces of the Netherlands Indies. In view, however, of the present situation in the Southwestern Pacific, it is thought inadvisable to follow that course.

For this reason the Governments of the Netherlands and of

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the United States of America have entered into consultation. As a result, the latter has agreed to send a contingent of the United States Army to Surinam to cooperate with the Netherlands forces in assuring the protection of the bauxite mines in that territory. This contingent will, of course, be withdrawn as soon as the present danger to the mines is removed and at the latest at the conclusion of hostilities.

Simultaneously the Government of the Netherlands has invited the Government of the United States of Brazil to participate in this defense measure. It is understood that Brazil will contribute to the common aim by exercising an especial measure of military vigilance in the frontier zone adjacent to Surinam and by sending a mission to Paramaribo to exchange information and concert all other steps on the basis indicated to assure maximum efficiency of the safety measures thus being jointly undertaken by the Brazilian, United States, and Netherlands forces.

The Government of Brazil has indicated its wholehearted approval of the emergency measures.

At the same time, the Government of the United States has notified the Governments of the American Republics of the foregoing arrangements which have been reached in the interests of all.

NOTE: Over 65 percent of all of the bauxite used in the United States for the manufacture of aluminum for aircraft came from within the borders of Dutch Guiana (also known as Surinam). Also, over 90 percent of the British supply of bauxite came from one mine in British Guiana, close by. It was therefore strategically important to insure the security of these territories against sabotage or against attack by land, sea, or air.

Early in 1941, extensive conversations and correspondence were carried on by our War, Navy, and

State Departments (with the British participating), sounding out the attitude of the Dutch authorities. On September 3, 1941, the President cabled the Queen of the Netherlands, inviting her attention to the immediate need for increased protection for the bauxite mines in Dutch Guiana. This need the President termed of "such transcendent importance and urgency" that it could not be delayed until Queen Wilhelmina's contemplated visit to the United States. The President recalled to the Queen that the United States was procuring over

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2 million tons of bauxite per year, and that any interruptions to this supply would most seriously delay the production of aircraft needed by the democracies. "The situation is so grave," the President wrote to the Queen, "that I am compelled to seek your approval for immediate entry of United States troops into Surinam to remove the threat to this source of critical raw material. I give you my assurance that occupation by United States troops would be a temporary measure for the period of the emergency only, and that they will be withdrawn as soon as the threat of damage to those vital mines is removed." The President proposed a force not to exceed 3,000 infantry, anti-aircraft, artillery, aircraft, and service troops, along with suitable vessels to patrol the river approaches to the mines.

Queen Wilhelmina agreed, and

shortly thereafter invited the President immediately to send the necessary troops. She stipulated that they be withdrawn as soon as the existing danger was removed, and that the local colonial troops remain under the command of the Dutch colony rather than under the United States forces. The President then requested that Brazil be invited to participate in the reinforcement of Dutch Guiana. Brazil was the only one of the American Republics having a common frontier with Dutch Guiana. Discussions had already been carried on between the United States and Brazil with respect to defense problems of common interest in the area.

In November, 1941, the Netherlands agreed with the plan, and the American forces, supported by a few bombers and pursuit planes, were then sent to the area.

118 ¶ Bill of Rights Day Proclamation. Proclamation No. 2524. November 27, 1941

WHEREAS a Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved August 21, 1941, authorizes and requests the President of the United States "to issue a proclamation designating December 15, 1941, as Bill of Rights Day, calling upon officials of the Government to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings on that day, and inviting the people of the United States to observe the day with appropriate ceremonies and prayer":

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate December 15, 1941, as Bill of Rights Day. And I call upon the officials of the

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Government, and upon the people of the United States, to observe the day by displaying the flag of the United States on public buildings and by meeting together for such prayers and such ceremonies as may seem to them appropriate.

The first ten amendments, the great American charter of personal liberty and human dignity, became a part of the Constitution of the United States on the fifteenth day of December, 1791.

It is fitting that the anniversary of its adoption should be remembered by the Nation which, for one hundred and fifty years, has enjoyed the immeasurable privileges which that charter guaranteed: the privileges of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the free right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.

It is especially fitting that this anniversary should be remembered and observed by those institutions of a democratic people which owe their very existence to the guarantees of the Bill of Rights: the free schools, the free churches, the labor unions, the religious and educational and civic organizations of all kinds which, without the guarantee of the Bill of Rights, could never have existed; which sicken and disappear whenever, in any country, these rights are curtailed or withdrawn.

The fifteenth day of December, 1941, is therefore set apart as a day of mobilization for freedom and for human rights, a day of remembrance of the democratic and peaceful action by which these rights were gained, a day of reassessment of their present meaning and their living worth.

Those who have long enjoyed such privileges as we enjoy forget in time that men have died to win them. They come in time to take these rights for granted and to assume their protection is assured. We, however, who have seen these privileges lost in other continents and other countries can now appreciate their meaning to those people who enjoyed them once and now no longer can. We understand in some measure what their loss can mean. And by that realization we have come to a clearer conception of their worth to us, and to a stronger and more unalter-

119. *Seven Hundred and Eighty-seventh Press Conference*

able determination that here in our land they shall not be lost or weakened or curtailed.

It is to give public expression and outward form to that understanding and that determination that we are about to commemorate the adoption of the Bill of Rights and rededicate its principles and its practice.

NOTE: See Item 133, this volume, ing the 150th anniversary of the for the President's radio address of ratification of the Bill of Rights. December 15, 1941, commemorat-

119 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Eighty-seventh Press Conference (Excerpts). November 28, 1941

(Arming of merchant vessels — Negotiations with Japan — The Pacific situation.)

THE PRESIDENT: I still hope to get off this afternoon at three o'clock. I was asked in the front row when I would come back. I can't answer the question because I don't know. I hope to stay until Tuesday, but I am not sure that I can.

If somebody will ask me what the reason is, the reason is the Japanese situation.

I have here a release, which you will get when you go out, in regard to merchant vessels. This is after consultation between State, War, Navy, and Maritime Commission. (*Reading*):

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes between the United States ports and ports of Spain, Portugal, and their adjacent island possessions will not be armed at this time.

"American merchant vessels sailing in the inter-American trade between ports of the United States and ports of Central and South America will not be armed, at this stage.

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes in the Pacific Ocean will not be armed under existing circumstances.

"Public announcement will be made of any change in policy affecting any of these routes."

And that is all.

Q. Mr. President, could you say how long you think the "existing circumstances" may prevail?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I would ask that question in Tokyo and not in Washington.

Q. Is there anything you can tell us, sir, about these Japanese negotiations?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I'd better not.

Q. If you have read newspapers carefully, I think you would come to the conclusion that we have been getting news based on Tokyo, to a large extent, in that respect. I just simply throw that out.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that probably is true, and it has been based on an American policy of infinite patience.

Q. Well, Mr. President, could you say, sir, whether these negotiations have broken down temporarily?

THE PRESIDENT: No. They have not.

Q. Mr. President, did the Japanese yesterday bring any response to the document presented by Mr. Hull?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell when the next meeting will be held with the Japanese?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know.

Q. Can you tell us, sir, if there were any new developments in your talks with the Japanese different from those that they have had from Mr. Hull?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I would say just exactly the same.

I think I could tell you, for background — but only for background — that the situation seems serious, because our one desire has been peace in the Pacific, and the taking of no steps to alter the prospects of peace, which of course has meant non-aggression. It really boils down to that.

And also — as background — I was, last spring, talking along the line of general peace for the Pacific, based on a settlement of the war between China and Japan — the restoration of peace there, plus a permanent arrangement for non-aggres-

sion in the Pacific, and the restoration of normal economic relations, access to raw materials.

And as you know, the Secretary of State, with even more patience than I have — which is saying a whole lot — had been holding conversations from, I think it was, April. And in the middle of them came the Japanese expedition to Indo-China, which is very far afield, and caused us very great concern, because it seemed to show a reasonable parallel with the Hitler methods in Europe. As, for example, the infiltration, over a period of several months, of the German armies into Rumania and Hungary, placing themselves in the position where strategically they were all set to attack Yugoslavia and Greece.

And of course the drawing of the parallel made peacefully inclined people over here wonder whether this occupation, with a limited number of troops in Indo-China, was the beginning of a similar action in the Far East, placing obvious American interests in great jeopardy if the drawing of such a parallel was justified.

The American flag, of course, does fly from the Philippines. And even before the Japanese went into Indo-China, one might almost say that the Philippines were located in a horseshoe, with Japanese military control over the coasts of China, all the way down to the southern border of China, and Japanese military control on the opposite side — the east — over the mandated islands, so called.

You look at a map closely, that is a sort of a horseshoe, open at the southern end, and the Philippines in the middle of it. I think a study of the map would be advisable for all of us, because the Hitler method has always been aimed at a little move here and a little move there, by which complete encirclement, or the obtaining of essential military points, was merely a prelude to the extension of aggression to other places. It's a perfectly obvious historical fact today. And we are of course thinking not only about the American flag in the Philippines, not only about certain vital defense needs

119. *Seven Hundred and Eighty-seventh Press Conference*

which come from that open end of the horseshoe, but we are thinking about something even more important, and that is the possible extension of control by aggression into the whole of the Pacific area. And we are thinking about what it would mean to this country if that policy were to be used against us in the whole Pacific area. I don't think that anything more can be said at this time. We are waiting. . . .

Q. Mr. President, would this mean that we are working for the status quo?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We have been for a long time.

Q. Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Wait a minute. I wouldn't say working for the status quo, because we —

Q. (*interposing*) Temporary status quo?

THE PRESIDENT: You have got to leave China out of the status quo. We are certainly not working for the status quo in China.

Q. (*interjecting*) That's right.

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) Or Indo-China, for that matter.

Q. Against further aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: Against further aggression. We are working to remove the present aggression. . . .

Q. That Chinese situation is absolutely solid and set, is it not?

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely.

Q. No chance of compromise?

THE PRESIDENT: No. . . .

NOTE: See also Item 122, this volume, for the President's appraisal of relations with Japan, and the negotiations with Japan, on the eve of Pearl Harbor.

120 (Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks at
Dinner of Warm Springs Foundation, Warm
Springs, Georgia. November 29, 1941

I DON'T quite know what to do about next year. Two years ago, or three years ago, I discovered I was particularly fond of turkey. So we started two Thanksgivings. And this year we added another. I don't know how many we ought to have next year. I'm open to suggestions.

It's good to be back with the Warm Springs family. It's good to see something happen, to see the family grow up, with a lot of new members of the family coming along. And I want to express the hope that the Warm Springs family will really never grow up. We will never come of age, and when we get to be twenty-one years old if anybody says we have reached our majority and become grown up, then it's time for this place to fold up.

Because after all, Warm Springs, to be successful in the future, has got to make some progress every year — all through the years — the same progress that we have been making during the past thirteen or fourteen years.

That gives me another idea — which is this. Sometimes I'm really proud of things I have done. In the old days when Warm Springs consisted of Fred Botts and myself and nobody else lived here, we gradually accumulated a little group. It got a little bigger and our first Thanksgiving group was ten or twelve, the next year twenty-five, the next year fifty, one hundred and fifty, and so on. I saw it coming, saw the problem getting bigger and bigger and more difficult to solve. Why, we almost got to the point, before I left off having anything to do with the management, where we needed a complaint bureau.

Well, I said to myself, the time to quit is when things are going well, so I quit as manager and I turned things over to these dictators around here with the hope they would attend to the growth of Warm Springs. And I want to take off my hat to them, all of them, to the dictators, to the nurses and to the push-boys.

120. *Dinner of Warm Springs Foundation*

Because it is a wonderful thing to see this progress, and, mind you, I say it almost as an outsider these days. I am lucky now if I can get here once or twice a year.

Every time I come back I find so many new things. Two or three days here this visit won't give me nearly enough time to see all the wonderful things that have happened since last spring. And I am confident that with the sympathy and understanding of not only the trustees and the management, but also of the patients — past and present and future — Warm Springs is never going to grow up — never going to stop growing — and through the years to come it will be doing a better job than ever before.

I see all kinds of things, and I cannot help feeling that this ought to be a good Thanksgiving, especially this year. Because we people here in this room and all through this community, and this State, and the United States, are in a unique position today. We are one of the largest Nations in the world, and nearly all of the very large Nations are either involved at the present time in a war of some kind — a war of self-defense or a war of conquest — or else the lives some of these Nations used to live have been completely blotted out and they are living lives that are owned and controlled by a dictator.

And I couldn't help thinking how much better it is — this kind of work which is being done here, that is being carried on by a medical profession and by a lot of interested people, and carried on by patients at the same time. What a wonderful system we are living in to enable that work to go on. It isn't ordered from above and it isn't government work. It is a free, independent kind of work where everybody who has an idea and wants to help has a chance to do his or her part.

And another thing, there are two big football games that I listened to on the air today; one is Georgia University and Georgia Tech. At the same time another game is going on — West Point against Annapolis — the Army and the Navy. These are great games. They are run in the spirit of peace, and the right kind of national spirit of peace is necessary for the conduct of either the Georgia game or that game between the Army and the

120. *Dinner of Warm Springs Foundation*

Navy, national institutions of budding soldiers, sailors, and marines.

How many other countries in the world have things like that going on? So, I think we have very great cause to be thankful, that through these years since 1918 we have been able to hold our games, and to carry on our institutions of health and education, and of cooperation along a whole lot of voluntary lines. We need to be thoroughly thankful that these years of peace were given to us. At the same time we should think not only of our own selfish purposes for this country of ours, but also think a little bit about other people, people in countries which have been overrun, people in countries which have been attacked, and, yes, people in those countries which are doing the attacking.

I think we can offer up a little silent prayer and I think lots of us do this without anybody knowing it. And we hope that these people will next year be able to hold a Thanksgiving more like the American Thanksgiving. It is something for us to dream about perhaps, especially in days like these when it is always possible that our Thanksgiving next year may remind us of a peaceful past. It may be that next Thanksgiving these boys of the Military Academy and of the Naval Academy will be actually fighting for the defense of these American institutions of ours.

So, I couldn't help but think of these things when a week and a half ago I was kept there in Washington, largely because of certain dangers that have been overhanging the future of this country. And I may have to go back tomorrow or next day, and I may be able to stay until Tuesday.

But at least it has given me faith and hope in the United States.

So tonight there are a lot of new faces and a lot of old faces, of grown-ups and younger people, and a little later I want to go out to the door as I have done since 1925 or 1926, and greet you personally and clasp your hand.

NOTE: It was the President's custom to spend every Thanksgiving at Warm Springs. In 1941, relations with Japan forced the President to postpone his visit for a week, and also to leave sooner than expected

121. *Remarks to Chairmen of Birthday Ball Committees*

to return to Washington. In 1942, Springs for the first time since the war duties kept him at his desk in United States entered the war (see Washington, but in April, 1943, the Item 38 and note, 1943 volume). President was able to visit Warm

121 ¶ Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to State Chairmen of Birthday Ball Committees.

December 2, 1941

I HAVE been put in an awful hole. I don't know whether to get angry about it, or cry. I am getting a large correspondence congratulating me on being 75 years old. I think it is up to you people to take care of it. You have an awful lot of explaining to do. We find that there is what might be called a conflict of opinion in the matter. I think probably the average person in this country says that a diamond jubilee is 75 years old. On the other hand, all the jewelers in the country say it is 60. So there we are. . . .

I had expected to get enough time down in Warm Springs to see what had happened down there in that particular end of the thing. Of course, that is only one out of a thousand different forms of the fight that we are all engaged in. Things down there are going awfully well. There was a bit of an epidemic this year, but at Warm Springs we were 118 patients, which was exceedingly good. Of course, we multiply that by three to get the total number that are taken care of during the year, and that is only a drop in the bucket — 350 children a year. But it is educational and we are learning a lot through that particular work of the national foundation. And I think we are not only learning a lot, but I told them down there, at the dinner, I hoped we will never have a twenty-first anniversary of the founding of the Warm Springs Foundation. I never want it to grow up. If it once grows up, it will stop growing. The whole work that we are engaged in is the kind of thing that unless it continues to grow and be useful, it will begin to die, and will get toward old age. And I never want it to do that.

121. *Remarks to Chairmen of Birthday Ball Committees*

I have always felt that for the sake of the young people all over the country, and therefore all the foundations, the experimental place at Warm Springs and all the work of every State and every county and every community has got to be kept young, as we are doing more good work every year that goes by.

I think we are pretty well established. We are on the map now. Of course it is true that during the past year, and other years, we have done an enormous amount of good. I am inclined to think that we ought to do a bit of boasting about what good work we have done; how many lives we have actually affected during the past. And of course it also is true that the bigger the work the lower the overhead. In other words, the more money that we can get raised this year the more people we can help. But the per capita cost on the whole will be lower, and relatively it will be a larger number of children who have been affected by infantile paralysis who will be helped locally; and also the more money we can afford on the research side.

I think it was Doc O'Connor who was telling me the other day about some enthusiastic advertising man who had written out something. He started off with the sentence: "Of course it is true that infantile paralysis is relatively a very small trouble in the total of our health problem." That man ought not to be in the advertising business, but in something else.

It is true in one sense that the number of children who have come down with infantile paralysis in the course of a given year is relatively small, compared with the number of people with heart trouble and a few other ailments. Nevertheless, it is such a crippling disease. People don't die — very few of them — but the effect of it all through the community and every part of the country is fully out of proportion to their own families and their own lives.

The public, I think, is coming to realize the importance of what we are doing. We have pretty well got rid of certain scourges that existed in the past. The scourge of t.b. is so much better than it was in our grandparents' day. There is absolutely no comparison. We can go back to any family Bible and read

122. *Seven Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference*

about the death of young people from — they didn't call it t.b. in those days — they called it "they went into a decline, and died." We are getting on top of certain things. There are other diseases that we don't know nearly so many things about.

Well, we are headed to do the same thing with infantile paralysis, but we haven't got there. I think that is why we need to keep these birthday parties going until we have achieved the ultimate objective.

I am awfully grateful to you all for having come these long distances. I really think it is very, very worth while, and I can say personally that it gives me an awful lot of pleasure and happiness to have you carrying on this work, not for me, but for the country as a whole.

KEITH MORGAN: Mr. President, one of the chairmen said this morning that he hoped the Japanese backed down, because since they brought you back from Warm Springs, they felt unkindly toward them.

THE PRESIDENT: You know, I am very peaceful myself, up to a limit.

122 ¶ The Seven Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference (Excerpt). December 2, 1941

(Objective of negotiations with Japan.)

Q. Mr. President, we were told at the State Department that you had asked Mr. Welles to make certain inquiries of Japanese representatives —

THE PRESIDENT: *(interjecting)* That is correct.

Q. *(continuing)* — or the Japanese Government, through their representatives, this morning.

THE PRESIDENT: *(interjecting)* Yes.

Q. *(continuing)* Is there any indication of the nature of those inquiries?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me put it this way, that —

122. *Seven Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference*

MR. CHARLES HAMILTON: (*interposing*) Mr. President —

VOICES: Sh — Sh.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask Charlie —

MR. CHARLES HAMILTON: (*interposing*) Never since Mr. Theodore Roosevelt have we needed a big stick as much as we do today, so I am giving this to you. (*Hands a big ash cane to the President*)

THE PRESIDENT: I think, by Jove —

MR. CHARLES HAMILTON: (*interposing*) I got it in Wales.

THE PRESIDENT: Charlie, thanks ever so much. That's one thing I have longed for. (*Laughter*) That's all right. That's a good hefty one. (*Holding it up to the reporters*) You know, it has got an awfully nice balance. . . .

Q. Mr. President, you started out to say, "Let me put it this way." (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: What was it we were talking about? Was it the — something before Congress, was it?

Q. No.

Q. The nature of the inquiries made of Japan.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me put it this way. And this answers a good many questions at the same time. I'll try to make this as short as I can.

As you know, since last April, we have been discussing with the Japanese Government some method to arrive at an objective. The objective was permanent peace in the whole area of the Pacific. It seemed at times as if progress were being made toward that objective. And during that whole period, up to I think it was the end of June, we assumed that as both Nations were negotiating toward that objective, that there would be no act which would be contrary to the desired end of peace.

We were therefore somewhat surprised, the end of June, when the Japanese Government sent troops — I think to a specified over-all total, in other words, a number which would not be exceeded — into Indo-China, after very brief negotiations with the French Vichy Government; at the conclusion

122. *Seven Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference*

of this arrangement the Vichy Government let it be understood rather clearly that they had agreed to this number of troops, principally because they were powerless to do anything else.

Sometime thereafter, after the troops had gone there, the conversations were resumed between Japan and the United States, and for a while they seemed to be making progress. But again we made it perfectly clear that the objective which we were seeking meant the taking of no additional territory by anybody in the Pacific area.

And the other day we got word from various sources that already, in Indo-China, there were large additional bodies of Japanese forces — various kinds of forces — naval, air, and land — and that other forces were on the way; and that even before these other forces had arrived, the number of forces already there had greatly exceeded, in Indo-China, the original amount which the French Government had agreed to, and that the forces that were on the way would still more greatly exceed the original number.

And the question was asked this morning of the Japanese Government, at my request, very politely, as to what the purpose of this was — what the intention of the Japanese Government in doing this was, as to the future; and eliminating, of course, the possibility that it was for the policing of Indo-China, which was an exceedingly peaceful spot beforehand.

And we hope to get a reply to that very simple question shortly.

Q. Was there any time limit put on it?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. That's a silly question. One doesn't put a time limit on things any more. That's the last century. We are at peace with Japan. We are asking a perfectly polite question. I think that's all. . . .

NOTE: See also Item 119, this volume, for the President's press conference remarks on the progress of negotiations with Japan several days prior to Pearl Harbor.

123 ¶ The President Finds That the Defense of Turkey Is Vital to the Defense of the United States and Directs the Lend-Lease Administrator to Transfer Supplies to Turkey. December 3, 1941

THE President announced that he had found the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States and had directed Lend-Lease Administrator E. R. Stettinius, Jr., to see that the defense needs of the Government of Turkey were filled as fast as possible.

NOTE: For accounts of the genesis of lend-lease, and the operation of the lend-lease program, see the following references: Item 145, pp. 606-615, 1940 volume; Item 152, and note, pp. 668-678, 1940 volume; Item 157, p. 710, 1940 volume; Items 14, 15, 17, 28, 37, 52, 76, 82, 96, 105, 111, and notes, this volume; Item 31, 1942 volume; Items 30, 98, 119, and 124, 1943 volume; and Items 25 and 31, 1944-1945 volume.

124 ¶ The President Sends a Personal Appeal to Emperor Hirohito to Avoid War in the Pacific. December 6, 1941

ALMOST a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective Nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our Nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of Nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any Nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this spring and summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other Nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hun-

124. *Personal Appeal to Emperor Hirohito*

dreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya, and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval, and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya, and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

NOTE: The foregoing appeal to Emperor Hirohito was despatched at 9 P.M., December 6 (Washington time), which was equivalent to 11 A.M., December 7, Tokyo time. The attack on Pearl Harbor commenced at 1:20 P.M., December 7 (Washing-

ton time), which was equivalent to 3:20 A.M. December 8, Tokyo time. See Item 132, this volume, for a complete review of the history of relations with Japan, and the timetable of events on December 7.

125 ¶ “December 7, 1941 — A Date Which Will Live in Infamy” — Address to the Congress Asking That a State of War Be Declared Between the United States and Japan.

December 8, 1941

Mr. Vice President, and Mr. Speaker, and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives:

YESTERDAY, December 7, 1941 — a date which will live in infamy — the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American Island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

125. *The President Requests War Declaration*

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces — with the unbounding determination of our people — we will gain the inevitable triumph — so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

NOTE: Less than 24 hours after the receipt of the first news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President drove to the Capitol to deliver the foregoing message to a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The President spoke grimly for six and a half

126. *Seven Hundred and Ninetieth Press Conference*

minutes, interrupted by frequent bursts of applause. It took the Congress precisely 33 minutes after the conclusion of the President's address to pass, by a vote of 82-0 in the Senate and 388-1 in the House of Representatives, the following joint resolution declaring that a state of war existed between the United States and Japan:

"Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government

and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

"Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States."

126 (The Seven Hundred and Ninetieth Press Conference — the First Wartime Press Conference (Excerpts). December 9, 1941

(Attack on Clark Field — Acceleration of production program — Shortage of metals — Labor-management conference — Information policy.)

MR. EARLY: Tremendous conference.

Q. How are you, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, fine. There's darn little news, except that I haven't finished my speech.

Q. It's going to be pretty late?

THE PRESIDENT: Pretty nearly finished though. That's old stuff (*indicating typed sheets before him*). That's the third draft. I am now completing the fifth copy.

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I have anything on operations. I think—I don't know whether you have had this before. There was an attack this morning on Clark Field in the Philippines, resulting in some officer and soldier casualties; and General MacArthur is trying to get further information. That was early this morning.

Q. Have you talked with General MacArthur, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Not personally on the telephone. He has been telephoning two or three times to the Chief of Staff. . . .

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us of your discussions with S.P.A.B. this morning?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think I can. It was a conference — of course O.P.M. was there also, and several other agencies. I should say that there were, you might say, two concurrent policies that were agreed on. The first was, on the present program, which is now getting into full production, to go ahead with a speed-up of it. Well, that involves, of course, probably working seven days a week, and pushing the speed of the existing program to such an extent that we will get a great many more actual deliveries in the calendar year 1942 than the present program calls for.

Then the other policy that comes with it is to enter into a still greater expansion of plants, which means new plants and additions to old plants, thereby increasing the total volume of production as fast as that can be attained. In other words, a speeding up, and an increase of totals, working toward an all-out effort. Of course, a great many other things will form a component part of that phrase — an “all-out effort.”

Q. (*interposing*) Mr. President —

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) We also talked about certain things called priorities, and as you will see from what I say tonight, there is not at this time any shortage in foodstuffs. In other words, there is enough for all of us, and enough left over to help the food situation among those who are fighting against the same evil that we are fighting against.

On a very large number of articles in normal civilian use, there is also no shortage at the present time for civilian use, or for defense purposes.

There is, however, for this new program, a very great shortage in most metals, and it seems clear that in putting the program into effect we shall have to do two things. The first is to increase the original output of the raw material or

metals, and the second is to divert from civilian use to defense needs at least 50 percent — at least half — of all metals which during this past year have been going to civilian and not defense purposes. It means that people will have to do without a great many metal things, which they have been able to get up to this time.

Q. Mr. President, this speed-up thing in production will about eliminate any unemployment in the automobile industry, will it not?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I don't think you can put it that way, because after all, if I said it would end it, then you would come back at me a month or two from now and say, "How about these people that have been thrown out of work temporarily while they were retooling the factory?" You see?

Q. I was thinking —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Not permanent. It's just like the usual slump in the automobile business, you know. About every summer they stop working for a month to get the tools for the new models out. Well, there may be something like that occurring in various plants, not only automobile but lots of other things, where they are retooling for defense purposes. . . .

Q. Mr. President, you have had a number of discussions with labor leaders in the last couple of weeks. A number of them have suggested the calling of a conference of labor and industry, to see if they couldn't sit down together and work out some kind of a voluntary program, in the place of anti-strike legislation. Are you giving any consideration to calling such a conference?

THE PRESIDENT: I am. And that is all I can say. Whether it would be an unofficial off-the-record, or an official conference, I haven't got the slightest idea. I am giving it consideration. Don't write it up as meaning this, that, or the other thing, because frankly I don't know. . . .

Q. Mr. President, this is not an impudent question, sir, but it might clear up things. Do you intend to give the public the benefit of all of the reports you get?

126. *Seven Hundred and Ninetieth Press Conference*

THE PRESIDENT: I would say this: I am going to give, all of us are going to give everything to the public, on two conditions. All information has to conform with two obvious conditions before it can be given out.

The first is that it is accurate. Well, I should think that would seem fairly obvious.

And the second is that in giving it out it does not give aid and comfort to the enemy. And I should think that those two conditions ought to be put up in every office in Washington.

Q. Where?

THE PRESIDENT: In Washington. That includes newspaper offices as well as department offices.

Q. There is no use to have that put up in department offices, because it is impossible to get any information from any department now, on the material that is a matter of record.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, but are you sure that it conforms to both conditions?

Q. To both of them, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Who told you that?

Q. What? They give you the run-around.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you can't assume that the information has conformed to the two conditions.

Q. You ought to have someone there who can say whether it does conform, and we are not —

THE PRESIDENT: (*interposing*) Oh, that has got to be determined by the higher officers — the Army and Navy.

Q. But we have been told that these officers have no information — have instructions not to talk on any subject.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is probably correct.

Q. Where does that put us? (*Laughter*)

THE PRESIDENT: It means that you have got to wait — sit and wait on this information, because you can't determine whether certain information conforms to those two principles. We can't leave that determination in the hands of a third assistant — what — Captain or Major in the Army, or a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy, who is a third or fourth assistant to the officer. It has got to come from the top.

126. *Seven Hundred and Ninetieth Press Conference*

Q. I am talking about what is already a matter of record. It is a question of saving us time. We spent four hours getting some information which was a matter of record.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, but lots of these things may be matters of record. It does not mean that they conform.

Q. Can we print that then?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly not. You are going to get it as soon as the information conforms to those two principles. Just as soon. Now that is perfectly easy. That is a very simple rule to go by. It has got to be accurate. In other words, it has got to have been proved. It can't be a flash of what somebody thinks in the matter. I want it to be an accurate record. Now that is the first thing.

Now the mere fact that one bureau in one Department gets a flash, for example — I should think as a matter of fact — mind you, this is war — this ought to be checked before that one bureau gets it out. It should be checked by somebody in authority.

And then the second thing is that it will not be information that will help the enemy. Now you fellows can't determine that. The papers are not running the war. The Army and Navy have got to determine that. . . .

Q. (*interposing*) Well, Mr. President, there have been a lot of reports which I think you might help us clear up, if possible, to the effect that one reason why the Japs were able to get over Pearl Harbor was that there were a lot of leaves granted — someone slept — let everybody go to Honolulu for the week end. That is the report. I think that if it could be cleared up, I think it would help.

THE PRESIDENT: How do I know? How do you know? How does the person reporting it know?

Q. I am sure I don't know.

THE PRESIDENT: And neither does the person starting the report.

Q. What's that?

THE PRESIDENT: And neither does the person starting the report have any information. You have to remember that.

126. *Seven Hundred and Ninetieth Press Conference*

Q. They — they might have some information, mightn't they, for —

Q. Mr. President, returning to your two conditions, I wonder if you could, for our guidance, define that second condition — “giving aid and comfort to the enemy”? The thing that troubles me — does that mean that no bad news is going to be given out?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. It depends on whether the giving out is of aid and comfort to the enemy.

Q. Mr. President, who will determine that as the over-all judgment? Will you determine it?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Army and Navy.

Q. Are they going to operate individually on this?

THE PRESIDENT: No. They work together very closely.

Q. But the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy will each determine what should come from his Department?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes — or jointly.

Q. But there isn't to be one give-out of news then, under this setup?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there isn't in London, for instance. They have consultations first, and they give out in London war communiqués to the public. It is divided, as I remember it, into three different kinds of communiqués. One is Army, one is Air, and one is Navy. And I think in London the way they have worked it out, to apparently the satisfaction of everybody — the press too — those are, each one of them, broken down into general fields.

For instance, on the Navy end, it's — there is a field called the Mediterranean field, another one called the Atlantic, and I suppose now there will be another — the Far East. And in the Air end, there are three fields there at the present time. There is the Libyan field, the Mediterranean, and the German field; and the domestic field. It seems to work out all right. Then of course, before they are all given out, the three fighting arms over there — we have only two — talk it over

127. *Fireside Chat on December 9, 1941*

between them, and see that they don't clash in what they give out. . . .

Q. Will there eventually be a censor that we can get our teeth into?

THE PRESIDENT: It is awfully hard to answer it. Talk to Steve [Early] about this. . . . What we want is to get the news out as soon as we can, subject to the two qualifications, and do it in the most convenient way. In other words, our objectives are exactly alike. It is going to work all right.

127 ¶ “We Are Going to Win the War and We Are Going to Win the Peace That Follows” —
Fireside Chat to the Nation Following the
Declaration of War with Japan.

December 9, 1941

THE sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality.

Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race. Their challenge has now been flung at the United States of America. The Japanese have treacherously violated the long-standing peace between us. Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American ships have been sunk; American airplanes have been destroyed.

The Congress and the people of the United States have accepted that challenge.

Together with other free peoples, we are now fighting to maintain our right to live among our world neighbors in freedom and in common decency, without fear of assault.

I have prepared the full record of our past relations with Japan, and it will be submitted to the Congress. It begins with

the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan 88 years ago. It ends with the visit of two Japanese emissaries to the Secretary of State last Sunday, an hour after Japanese forces had loosed their bombs and machine guns against our flag, our forces, and our citizens.

I can say with utmost confidence that no Americans, today or a thousand years hence, need feel anything but pride in our patience and in our efforts through all the years toward achieving a peace in the Pacific which would be fair and honorable to every Nation, large or small. And no honest person, today or a thousand years hence, will be able to suppress a sense of indignation and horror at the treachery committed by the military dictators of Japan, under the very shadow of the flag of peace borne by their special envoys in our midst.

The course that Japan has followed for the past ten years in Asia has paralleled the course of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and in Africa. Today, it has become far more than a parallel. It is actual collaboration so well calculated that all the continents of the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield.

In 1931, ten years ago, Japan invaded Manchukuo — without warning.

In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia — without warning.

In 1938, Hitler occupied Austria — without warning.

In 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia — without warning.

Later in 1939, Hitler invaded Poland — without warning.

In 1940, Hitler invaded Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg — without warning.

In 1940, Italy attacked France and later Greece — without warning.

And this year, in 1941, the Axis powers attacked Yugoslavia and Greece and they dominated the Balkans — without warning.

In 1941, also, Hitler invaded Russia — without warning.

And now Japan has attacked Malaya and Thailand — and the United States — without warning.

It is all of one pattern.

We are now in this war. We are all in it — all the way. Every

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single man, woman, and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking of our American history. We must share together the bad news and the good news, the defeats and the victories — the changing fortunes of war.

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So far, the news has been all bad. We have suffered a serious set-back in Hawaii. Our forces in the Philippines, which include the brave people of that Commonwealth, are taking punishment, but are defending themselves vigorously. The reports from Guam and Wake and Midway islands are still confused, but we must be prepared for the announcement that all these three outposts have been seized.

IV

The casualty lists of these first few days will undoubtedly be large. I deeply feel the anxiety of all of the families of the men in our armed forces and the relatives of people in cities which have been bombed. I can only give them my solemn promise that they will get news just as quickly as possible.

V (5)

This Government will put its trust in the stamina of the American people, and will give the facts to the public just as soon as two conditions have been fulfilled: first, that the information has been definitely and officially confirmed; and, second, that the release of the information at the time it is received will not prove valuable to the enemy directly or indirectly.

Most earnestly I urge my countrymen to reject all rumors. These ugly little hints of complete disaster fly thick and fast in wartime. They have to be examined and appraised.

As an example, I can tell you frankly that until further surveys are made, I have not sufficient information to state the exact damage which has been done to our naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. Admittedly the damage is serious. But no one can say how serious, until we know how much of this damage can be repaired and how quickly the necessary repairs can be made.

I cite as another example a statement made on Sunday night that a Japanese carrier had been located and sunk off the Canal Zone. And when you hear statements that are attributed to what they call "an authoritative source," you can be reasonably sure

Complete control over American opinion to him

from now on that under these war circumstances the "authoritative source" is not any person in authority.

Many rumors and reports which we now hear originate with enemy sources. For instance, today the Japanese are claiming that as a result of their one action against Hawaii they have gained naval supremacy in the Pacific. This is an old trick of propaganda which has been used innumerable times by the Nazis. The purposes of such fantastic claims are, of course, to spread fear and confusion among us, and to goad us into revealing military information which our enemies are desperately anxious to obtain.

Our Government will not be caught in this obvious trap — and neither will the people of the United States.

It must be remembered by each and every one of us that our free and rapid communication these days must be greatly restricted in wartime. It is not possible to receive full, speedy, accurate reports from distant areas of combat. This is particularly true where naval operations are concerned. For in these days of the marvels of radio it is often impossible for the commanders of various units to report their activities by radio at all, for the very simple reason that this information would become available to the enemy, and would disclose their position and their plan of defense or attack.

Of necessity there will be delays in officially confirming or denying reports of operations but we will not hide facts from the country if we know the facts and if the enemy will not be aided by their disclosure.

To all newspapers and radio stations — all those who reach the eyes and ears of the American people — I say this: You have a most grave responsibility to the Nation now and for the duration of this war.

If you feel that your Government is not disclosing enough of the truth, you have every right to say so. But — in the absence of all the facts, as revealed by official sources — you have no right in the ethics of patriotism to deal out unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people believe that they are gospel truth.

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Every citizen, in every walk of life, shares this same responsibility. The lives of our soldiers and sailors — the whole future of this Nation — depend upon the manner in which each and every one of us fulfills his obligation to our country.

Now a word about the recent past — and the future. A year and a half has elapsed since the fall of France, when the whole world first realized the mechanized might which the Axis Nations had been building for so many years. America has used that year and a half to great advantage. Knowing that the attack might reach us in all too short a time, we immediately began greatly to increase our industrial strength and our capacity to meet the demands of modern warfare.

Precious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the Nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression. Our policy rested on the fundamental truth that the defense of any country resisting Hitler or Japan was in the long run the defense of our own country. That policy has been justified. It has given us time, invaluable time, to build our American assembly lines of production.

Assembly lines are now in operation. Others are being rushed to completion. A steady stream of tanks and planes, of guns and ships, and shells and equipment — that is what these eighteen months have given us.

But it is all only a beginning of what still has to be done. We must be set to face a long war against crafty and powerful bandits. The attack at Pearl Harbor can be repeated at any one of many points, points in both oceans and along both our coast lines and against all the rest of the hemisphere.

It will not only be a long war, it will be a hard war. That is the basis on which we now lay all our plans. That is the yardstick by which we measure what we shall need and demand; money, materials, doubled and quadrupled production — ever-increasing. The production must be not only for our own Army and Navy and Air Forces. It must reinforce the other armies and navies and air forces fighting the Nazis and the war lords of Japan throughout the Americas and throughout the world.

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VII

Downing
Theory

I have been working today on the subject of production. Your Government has decided on two broad policies.

The first is to speed up all existing production by working on a seven-day-week basis in every war industry, including the production of essential raw materials.

The second policy, now being put into form, is to rush additions to the capacity of production by building more new plants, by adding to old plants, and by using the many smaller plants for war needs.

Over the hard road of the past months, we have at times met obstacles and difficulties, divisions and disputes, indifference and callousness. That is now all past — and, I am sure, forgotten.

The fact is that the country now has an organization in Washington built around men and women who are recognized experts in their own fields. I think the country knows that the people who are actually responsible in each and every one of these many fields are pulling together with a teamwork that has never before been excelled.

On the road ahead there lies hard work — grueling work — day and night, every hour and every minute.

I was about to add that ahead there lies sacrifice for all of us.

But it is not correct to use that word. The United States does not consider it a sacrifice to do all one can, to give one's best to our Nation, when the Nation is fighting for its existence and its future life.

It is not a sacrifice for any man, old or young, to be in the Army or the Navy of the United States. Rather is it a privilege.

It is not a sacrifice for the industrialist or the wage earner, the farmer or the shopkeeper, the trainman or the doctor, to pay more taxes, to buy more bonds, to forego extra profits, to work longer or harder at the task for which he is best fitted. Rather is it a privilege.

It is not a sacrifice to do without many things to which we are accustomed if the national defense calls for doing without.

A review this morning leads me to the conclusion that at present we shall not have to curtail the normal use of articles of food.

There is enough food today for all of us and enough left over to send to those who are fighting on the same side with us.

But there will be a clear and definite shortage of metals of many kinds for civilian use, for the very good reason that in our increased program we shall need for war purposes more than half of that portion of the principal metals which during the past year have gone into articles for civilian use. Yes, we shall have to give up many things entirely.

And I am sure that the people in every part of the Nation are prepared in their individual living to win this war. I am sure that they will cheerfully help to pay a large part of its financial cost while it goes on. I am sure they will cheerfully give up those material things that they are asked to give up.

And I am sure that they will retain all those great spiritual things without which we cannot win through.

I repeat that the United States can accept no result save victory, final and complete. Not only must the shame of Japanese treachery be wiped out, but the sources of international brutality, wherever they exist, must be absolutely and finally broken.

In my message to the Congress yesterday I said that we "will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us." In order to achieve that certainty, we must begin the great task that is before us by abandoning once and for all the illusion that we can ever again isolate ourselves from the rest of humanity.

In these past few years — and, most violently, in the past three days — we have learned a terrible lesson.

It is our obligation to our dead — it is our sacred obligation to their children and to our children — that we must never forget what we have learned.

And what we all have learned is this:

There is no such thing as security for any Nation — or any individual — in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism.

There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning.

We have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not im-

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immune from severe attack — that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map any more.

We may acknowledge that our enemies have performed a brilliant feat of deception, perfectly timed and executed with great skill. It was a thoroughly dishonorable deed, but we must face the fact that modern warfare as conducted in the Nazi manner is a dirty business. We don't like it — we didn't want to get in it — but we are in it and we're going to fight it with everything we've got.

I do not think any American has any doubt of our ability to administer proper punishment to the perpetrators of these crimes.

Your Government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive the complete and perpetual control of the whole of the Pacific area — and that means not only the Far East, but also all of the islands in the Pacific, and also a stranglehold on the west coast of North, Central, and South America.

We know also that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. That plan considers all peoples and Nations which are not helping the Axis powers as common enemies of each and every one of the Axis powers.

That is their simple and obvious grand strategy. And that is why the American people must realize that it can be matched only with similar grand strategy. We must realize for example that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to German operations in Libya; that any German success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the Dutch East Indies; that a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America, and the Canal.

On the other side of the picture, we must learn also to know that guerrilla warfare against the Germans in, let us say, Serbia or Norway helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the

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Germans helps us; and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthen our hands.

Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia. And Germany puts all the other Republics of the Americas into the same category of enemies. The people of our sister Republics of this hemisphere can be honored by that fact.

The true goal we seek is far above and beyond the ugly field of battle. When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. We Americans are not destroyers — we are builders.

We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this Nation, and all that this Nation represents, will be safe for our children. We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini.

We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows.

And in the difficult hours of this day — through dark days that may be yet to come — we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side. Many of them are fighting with us. All of them are praying for us. For in representing our cause, we represent theirs as well — our hope and their hope for liberty under God.

NOTE: As initially drafted, the foregoing fireside chat included a long review of the history of our relationships with the Japanese, and a detailed account of the negotiations in the weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. This material had been prepared in the State De-

partment, and constituted a very careful documentation of historical facts. As such, it was important to be in the record in order to show that the United States Government had exhausted every possible means to achieve an amicable and honorable settlement with Japan.

128. *Party Chairmen Pledge Cooperation During War*

However, this tediously detailed review of diplomatic history was hardly inspiring material for a fire-side chat, to which millions of Americans, and peoples all over the world, would be listening, waiting for the President to tell them what course America would take in resisting the sneak attack. The President's confident words "We are going to win the war and we are

going to win the peace that follows" provided a definite boost to the morale of all the embattled Allies.

Accordingly, the President decided to use the material about the history of our relations with the Japanese in a message to the Congress. He submitted it on December 15, 1941 (see Item 132, this volume).

128 ¶ The President Thanks the Republican and Democratic National Chairmen for Pledging Party Cooperation During the War.

December 11, 1941

LET me thank you both, personally and on behalf of our country, for the patriotic action you have in contemplation. The national organizations of the two great parties are capable of inestimable service in our present emergency. The Nation-wide quality of their personnel, the circumstance that their agents are men and women of eminence and respect in their respective communities will, I am sure, demonstrate that in time of war there can be no partisan domestic politics. There can be only a determined intent of a united people to carry on the struggle for human liberty to a victorious conclusion.

So, I am sure we appreciate — and the people will appreciate — that the political truce is for the period of the emergency and that the principles of our respective parties will continue to dominate our courses. When the war is over we will still be adhering to our historic method of settling our domestic problems which has made our country the great Nation it is, and has shown the world that democratic freedom is a perfectly workable system of government.

129. *War Declarations with Germany and Italy*

My own thought, with which I hope you will agree, is that the two national party organizations can function to the best advantage in the field of civilian defense, but you will, of course, work out your own procedure and processes in carrying out your patriotic purpose.

129 ¶ **Message to the Congress Asking That a State of War Be Recognized Between Germany and Italy and the United States.**

December 11, 1941

To the Congress:

ON THE morning of December eleventh, the Government of Germany, pursuing its course of world conquest, declared war against the United States.

The long known and the long expected has thus taken place. The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward this hemisphere.

Never before has there been a greater challenge to life, liberty, and civilization.

Delay invites greater danger. Rapid and united effort by all of the peoples of the world who are determined to remain free will insure a world victory of the forces of justice and of righteousness over the forces of savagery and of barbarism.

Italy also has declared war against the United States.

I therefore request the Congress to recognize a state of war between the United States and Germany, and between the United States and Italy.

NOTE: On the morning of December 11, 1941, news was received that Germany had officially declared war on the United States. Italy followed shortly thereafter with its declaration of war. The President had addressed the House and Senate in joint session on December 8 in asking for a declaration of a state of war between Japan and the United States (see Item 125 and note, this volume), but the foregoing message

130. *Wartime Labor Policy Conference*

was not delivered by the President in person.

The Congress, promptly and unanimously adopted the following two joint resolutions declaring a state of war between Germany and Italy and the United States:

“Whereas the Government of Germany has formally declared war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

“Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States, is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Government

of Germany; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.”

“Whereas the Government of Italy has formally declared war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

“Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Italy which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Government of Italy; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.”

130 (The President Calls a Conference to Draft a Basic Wartime Labor Policy. December 11, 1941

THE President today issued invitations for a conference to be held between industry and labor to consider the problem of labor disputes during the war.

The President invited the Presidents of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations each to designate six representatives from different unions affiliated with their organizations. He also invited the Chairman of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce to choose, after appropriate consultation, twelve representatives of industrial management. He will later appoint someone to serve as Moderator and Associate Moderator.

The conference will be held at Washington and will commence during the early part of the week of December 15.

The first and essential objective of the conference will be to

130. *Wartime Labor Policy Conference*

reach a unanimous agreement to prevent the interruption of production by labor disputes during the period of the war. It is not expected that there will be any hesitation on the part of either labor or industry to accept this basic condition of the Nation's safety.

The conferees doubtless will find it necessary to agree upon machinery by which these disputes may amicably and finally be settled. It is thought this machinery might include appropriate procedures for adjusting disputes, for mediation, and for resort in defense industries to some tribunal whose decisions will be binding by agreement on all parties. But it is for the conferees to decide what form the machinery shall take so long only as an agreement is reached. Since the efficacy of that agreement will depend upon the voluntary cooperation of all concerned, emphasis is placed on the fact that it must represent a unanimous accord.

The agreement, it is pointed out, might include or be followed by an agreement defining appropriate practices for both labor and management to secure maximum production for war needs. In view of the gravity of the emergency now confronting this country, the President urges that the conferees reach a conclusion, at least upon the primary agreement preventing interruptions to production, and report to him within a very few days after convening.

NOTE: After the usefulness of the National Defense Mediation Board had been destroyed by the resignation of the C.I.O. representatives (see Items 20 and 103 and notes, this volume), a substitute machinery had to be found. Accordingly the President began discussions with the Secretary of Labor and other advisers looking to the creation of a new organization for the peaceful settlement of labor dis-

putes in vital war industries. Even prior to Pearl Harbor the President had decided that he would call a conference of labor and employer representatives, the purpose of which was to be to reach agreement on a basic wartime labor relations policy.

The President was anxious that such an agreement be reached voluntarily by labor and management; he felt agreement was urgent not

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only because of the collapse of the National Defense Mediation Board but also because of the number of harsh and punitive proposals for the handling of industrial relations problems which were gaining support in the Congress. Some of these legislative proposals would have gravely impaired, if not destroyed, the gains which labor had achieved over many years. Accordingly, the President pressed his plans for the Labor-Management Conference.

When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, it became vital for the Government to move at once to set up the necessary mechanisms and policy for the wartime settlement of disputes in war industries.

William H. Davis was named Moderator of the Conference, and because of the strong feeling in the Congress regarding labor disputes legislation, the President selected Senator Elbert D. Thomas, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, as Vice-Moderator of the Conference. Labor and industry were each represented by twelve individuals. William Green and Philip Murray, Presidents of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, each named six representatives; and William L. Batt, Chairman of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce, consulted with the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers in choosing the twelve industry representatives.

The President addressed the Conference informally and extemporaneously at the White House on the opening day of its sessions (see Item 135 and note, this volume). He emphasized the need for unanimous agreement, and urged the conferees to expedite their deliberations.

Most of the opening day of the Conference was devoted to outlining the problems faced by labor and management in the war crisis. On the second day, December 18, both the labor and the industry representatives advocated the establishment of a board for the peaceful adjustment of industrial strife. By the third day of the Conference, the labor representatives had drawn up a joint proposal for a new War Labor Board with powers of conciliation and arbitration.

But almost at the outset, the conferees split on whether the closed shop was an issue which was to be considered by the proposed War Labor Board. The employer representatives insisted that disputes involving the issue of a closed shop should not be within the jurisdiction of the Board; the labor representatives, on the other hand, vigorously urged that the new Board should be empowered to deal with all union security issues.

Labor contended that it should be protected in return for its pledge to renounce wartime strikes; its representatives argued that since they were yielding the right to protect unions through the weapon of a

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strike, they were entitled at least to urge that the new Board in appropriate cases grant them the closed shop or a similar form of union security. So important did the labor representatives consider this issue that they telephoned the President during the Conference and asked to present their arguments to him directly. But the President preferred that the conferees reach an agreement without his intervention, for only by such voluntary agreement was real stability for the Board assured. Accordingly the President rejected the labor conferees' request and refused to receive any of the conferees until the Labor-Management Conference had arrived at a unanimous voluntary agreement.

The deadlock in the Conference continued on December 19, and Mr. Davis so reported to the President, who then instructed the Conference to reconvene on December 22 and make another attempt to achieve unanimity. Several appeals by the Moderators failed to break the deadlock, and on a number of test votes the Conference split evenly, twelve-twelve, with labor and industry in each case taking opposite sides on whether the issue of the closed shop would come within the jurisdiction of the Board.

The President summoned the

Moderators to the White House on the morning of December 23. That afternoon, he addressed a letter to the conferees embodying the three major points on which there had been unanimous agreement in the Conference (see Item 142 and note, this volume). On the critical issue which split the Labor-Management Conference, the President ruled that the new Board should determine its own jurisdiction. After the establishment of the National War Labor Board (see Item 6 and note, 1942 volume), the public, industry, and labor representatives on the tripartite Board did in fact pass on many closed shop and union security issues, skillfully and almost always successfully.

The deliberations of the President's Labor-Management Conference laid the cornerstone of the Government's wartime labor policy. It is true that the no-strike, no-lockout agreement did not completely eliminate wartime strikes. Nevertheless, the agreement did reduce the number of strikes immeasurably and laid the groundwork for the peaceful settlement of thousands of labor disputes involving millions of workers.

(See Items 6 and 97, 1942 volume, for an account of the work of the National War Labor Board.)

131 (The Seven Hundred and Ninety-first
Press Conference (Excerpts).

December 12, 1941

(Telegram from Great Britain offering aid — Sale of defense bonds — Defensive sea areas — Red Cross — Support by Latin American Nations — Publication of casualty lists — Wake Island.)

THE PRESIDENT: I have got a number of things, all of which shed a light on operations.

The first thing is that I received yesterday morning a very fine telegram from the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Lord Beaverbrook, offering to help the United States in any particular where we were short of any materials, and specifically offered to turn over to us the product — the output of three shell-making plants in Canada, in case we need that immediate output. The thing is being studied at the present time. I just use that as an illustration of the spirit.

Number two, the Treasury reports that on Monday and Tuesday and Wednesday — this week — we sold, through banks, defense bonds of \$5,592,000 as against last week's sale, on the first three days of the week, of \$2,474,000. In other words, 126 percent up — more than double. Through the post offices in the same period, at five big offices, we sold \$1,510,000, in the first three days of this week, as compared with \$852,000 the first three days of last week, or an increase of 70 percent. And the post office stamp sales — again just in five of the biggest post offices — went up 25 percent. . . .

I signed last night an Executive Order relating to certain regulations in setting up eight defensive sea areas. You will get the list. Portland, Maine; Portsmouth; Boston; Narragansett Bay; San Diego; San Francisco; Columbia River; and Puget Sound. And the Navy says that there is no reason why this shouldn't be made public in detail. It would be a good thing to have it made public for the use of our own coastwise

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navigation so that they will know where they can go, and where they ought not to go.

And finally, I am about to sign a Proclamation — which I think probably ought to be stressed a little bit, because it has nothing to do with war operations, but it has to do with the conduct of the war — in regard to the Red Cross. (*Reading*):

“WHEREAS in preparation for just such an emergency as we are now facing, the American National Red Cross has been spending funds at the rate of more than one million dollars a month, which is but a small fraction of the amount that the organization now requires in order to carry out effectively its functions as an essential auxiliary of our armed forces, particularly as a friendly liaison in welfare problems between the man in service and his family at home, and as a key agency in the civil-defense plans: . . .

“I hereby proclaim the beginning, as of this date, of a Red Cross War Fund Campaign for the raising of a minimum sum of fifty million dollars; and appeal to the American people to make this campaign an overwhelming success.”

I think it is very important that we carry this out as an essential part of the war.

Q. Mr. President, would you care to make any comment, sir, on the attitude expressed by various Latin American Governments in support of our position?

THE PRESIDENT: I would say just two words. First: Excellent. And second: Wholly satisfactory. That's three words. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. President, have you decided who will go to the American conference in Rio?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not yet. We haven't discussed it.

Oh, I have one other thing that I might as well tell you about, because the thing only came up this morning. That is this:

In the World War, everybody that was in it — both sides, I think — and in the present war all those who were in it since the first of September, the papers have not carried columns of the names of casualties. That was done by common consent.

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And the thought of both the Army and the Navy is that we should conform to that common consent agreement.

Just as soon as it is possible, the next of kin will be notified of those on both the death list and the wounded list, so that there is nothing hidden from the people who are interested in the man's name, and we get it to them just as soon as we can. The newspapers will give out the totals of killed and wounded.

And I want to express the hope that the newspapers of the country, and the radio — of course they do not do it on the radio, probably, anyway — will not print the lists, for very obvious reasons. It gives information to the enemy. . . .

Q. Mr. President, is the garrison at Wake Island still holding out?

THE PRESIDENT: So far as we know, Wake Island is holding out — it has done a perfectly magnificent job. We are all very proud of that very small group of marines who are holding the Island. We have no further information today. They are holding out. We knew that very early this morning. . . .

132 ¶ *A Message to the Congress Outlining the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan. December 15, 1941*

To the Congress:

ON DECEMBER 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among Nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other Nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent Nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions." There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China . . . pro-

tect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unflinchingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support “by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all Nations in that Empire”; that it was “the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean”; and that “the policy of both Governments” was “directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo” in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty. It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all Nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament.

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then — in 1931 — that Japan

undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties.

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once rearmed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy — then still under the domination of Mussolini — also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy, and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage — and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was “fundamentally incapable of amicable solution.” He added that Japan had “no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other Power.” Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind.

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government began to belie these assurances — at least so far as the rights and interests of other Nations in China were concerned.

Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no Nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

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The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the Anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July, 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability, and might superior in every way to any other race in Europe — superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, following suit, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient — nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women,

and children. They sank American vessels — including a naval vessel, the *Panay*. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and in some cases drove out, American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other Nations — flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed, or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained, or subjected to indignities; of interferences with American nationals, rights, and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest. Since 1935, without provocation or excuse they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent Nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda, and sabotage. This machine — unprecedented in size — has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan increasingly combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere — if it were successful in the other con-

tinents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of Nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indo-China. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand — and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma. The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese timetable; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page are the names of Australia, New Zealand, and all the other islands of the Pacific — including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New

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Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia." What they really intended was the enslavement of every Nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment — not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan — but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese state. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving Nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.

IV

Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October, 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the Treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet

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Union, not a signatory, attended. After the conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937, the conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes."

Japan scorned the conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this course of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all Nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality — including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.

The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly offered quali-

fied statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government connived with Hitler to force from the Vichy Government of France permission to place Japanese armed forces in southern Indo-China, and began sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States meet personally to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This Government tried hard — but without success — to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941.

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal, which called for supplying

by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained, however, no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese Government, on November 26, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement.

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other Nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other Nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indo-China or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the Governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested Governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any Government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily

at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other Governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-Nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and (i) to use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indo-China. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indo-China. I was given an evasive and specious reply. Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan.

To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a

vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 1:20 P.M., Washington time — 7:50 A.M. Honolulu time of same day — Monday, December 8, 3:20 A.M., Tokyo time.

To my message of December 6 (9 P.M. Washington time — December 7, 11 A.M. Tokyo time) to the Emperor of Japan, invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me on December 10 (6:23 A.M. Washington time — December 10, 8:23 P.M., Tokyo time) a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8, 1 P.M. (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock on the morning of the eighth (December 7, 5 P.M., Washington time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him to call at his official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum dated December 8 (December 7, Washington time) the text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 P.M. on Sunday, December 7 (Monday, December 8, 4:20 A.M., Tokyo

time)); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message.

Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President." The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of Japanese forces in French Indo-China, His Majesty had commanded his Government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack which had already been made without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror, and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too — a host of them — have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

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All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

All but three of the Governments of Nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own hemisphere many of our sister Republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.

The following are the countries which have to date declared war against Japan:

Australia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
The Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Panama
Poland
El Salvador
South Africa
United Kingdom

These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting, as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of Nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and manpower to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and

133. *Address on Bill of Rights Anniversary*

force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

133 ¶ “Having Taken Up Arms in the Defense of Liberty, We Will Not Lay Them Down Before Liberty Is Once Again Secure” — Radio Address Commemorating the 150th Anniversary of the Ratification of the Bill of Rights.

December 15, 1941

Free Americans:

NO DATE in the long history of freedom means more to liberty-loving men in all liberty-loving countries than the fifteenth day of December, 1791. On that day, 150 years ago, a new Nation, through an elected Congress, adopted a declaration of human rights which has influenced the thinking of all mankind from one end of the world to the other.

There is not a single Republic of this hemisphere which has not adopted in its fundamental law the basic principles of freedom of man and freedom of mind enacted in the American Bill of Rights.

There is not a country, large or small, on this continent and in this world which has not felt the influence of that document, directly or indirectly.

Indeed, prior to the year 1933, the essential validity of the American Bill of Rights was accepted everywhere at least in principle. Even today, with the exception of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the peoples of the whole world — in all probability four-fifths of them — support its principles, its teachings, and its glorious results.

But, in the year 1933, there came to power in Germany a political clique which did not accept the declarations of the

American bill of human rights as valid: a small clique of ambitious and unscrupulous politicians whose announced and admitted platform was precisely the destruction of the rights that instrument declared. Indeed the entire program and goal of these political and moral tigers was nothing more than the overthrow, throughout the earth, of the great revolution of human liberty of which our American Bill of Rights is the mother charter.

The truths which were self-evident to Thomas Jefferson — which have been self-evident to the six generations of Americans who followed him — were to these men hateful. The rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which seemed to the Founders of the Republic, and which seem to us, inalienable, were, to Hitler and his fellows, empty words which they proposed to cancel forever.

The propositions they advanced to take the place of Jefferson's inalienable rights were these:

That the individual human being has no rights whatsoever in himself and by virtue of his humanity;

That the individual human being has no right to a soul of his own, or a mind of his own, or a tongue of his own, or a trade of his own; or even to live where he pleases or to marry the woman he loves;

That his only duty is the duty of obedience, not to his God, not to his conscience, but to Adolf Hitler; and that his only value is his value, not as a man, but as a unit of the Nazi state.

To Hitler the ideal of the people, as we conceive it — the free, self-governing, and responsible people — is incomprehensible. The people, to Hitler, are "the masses" and the highest human idealism is, in his own words, that a man should wish to become "a dust particle" of the order "of force" which is to shape the universe.

To Hitler, the government, as we conceive it, is an impossible conception. The government to him is not the servant and the instrument of the people but their absolute master and the dictator of their every act.

To Hitler the church, as we conceive it, is a monstrosity to be

destroyed by every means at his command. The Nazi church is to be the "National Church," a pagan church, "absolutely and exclusively in the service of but one doctrine, one race, one Nation."

To Hitler, the freedom of men to think as they please and speak as they please and worship as they please is, of all things imaginable, most hateful and most desperately to be feared.

The issue of our time, the issue of the war in which we are engaged, is the issue forced upon the decent, self-respecting peoples of the earth by the aggressive dogmas of this attempted revival of barbarism; this proposed return to tyranny; this effort to impose again upon the peoples of the world doctrines of absolute obedience, of dictatorial rule, of the suppression of truth, of the oppression of conscience, which the free Nations of the earth have long ago rejected.

What we face is nothing more nor less than an attempt to overthrow and to cancel out the great upsurge of human liberty of which the American Bill of Rights is the fundamental document: to force the peoples of the earth, and among them the peoples of this continent and this Nation, to accept again the absolute authority and despotic rule from which the courage and the resolution and the sacrifices of their ancestors liberated them many, many years ago.

It is an attempt which could succeed only if those who have inherited the gift of liberty had lost the manhood to preserve it. But we Americans know that the determination of this generation of our people to preserve liberty is as fixed and certain as the determination of that early generation of Americans to win it.

We will not, under any threat, or in the face of any danger, surrender the guarantees of liberty our forefathers framed for us in our Bill of Rights.

We hold with all the passion of our hearts and minds to those commitments of the human spirit.

We are solemnly determined that no power or combination of powers of this earth shall shake our hold upon them.

134. "To the President of the United States in 1956"

We covenant with each other before all the world, that having taken up arms in the defense of liberty, we will not lay them down before liberty is once again secure in the world we live in. For that security we pray; for that security we act — now and evermore.

NOTE: See Item 118, this volume, designating December 15, 1941 as for the President's proclamation Bill of Rights Day.

134 ¶ "To the President of the United States in 1956" — The President Writes About Colin P. Kelly, III. December 17, 1941

To the President of the United States in 1956:

I AM WRITING this letter as an act of faith in the destiny of our country. I desire to make a request which I make in full confidence that we shall achieve a glorious victory in the war we now are waging to preserve our democratic way of life.

My request is that you consider the merits of a young American youth of goodly heritage — Colin P. Kelly, III — for appointment as a Cadet in the United States Military Academy at West Point. I make this appeal in behalf of this youth as a token of the Nation's appreciation of the heroic services of his father, who met death in line of duty at the very outset of the struggle which was thrust upon us by the perfidy of a professed friend.

In the conviction that the service and example of Captain Colin P. Kelly, Jr., will be long remembered, I ask for this consideration in behalf of Colin P. Kelly, III.

135 ¶ Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to the Management-Labor Conference.

December 17, 1941

I AM SORRY to be twenty minutes late, but I have the kind of a schedule these days that makes it sometimes impossible for me to be strictly on time.

In asking you to come here to this conference, I think we should all — every one of us — realize not only the serious purpose before us, but the serious problem as well.

Two weeks ago, I suppose the average American felt either that we wouldn't get into the war, or that if we did, we would mop up, if it came to war in the Pacific, in very short order. Rather derogatory remarks were leveled all through this country against any danger from Japan. Of course, as we have begun to realize now and realize more deeply as time goes on, there is very real danger to the whole world, because there is a new philosophy in the world which would end for all time — if it is swept into this country, even if it is swept over the rest of the world — it would mean an end of private industry, and it would mean the end of trade unionism equally. It is a real danger. We haven't won the war by a long shot. It is going to go on for a long time.

And so I have asked you here to help win this war, just as much as if you were in uniform. I am going to use a word which none of us like — and I don't either. The word is "must." I am applying the word "must" to you as individuals, and to myself.

A boy, the other day, was out in a plane. The Government did not tell him he had to dive on a battleship and lose his life. That was his "must"; his own personal "must." There was nothing in his orders that told him he had to dive his plane into a Japanese battleship. That was young Kelly's own personal "must."

And each one of you, and I too, we have our personal "musts."

So, when I use the word "must," I want you to appropriate it to yourselves, individually — as Americans.

We are here as a group — industry and labor — with a Chair-

man chosen from the executive branch of the Government, and a Vice Chairman from the legislative branch of the Government, to act. I dug up the word "Moderator." It's a good word. These two gentlemen are Moderators. I don't think they will have to wield any big stick. I think rather they can truly act as exceedingly peaceful Moderators in presiding at your meetings.

I know, if I were a Moderator, I would want results — a complete agreement. I would want something else and, as Moderator, I might help get it. I want speed. Speed now is of the essence, just as much in turning out things in plants as it is among the fighting forces. It is just as necessary to turn out equipment as it is to drill an army, or build up a navy, after the equipment is turned out. Speed is very, very much of the essence.

With speed goes something we all know that we have got to have in the next few weeks. We have got greatly to increase our production program. We are still in a sense — whether you like it or not — the arsenal of the free world. Geographically we can turn out materials without anything like the same physical danger to the workers and to the plants as prevails in Britain, or in China, or Russia. We have got to do perfectly unheard of things.

I always like a little story that one of my people who came back from Russia told me the other day. When the Germans were approaching not one city, but many cities where industrial plants were turning out fighting munitions, the Russians, realizing that they probably would lose the city or cities, began to move their factories. And how did they move them? They ran a freight train — backed it into the factory, and they loaded the tools into the freight cars. And with every tool — into the same freight car — went the man who was operating that tool. Their simple objective, when they moved 600 or a thousand miles away was to reestablish the factory. They would have the people, the workers, with their tools. They did not have to put new people — untrained people — onto these tools.

And I wonder just a little bit what the average American would do if our Government backed a freight train in and said

to every worker: "Five minutes notice. You can't say good-by to your family. Get into that freight car with the tools you are working with. There is your suitcase—a hamper of food, a couple bottles of water. We will let you out when you get a thousand miles or so inland."

That is what war means. I pray that we won't have anything actually happening like that over here. But speed, and more speed, is essential. And that is why any kind of a stoppage of work, anywhere—even if it seems to be something the average manager of the plant, or the average worker in the plant, does not deem to be particularly important to winning this war—may be most important.

We have to feel that we, all of us, are subject to a self-imposed discipline. In other words, I think you have—and I am not telling you in the sense of an Executive Order, or as President, but as an American citizen—that you must reach an agreement.

To go back for a minute, if I were Moderator, I think I would impose a time limit on speeches. I think you know just what I mean. For example, there is one branch of the Government—the Senate. It is only in a very great emergency that the Senate imposes on itself, without any rule, a limitation on speeches. The Senators do it voluntarily, by common consent. And, in times of great emergency, oratory in the Senate is at a minimum. On the other side of the Capitol is the House of Representatives. It is a very large body and it is pretty hard to limit debate without a rule. So there is a rule. And when a bill comes out from a Committee the rule adopted allots so much time to each side. The result is that on tremendously serious measures—laws—the debate is limited to two days, or three days or less in that very, very large body.

You are a lot smaller in numbers than the Senate and, I believe, you can make even better time than the Senate of the United States under emergency conditions. The country is expecting something out of you in a hurry—I don't say by tomorrow night—but it will be a thrilling thing if we could get something out in the way of a unanimous agreement by tomorrow

night, Thursday, or at the latest Friday night. I see no reason why, in this instance, you shouldn't adopt the Congressional custom and ask "leave to print." In five minutes you could say all you want to say. Ask your fellow members for "leave to print."

Actually, as we know, we are all after the same thing. I think that even if there hadn't been a war with three very large Nations — Germany, Japan, Italy — the differences on both sides, in this country of ours, are relatively small. We have been making very definite progress on the whole subject of labor and management. We are going to continue to make progress. I believe every sensible person on both sides — labor and management, and in Government — realizes that eight or nine years ago we were rather far behind in this country; that we needed a greater spread in the earnings of the country; that we needed better working conditions. England was ahead of us. The Scandinavian countries were ahead of us. We have made a lot of progress, and at the end of this very great world war, because it truly is that, we are not going to stop progress. Our kind of Nation is going to make more progress. Let us agree not to go backwards. But let us agree that, during this war, we won't hold things up.

That is the primary thing — to keep the work going. I don't believe you are going to have great difficulties, because I don't think it is a hard agreement for you to make. You are going to be faced with one fact — an enormous number of additional people are going to be at work on this war program. I can't tell you the details, but we can look for the employment during the coming year of 1942 of millions of new workers in defense. We have got to protect them. We have got to keep things going. We can't have stoppages.

And so I was just thinking of an old idea of self-discipline — an old Chinese proverb — of a Chinese Christian. He prayed every day — he had been told to pray to our kind of God — and his prayer was: "Lord, reform Thy world, beginning with me." It is rather a nice line for us all to keep in the back of our heads.

There isn't much difference between labor and management actually. I suppose a very large proportion of management has

come, in this country, from the ranks of labor. It's like the old Kipling saying about "Judy O'Grady an' the Colonel's Lady." They are both the same under the skin. That is true in this country, especially in this country, and we want to keep it so. And keeping it so, and improving it, is the problem at this time.

Don't believe everything you read in the papers. They have to print things, they have to keep an interest going. I was reading a paper this morning which was telling how inevitable — because we are a bigger Nation and have more resources and probably better abilities — victory would be.

I want to see what we can do. We have only been in this war for a week and a half. It is serious, at the present time. We are not sitting on "Easy Street."

I hope very much, in fact I am very confident, you will realize the spiritual side of this war emergency. We want our type of civilization to go on. It is threatened. We want our freedoms. We want freedom to express our own opinions. We want freedom of religion and the others as well. They are threatened.

I think very much the country is looking to you gentlemen to give us, just as fast as you possibly can — by tomorrow or the next day — some kind of an agreement so that we all can shake hands. After this war is won, let's go back if we want to, if we have to, to old Kilkenny. And you know what a Kilkenny fight is. But that is something that we can put aside until that date comes.

The country is looking to you. I am looking at you. The Congress is looking at you. All I can say is, God speed your efforts.

NOTE: The Management-Labor Conference was called by the President shortly after Pearl Harbor in order to draft a basic wartime labor policy and establish machinery for the settlement of wartime industrial disputes (see Item 130 and note, this volume, for an account of the inception and proceedings of the Conference).

The foregoing remarks of the

President opened the Conference. Although the President had asked the conferees to complete their work by December 19, a deep cleavage between the labor and employer representatives over the issue of whether the new War Labor Board should handle cases involving demands for a closed shop delayed agreement among the conferees until December 23.

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At the close of the Conference, the President addressed a letter to the conferees setting forth the main points of unanimous agreement arising from the deliberations (see Item 142 and note, this volume).

The immediate result of the Conference was the establishment of the tripartite National War Labor Board for the settlement of labor disputes (see Item 6 and note, 1942 volume).

136 ¶ The President Appoints a Commission to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack. Executive Order No. 8983. December 18, 1941

PURSUANT to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following:

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army.

The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.

The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington, D. C., will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and any other place it may deem necessary to visit for the completion of its inquiry. It will then return to Washington, D. C., and submit its report direct to the President of the United States.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own proce-

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ture, to employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary, to fix the compensation and allowances of such assistants, to incur all necessary expenses for services and supplies, and to direct such travel of members and employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment of its mission. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its professional assistants, including civilian advisers and any Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers so employed, detailed, or assigned shall receive payment of his actual and necessary expenses for transportation, and in addition and in lieu of all other allowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence or station in connection with the business of the Commission, a per diem allowance of twenty-five dollars. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President.

All executive officers and agencies of the United States are directed to furnish the Commission such facilities, services, and cooperation as it may request of them from time to time.

NOTE: Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the President sent Secretary of the Navy Knox to Hawaii to report on the damage sustained. There was an outcry from many segments of the press, and even from many officials within the administration, demanding an immediate publication of every detail of the damage to the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor. The President firmly rejected such precipitous action, and refused to disclose any information which might be of any value to the Japanese. Nevertheless, he would not go along with some in the administration — especially among the military leaders — who wanted to put a

clamp of complete secrecy on all of the facts. The President believed that in a democracy the people had to know the facts in order to reach sound conclusions; but he knew that disclosure of facts also had to be limited by considerations of military security.

Accordingly, less than two weeks after Pearl Harbor the President, by the foregoing Executive Order, provided for an impartial investigatory commission, headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts of the United States Supreme Court. This body, popularly known as the "Roberts Commission," examined 127 witnesses and took almost 2,000 pages of testimony. It made its re-

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port to the President on January 23, 1942. The President directed that the Roberts Report be made public in its entirety, and it was published also as a Senate Document.

In a letter dated May 20, 1949, Mr. Justice Roberts wrote me the following account of the presentation of the report of the Roberts Commission to the President:

"The Pearl Harbor Commission finished drafting its report on a Friday. In the presence of the Commission, I called the White House and advised the President's secretary, Miss Tully, that the report would be ready for submission Friday afternoon and asked whether the President desired us to send the report by messenger, to have the Commission call on him and hand him the report, or to have me bring it to him, as Chairman. Miss Tully replied that the President was at the moment in a cabinet meeting and that she would call me later. Sometime later she called me on the telephone and told me that the President felt too tired after the Cabinet meeting to take up the report on Friday afternoon. She requested that I, as Chairman of the Commission, present the report to him on Saturday morning.

"I called on Saturday morning and found the President in his study on the second floor of the White House, at his desk. I handed him two duplicate original copies of the report. He immediately started to read the report, and he read it through, pausing from time to time to make comments and to ask questions. I think it must have taken him well over an hour to finish the report.

"At the close of the reading, he turned to me and said, 'Is there any reason why this report should not be given to the public in its entirety?' I

replied that I would be gratified if the entire report were given out. He then rang for one of his secretaries. (I am not sure who it was, but I believe it was Mr. Early.) He threw both copies of the report across his desk to the secretary and said, 'Give that in full to the papers for their Sunday editions.' The secretary said something to the effect that if this was to be done, he would have to start the clerical force on preparing mimeographed copies at once. As the secretary was about to leave the President's study, he said, 'Mr. President, do you care to make any statement for the newspapers, thanking the Commission for its work?' The President at once replied that he wanted to do this and dictated a brief statement. I believe that the whole transaction took about two hours."

In addition to releasing the text of the Roberts Report for publication, the President, in his fireside chat of February 23, 1942, supplied additional facts and figures as to the Pearl Harbor damage (see Item 23, 1942 volume). Certain facts, such as the number of planes destroyed by the Japanese, and the precise damage to ships and naval installations, were, of course, not revealed for some time.

The full story about the Pearl Harbor attack became completely known only after the defeat of Japan and the interrogation of the Japanese officials responsible for the sneak attack. The idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor was first conceived in January, 1941, by the Japanese fleet commander, Admiral Yamamoto. The operations order was drafted in outline on September 13,

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1941. The fleet and air units assembled in the Kurile Islands in mid-November, and departed for their attack at 9 A.M., November 26, at the very time that Japanese diplomatic representatives were conducting "peace" negotiations in Washington. On December 2, while the attacking force was en route, Admiral Yamamoto gave the final green light to execute the plans.

The Japanese attacking force consisted of 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, and approximately 360 planes. The planes were launched from the carriers at a point north of Oahu. The Japanese torpedo bombers succeeded in doing the greatest damage to American ships. American personnel casualties amounted to about 3,300, and 188 Army and Navy planes were destroyed. Eight American battleships were severely damaged or destroyed, as were 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels. Six of the eight battleships were sunk. But it is a tribute to American determination and genius that five of the six battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor were raised; and, with the two battleships which had been damaged but not sunk, they were repaired and restored to the fleet. Before the end of the war, they all went into action against Japan. The *Nevada*, heavily damaged at Pearl Harbor, was a flagship in the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944.

The President twice approved

Joint Resolutions of the Congress which extended any statutory limitations on the trial and punishment of the persons involved. On the second approval, on June 13, 1944, the President issued a statement, noting that he was approving the resolution despite the objections of his own Secretaries of War and the Navy, who felt that investigations might interfere with the prosecution of the war (see Item 43 and note, 1944-1945 volume).

Some politicians and parts of the press attempted frequently to make political capital against the President out of the Pearl Harbor disaster by claiming: (1) that Roosevelt had not prepared the country adequately for war; or (2) that Roosevelt as Commander in Chief should have warned the military services of the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack; or (3) that Roosevelt deliberately incited an attack in order to drag the country into a war he desired.

As to the first charge, the record is clear that many of those same groups who claimed that the country was not sufficiently prepared for war on December 7, 1941, had fought tooth and nail against every request the President had made in previous months to strengthen the country. The magnificent increases in the armed forces and in the facilities with which to equip them had been accomplished in spite of their outcries.

As to the second charge, the President repeatedly during 1941 — and

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commencing as far back as his Chicago "quarantine" speech in October, 1937 — had warned the country of the aggressive designs which dictator countries had against the western hemisphere. Many of these latter-day critics had laughed at these warnings, calling them "war-mongering."

As to the third charge, that the President through an ultimatum forced Japan to attack, the record is clear that down to the very minute the Pearl Harbor attack started, the President and Secretary of State Hull were leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to achieve amicable and honorable settlement with Japan.

In 1946, after months of hearings and nearly 40 volumes of testimony, the United States Senate Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack concluded:

"The ultimate responsibility for the attack and its results rests upon Japan. . . . The diplomatic policies and actions of the United States provided no justifiable provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on this Nation. . . . The committee found no evidence to support the charges, made before and during the hearings, that the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy tricked, provoked, incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into attacking this Nation in order that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from the Congress. On the contrary, all evidence conclusively points to the fact that they discharged their responsibilities with distinction, ability, and foresight and in keeping with the highest traditions of our fundamental foreign policy.

"The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government officials made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national honor and endangering our security, to avert war with Japan."

137 (The Office of Defense Transportation Is Established. Executive Order No. 8989.

December 18, 1941

BY VIRTUE of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the state of war and to assure maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the Nation for the successful prosecution of the war, it is hereby ordered:

1. The term "domestic transportation" whenever used in this

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Order shall include railroad, motor, inland waterway, pipe line, air transport, and coastwise and intercoastal shipping.

2. There shall be in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Defense Transportation, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his responsibilities and authorities under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director shall receive compensation at such rate as the President may determine and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.

3. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Office of Defense Transportation shall:

a. Coordinate the transportation policies and activities of the several Federal agencies and private transportation groups in effecting such adjustments in the domestic transportation systems of the Nation as the successful prosecution of the war may require.

b. Compile and analyze estimates of the requirements to be imposed upon existing domestic transport facilities by the needs of the war effort; determine the adequacy of such facilities to accommodate the increased traffic volume occasioned by the war effort; develop measures designed to secure maximum use of existing domestic transportation facilities; and stimulate the provision of necessary additional transport facilities and equipment in order to achieve the level of domestic transportation services required; and in this connection advise the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board as to the estimated requirements and recommend allocations of materials and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate domestic transportation service.

c. Coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements with the objective of preventing possible points of traffic congestion

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and assuring the orderly and expeditious movement of men, materials, and supplies to points of need.

d. In cooperation with the United States Maritime Commission and other appropriate agencies, coordinate domestic traffic movements with ocean shipping in order to avoid terminal congestion at port areas and to maintain a maximum flow of traffic.

e. Perform the functions and exercise the authority vested in the President by the following, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 3 of this Order:

(1) Sec. 1(15) of Interstate Commerce Act as amended, USC title 49, sec. 1(15).

(2) Sec. 6(8) of Interstate Commerce Act as amended, USC title 49, sec. 6(8).

f. Survey and ascertain present and anticipated storage and warehousing requirements at points of transfer and in terminal areas; and encourage the provision of increased storage, loading, and unloading facilities where necessary.

g. Represent the defense interest of the Government in negotiating rates with domestic transportation carriers and in advising the appropriate governmental agencies with respect to the necessity for rate adjustments caused by the effect of the defense program.

h. Advise upon proposed or existing emergency legislation affecting domestic transportation, and recommend such additional emergency legislation as may be necessary or desirable.

i. Keep the President informed with respect to progress made in carrying out this Order; and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to it.

4. In the exercise of its functions and authority with respect to transportation priorities and preferences, the Office of Defense Transportation shall be governed as to the relative importance of deliveries required for defense by such instructions, certifications, and directives as may be issued by the Office of Production Management pursuant to the provisions of the Executive Order of August 28, 1941, entitled "Delegation and Co-

ordination of Priority Authority"; and the Office of Defense Transportation shall take all lawful steps within the scope of its authority to effect such deliveries through appropriate public or private agencies.

5. In the study of problems and in the discharge of its responsibilities, it shall be the policy of the Office of Defense Transportation to collaborate with existing departments and agencies which perform functions and activities pertaining to transportation and to utilize their facilities and services to the maximum. Particularly, the Office of Defense Transportation shall maintain close liaison with the United States Maritime Commission in the consideration of problems involving the relationship of ocean shipping with coastwise and intercoastal shipping and inland transport; with the Interstate Commerce Commission on problems of rates, routing, and car service; and with the War and Navy Departments with respect to the strategic movement of troops and supplies by domestic transportation carriers. The Office of Defense Transportation may arrange for the establishment of committees or groups of advisers representing two or more departments and agencies or private transportation groups, as the case may require, to study and develop plans for the coordination and most effective use of existing domestic transportation facilities.

6. To facilitate unity of policy and action and the use of existing governmental services, the heads of each of the following departments and agencies shall designate a responsible representative or representatives to maintain formal liaison with the Office of Defense Transportation: The Department of War, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United States Maritime Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Works Agency, the Federal Loan Agency, the Board of Investigation and Research appointed under the Transportation Act of 1940, the Office of Production Management, the Office of Price

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Administration, the Economic Defense Board, and such additional departments and agencies as the President may subsequently designate.

7. There shall be within the Office of Defense Transportation a Division of Railway Transport, a Division of Motor Transport, a Division of Inland Waterway Transport, a Division of Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport, and such other operating and staff divisions as the Director may determine. The Director may provide for the internal management of the Office of Defense Transportation and shall obtain the President's approval for the appointment of the heads of the above divisions and such other divisions as may be established.

8. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated or allocated to the Office of Defense Transportation, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services. However, the Office of Defense Transportation shall use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available through the Office for Emergency Management.

NOTE: In the initial steps of the period of intensified defense preparations after May 25, 1940, one of the seven members of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense was charged with problems relating to transportation. After the Administrative Order of January 7, 1941, was issued, a Division of Transportation was established as part of the Advisory Commission. (See note to Item 154, p. 700, 1940 volume.)

A variety of factors combined to make the transportation problems of World War II far more acute and difficult even than those of the previous war. Successful enemy at-

tacks on our coastwise shipping early in World War II not only threw a greater burden on inland transportation facilities but also cut sharply into the amount of petroleum and petroleum products which would ordinarily be moved by tankers from the southwestern oil fields to the eastern States. In addition, the quantity of what had to be transported was far greater during World War II than during World War I. The size of the armed forces was, of course, larger; increased shipments of men and materials to ports on all our sea-coasts were required; larger freight tonnages had to be shipped for our

war industries; and there was a general displacement of population caused by the expansion of war industries.

Accentuating the difficulties was the fact that to meet these larger requirements, there were far fewer facilities of transportation. In its attempt to ameliorate these problems, the Division of Transportation during six months of 1940 and until Pearl Harbor, in the main, had to act only in an advisory and coordinating capacity, with no regulatory powers. It became apparent in 1941 that an independent agency with greatly increased powers was needed to cope with the rising problems of domestic transportation. The impact of Pearl Harbor hastened the issuance of the foregoing Executive Order.

Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, was made the first Director of the Office of Defense Transportation and served until his death on March 15, 1944. One of the early problems confronted by the Office of Defense Transportation was to alleviate possible congestion in freight traffic moving toward ports. On March 18, 1942, the O.D.T. organized a Transportation Control Committee, representing the War Shipping Administration and the Army and the Navy. By daily meetings and the issuance of permits to procurement agencies and shippers, O.D.T. succeeded in preventing any serious freight traffic congestion at the ports.

In order to provide additional facilities for the transportation of petroleum from the southwestern oil fields, in view of the huge loss of tankers due to enemy submarine action, the O.D.T. stimulated the use of barges and tank trucks for the transportation of petroleum; with the construction of adequate pipe lines, this problem became less serious as the war progressed.

Despite the smaller number of passenger and freight cars actually available during World War II, the O.D.T. solved the problem of handling the sharp increase in traffic by securing a full utilization of the existing equipment. This involved heavier loading of freight cars, re-servicing existing cars which were in bad condition, and speeding up the movement of cars on all lines.

Heavy troop movements during 1942, and a sharp increase in passenger business due to wartime conditions, resulted in an increase in railway passenger-miles of 83 percent in 1942 over 1941. A compulsory priority system was not instituted, but O.D.T. achieved considerable success through educational campaigns to persuade the public not to travel unnecessarily and also to reduce and eliminate transportation to conventions and athletic or recreational events.

The power of the Office of Defense Transportation was expanded through the issuance of Executive Order 9156, May 2, 1942. That Executive Order extended the power of O.D.T. to cover all rub-

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ber-borne transport. By Executive Order No. 9214, August 5, 1942, the O.D.T.'s jurisdiction was extended to the territories and possessions of the United States. An additional grant of authority was made by Executive Order No. 9294, January 4, 1943, which extended O.D.T. control to include the local passenger transportation, equipment, and operations of Federal departments in the movement of war workers to and from work.

It soon became apparent that it was necessary to extend the authority of O.D.T. to include local transportation, the problem concerning which had been accentuated by the rapid rise of war industry centers. O.D.T. orders were issued to assure the maximum utilization of existing equipment, to eliminate duplications of schedules and services, to ban unnecessary use of local transportation, and to require proper maintenance of equipment and maximum loading. As was the case with railway and freight cars, local transportation had to carry its increasing war burdens without a material rise in the number of street-cars, buses, and other local transportation facilities available.

In addition to stimulating the

movement of petroleum through the inland waterways system, the O.D.T. sponsored the construction of a fleet of towboats, tugs, and barges for the purpose of transporting coal to needed areas.

In order to control the use of commercial motor vehicles, O.D.T. required a certificate of war necessity for every commercial motor vehicle in operation, specifying the maximum mileage permitted as a basis of allotments of motor fuel by the O.P.A. As the rubber shortage became more acute, additional orders were issued by O.D.T. to eliminate waste and unnecessary operation of commercial motor vehicles. Through the cooperation of many local industry committees, with a total membership of about 102,000, O.D.T. succeeded in reducing the total number of miles operated by commercial motor vehicles by 15,000,000,000 between 1941 and 1944, a reduction of about 20 percent. By the elimination of inefficiencies in operation and routes, O.D.T. succeeded in increasing the number of passengers carried by intercity buses by 391 percent in 1944 over 1938, with bus mileage being only 96 percent greater.

138 ¶ The President Issues a Statement and Establishes the Office of Censorship. Executive Order No. 8985. December 19, 1941

Statement:

ALL Americans abhor censorship, just as they abhor war. But the experience of this and of all other Nations has demonstrated that some degree of censorship is essential in wartime, and we are at war.

The important thing now is that such forms of censorship as are necessary shall be administered effectively and in harmony with the best interests of our free institutions.

It is necessary to the national security that military information which might be of aid to the enemy be scrupulously withheld at the source.

It is necessary that a watch be set upon our borders, so that no such information may reach the enemy, inadvertently or otherwise, through the medium of the mails, radio, or cable transmission, or by any other means.

It is necessary that prohibitions against the domestic publication of some types of information, contained in long-existing statutes, be rigidly enforced.

Finally, the Government has called upon a patriotic press and radio to abstain voluntarily from the dissemination of detailed information of certain kinds, such as reports of the movements of vessels and troops. The response has indicated a universal desire to cooperate.

In order that all of these parallel and requisite undertakings may be coordinated and carried forward in accordance with a single uniform policy, I have appointed Byron Price, Executive News Editor of the Associated Press, to be Director of Censorship, responsible directly to the President. He has been granted a leave of absence by the Associated Press and will take over the post assigned him within the coming week, or sooner.

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Executive Order:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and particularly by section 303, Title III of the Act of December 18, 1941, Public Law 354, 77th Congress, 1st session, and deeming that the public safety demands it, I hereby order as follows:

1. There is hereby established the Office of Censorship, at the head of which shall be a Director of Censorship. The Director of Censorship shall cause to be censored, in his absolute discretion, communications by mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between the United States and any foreign country or which may be carried by any vessel or other means of transportation touching at any port, place, or Territory of the United States and bound to or from any foreign country, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President shall from time to time prescribe. The establishment of rules and regulations in addition to the provisions of this Order shall not be a condition to the exercise of the powers herein granted or the censorship by this Order directed. The scope of this Order shall include all foreign countries except such as may hereafter be expressly excluded by regulation.

2. There is hereby created a Censorship Policy Board, which shall consist of the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of the Navy, the Director of the Office of Government Reports, and the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures. The Postmaster General shall act as Chairman of the Board. The Censorship Policy Board shall advise the Director of Censorship with respect to policy and the coordination and integration of the censorship herein directed.

3. The Director of Censorship shall establish a Censorship Operating Board, which shall consist of representatives of such departments and agencies of the Government as the Director shall specify. Each representative shall be designated by the head of the department or agency which he represents. The Censor-

ship Operating Board shall, under the supervision of the Director perform such duties with respect to operations as the Director shall determine.

4. The Director of Censorship is authorized to take all such measures as may be necessary or expedient to administer the powers hereby conferred, and, in addition to the utilization of existing personnel of any department or agency available therefor, to employ, or authorize the employment of, such additional personnel as he may deem requisite.

5. As used in this Order the term "United States" shall be construed to include the Territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands.

NOTE: For a long time the President had recognized the imperative necessity for wartime control of information to the extent that such control was required to preserve American security. When war in Europe broke out, the military services began training officers in preparation for the censorship of international communications. Several plans were presented to the President for his consideration, and on June 4, 1941, the President approved a plan providing for the appointment of a Director of Censorship, supported by an Army officer as chief postal and wire censor and a Navy officer as chief radio and cable censor. The plan approved by the President also recommended a censorship advisory committee consisting of representatives of all interested Government departments and agencies, and legislation to enable the accomplishment of necessary censorship.

the President appointed a censorship committee, whose Chairman was Postmaster General Frank C. Walker, to work out the legislative and administrative details of a wartime censorship policy. Under direction of the censorship committee, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation prepared recommendations based on the suggestions of fifteen departments and agencies and on the experiences of British and Canadian censorship.

Pearl Harbor promptly caused these plans to be carried out by concrete action. The President directed the Navy Department to proceed with the censorship of radio communications and telephone and telegraph wires crossing the borders. Postal censorship by the War Department followed several days later. On December 8, the President instructed the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assume temporary control of all phases of censorship. The Congress

A month before Pearl Harbor,

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on December 18, 1941, passed the First War Powers Act (55 Stat. 838), one title of which empowered the President to censor communications by mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between the United States and any foreign country. The President announced at his press conference on December 16 that Byron Price, Executive News Editor of the Associated Press, would be the new Director of Censorship, directly responsible to the President. The issuance of the Executive Order followed three days later.

In addition to the terms of the First War Powers Act and the foregoing Executive Order, the powers and policies of the Office of Censorship in respect to domestic press and radio were defined in the following letter from the President to Byron Price:

The White House
Washington
January 27, 1942

"My dear Mr. Price:

"As President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct you in your capacity as Director of Censorship to coordinate the efforts of the domestic press and radio voluntarily withholding from publication military and other information which should not be released in the interest of the effective prosecution of the war.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Byron Price,
Director, Office of Censorship,
Washington, D. C."

In consultation with the War and Navy Departments and several other agencies, the Office of Censorship issued codes of wartime practices to the press and radio, listing certain items which should not be mentioned by the press or radio because of their threat to security. Matters which were thus limited concerned troop, ship, and plane disposition, movements, and strength; and data concerning fortifications, war production, and weather. Regulations were also formulated to cover international communications.

On January 21, 1942, a tripartite agreement among British, Canadian, and American censorship offices was signed, providing for a complete exchange of information. Liaison was also established with several Latin American countries and the French censorship office at Algiers.

One of the first of the difficult problems which confronted the Office of Censorship was whether it should censor all Government publicity at the source. A month after Pearl Harbor, the Censorship Policy Board, established under the foregoing Executive Order, decided that the release of governmental information should be governed by principles developed by the Office of Facts and Figures. (See Item 99 and note, this volume.)

Postal censorship was the largest administrative function of the Office. An average of over a million letters a day passed through the

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field stations. A sample percentage of the mail passing through was opened and read, and mail was ordinarily not delayed for more than 24 hours.

The Office of Censorship frequently stepped in to issue special memoranda which covered specific situations. For example, by cautioning the press and radio, the Director of the Office of Censorship kept almost completely secret the visit of Soviet Commissar Molotov to confer with the President in Washington in the spring of 1942. After being tipped off in advance, all American press and radio sources kept the Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, a tight secret. The German radio attempted to ferret out the true location of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings. At various times it reported the President and the British Prime Minister together in London, on a battleship in the Atlantic, and in Washington. The Germans did not learn the secret till it was officially announced after the completion of the Conference. By careful planning, the Office of Censorship succeeded in keeping secret the date and place of the Allied invasion of Europe. Commencing more than six months before D-Day, Director Price warned radio and newspaper men against the dangers of speculation on this important secret. Speculations were not forbidden, but the Office of Censorship required that sufficient alternatives be

included to avoid giving essential information to the enemy.

In general, military and naval secrecy was extremely well preserved through the system of voluntary censorship. As is perhaps inevitable, there were a few notable exceptions; these isolated exceptions cannot obscure the wholehearted and almost universal cooperation of the press and radio.

The most dramatic achievement of voluntary censorship was in connection with the development of the atomic bomb. (See Item 60 and note, this volume.) To insure that no newspaper office or radio station would disseminate information about this top-secret project, Director Price sent a confidential message to all editors and broadcasters on June 28, 1943, requesting that all information relating to atom smashing, or atomic energy in general, be withheld. Lest the 25,000 recipients of this message sense the real importance of the atomic experiments and the use of uranium, the message put a further ban on references to polonium, ytterbium, hafnium, radium, thorium, protactinium, rhenium, and deuterium. References to these obscure elements had the intended effect of throwing out of focus the mention of uranium, and the message caused no unusual excitement.

There were a number of inadvertent leaks in radio broadcasts and newspaper accounts referring to atomic development. Once checked, however, none of these leaks de-

veloped into serious proportions. Yet the Office of Censorship had to be increasingly vigilant in checking not only the customary sources but also drama columns and fiction stories; comic strips for instance had to be watched carefully, for the fantastic warfare waged in some of the more imaginative strips was beginning to find a parallel in actual life. The tension rose as the first atomic bomb was exploded in a test in the New Mexico desert. At that time, the Office of Censorship was able to control stories about the Manhattan project, and it was generally believed that an ammunition dump had blown up.

In addition to its negative function of suppressing the release of information which would endanger American security, the Office of Censorship performed an affirmative task in intercepting intelligence information regarding sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities. Such intercepts not only prevented

the entrance of harmful propaganda but also led directly to the arrest and conviction of a number of enemy agents. Many cables and postal intercepts provided useful information about enemy military installations, which helped American bombers to find and destroy them. Intercepts also proved effective in disclosing violations of import and export regulations.

With the Japanese acceptance of Allied surrender terms, it became unnecessary to continue the activities of the Office of Censorship; on August 15, 1945, President Truman directed, on Byron Price's recommendation, that voluntary censorship of press and radio cease and that censorship of all international communications also come to an end. The Office itself was formally abolished as of November 15, 1945. It had performed a job which was as urgent as it was distasteful — and it had performed the job exceedingly well.

139 ¶ White House Statements Announcing the Arrival of Prime Minister Churchill and the Beginning of Conferences. December 22, 1941

THE British Prime Minister has arrived in the United States to discuss with the President all questions relevant to the concerted war effort. Mr. Churchill is accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook and a technical staff. Mr. Churchill is the guest of the President.

* * *

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There is, of course, one primary objective in the conversations to be held during the next few days between the President and the British Prime Minister and the respective staffs of the two countries. That purpose is the defeat of Hitlerism throughout the world.

It should be remembered that many other Nations are engaged today in this common task. Therefore the present conferences in Washington should be regarded as preliminary to further conferences which will officially include Russia, China, the Netherlands, and the [British] dominions. It is expected that there will thus be evolved an over-all unity in the conduct of the war. Other Nations will be asked to participate to the best of their ability in the over-all objective.

It is probable that no further announcements will be made until the end of the present conferences, but it may be assumed that the other interested Nations will be kept in close touch with this preliminary planning.

NOTE: See Item 141, this volume, for the joint press conference held by the President and Churchill. For the presidential statement summarizing his conferences with Churchill, see Item 144 and note, this volume. See Item 1 and note, 1942 volume, for the Joint Declaration of the United Nations which was developed during Churchill's visit.

140 ¶ The President Supports a Combined Production Effort with Canada. December 23, 1941

Statement of the President:

THE Joint War Production Committees of Canada and the United States have unanimously adopted a declaration of policy calling for a combined all-out war production effort and the removal of any barriers standing in the way of such a combined effort. This declaration has met the approval of the Canadian War Cabinet. It has my full approval. To further its implementation, I have asked the affected departments and agencies in our Government to abide by its letter and spirit, so far as lies within

their power. I have further requested Mr. Milo Perkins, the Chairman of the American Committee, to investigate, with the aid of the Tariff Commission and other interested agencies, the extent to which legislative changes will be necessary to give full effect to the declaration.

Through brute force and enslavement, Hitler has secured a measure of integration and coordination of the productive resources of a large part of the continent of Europe. We must demonstrate that integration and coordination of the productive resources of the continent of America is possible through democratic processes and free consent.

Statement of War Production Policy for Canada and the United States:

Having regard to the fact that Canada and the United States are engaged in a war with common enemies, the Joint War Production Committee of Canada and the United States recommends to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada the following statement of policy for the war production of the two countries.

1. Victory will require the maximum war production in both countries in the shortest possible time; speed and volume of war output, rather than monetary cost, are the primary objectives.
2. An all-out war production effort in both countries requires the maximum use of the labor, raw materials, and facilities in each country.
3. Achievement of maximum volume and speed of war output requires that the production and resources of both countries should be effectively integrated, and directed toward a common program of requirements for the total war effort.
4. Each country should produce those articles in an integrated program of requirements which will result in maximum joint output of war goods in the minimum time.
5. Scarce raw materials and goods which one country requires from the other in order to carry out the joint program of war production should be so allocated between the two countries that such materials and goods will make the maximum contribution

toward the output of the most necessary articles in the shortest period of time.

6. Legislative and administrative barriers, including tariffs, import duties, customs and other regulations or restrictions of any character which prohibit, prevent, delay, or otherwise impede the free flow of necessary munitions and war supplies between the two countries should be suspended or otherwise eliminated for the duration of the war.

7. The two Governments should take all measures necessary for the fullest implementation of the foregoing principles.

Members for Canada

G. K. Sheils, Chairman
R. P. Bell
H. J. Carmichael
J. R. Donald
W. L. Gordon
H. R. MacMillan

Members for the U. S.

Milo Perkins, Chairman
J. B. Forrestal
W. H. Harrison
R. P. Patterson
E. R. Stettinius
H. L. Vickery

NOTE: On April 20, 1941, the President and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada conferred at Hyde Park, New York, and issued the following statement (commonly known as the "Hyde Park Agreement of 1941"):

"Among other important matters, the President and the Prime Minister discussed measures by which the most prompt and effective utilization might be made of the productive facilities of North America for the purposes both of local and hemisphere defense and of the assistance which in addition to their own programs both Canada and the United States are rendering to Great Britain and the other democracies.

"It was agreed as a general principle that in mobilizing the resources of this continent each country should provide the other with the defense articles

which it is best able to produce, and, above all, produce quickly, and that production programs should be coordinated to this end.

"While Canada has expanded its productive capacity many-fold since the beginning of the war, there are still numerous defense articles which it must obtain in the United States, and purchases of this character by Canada will be even greater in the coming year than in the past. On the other hand, there is existing and potential capacity in Canada for the speedy production of certain kinds of munitions, strategic materials, aluminum, and ships, which are urgently required by the United States for its own purposes.

"While exact estimates cannot yet be made, it is hoped that during the next twelve months Canada can supply the United States with between \$200,000,000 and \$300,000,000 worth of such defense articles. This sum is a small

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fraction of the total defense program of the United States, but many of the articles to be provided are of vital importance. In addition, it is of great importance to the economic and financial relations between the two countries that payment by the United States for these supplies will materially assist Canada in meeting part of the cost of Canadian defense purchases in the United States.

"Insofar as Canada's defense purchases in the United States consist of component parts to be used in equipment and munitions which Canada is producing for Great Britain, it was also agreed that Great Britain will obtain these parts under the Lend-Lease Act and forward them to Canada for inclusion in the finished article.

"The technical and financial details will be worked out as soon as possible in accordance with the general principles which have been agreed upon between the President and the Prime Minister."

To carry out the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941, several joint committees were established to exchange information relating to the supplies of strategic war materials and to effect a more efficient use of the combined resources of Canada and the United States in defense production.

On November 5, 1941, the President and the Prime Minister of Canada announced the establishment of a Joint Defense Production Committee to coordinate the efforts of the United States and Canada in the production of defense matériel. After Pearl Harbor this Committee was reconstituted as the Joint War Production Committee of Can-

ada and the United States, as set forth in the foregoing statement of the President. The policies enunciated in the statement were carried out largely by the War Production Board in the United States (see Item 9 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the establishment and functions of the War Production Board) and the Department of Munitions Supply in Canada.

Additional steps in Canadian-American economic cooperation were taken on November 7, 1942, when Canada was included as a third member of the Anglo-American Combined Production and Resources Board (see Item 114, 1942 volume); and on October 25, 1943, when the President and Prime Minister Churchill invited Canada to become a member of the Combined Food Board (see Item 62 and note, 1942 volume). The Combined Production and Resources Board dealt with many phases of economic cooperation between Canada and America, including the adequacy of productive facilities, prevention of industrial waste, and standardization of specifications and equipment. For example, the Board recommended against the construction of a proposed war plant in Canada because American production facilities for the particular product involved were sufficient for the joint needs of the United States and Canada; quotas were suggested for the United States and Canada for shipment of textiles to liberated areas; and it recommended similar quotas

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for the supply of agricultural machinery for the U.N.R.R.A. program. The Combined Food Board performed effectively in reducing competitive bidding on foodstuffs which were in short supply. This was achieved by recommending allocations of markets and sources of supply to the War Food Administration of the United States and to its Canadian and British equivalents.

Further steps in encouraging the economic cooperation of Canada and the United States were taken early in 1942 when agreements were reached to facilitate the movement of agricultural labor and machinery across the border between the two countries. The movement of migratory labor was principally from Canada into the United States, and manpower shortages in the northern United States were eased by these free movements of grain workers, potato and tomato pickers, tobacco workers, dairy farm workers, lumbermen, maple sugar workers, and food processing workers.

To carry out the policy statement of the Joint War Production Committee, printed above, the President also exercised his powers under the First War Powers Act by issuing Executive Order No. 9177 on May 30, 1942, which extended to the Secretaries of War, Treasury, and Agriculture and to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation legal authority already vested in the Secretary of the Navy to import, free of

duty, emergency purchases of war materials, including materials from Canada.

The United States and Canada concluded a number of special wartime arrangements to increase the water power supply needed for industrial plants on both sides of the border. Agreements were reached to divert for power purposes from the Niagara River above Niagara Falls 12,500 cubic feet of water per second on the American side of the Falls and 9,000 cubic feet a second on the Canadian side. Agreement was also reached for the temporary raising of the level of Lake St. Francis so that the Canadian power company which was utilizing water diverted from that lake could continue to export electric power needed by an American aluminum plant in northern New York. Important steps were taken by the Governments of the United States and Canada looking toward the proposed development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, although Congressional approval of the agreement negotiated between the United States and Canada was not accorded during the President's lifetime (see Item 49 and note, this volume, and references cited therein, for an account of the attempt of the President to further the development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway).

The close cooperation of Canada with the United States was evidenced by Canada's opening to American traffic that part of the

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Alaska Highway lying in Canada on the same terms as Canadian traffic. It was also shown by the waiver by the Canadian Government of import duties and charges on shipments originating in the United States and transported over the highway to Alaska.

The development of atomic energy during the war (see Item 60 and note, this volume) also involved the use of some of the supplies of raw materials from Canada which were needed for atomic development.

141 (The Seven Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference — Joint Press Conference with the President and Prime Minister Churchill.

December 23, 1941

(Creation of O.D.T. — Conference with Churchill — Churchill is questioned by the press.)

(The guest at this press conference was the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill.)

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry to have taken so long for all of you to get in, but apparently — I was telling the Prime Minister — the object was to prevent a wolf from coming in here in sheep's clothing. *(Laughter)* But I was thereby mixing my metaphors, because I had suggested to him this morning that if he came to this conference he would have to be prepared to meet the American press, who, compared with the British press — as was my experience in the old days — are "wolves" compared with the British press "lambs."

However, he is quite willing to take on a conference, because we have one characteristic in common. We like new experiences in life.

I only have one or two things. And the first is — I will get myself out of the way first — the first is that I have established the Office of Defense Transportation, in the Executive Office of the President. They are to coordinate all of the transportation policies and the activities of the several Federal agencies

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and private transportation groups, compile and analyze estimates of the requirements of the future, and coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements. They will have in the Office a Division of Railway Transportation, a Division of Motor Transport, a Division of Inland Waterway Transport, a Division of Coastwise and Inter-Coastal Transport, and such other operating and staff divisions as the Director may determine.

And I have appointed Mr. Joe Eastman to the position of Director, and asked the Interstate Commerce Commission to give him leave of absence for that purpose.

I think that is all that I have.

If you want to know something about plans for the immediate future, I think last night's statement [see Item 139, this volume] covered the great purpose and the objective of the conference Mr. Churchill and I are having with the staffs.

And we want to make it clear that this is a preliminary British-American conference, but that thereby no other Nations are excluded from the general objective of defeating Hitlerism in the world. Just for example, I think the Prime Minister this morning has been consulting with the Dominions. That is especially important, of course, in view of the fact that Australia and New Zealand are very definitely in the danger zone; and we are working out a complete unity of action in regard to the Southwest Pacific. In addition to that, there are a good many Nations besides our own that are at war.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (*interposing*) Canada.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Canada, the Prime Minister suggests, is also —

THE PRIME MINISTER: (*interposing*) In the line.

THE PRESIDENT: (*continuing*) — in the line — both sides of Canada. I think it is all right to say that Mr. Mackenzie King will be here later on.

In regard to the other Nations, such as the Russians, the Chinese, the Dutch, and a number of other Nations which

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are — shall I say — overrun by Germany, but which still maintain governments which are operating in the common cause, they also will be on the inside in what we are doing.

In addition to that, there are various other Nations, for example a number of American Republics which are actually in the war, and another number of American Republics which although not acting under a declaration of war are giving us very definite and much-needed assistance. It might be called on their part “active non-belligerency.”

At five o'clock we are having a staff meeting. We have already had a meeting with the State Department officials, and during the next few days decisions will materialize. We can't give you any more news about them at this time, except to say that the whole matter is progressing very satisfactorily.

Steve [Early] and I first thought that I would introduce the Prime Minister, and let him say a few words to you good people, by banning questions. However, the Prime Minister did not go along with that idea, and I don't blame him. He said that he is perfectly willing to answer any reasonable questions for a reasonably short time, if you want to ask him. . . . And so I am going to introduce him, and you to him and tell you that we are very, very happy to have him here. . . .

And so I will introduce the Prime Minister.

(To the Prime Minister) I wish you would just stand up for one minute and let them see you. They can't see you.

(Applause greeted the Prime Minister when he stood up, but when he climbed onto his chair so that they could see him better, loud and spontaneous cheers and applause rang through the room.)

THE PRESIDENT: *(to the press)* Go ahead and shoot.

Q. What about Singapore, Mr. Prime Minister? The people of Australia are terribly anxious about it. Would you say to be of good cheer?

THE PRIME MINISTER: We are going to do our utmost to defend Singapore and its approaches until the situation becomes so

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favorable to us that the general offensive in the Pacific can be resumed.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, isn't Singapore the key to the whole situation out there?

THE PRIME MINISTER: The key to the whole situation is the resolute manner in which the British and American democracies are going to throw themselves into the conflict. As a geographical and strategic point it obviously is of very high importance.

Q. Mr. Minister, could you tell us what you think of conditions within Germany — the morale?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I have always been feeling that one of these days we might get a windfall coming from that quarter, but I don't think we ought to count on it. Just go on as if they were keeping on as bad as they are, or as good as they are. And then one of these days, as we did in the last war, we may wake up and find we ran short of Huns. (*Laughter*)

Q. Do you think the war is turning in our favor in the last month or so?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I can't describe the feelings of relief with which I find Russia victorious, the United States and Great Britain standing side by side. It is incredible to anyone who has lived through the lonely months of 1940. It is incredible. Thank God.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there have been suggestions from various sources that possibly the German retreat — or the Russian success — has some element of trickery in it, that the Germans are not particularly routed. In other words, a bit of camouflage. Can you throw any light on that, or do you care to?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, of course, it is only my opinion, but I think that they have received a very heavy rebuff. Hitler prophesied that he would take Moscow in a short time. Now his armies are joggling backwards over this immense front, wondering where he can find a place to winter. It won't be a

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comfortable place. They have had immense losses. And the Russians have shown a power of resiliency, a gift of modern warfare under their leader, Stalin, which has rendered immense service to the world cause.

Q. Mr. Minister, can you tell us when you think we may lick these boys?

THE PRIME MINISTER: If we manage it well, it will only take half as long as if we manage it badly. (*Laughter*)

Q. How long, sir, would it take if we managed it badly?

THE PRIME MINISTER: That has not been revealed to me at this moment. We don't need to manage it badly.

Q. How long if we manage it well, sir?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, it would be imprudent to indulge in a facile optimism at the moment.

Q. Do you favor a personal conference of yourself, Mr. Roosevelt, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek?

THE PRIME MINISTER: In principle, yes. (*Laughter*)

Q. Do you think it is important, Mr. Prime Minister, that our American war materials continue to go, to some extent at least, through the Middle East and to Russia during this particular period?

THE PRIME MINISTER: My feeling is that the military power and munitions power of the United States are going to develop on such a great scale that the problem will not so much be whether to choose between this and that, but how to get what is available to all the theaters in which we have to wage this World War.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in one of your speeches you mentioned three or four of the great climacterics. Would you now add our entry into the war as one of those, sir?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I think I may almost say, "I sure do." (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, during your talks here, will you take up economic, and diplomatic, and postwar problems?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I hope not too much on them. Well, really,

141. *Seven Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference*

we have to concentrate on the grim emergencies, and when we have solved them, we shall be in a position to deal with the future of the world in a manner to give the best results, and the most lasting results, for the common peoples of all the lands. But one has only a certain amount of life and strength, and only so many hours in the day, and other emergencies press upon us too much to be drawn into those very, very complicated, tangled, and not in all cases attractive jungles.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, can you say anything now about the prospect of an anti-Axis command on those discussions?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I think it would be very difficult to arrange.

What you require is the broad blocking in of the main plans by the principal personages in charge of the action of the different states, and then the release of that to the highest military expert authorities for execution. But this is a war which is absolutely — literally world-wide, proceeding at the same time from one end of the globe to the other, and in the air, on the land, and on the sea. I do not think there has ever been a man born — even if he were Napoleon, he wouldn't know anything about the air — who could assume the functions of world commander in chief for the — I would say associated powers. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, are you giving consideration to creation of an Allied supplies command, whereby materials of the anti-Axis powers would be allocated under a central agency?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, there is the very closest liaison between our people over here and the United States officers. Lord Beaverbrook is here with an executive staff, and we have, I believe, quite a large staff here, and they are in the closest accord. Then at the summit of the problem is a fairly simple one of allocation in accordance with the emergency. And of course, the rule we have got to follow is to see how much we can help each other. It should be a rivalry in mutual helpfulness, and that is the only one.

141. *Seven Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference*

Q. Mr. Minister, do you anticipate a German offensive on a new front in the near future?

THE PRIME MINISTER: There is a lot of talk about their coming along and making an attack in the Mediterranean. There is a lot of talk about their getting ready for an invasion of England next year. We have heard a lot of this, and I expect something will come of it, but where, I can't tell. I will be very glad to be informed. Gentlemen, if you have got any information, it will be thankfully received. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. Minister, have you any information as to whether the Germans have lost more matériel in Russia than they can replace by spring?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I should think that they have got ample matériel, because they not only have their own vast factories — which were running at full war speed when the war broke out — they have a great accumulation, and they have what they captured from so many other countries. I shouldn't think that was where they would run short. But of course, the quality of the matériel, as we move on each year into new and better times — they might not have the power to keep in the race with that.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what are the materials that Germany is most likely to run short of? What are the materials of which they are most short?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I did hear something about oil and other things, but it is rather technical for me.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, can you interpret any of the recent events in Germany as possible internal collapse — symptomatic of an internal collapse?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Don't let us bank on that. We have got to bank on an external knockout. If the internal collapse comes, so much the better.

Q. Mr. Minister, have you any doubt of the ultimate victory?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have no doubt whatever.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

142. *A Plan to Guarantee Uninterrupted Production*

NOTE: For other presidential references to the visit of Prime Minister Churchill, see Items 139 and 144, this volume. See Item 1 and note, 1942 volume, for the Joint Declaration of the United Nations which was developed during

Churchill's visit.

See Item 137 and note, this volume, for the text of the Executive Order establishing the Office of Defense Transportation and an account of its activities and accomplishments.

142 ¶ The President Submits a Plan to Guarantee Uninterrupted Production.

December 23, 1941

Gentlemen of the Conference:

MODERATOR DAVIS and Senator Thomas have reported to me the results of your deliberations. They have given me each proposition which you have discussed. I am happy to accept your general points of agreement as follows:

1. There shall be no strikes or lockouts.
2. All disputes shall be settled by peaceful means.
3. The President shall set up a proper War Labor Board to handle these disputes.

I accept without reservation your covenants that there shall be no strikes or lockouts and all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means. I shall proceed at once to act on your third point.

Government must act in general. The three points agreed upon cover of necessity all disputes that may arise between labor and management.

The particular disputes must be left to the consideration of those who can study the particular differences and who are thereby prepared by knowledge to pass judgment in the particular case. I have full faith that no group in our national life will take undue advantage while we are faced by common enemies.

I congratulate you — I thank you, and our people will join me in appreciation of your great contribution.

Your achievement is a response to a common desire of all men

143. *Christmas Eve Message to the Nation*

of good will that strikes and lockouts cease and that disputes be settled by peaceful means.

May I now wish you all a Merry Christmas.

NOTE: The President had called the Management-Labor Conference shortly after Pearl Harbor for the purpose of drafting a basic labor policy for wartime and to establish a new administrative agency for the settlement of wartime labor disputes (see Items 20, 103, 130, and 135 and notes, this volume). As described in the note to Item 130, this volume, the conferees were deadlocked on the issue whether the jurisdiction of the new War Labor Board should extend to disputes involving the inclusion of a closed shop in collective bargaining agreements. Labor representatives insisted that the new Board should have such jurisdiction; employer representatives were equally insistent that it should not.

Immediately before the foregoing statement was issued, the Secretary of Labor presented to the President

the issues involved in the deadlock of the conferees. Secretary of Labor Perkins has described in her book [*The Roosevelt I Knew*, 1946, Viking Press] the President's reaction. The President, she has reported, replied: " 'Oh, well, I can handle that. We can't expect perfection. I will accept the three important points they *have* agreed on with thanks. I'll promise to appoint the Board promptly.' Lifting his right eyebrow quizzically, the President then added: 'We'll let the Board make its own rules and regulations and determine its jurisdiction.' "

In practice, the National War Labor Board (see Item 6 and note, 1942 volume) ultimately did handle many cases involving recognition of a closed shop and, in doing so, settled peacefully many labor disputes which arose out of these issues.

143 ¶ "Our Strongest Weapon in This War Is That Conviction of the Dignity and Brotherhood of Man Which Christmas Day Signifies"
—Christmas Eve Message to the Nation.

December 24, 1941

Fellow workers for freedom:

THERE are many men and women in America—sincere and faithful men and women—who are asking themselves this Christmas:

How can we light our trees? How can we give our gifts? How can we meet and worship with love and with uplifted spirit and heart in a world at war, a world of fighting and suffering and death?

How can we pause, even for a day, even for Christmas Day, in our urgent labor of arming a decent humanity against the enemies which beset it?

How can we put the world aside, as men and women put the world aside in peaceful years, to rejoice in the birth of Christ?

These are natural — inevitable — questions in every part of the world which is resisting the evil thing.

And even as we ask these questions, we know the answer. There is another preparation demanded of this Nation beyond and beside the preparation of weapons and materials of war. There is demanded also of us the preparation of our hearts; the arming of our hearts. And when we make ready our hearts for the labor and the suffering and the ultimate victory which lie ahead, then we observe Christmas Day — with all of its memories and all of its meanings — as we should.

Looking into the days to come, I have set aside a day of prayer, and in that Proclamation I have said:

“The year 1941 has brought upon our Nation a war of aggression by powers dominated by arrogant rulers whose selfish purpose is to destroy free institutions. They would thereby take from the freedom-loving peoples of the earth the hard-won liberties gained over many centuries.

“The new year of 1942 calls for the courage and the resolution of old and young to help to win a world struggle in order that we may preserve all we hold dear.

“We are confident in our devotion to country, in our love of freedom, in our inheritance of courage. But our strength, as the strength of all men everywhere, is of greater avail as God upholds us.

“Therefore, I . . . do hereby appoint the first day of the year 1942 as a day of prayer, of asking forgiveness for our shortcomings of the past, of consecration to the tasks of the present, of asking God’s help in days to come.

“We need His guidance that this people may be humble in spirit but strong in the conviction of the right; steadfast to endure sacrifice, and brave to achieve a victory of liberty and peace.”

144. *Conferences with Prime Minister Churchill*

Our strongest weapon in this war is that conviction of the dignity and brotherhood of man which Christmas Day signifies — more than any other day or any other symbol.

Against enemies who preach the principles of hate and practice them, we set our faith in human love and in God's care for us and all men everywhere.

It is in that spirit, and with particular thoughtfulness of those, our sons and brothers, who serve in our armed forces on land and sea, near and far — those who serve for us and endure for us — that we light our Christmas candles now across the continent from one coast to the other on this Christmas Eve.

We have joined with many other Nations and peoples in a very great cause. Millions of them have been engaged in the task of defending good with their life-blood for months and for years.

One of their great leaders stands beside me. He and his people in many parts of the world are having their Christmas trees with their little children around them, just as we do here. He and his people have pointed the way in courage and in sacrifice for the sake of little children everywhere.

And so I am asking my associate, my old and good friend, to say a word to the people of America, old and young, tonight — Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

144 ¶ Statement by the President Summarizing
His Conferences with Prime Minister Churchill.
December 27, 1941

MUCH has been accomplished this week through the medium of the many conferences held, in the meetings of the supply and production officials, in the sessions held by members of the military and naval groups, and in the discussions with the chiefs of missions of all Nations at war with the common enemy. Included were conferences with the Russian and Chinese Ambassadors, the Canadian Prime Minister, and the Netherlands Minister.

As a result of all of these meetings, I know tonight that the position of the United States and of all Nations aligned with us has been strengthened immeasurably. We have advanced far along the road toward achievement of the ultimate objective — the crushing defeat of those forces that have attacked and made war upon us.

The conferences will continue for an indefinite period of time. It is impossible to say just now when they will terminate.

It is my purpose, as soon as it is possible, to give insofar as safety will permit — without giving information of military value to the enemy — a more detailed accounting of all that has taken place in Washington this week and of all that will take place during the remainder of the meetings.

The present over-all objective is the marshaling of all resources military and economic, of the world-wide front opposing the Axis. Excellent progress along these lines is being made.

NOTE: On the night the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, the President talked with Winston Churchill by transatlantic telephone. The President had been keeping in close touch with the British Prime Minister, particularly since their Atlantic Charter meeting in August, 1941. The entry of the United States into the war called for a second conference between the leaders of Britain and the United States and their staffs.

On December 22, 1941, Churchill and his staff arrived in Washington (see Item 139, this volume). His original plan was to stay a week in Washington, spend two days in Canada, and then return home on January 1. Actually, Churchill made the trip to Canada, but did not leave for England until January 14.

During his stay in Washington, Prime Minister Churchill and the President joined in several public appearances, such as the annual Christmas Eve tree-lighting ceremony on the White House lawn (see Item 143, this volume). The two leaders held a joint press conference on December 23 (see Item 141, this volume). The President and Churchill attended an interdenominational service at the Foundry Methodist Church on Christmas Day. Among his other official activities, Churchill addressed a joint session of the Congress in the House Chamber on December 26, 1941.

The Conference, known as the Arcadia Conference, enabled full and free interchange of information and the formulation of plans by the

144. *Conferences with Prime Minister Churchill*

President and Churchill and their military, naval, production, and procurement staffs. Frequent meetings of the top officials were held at the White House, and there were also twelve meetings of the American and British Chiefs of Staff held in the Federal Reserve Building. One of the most important documents produced by the Arcadia Conference was the Joint Declaration of the United Nations, issued on New Year's Day, 1942 (see Item 1 and note, 1942 volume).

The Arcadia Conference reaffirmed the decision that Germany was the first and most important Axis power for the Allies to strike and defeat. Staff talks between the British and Americans had already reached this conclusion, and despite the fact that the United States was first plunged into the war in the Pacific, Germany remained the primary target. This conclusion was presented by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and not on the initiative of any British source. It was based on the simple facts that in only that theater could the necessary build-up of forces be accomplished, air superiority be achieved, and British ground forces be committed along with the Americans. Because of sea distances, shipping difficulties, and an absence of nearby landing fields and staging areas, an early concentration of forces against Japan was out of the question. Furthermore, Germany possessed greater productive power and scientific genius than Japan, and

therefore it was necessary to attack her before she became even stronger.

Because of the new Japanese advances which stretched appallingly beyond expectations, a new theater of war was created at the Conference. This new theater was termed the A.B.D.A. Area (American, British, Dutch, Australian), covering generally the area from the Bay of Bengal to Australasia. The British General Sir Archibald Wavell was named Supreme Commander of the A.B.D.A. Area, with the American Admiral T. C. Hart under General Wavell's command. The appointment of General Wavell was the first application of the principle of "unified command" which had previously been resolved at the Arcadia Conference. This principle, advanced with clarity and precision by General Marshall in a meeting of the British and American Chiefs of Staff on Christmas Day afternoon, was the subject of some brisk argument before all parties subscribed to it. The President urged the approval of a unified command at a major White House meeting on December 26. Although Churchill at first opposed the idea he eventually was brought around to support it.

At the same time that General Wavell was appointed, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was made Supreme Commander of Allied land and air forces in the Chinese Theater.

The discussion of military and naval strategy naturally occupied a

145. *Methods for Wartime Procurement*

vast amount of the Conference. The operation against North Africa was discussed, and plans were laid for launching it as early as March, 1942, in the event the French invited such an operation or if Hitler invaded Spain. The Conference felt that 1942 should be spent largely in wearing down Germany's resistance through air bombardment, assistance to Russia's offensive, the blockade and maintenance of the spirit of revolt in occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements. At that time, 1943 was set as the most likely year for the assault on the European Continent.

In further pursuance of the principle of unity of command, the President continued to urge an appropriate joint body to formulate the necessary plans and to issue the commands to the field. This concept developed into the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which operated in such an effective manner throughout the war.

Basic decisions were reached at the Arcadia Conference on the nature of the Combined Raw Mate-

rials Board and the Munitions Assignments and Shipping Adjustment Boards (see Item 11 and note, 1942 volume). The greatest discussions arose over the amount of independent authority to be accorded to the Munitions Assignments Board, with the President supporting General Marshall in the proposition that it should operate under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as it eventually was established.

The Arcadia Conference also tackled the question of production goals to be met by the Allies. These represented the Victory Program which the President announced in his State of the Union Message to the Congress (see Item 5, 1942 volume). As pointed out in Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, "Roosevelt himself arbitrarily revised some of the figures upward on the eve of his speech to Congress. When Hopkins questioned him on this, Roosevelt said, 'Oh — the production people can do it if they really try.'"

They did try — and they did do it.

145 ¶ The President Establishes the Methods for Wartime Procurement. Executive Order No. 9001. December 27, 1941

THE successful prosecution of the war requires an all-out industrial mobilization of the United States in order that the materials necessary to win the war may be produced in the shortest pos-

145. *Methods for Wartime Procurement*

sible time. To accomplish this objective it is necessary that the Departments of War and the Navy and the United States Maritime Commission cooperate to the fullest possible degree with the Office of Production Management in the endeavor to make available for the production of war material all the industrial resources of the country. It is expected that in the exercise of the powers hereinafter granted, these agencies and the Office of Production Management will work together to bring about the conversion of manufacturing industries to war production, including the surveying of the war potential of industries, plant by plant; the spreading of war orders; the conversion of facilities; the assurance of efficient and speedy production; the development and use of subcontracting to the fullest extent; and the conservation of strategic materials.

TITLE I

1. By virtue of the authority in me vested by the Act of Congress, entitled "An Act to expedite the prosecution of the War effort," approved December 18, 1941 (hereinafter called "the Act"), and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and deeming that such action will facilitate the prosecution of the war, I do hereby order that the War Department, the Navy Department, and the United States Maritime Commission be and they hereby respectively are authorized within the limits of the amounts appropriated therefor to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made, and to make advance, progress, and other payments thereon, without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts. The authority herein conferred may be exercised by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the United States Maritime Commission respectively or in their discretion and by their direction respectively may also be exercised through any other officer or officers or civilian officials of the War or the Navy Departments or the United States Maritime Commission. The Secretary

of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the United States Maritime Commission may confer upon any officer or officers of their respective departments, or civilian officials thereof, the power to make further delegations of such powers within the War and the Navy Departments, and the United States Maritime Commission.

2. The contracts hereby authorized to be made include agreements of all kinds (whether in the form of letters of intent, purchase orders, or otherwise) for all types and kinds of things and services necessary, appropriate, or convenient for the prosecution of war, or for the invention, development, or production of, or research concerning any such things, including but not limited to, aircraft, buildings, vessels, arms, armament, equipment, or supplies of any kind, or any portion thereof, including plans, spare parts and equipment therefor, materials, supplies, facilities, utilities, machinery, machine tools, and any other equipment, without any restriction of any kind, either as to type, character, location, or form.

3. The War Department, the Navy Department, and the United States Maritime Commission may by agreement modify or amend or settle claims under contracts heretofore or hereafter made, may make advance, progress, and other payments upon such contracts of any percentum of the contract price, and may enter into agreements with contractors and/or obligors, modifying or releasing accrued obligations of any sort, including accrued liquidated damages or liability under surety or other bonds, whenever, in the judgment of the War Department, the Navy Department, or the United States Maritime Commission respectively, the prosecution of the war is thereby facilitated. Amendments and modifications of contracts may be with or without consideration and may be utilized to accomplish the same things as any original contract could have accomplished hereunder, irrespective of the time or circumstances of the making of or the form of the contract amended or modified, or of the amending or modifying contract, and irrespective of rights which may have accrued under the contract, or the amendments or modifications thereof.

4. Advertising, competitive bidding, and bid, payment, performance, or other bonds or other forms of security, need not be required.

TITLE II

Pursuant to Title II of the Act and for the protection of the interests of the United States, I do hereby prescribe the following regulations for the exercise of the authority herein conferred upon the War Department, the Navy Department, and the United States Maritime Commission.

1. All contracts and all purchases made pursuant to the Act and this Executive Order shall be reported to the President of the United States. Such reports shall be made at least quarterly, provided, however, that purchases or contracts of less than \$100,000 may be consolidated in such reports with other such purchases and need not be separately set forth. In case the War Department, the Navy Department, or the United States Maritime Commission shall deem any purchase or contract to be restricted, confidential, or secret in its nature by reason of its subject matter, or for other reasons affecting the public interest, such purchases or contracts shall not be included with those described in the report just mentioned, but shall be included in a separate report containing such restricted, confidential, or secret purchases or contracts. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the United States Maritime Commission shall make public so much of such reports (other than those reports covering restricted, confidential, or secret contracts or purchases) as they shall respectively deem to be compatible with the public interest.

2. Notwithstanding anything in the Act or this Executive Order the War Department, the Navy Department, and the United States Maritime Commission shall not discriminate in any act performed thereunder against any person on the ground of race, creed, color, or national origin, and all contracts shall be deemed to incorporate by reference a provision that the contractor and any subcontractors thereunder shall not so discriminate.

3. No claim against the United States arising under any pur-

145. *Methods for Wartime Procurement*

chase or contract made under the authority of the Act shall be assigned except in accordance with the Assignment of Claims Act, 1940 (Public No. 811, 76th Congress, approved October 9, 1940).

4. Advance payments shall be made hereunder only after careful scrutiny to determine that such payments will promote the national interest and under such regulations to that end as the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the United States Maritime Commission may prescribe.

5. Every contract entered into pursuant to this Order shall contain a warranty by the contractor in substantially the following terms:

“The contractor warrants that he has not employed any person to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty shall give the Government the right to annul the contract, or, in its discretion, to deduct from the contract price or consideration the amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fees. This warranty shall not apply to commissions payable by contractors upon contracts or sales secured or made through bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the contractor for the purpose of securing business.”

6. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting.

7. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize any contracts in violation of existing law relating to limitation of profits, or the payment of a fee in excess of such limitation as may be specifically set forth in the act appropriating the funds obligated by a contract. In the absence of such limitation, the fixed fee to be paid the contractor as a result of any cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract entered into under the authority of this Order shall not exceed 7 per centum of the estimated cost of the contract (exclusive of the fee as determined by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the United States Maritime Commission, as the case may be).

8. No contract or modification or amendment thereof shall be exempt from the provisions of the Walsh-Healey Act (49 Stat. 2036) because of being entered into without advertising or com-

petitive bidding, and the provisions of such Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended (49 Stat. 1011), the Copeland Act, as amended (48 Stat. 948), and the Eight Hour Law, as amended by the Act of September 9, 1940 (Public No. 781, 76th Congress), if otherwise applicable shall apply to contracts made and performed under the authority of this Order.

NOTE: The great bulk of the procurement by the War and Navy Departments and the United States Maritime Commission (and later, by virtue of subsequent Executive Orders, by a number of other war agencies or departments engaged in war activities) was accomplished under the foregoing Executive Order. It was this Order, issued pursuant to the First War Powers Act, which served as the source of authority for the wartime methods of purchasing.

Until the passage of the First War Powers Act and Executive Order No. 9001, purchases by the Government were governed by a maze of complex and exceedingly restrictive statutes which had long since become obsolete and which were wholly inappropriate to the requirements of wartime. In general, peacetime statutes required the letting of contracts only upon competitive bidding and on a fixed price basis.

Obviously, these requirements were not always suitable for wartime purchasing. For example, many articles had to be purchased, and many contracts had to be entered into, which could not be publicized in the manner which competitive bidding would require. Further, many new kinds of articles

had to be purchased, or new sources of manufacture encouraged; in these circumstances, a fixed price in advance could not be set.

In recognition of these, and other factors, the foregoing Executive Order was issued. It permitted a great deal of necessary flexibility in wartime contracting. Except for very small purchases, or purchases of common and standard supplies, the competitive bidding system was not used during the war. The more normal method was to negotiate the prices of contracts. In a substantial number of cases, however, not even this was possible, and so, particularly in experimental contracts, or contracts where price could not reasonably be determined in advance, the form adopted was cost plus a fixed fee.

The wartime experience demonstrated how obsolete some of the old procurement statutes had become; it also demonstrated that even in peacetime, competitive bidding was not always the most desirable means of procurement. Accordingly, in 1947, the Congress enacted a law (62 Stat. 21), known as the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, which permitted the armed services to continue, in carefully defined circumstances, some of

the flexibility in negotiating contracts, and in adopting forms appropriate to the particular type of procurement, which they had been permitted under the foregoing Executive Order.

146 ¶ A Pledge to the Philippines That All Our Resources Will Be Dedicated to the Defeat of the Japanese War Lords. December 28, 1941

The People of the Philippines:

NEWS of your gallant struggle against the Japanese aggressor has elicited the profound admiration of every American. As President of the United States, I know that I speak for all our people on this solemn occasion.

The resources of the United States, of the British Empire, of the Netherlands East Indies, and of the Chinese Republic have been dedicated by their people to the utter and complete defeat of the Japanese war lords. In this great struggle of the Pacific the loyal Americans of the Philippine Islands are called upon to play a crucial role.

They have played, and they are playing tonight, their part with the greatest gallantry.

As President I wish to express to them my feeling of sincere admiration for the fight they are now making.

The people of the United States will never forget what the people of the Philippine Islands are doing this day and will do in the days to come. I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and in material, of the United States stand behind that pledge.

It is not for me or for the people of this country to tell you where your duty lies. We are engaged in a great and common cause. I count on every Philippine man, woman, and child to do his duty. We will do ours.

146. *A Pledge to the Philippines*

NOTE: On March 24, 1934, the President had signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act (48 Stat. 456) providing for an interim Commonwealth government for the Philippines and, at the end of ten years, complete independence (see Item 34 and note, pp. 118-120, 1934 volume).

After the enactment of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Philippine people adopted a constitution and thereafter, during the years of the Commonwealth, developed their political and economic institutions to a high degree. Complete independence for the Philippine people was near, and they were already preparing for the election of their first President and Congress, when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

While the major effort of the United States was of course directed toward driving the Japanese out of the Philippines (see Item 133 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for the President's message on the liberation of Manila), there was also the need to preserve the Philippine Government in exile, and to lay plans for the postwar Republic of the Philippines. At the request of the President, the principal executive officers of the Philippine Commonwealth were transferred in 1942 from Corregidor to Washington, D. C.

Among the officials who came to Washington to carry on Filipino affairs were President Manuel Quezon and Vice President Sergio

Osmeña. Upon the death of President Quezon in 1944, Vice President Osmeña advanced to the Presidency. By joint resolution approved by the President on November 12, 1943 (57 Stat. 590), the term of office of the President of the Philippines was continued until such time as a successor could be elected and qualified.

In a radio broadcast to the Philippine people on August 12, 1943, the President renewed the American pledge that the Republic of the Philippines would be established when the power of Japan had been destroyed (see Item 88 and note, 1943 volume, for the text of this radio address). In a message to the Congress on October 6, 1943, the President asked for further measures to provide for full security for the Philippines and to assist in her physical and economic rehabilitation after the war (see Item 110 and note, 1943 volume).

The President had a long, abiding interest in the Philippines. He was determined that the United States set an example to the world in giving independence to its insular possessions. It is notable that President Osmeña had been conferring with the President during his last visit to Warm Springs, Georgia, and that at the last press and radio conference of President Roosevelt, he discussed Philippine independence (see Item 145, 1944-1945 volume).

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(Index by Dr. Kenneth W. Hechler)



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